




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JOSEPH HENRY THAYER, D.D.,

BUSSEY PROFESSOR OF NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM AND INTERPRETATION IN THE
DIVINITY SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

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THE SCIENTIFIC VINDICATION

OF

CHRISTIANITY.

BY

J. H. A. EBRARD, PH.D., D.D.,

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Translated by

REV. JOHN MACPHERSON, M.A.

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
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NOTE BY TRANSLATOR.



WHILE this work has been translated from the second and latest edition of the German original, Dr. Ebrard kindly forwarded certain additions to, and alterations of, the text of the Second Part, which have been carefully incorporated in the English version. The present rendering of Dr. Ebrard's work may therefore be regarded as practically a third edition.

THIRD SECTION.

THE DARWINIAN THEORY OF DESCENT.¹



§ 156. *Outline of the Questions under Discussion.*

IN regard to Darwin's Theory of Descent a careful investigation must be entered upon in order to discover what its characteristic features are, and what the points are at which its antagonism to the Christian doctrine of the origination of nature becomes apparent.

A. This antagonism does not consist in the assertion on the part of the Darwinian theory, that by means of descent more perfect kinds and species originate from such as are less perfect. Still less can it be regarded as lying in the position that previously existing causes and forces co-operate in the origination of natural kinds and species. The representatives of that theory are wont indeed to speak as if, according to the biblical and Christian doctrine, all the several species of plants and animals had been called into being by God *creatione immediata*. Holy Scripture, however, says precisely the opposite. God says, Gen. i. 11: "Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed and the fruit tree yielding fruit after his kind whose seed is in itself, upon the earth." And at ver. 20: "Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above

¹ Principal Works: Charles Darwin, *Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection*, London 1859; 28th thousand, 1885. Ernst Hückel, *History of Creation*, 3rd ed. 2 vols. London 1883, from the German ed. of Berlin 1865. Darwin, *Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication*, London 1868. Darwin, *The Descent of Man, and Selection in relation to Sex*, 2nd ed. London 1885.

the earth." And at ver. 24: "Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind." It is only in the creation of man that God works immediately; ver. 26: "Let us make man;" ver. 27: "So God created man" (see *Obs.* 1). In regard to the creation of the lower animals, the creating (ver. 21) or making (ver. 25) of God is thus, according to Holy Scripture, not an immediate act, but a creative impulse given to water and earth, which does not exclude, but rather calls into operation the powers that are present in the sea and in the dry land (*Obs.* 2). In a precisely similar manner, too, there is ascribed to the earth after the Flood the power of bringing forth new animals (*Obs.* 3).

According to the theory and teaching of Holy Scripture, then, the hypothesis that lower species previously existing had been used as means for the production of higher forms is not by any means excluded. It is quite possible that an *ovulum* existing in an animal of a lower organization might be employed by the Creator as the starting-point for a higher development; as, for example, the life germ in the egg might be endowed with new powers and laws of development not previously existing. This is the view of the naturalists Heer and Kölliker, the theory of "heterogeneous procreation," or the theory of the impression of a definite stamp. Although one may feel compelled to ascribe to rudimentary organs generally a good practical as well as an ideal end (§ 153), he need not thereby in any way bring himself into conflict with Holy Scripture or with Christianity. But germ cells might also propagate themselves by the production of new germ cells, and that indeed in such a way that differences might be produced, so that the daughter cells might possess the germ of a law of development different from that of its mother cell. Thus, then, there could be germ cells of various species and kinds as latent bearers of a powerful organic life in the earth, which, as the time comes for the combination of these, and as the conditions of life were given, would be developed into

organisms. This theory of the "genealogy of germ cells" has been developed by Wigand with much acuteness in his work bearing that title. Like the theory of the impression of a definite stamp, it falls within the general range of the theories of descent, but both are in harmony with the first chapter of Genesis, especially in the form employed by Wigand. The admission, however, has been expressly made by Wigand himself, that no importance can be attached to such theories beyond that which is due to fair hypotheses. Both theories recognise in the present course of nature the constancy of kinds and species.¹ Constant species constitute the end and final purpose of creation. This is affirmed in a very decided manner by Holy Scripture, Gen. i. 11 and 24. As to the means, however, whereby the multiplication of these existing species must be secured, Scripture is wholly silent.

B. The characteristic feature of the Darwinian theory which renders it hostile to Christianity does not, therefore, consist in the adoption of a theory of descent as such, but in something quite different. Cuvier's researches (§ 155) had already taught us that at the basis of each animal species there lay a teleological law of development to the effect that upon the change of one organ all the organs must undergo a similar or corresponding change, if the organism is to continue living and operative. Thus our position is confirmed, that the organization of every organic being is to be explained from a monad of life, which determines and governs the structure of the growing organism, doing this indeed involuntarily and unconsciously, so that it cannot be itself the end-prescribing subject of this development process. Only the eternal self-conscious Author and Creator of nature can be the author at once of the life monad and of the laws of its development. If, then, He has made use of the whole range of inorganic forces

¹ In a clear as well as profound investigation, Wigand (*Darw. und Naturf.* i. 13-38) has established and vindicated, against the flippant sneers of Darwinian natural philosophers, the idea of species, that is, the idea of a thoroughly independent and immutable kind.

in the creating of organisms, as is assumed in Gen. i. 11, 20, 24, this can only mean that He created the germs of life, the life monads, plant germs, and the animal soul, which now operate upon the inorganic elements so as to raise them into higher chemical combinations, and out of these again their bodies are constructed. And even should He, as Wigand thinks, have made use of a germ cell of a lower species in order to have it developed into an organism of a higher kind, this is only conceivable when we understand it as meaning that He creatively produced the life monad of this germ cell, so that it is developed like its present in accordance with another law of development, but one which invariably and immediately produces suitable modifications in all the several organs (comp. Cuvier).

These, then, are the main points which Darwinianism denies. We have here the real centre of the controversy. The question is not whether an individual of a lower order can be transferred to a higher, but as to what the factors are by which this can be done.¹ Darwin and his followers affirm: 1. That from inorganic bodies, without the existence of a vital force or life monad, and purely in a mechanical way, that is, by means of physico-chemical laws, such as prevail in inorganic nature, an organism, a living germ cell, can be formed; and 2. That in the course of an infinite number of generations, out of the lower organisms higher organisms had been formed, without any author designedly producing this change, but simply according to the law of a blind causality without any finality, simply in consequence of chance variability without tendency or plan, and in consequence of adaptation to external conditions of life. So then, to give one striking example, the giraffes spring from short-necked animals which, having eaten all the grain and foliage of the

¹ If Rud. Schmid had read those words attentively, he would neither have classified the theory of descent under Darwinianism as a species, nor explained Wigand's theory of germ cells as a mere "modification of Darwinianism,"—but then, perhaps, his whole book would have remained unwritten.

shorter plants, realized the need of having their heads raised to reach higher and higher among the branches of the trees, and had consequently one vertebra after another added to their necks. We shall seek now first of all to examine and discuss in detail this second proposition: the origin of higher kinds from lower by means of chance causalities; and then we shall turn to investigate the first: the origin of organic life from inorganic matter in a mechanical way.

Obs. 1.—When it is said in Gen. ii. 7: “And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul,”—there is here a simple statement of the fact that man consists of two elements: the corporeal, forming his body, which is from the already created earth and is resolvable into it again; and the spiritual, the breath of life, which inspiring this corporeal material raises it into a unity, and is given immediately by the Creator. That God formed man’s body out of the earth, the soil of the garden, *humus*, is not said; that would have required *וַיַּצַּר אֱתֵהָאָדָם מֵאֲדָמָה*. There is, however, neither *מֵאֲדָמָה* nor *מֵעֶפֶר*, but *עֶפֶר*. The words do not indicate whereof, but whereto God made man’s body, with what destiny, namely, to be frail and transient as coming from the earth, *מִזֶּהָאֲדָמָה*, *e terra, terrenus*. In Hebrew *עֶפֶר* means dust, not the fine dust which flies about and lights upon everything, which is rather *אֶבֶן*, but rather pounded, pulverized earth, *detritum*, and hence it is used especially of the mould into which the corpse is resolved (Ps. xxx. 9), the frail crumbling clay (Gen. xviii. 27; Ps. ciii. 14), the grave as that which is filled with human dust (Ps. xxii. 29, xxx. 9; Job xx. 11, xxi. 26). The objection of a distinguished scientist, that the human body does not, unless in a very slight degree, consist of earthy substances, but in great part of water and of carbon, does not affect that passage of Scripture, but only its false interpretations.

Obs. 2.—When the first chapter of Genesis mentions water in connection with the bringing forth of fishes and of creeping things, and the dry land with the bringing forth of the mammalia, we have a doctrine set forth that has been thoroughly confirmed by geognosy. The orders of fishes and saurian reptiles, in their fossil remains, appear in those formations (Carboniferous, Triassic, Jurassic) which are deposited by water. It is also quite evident that before each new member of those formations, and therefore before each new stage of organic development of those periods, a chemical change of the water of the

sea must have taken place. The water, for example, in which the brown Jura with its iron was deposited, must have had another chemical combination before it deposited the white Jura. But the appearance of the higher mammals was preceded by the elevation of the crystalline mountain ranges, and was contemporaneous with the floods of the Tertiary period and the deposition of the alluvium, and the enormous ferment and revolution of the dry land consequent thereupon. Through those changes and fermentations of the inorganic world the corporeal substances, the inorganic centres of power, were aimed at, which formed for the life monads that might yet be made the material out of which they should construct their own bodies.

Obs. 3.—Before the Flood single pairs of animals accessible to man, and of domesticated animals seven, were hidden away in the Ark (Gen. vi. 19 f., vii. 2, viii. 19). Then, according to Gen. vi. 7, vii. 8, only בהמה, beast, עוף, fowl, and רמש, creeping things, were to be in the ark; of the חית-הארץ, which embraces generally the wild animals spread over the earth, there is no mention. But in chap. vii. 21, among those animals not taken into the ark which were drowned in the Flood, besides the בהמה, the עוף, and the רמש, are mentioned also the חית-הארץ. According to this, the animals belonging to the first three orders were reduced to a single pair, except a few of whom seven pairs were preserved, but the חית-הארץ were completely destroyed in the Flood. But God says of the Flood in Gen. ix. 9, 10: “I establish my covenant with you, and with your seed after you, and with every living creature that is with you; of the fowl, of the cattle, and of every חית-הארץ, as well (on מוֹלֵל, comp. Jonah iii. 5; Gen. xix. 11; 1 Sam. xxx. 19) all that go out of the Ark as all חית-הארץ.” Here, then, are wild animals not only in a general way assumed to be again in existence, after (according to Gen. vii. 21) all wild animals had been overwhelmed, but these post-diluvian חית-הארץ are even expressly distinguished from the animals that had been saved in the ark.

A.—THE ORIGIN OF THE HIGHER SPECIES FROM THE LOWER THROUGH ACCIDENTAL CAUSALITIES.

§ 157. *No newly discovered Facts lie at the Basis of this Theory.*

Häckel frankly confesses (*Nat. Hist. of Creation*, vol. i. p. 27): “Darwin does not make use of new or hitherto unknown properties of matter, but it is simply by extremely ingenious combination, by the synthetic comprehension, and by the

thoughtful comparison of a number of well-known facts, that Darwin has solved the 'holy mystery' of the living world of forms." And with an amusing candour Darwin himself says (*Descent of Man and Selection in relation to Sex*, p. 606): "Many of the views which have been advanced are highly speculative, and some no doubt will prove erroneous." If, then, we have here to do not with new discoveries, but with new conclusions drawn from facts that were previously known, then it is within the right and the power of every man capable of logical thinking to examine those conclusions as to their logical correctness. When we consider, too, the desultory way in which Darwin constantly passes away from one subject to another altogether heterogeneous, and erroneously mixes up one with the other, we do not get a favourable impression. What sort of treatment Hæckel gives to the most elementary principles in the domain of thought has already been shown in § 147, but must be here further illustrated. On p. 29 he blames the opponents of Darwin because "they look upon the whole domain of animal nature as a perfect mystery, and upon the origin of animals and plants as quite inexplicable and miraculous." But by miracle is to be understood not the regulating, but the abrogating of the laws of nature: creative purpose and miracle are two very different things. Then at p. 27 he says: "Organic nature appears no longer as the ingeniously designed work of a creator building up according to a definite purpose, but as the necessary consequence of active causes, which are inherent in the chemical combination of matter itself and in its physical properties." What an antithesis! The Strasburg Cathedral is not the work of an ingenious artist, but the necessary consequence of active causes! As though by the assumption of a creator with a definite purpose the causative means would have been excluded, or on the assumption of such means that the creator must be excluded! Where has the chemical combination of matter its cause? Or is it the mountain before which the — Achilles stands still? At p. 34 he says:

"Our theory does not see in every individual species of animal and plant the embodied thought of a personal creator." Certainly natural science is not required to do so, since its department is not that of redemption and miracle, but that of creation and natural law. *Sutor ne ultra crepidam!* Between an explanation, which has never entered the mind of anybody, of phenomena subject to natural law from supernatural processes, and the Hæckelian explanation of them from chance causalities without purpose or plan, about the ultimate cause of which we are not permitted to ask, there lies a third possible explanation. They may be explained as the effect of a creator who works with a purpose, and uses in his creative activity the powers of nature as means.

At p. 100 Hæckel says: "The teleological view of nature, which explains the phenomena of the organic world by the action of a personal creator acting for a definite purpose necessarily leads to a dualistic conception of nature—an inorganic nature, which must be explained by causes acting *mechanically* (*causæ efficientes*), and an organic nature, which must be explained by causes acting for a definite purpose (*causæ finales*)."¹ More utter nonsense has scarcely ever been written. It is not the assumption of a creator that leads to the distinction of organic and inorganic nature, but the reverse. The knowledge of this distinction, together with the knowledge of the designed relation between the organic and inorganic natural phenomena, leads to the knowledge of a creator working with a plan, and consequently to the true Monism, that is, Theism; whereas Hæckel, because he sets up "the chemical combination of matter" as the ultimate cause, suffers shipwreck in an irrational Pluralism. But not contented with this method, "which step by step goes right in the teeth of the most usual rules of thought,"¹ he actually goes so far as to claim this as a new scientific achievement,² that "the history

¹ Wigand, iii. 261 f.

² Hæckel, "Abhandlung über die Gaströa," in the *Jen. Zeitschr. f. Naturwissenschaft*, 1874, p. 1.

of the development of organisms had been raised from the rank of an empirical investigation of the facts which it had followed out into a philosophical inquiry about natural causes." "Therefore," says Wigand (iii. 270), criticizing this statement, "natural causes are to be henceforth demonstrated by philosophy: nature is to be constructed *à priori* independently of experience!" And even this is not enough. Where facts of observation are in opposition to the *à priori* construction, Häckel is not ashamed to make a false report of the facts. He here follows his spiritual relative D. F. Strauss, who has passed to the dust and the worms. As I have elsewhere brought against Strauss the charge of falsifying science,¹ the same is charged against Häckel, and numerous instances given by Rubimeyer (*Entstehung des Menschengeschlechts*), Metzschnikoff (*Zeitsch. f. Wiss. Zoologie*, vol. xxiv. pp. 6-9), His (*Unsre Körperform*, 1874, p. 164), Semper (*Häckelismus*, 1875, p. 35), Wigand (ii. 432 f.), Hoffmann (*War Goethe ein Mitbegründer der Descendenztheorie?* Heidelb. 1877). Hence Wigand rightly charges him with "immoral procedure" (iii. 272); Semper refuses him the right of being reckoned among serious inquirers, and Pfaff (*Schöpfungsg.* 2nd ed. p. 709) declines discussion with him. That respectable workers in these departments are simply ignored by Häckel, and that it is left to the *Gartenlaube* to take care of his reputation, is what might be expected. All the same, we scruple not to tear from the phenomenon of Häckelism the calfskin that has covered its unshapely limbs, and to show to the public in its true form the idol before which it has been prostrating itself.

§ 158. *Review of the Darwinian Arguments.*

Six proofs that do not prove the point are of no avail. Phenomena are diligently collected from every quarter, none of which really prove what they are wanted to prove. Yet

¹ *Wissensch. Krit. der ev. Geschichte*, 3rd ed. 1868, p. 803 f.—Strauss never made any reply.

on every such group of phenomena or instances of so-called facts an assertion of a sweeping description is based, which is proudly designated "a law;" and when any of these "laws" fails to prove what it ought, another such law must always be forthcoming to fill up the gap. Darwin starts from the observation that plants and animals, when they become the subjects of care and culture on the part of man, undergo certain modifications in their structure. It is an admitted fact that among many species of flowers, if they have rich soil given them, the stamens are changed into leaves or petals. But this is not to be wondered at, since the stamen is nothing else than a modified leaf. So, too, it is an admitted fact that trained domestic animals, if they always pair with tame creatures of their own kind, in the course of some generations become a new permanent variety. This is seen, for example, if we compare the domestic cat with the wild cat, the tame duck with the wild duck, etc. From these instances, then, Darwin deduced a universal law of variability, in the sense of continual, spontaneous, and indeed purposeless and unlimited change. He affirmed that organisms had the property of changing their nature in the course of propagation in the greatest variety of ways in any direction one might desire. But when stated in such abstract universality this assertion is not true. Wigand (i. 48 ff.) has proved most convincingly that the variability which really exists is confined within extremely narrow limits. We have variability, for example, in the vegetable kingdom in chemical modification of colour, juice, and oil, in the thickening of the walls of the cells, in changes of the hairy covering of the plant, of the season of blossoming, but in morphological respects, only in the form and design of the leaves, in relative length, for example, of the flower-stalk and sheath, in the form of the fruit,—but always so manifesting itself that the variations do not in the least interfere with the character of the species. A variability, by which one species could pass over into another species, or even one family into another, one class or order into another, is not

really to be found in nature, not even in the region of artificial breeding. No one yet, either by domestication or by any other means, has been able to transform a reptile into a bird, a stinging nettle into a fig-tree or even into a hop-plant. And yet nettles, figs, and hops are closely related members of one family; and birds, according to Häckel, should actually have sprung from reptiles. With this law of variability Darwin next combines a second "law;" which, however, does not rest on any facts, but merely upon a hypothesis. This is the law of natural selection, which is thus stated: Among a number of plants and animals there are those that are most likely to survive, the organization of which is the fittest. If, now, those "fitly organized" alone are kept in life and propagate themselves, it follows that their descendants will be yet more fitly organized than the average of their precursors. The result of this natural selection he calls "fitness." He understands by fitness not a faculty, not a precedency, but simply the fact that the existing organisms are fit for the conditions and surroundings amid which they exist, because only those have continued in existence which, in the way of unrestricted variability, have come into possession of favourable, that is, fit properties.¹—In actual nature, however, all individuals of one species are really organized in an equally favourable way, so far as the properties of the species are concerned, and unequally only as regards individual strength, soundness, and size. This law of natural selection, therefore, could never lead to the origination of new species, but at most to the origination of robuster individuals of the same species (comp. § 162, A.), although experience, as well as the mathematical calculus, would seem to dispute even this.² Then Darwin has sought support for his

¹ Compare on this point Wigand, iii. 236 f.

² After Seidel's example, Dr. Paul Kramer (*Theorie und Erfahrung. Beiträge zur Beurtheilung des Darwinismus*, Halle, 1877) has made an examination on mathematical principles in a thoroughly exact manner, to discover what result would follow, and would necessarily follow, if the presuppositions of the Darwinian natural selection were expressed as mathematical formulæ. The result is, that not even in the least degree is a

second law by a third and a fourth. That the more weakly organized individuals of every species meet the earliest death, is explained by the law of the struggle for existence, which consists in this, that each individual has to fight in order to get room upon the earth and fodder, partly with individuals of his own species, partly with individuals of other kinds, his so-called enemies, and in this fight the fitly organized individuals gain an easy victory over those less fitly organized. But that the descendants should resemble their parents in respect of a fit organization results from the law of heredity; for he affirms, without proving it, that individual characteristics of the parent descend by inheritance to their offspring, and in the end become properties of a species. And when it is objected that, according to the teachings of experience, a descent by inheritance has attained unto the permanence of a law only when belonging to properties of the species, not when found merely in properties of varieties, since improved plants and animals may easily be reduced to a wild state again, still less if appearing only in single individuals, he advances in explanation of this undeniable fact a fifth law, the law of *Atavism*, that favourable properties of parents are not always transmitted, but sometimes also the unfavourable properties of earlier ancestors come again into view. But if all this were granted, still nothing would have been gained. For, in the first place, the fifth law overthrows the fourth; for if favourable properties be "not always" transmitted, then the proposition that they must be inherited is no law. Further, those laws afford no explanation as to wherefore, alongside of the highly developed kinds and classes, an immense multitude,

more robust, let alone a specifically and morphologically changed, progeny attained unto. And indeed he proves this of the co-efficients of every asked-for variety, of every asked-for diversification, and of every asked-for diminution or disappearance through death, and presupposes generally the conditions most favourable to Darwinism. The perfecting would be always infallibly paralyzed by the unavoidable pairing of favourably varied individuals with unfavourable individuals that had not been varied. Compare also Wigand, i. 82 ff., and 203 f. Also Pfaff, *Schöpfungsg.* p. 673.

forming a vast majority, of individuals of the lowest and most imperfect classes, such as infusoria, mollusca, worms, fungi, lichens, mosses, continue still to exist, which thus in spite of their unfavourable organization have successfully carried on the struggle for existence. In the third place, the old objection against the second law still applies with undiminished force, that by natural selection only the descent by inheritance of already existing properties of species, but not at all the origination of properties of a higher kind than those of their parents, can be explained. If among a heap of reptiles there were some on whose skinny membranes feathers had grown, it might be explained that these could fly better, and more easily escape their enemies than the others, and that they alone survived so as to beget again young ones with feathered wing membranes. But how it happened that feathers grew upon these reptiles is not in the least explained by natural selection, by the struggle for existence, and by the doctrine of heredity. Seeing, then, that even with those five laws he cannot always get what he wants, Darwin scruples not to add a sixth law, the law of sexual selection. The content and meaning of this law may be thus expressed: Among animals, the female, in choosing between two males, prefers the one most perfectly organized, and the result of this is a regular tendency to the improvement of the animal kingdom. But even here again, that it is only with the propagation of properties already existing, and not with that of new properties, that we are dealing, is quite plain. If there were no feathered male saurians existing, then no female saurian could reach out her hand to him; but if the male saurian, possessed of a feathered coat, is already existing, it is not sexual selection that can explain the origination of this feathery covering (comp. § 164). This nonsense, then, has to be masked by the doctrine, that those new properties originate quite slowly and gradually, by almost imperceptible stages. Small and insignificant modifications, which at first only constitute new varieties, by their gradual accumulation lead up by and by to a new species,

genus, order. This, however, does not make the nonsense less nonsensical, but more so. Characteristics of varieties and characteristics of species and orders are distinguished not merely quantitatively, but qualitatively. For the distinction of species lies in the differences of the plan of structure (comp. Wigand, i. 224 ff.). Various species of the saurian order are distinguished by a difference in the number of their vertebræ. According to Darwin, a plesiosaurus with thirty-two vertebræ must have originated from an ichthyosaurus with six vertebræ, and thus in the course of a million years the descendants of the latter, taking one little step after another, may have grown into a creature with 1000 vertebræ.¹ Or by what transition stages may a three-leafed flower have transformed itself into a four or five-leafed one? Or what were the gradual infinitely short steps of movement from a centripetal development of leaf into a centrifugal?—In the end it just comes to this,² that the first infinitely short step in modification could not possibly be of any use in the struggle for existence, and would also be useless for improvement of the breed by the process of natural selection. According to Darwin, the limbs of articulated animals should have been formed quite gradually. What then, one may fairly ask, could the first deposit, say of one-tenth of a millimetre in length, of what was afterward to be a limb, do for an animal in the struggle for existence? One must assume that nature foresaw that from such a little piece of paste, such an abnormality arising from chance variability in the body of a limbless individual, in the course of a thousand or ten thousand generations, a useful limb would be developed. With such an assumption, however, the whole Darwinian theory of chance variability falls to the ground, and gives place to an intelligent teleological law of growth.

¹ Comp. Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 2nd ed. p. 691.

² *Ibid.* p. 703.

§ 159. *Review of Häckel's Arguments and Examination of the Logical Consistency.*

Darwin considers Häckel to be his most eminent disciple and apostle, and Häckel regards this as his highest distinction. And yet the doctrine of Häckel is something quite different from that of his master. Darwin's fundamental assumption is a spontaneous unlimited power of variability; and from the fact that out of the whole number of aimlessly varied individuals only those which by chance are varied fitly and favourably sustain the struggle for existence, survive and propagate themselves, there results the principle of "fitness" as a passive consequence, that is, as the existence of such organisms as have by chance attained unto the possession of fit qualities. Häckel, on the other, takes the word "fitness" or adjustment in the sense of an active power, which is not the result but the cause of the selection and the perfecting. His fundamental presupposition is, in spite of his Teleophobia, this, that each organism has the power designedly to adjust itself to the surroundings and conditions under which it lives. From this quite heterogeneous¹ fundamental principle his arguments are developed in the following manner:—

1. Adaptation. Each individual changes its structure when its outward condition is altered. It adjusts itself to its circumstances.

2. Heredity (Häckel, *Nat. Hist. of Creation*, vol. i. p. 203).
(a) Conservative transmission. So-called properties of species, that is, properties which the parents had already inherited, descendants also inherit. (b) Progressive transmission. Properties which the parents first as individuals won by adaptation are transmitted to the progeny, and become thus properties of the species.

Here the law of progressive transmission stands in absolute logical contradiction over against the conservative transmis-

¹ Wigand, iii. 236 f.

sion.¹ By means of adaptation one property of an organ falls away and another comes forward in its place. But how would it be possible for the two properties, which are exclusive of one another, equally to use the power of transmission; the one in accordance with the law of conservative, the other according to the law of progressive transmission? "By adaptation" feathers and feathered wings have grown upon a dinosaurus, which had a scaly coat transmitted to it from its parents, so that it has been transformed into an ostrich-like bird,—so Hæckel at least assures us (*Nat. Hist. of Creation*, vol. ii. p. 229). Now according to law *a* the featherless scaly-coated creature, but according to law *b* the one with the feathered skin, must transmit its properties; its descendants must therefore at once be featherless and feathered. This is logically impossible. These two laws contradict one another: the one enjoins the contradictory opposite of the other. How then came Hæckel by these laws? He has been led to set up law *a* by the fact of the continued existence of an immense number of the lowest, most undeveloped species; and he has been obliged to add the other, the law *b*, in consequence of a wish to explain the derivation of higher species from lower, which is not a fact of observation, but only an assumption. And so in a strictly logical way he ought to express himself to this effect: "Sometimes inherited qualities are transmitted, sometimes instead of them individual peculiarities are transmitted." But in that case this is no longer a "law;" for by a law we mean that which always holds true.

¹ Comp. Wigand, i. 81 f.: "To assume that species inclines to transmit its properties, and at the same time that it inclines to vary its properties, is a contradiction which can only be resolved by supposing that transmission is the general law limited only in a certain measure by variability. From this combination occurring in nature Darwin draws his two principles, and operates with them as if they were abstract ideas and catch words. If he wants to explain the combined development of forms, the principle of unlimited variability is emphasized; if he wants to explain how new forms become permanent, then all possible care is taken to give emphatic expression to the fact of heredity. But we have proved that the one, just as well as the other, is in this sense and connection a pure fiction."

We now come to a matter that proves a critical task to Hæckel, the explanation of the fact of the tendency in improved species to revert to the original and uncultivated type. In order to account for this he advances his third law. *c. The Law of Interrupted Transmission, also called Atavism. The properties of the parents are not transmitted, but those of the less perfect ancestors pass over to the child.* The logical contradiction is now made complete. If it be a "law" that to the child are transmitted not the attributes of his parents, but those of his earlier ancestors, then this ought always to happen. It does not, however, invariably take place, but rather only very seldom, and so it is no "law," but an exception to a law. If sometimes *a*, sometimes *b*, sometimes *c* holds good, then for each particular concrete case neither *a*, nor *b*, nor *c* holds good as a law. All we can say is that for each case there are three possibilities, each of which excludes the other two. The entire law then is blown away like a soap-bubble before the wind. Instead of a law reached by induction, we find only two pairs of mutually contradictory propositions. *A. a.* The properties of species are regularly transmitted: species therefore do not change by adaptation;—a fact which we see before our eyes in regard to all species, especially in the permanence and persistence of even the lowest species. *b.* Species are continually undergoing change;—an unproved assertion. *B. a.* Individuals inherit properties that had first been won by adaptation;—this applies to properties of varieties, but not unlimitedly, and not so as to enable this to rank as a law. *b.* Reversion from cultivated forms to the original condition of the species is met with;—and that regularly so soon as the cultivating influence ceases. And indeed *B, b* just shows how rigidly the law *A, a* applies, and how incorrect the assertion *A, b* is.

Our manipulator of ideas next increases our astonishment by producing a fourth law. *d. The Law of Sexual Transmission: The male characters are transmitted only to the male, and the female only to the female descendants.* One who rings the bell

may no doubt claim to have done something ! It seems indeed a scholarly achievement to increase the number of these "laws" even by one. And yet, perchance, there is nothing brand-new in this ! The possession of male organs, of the mane, and of horns in the case of certain male animals, etc.,—these are characters that are inherited only by the male individuals ; the possession of the uterus, suck-giving teats, etc., are characters transmitted only to female individuals ! Astonishing ! We shall yet be hearing it called a law of nature that the properties of a buffoon are to be found only in a buffoon ! And all the more astonishing is this law as its incontestable correctness can be proved even in regard to inorganic nature. For that particular sort of cylindrical hole, around which metal has been poured, is transmitted only to the cannon, and water flowing between banks is to be found only in rivers, so it might also be admitted to be an important law of nature, that the great rivers flow precisely by the great cities, and that in the cat's skin there are two holes just where the eyes are. It is therefore a law of nature that those properties which constitute the idea of a male individual "are transmitted only to male individuals" !! Häckel must thus have first conceived of male individuals without manhood, and thinks of manhood first coming to them by transmission. An emasculated system of logic truly !

3. The Struggle for Existence together with Natural Selection.

4. Sexual Selection.

How it fares, viewed from the standpoint of logic, with the manipulation of ideas that derives from these two laws the origin of new specific properties, has been already shown in § 158.

§ 160. *Examination of the Scientific Accuracy of Darwinism.*—

A. The Vegetable Kingdom.

We come now to inquire into the scientific accuracy of this theory, and the extent to which those "laws" are applicable.

We desire to throw no suspicion on any one of those facts in natural history, upon which Darwin, Häckel, Vogt, etc., base their theories; rather we start with the assumption of these facts, and wish to try whether from them those scientific results do really follow which they have deduced from them. We turn our attention in the first place to the Vegetable Kingdom.

1. In the plant world adjustment or adaptation, on closer inspection, is of such a kind that all the examples brought forward by Darwin and his school are physiological, not morphological. We have already pointed out (§ 67) that the organism of the plant is only feebly differentiated, that consequently there any organ can undertake almost any physiological function. We may refer, for example, to the much "tossed-about linden," where the original branches have become roots and the original roots branches. We may point to the stamens transformed into flower leaves, to the embryonic bud or eye present in root bulbs (onions, potatoes), as well as in the blossoms. But just for this reason, even when the conditions of its life are changed, no morphological change takes place in the plant, as already Nägeli (*Entstehung und Begriff der naturhistorischen Art*. München 1865, p. 26 ff.) has in a most convincing manner proved. According to Darwin and his school, properties that are practically indifferent should be variable; the practically useful, on the other hand, should be constant. In actual fact the truth is the direct opposite of this. The practically quite indifferent and physiologically useless relations of position and number of the plant organs are the most tenacious and constant. Nägeli has further demonstrated (*Botan. Mittheilungen*, 1868), that as regards the cultivation of varieties among plants outward circumstances alone can effect nothing, but cultivated varieties are produced only when in the species of plant there is already present a tendency in the direction of forming varieties. Among all the varieties of plants actually brought out, the variation attained unto consists steadily only in the colour and size of

the parts of the flower, in the quantity of sugar contained in the fruit, the chemical quality of the sap, oil, etc., and in the form (cellular texture and hairy covering) of the leaves (folia); on the other hand, the arrangement and number and general structure of the organs remain unchanged. The parts of the flowers of the Rosaceæ, Amygdaliæ, and Pomaceæ are and continue five in number, those of the Gramineæ three, those of the Cruciferae four. Here variation is never found;¹ much less can a dichlamydeous plant ever be developed as a variety, either spontaneously or by artificial cultivation, from a monochlamydeous plant, a dicotyledoneous plant from either a gymnogonous or a monocotyledoneous plant, or a phanerogamous plant from a cryptogam. That the boundary line between variety and species is in many cases, especially in the group of very variable species, uncertain, is quite correct. We may instance the *Ajuga pyramidalis* standing between the *Ajuga reptans* and *Ajuga genevensis*, or the "weak" species that seem to pass from one to another: *Polygala amara*, *comata*, *vulgaris*, etc.; while, on the other hand, the species *Polygala chamæbuxus* maintains its distinction quite clearly. All the more decided on that account is the objective distinction of species, and especially of Families, Classes, and Orders.² Everything adduced by Hæckel in support of his position really serves only to confirm our contention. When he (*Nat. Hist. of Creation*, vol. i. p. 246), as well as Sachs (*Lehrbuch*, p. 838), maintains that the parasitic

¹ Monstrosities in particular cases have been observed (see the most recent in Wigand, i. 50 ff.), e.g. change of anthers into pistils, modification of an annular into a spiral position. But, in the first place, no transmission of such anomalies can be proved; and, in the second place, even if they had been transmitted, they would still only establish new varieties, not new species, seeing that along with the particular anomaly the whole of the other properties of the species are retained.

² That subjectively one botanist may assume a different principle of classification from another, as in the case of de Candolle and Jussieu, subjectively the one breaking up a family of the other into several families, or the one taking as a genus a species of the other, is not in opposition to what we have affirmed, that objectively no species and no genus, and no family in the narrower or wider sense, passes by variation over into another.

plants *Lathræa*, *Monotropa*, and *Orobanche* (he might have also added *Neottia*), had lost their chlorophyl in consequence of their parasitic life, this is no fact of natural history, but a mere hypothesis. These three species are only met with as parasites on other plants, and no man has ever seen them growing independently in the soil, with green leaves. That they did originally grow from the ground, and originally had green leaves, and only subsequently betook themselves to a parasitic mode of life, and in this way had come to lose their chlorophyl, is therefore a pure creation of the imagination,¹ and even as such unsatisfactory, inasmuch as there are some parasites that do develop chlorophyl, such as the *Melampyrum arvense* and the *Viscum album*. The case is no better in regard to another instance which Häckel adduces, that of the hairy covering. "In dry situations the hairs necessary for sucking in the water from the atmosphere are developed; and so new species are formed." Were this true, then it would only afford a further proof that plants develop their organs teleologically and according to a plan. It could never prove that from lower species and classes higher ones might spring. For the covering with hair belongs not to the morphological, but to the physiological side of the plant organism, that is, to the part of the plant which is in itself most variable. It is quite analogous to the covering with hair of animals, where we see, as in the case of horses, sables, etc., that during winter a longer and thicker fur grows upon them, without thereby introducing in any way a change of species. But what has been adduced as a fact is really not true, but is with perfect accuracy designated by the accomplished botanist Wigand (iii. 237) a pure fiction (see *Obs.* 1). The possibility of the origination of higher species and orders of plants from lower by adaptation is therefore plainly undemonstrable from the facts. All the facts serve only to prove the permanence of species, and of good or genuine kinds.²

¹ Comp. Wigand, i. 443 f.

² Nature cannot be in the least affected by the fact that descriptive

2. Equally unsatisfactory is the so-called law of Heredity or Transmission. For if there are no morphological changes by means of transmission really forthcoming, then of course no such modifications can transmit themselves. In fact, the law of inheritance in the plant world is an extremely simple one: Every genus or every actual, rightly so-called, species transmits its generic and specific properties unchanged to its descendants (see *Obs.* 2); even differences of climate and soil do no more than produce those above-named physiological variations. A plant which has been artificially deprived of its natural conditions of life degenerates, yet without having its morphological structure altered, that is, it produces a variety. But, conversely, every plant that has been altered through cultivation, so soon as the conditions of life effected artificially by cultivation are withdrawn, shows a decided inclination to return to its original specific character. It tends to grow wild again, as in the case of the cabbage order, roses, fruit-trees, etc. The development of species asserts itself powerfully.

3. There cannot rationally be any talk about a struggle for existence among plants. Where many plants of the same kind stand close together, as the grasses on the meadows, trees in a natural forest, stalks of grain upon the fields, there in the course of nature not all the seeds that fall into the soil spring up, but only as many as find room in the ground for striking their roots, and even of these again a part will later on be destroyed.¹ But here it does not depend upon the "favourable properties of the individual" what seeds will perish and what plants will survive, but on circumstances of an altogether different kind. A powerful oak tree standing on very good soil may bear noble acorns, and yet possibly not one of these may reach the soil, because many squirrels infest the tree and eat up the acorns; whereas, on the other

botanists in their pedantic endeavours after minute accuracy become hair-splitting, and have enumerated as distinct species what are but varieties.

¹ Comp. Wigand, i. 97 f.

hand, many of the acorns of a weak oak tree standing on a poor thin soil may root themselves and grow up. From this "struggle for existence," that is, for place and room, there cannot, therefore, be deduced any permanent improvement of individual properties, still less an origination of new specific or generic properties. But there is no other sort of struggle for existence than this for the plant world to fight; for from every other point of view plants are absolutely passive. The plant has no means of protecting itself from those animals which browse upon it, and it could only happen in a world turned upside down, that animals should seek out for their eating only the weakest, most miserable and leanest specimens, and leave the most "favourably organized" to survive. If a species of plant stands in a place for it the most unfavourable, having been driven from another place which affords the proper conditions for its growth, there results therefrom (Wigand, i. 102) only another topographical variety, but never the formation of a new species.

4. Finally, we cannot seriously speak of sexual selection in the vegetable kingdom. The androgynous Phanerogamous plants are in most cases self-impregnated, and have therefore no choice; in other cases, as in certain species of clover, the pollen is carried to them, as also in the case of non-androgynous plants, without their own co-operation, by insects, and in the case of many dioecious plants by the wind. Here again there is no choice. The cryptogam produces perfectly its spores or germ cells without proper self-fertilization, and surrenders them to the wind, where there can be no proper specific choice. Therefore, neither by sexual selection, nor by the struggle for existence, with its natural selection, nor by adaptation, can a development of morphologically higher species, genera, or classes from lower ones be explained.

Obs. 1.—Hairy covering.—It is true that plants which live in water, e.g. *Nymphaea*, *Nuphar*, *Ranunculus fluitans* and *aquat.*, have no hairy covering. Among the hairy land plants, however,

especially of the family of the *Boragineæ*, there are very many which by no means inhabit dry situations; *e.g.* all the German species of the *Pulmonaria*, with their bristly stalks, grow in shady damp woods and groves; the *Echium rubrum*, which grows in woods and meadows, is just as bristly with thick hairs as the *Echium vulgare* or the *pustulatum*, which prefer sunny dry places. The *Echiospermum lappula*, which grows in dry places, bears marks or imprints like those made by hairs; the *deflexum*, which grows in shady damp places, has an expanding covering of hair. According to Hæckel's theory, the *Pulmonaria*, the *Echium rubrum*, and the *Echiospermum deflexum* ought long ago to have lost their hairy coverings.

Obs. 2.—If true of any plant, surely it ought to be true of the Dwarf Pine (*Pinus Mughus*), that it had been developed from the *Pinus Sylvestris* in consequence of climatic influences. And yet that is not so: even where it reaches a lower position on the Alps, and occupies a place alongside of the *Pinus Sylvestris*, "it ever continues clearly distinguishable from it" (O. Sendtner, *Vegetationsverhältn. v. Oberbaiern, in Bavaria*, I. A. p. 107). Equally well marked is the specific difference between these two and the *Pinus pumilio*, which outwardly have a strong resemblance to the Dwarf Pine. The *Pinus pumilio* stands low down upon moorland, is of the form of a tree, and about 32 feet high; but still the specific difference between it and the *Pinus Sylvestris* and the *Pinus Mughus* continue: "it remains a clearly differentiated species." In Sicily and Madeira, notwithstanding the extreme heat of the climate, oaks, vines, apple and pear trees thrive and flourish, having just about the same seasons as in Germany (Heer, *Jahresber. der nat. Gesellsch. der Schweiz*, 1851, and in his *A. Escher v. d. Linth*. p. 73 f.).

§ 161. *Examination of the Scientific Accuracy of Darwinism.*—

B. The Animal Kingdom. (1) Variability and Adaptation.

The utter bankruptcy into which the Darwinian theory has fallen in its attempts to apply the doctrine of descent to the vegetable kingdom does not augur well for its success in application to the animal kingdom. If the origin of forms in the vegetable kingdom cannot be explained as mere chance occurrences without generic and specific laws of growth, then it is *à priori* highly improbable that in the much higher and more thoroughly developed animal kingdom the case should stand

differently. We shall endeavour here to examine in detail the scientific accuracy of the several so-called "laws," especially the laws of Variability and Adaptation. Hæckel writes thus (*Nat. Hist. of Creation*, vol. i. p. 249): "We simply mean to express the fact that we know of no limit to the variation of organic forms occasioned by the external conditions of existence." All variations, therefore, that were necessary in order gradually to develop the most highly organized nature out of the lowest, could be accomplished by means of external conditions of existence. And this is the ultimate attainment reached by the Darwinian-Hæckelian theory. But this unproved assertion is contradicted by experience, and for this we can adduce no less satisfactory a witness than Hæckel himself. For a few lines farther on he writes: "There appears, indeed, to be a limit given to the adaptability of every organism by the type of its tribe. No vertebrate animal can acquire the ventral nerve-chord of articulate animals instead of the characteristic spinal marrow of the vertebrate animals." And we may likewise add, that just as little can an articulate animal acquire the spinal marrow of a vertebrate. Even in the most variable species variability is never purposeless (Wigand, i. 54). The varieties are not a chaos, but a reticular ramified system in its minutest details. Still less is it unlimited (Wigand, i. 56), but restricted, even in the most variable forms, to very narrow limits, and indeed always within the limits of the species; always, therefore, within a circle, never along a straight line, which stretches out to another species. "Even the extremest forms of the dog, the pigeon, are recognised with certainty by every one as a dog, a pigeon." According to the statement quoted above, even morphological variations should be effected by chance causalities of external conditions of existence. As examples of such causalities three cases may be enumerated: (a) Variety of fodder: *e.g.* the giraffe which finds no longer any feeding low down and must reach its neck up to the higher branches of the trees, grows a greater number of vertebrae (Hæckel, vol. i. p. 114). (b) The use and exercise of organs

(Häckel, vol. ii. 261): the insect-eaters, the shrew-mouse and mole, "have become transformed by adaptation to a flying mode of life," in consequence of which wing membranes have grown between the toes, and they have become flying mice. At p. 115 of vol. i. he writes: "The webs between the toes of the webbed feet in frogs and other aquatic animals have arisen solely from the constant endeavour to swim." According to Lamarck and Häckel, therefore, use makes the organ; whereas according to Darwin the organ, which originates by chance in consequence of spontaneous variability, calls forth the use. (c) Disuse of organs. Seeing that there are organs which are highly developed among the lower ranks of animals, and are no longer found among the higher ranks of animals, seeing that it is quite impossible to discover the order of the descent, according to which only progress and not also retrogression in the development of particular organs must have been presupposed, Darwinians are compelled to devise even for these retrogressions a plausible explanation, and they find this in "the disuse of organs." Several times does Häckel repeat (vol. i. 12, 239, 287) the statement that ostriches disaccustomed themselves from flying, and have consequently come to have such short wings. Serpents (p. 14) have their origin from lizards, which abandoned the habit of running on their feet.—Such, then, is the character of the assertion, and such, too, the hypothesis which is reared upon it. The use of an organ not yet existing is to produce that very organ—web membranes for swimming, wing membranes for flying, yea, even brand-new bones in the skeleton. But where are the proofs to be found? Where are the vouchers and examples of facts, outside of the imagination of Häckel, that are actually to be met with in an actual examination of nature, that are therefore possible? These proofs are not forthcoming,—at least none that can stand examination. In the first place, Häckel refers to the fact that most pigeons have twelve tail feathers, but the peacock-pigeon has from thirty to forty, and that many breeds of pigeons have also a ruffle

of feathers on the neck. But now—even granting that the peacock-pigeon sprang by chance external conditions and influences from another kind of pigeon—this has no analogy to the possibilities asserted; for the feathers belong, like the hair, to the covering of the animal, which is always variable; and that a number of covering feathers have been developed into larger tail feathers is no morphological modification, but a physiological one, analogous to the development of stamens into a flower leaf. But now, besides, Hæckel himself is obliged to confess (vol. i. 143), that although Darwin maintains the derivation of the peacock-pigeon from the *Columba livia*, the blue rock-pigeon, still “breeders of pigeons are unanimously of opinion that each peculiar or specifically marked race of pigeons must be derived from a corresponding wild original species.”

Thus the first proof is a failure. Let us hear the second! Among the various races of pigeons the number of the vertebræ and of the ribs varies. This, if only it were proved, would be a strong proof that those races were derived one from the other, and had been so varied by chance external causalities. But there the fatal pigeon-breeders come with their unanimous conviction that those so-called races are no varieties, but in the earliest times distinguished as different species. In fact, Aristotle himself knew of four principal kinds of pigeons (*de hist. animalium*, v. 13). And so nothing is proved by the second proof, beyond the admitted fact that between different kinds a difference of structure is found, which may extend to the number of bones; but that the one kind can spring from the other by external causalities is not actually proved by Hæckel calling what are really species by the name of races.

A third really inimitable proof is specially brought forward to show that by use¹ new organs are formed: “Compare, for

¹ Wigand strikingly remarks (ii. 77): “The unequal effect of outward conditions of life on several organisms living in the same medium of one and the same species, presupposes the existence in them of diverse capacities

example, the arms and legs of a trained gymnast with those of an immovable bookworm" (*Nat. Hist. of Creation*, vol. i. p. 240). Most wonderful! A powerful arm in comparison with a weak arm is a new organ! That by use muscles are strengthened, and that from strengthened muscles the ligaments and bones also receive richer support, are facts that have been long ago acknowledged; but this surely has nothing whatever to do with the formation of new organs. Darwin himself confesses, in his *Variation of Animals and Plants*, that the results of use and disuse are to be seen only in the changes of length, weight, and structure, but not in the form of the organs. If, indeed, Hæckel could bring forward a case in which a gymnast in consequence of his exercise in climbing had grown a long prehensile tail, or a swimmer a swimming-bladder, we should at once lower our sails.

In the fourth place, Hæckel (i. 239) refers to "the dog and horse, which are so vastly improved by cultivation, and show an extraordinary degree of mental development." In this respect these animals seem to have more intelligence than their panegyrist, who fails utterly to perceive that here, too, we have to do, not with the origination of new organs, but only with the development of an organ of the brain that was previously existing.

Finally, in the fifth place, and in this instance, indeed, it is the stunting of organs by disuse, he refers to the *os coccygis* of man, for he maintains that this is the tail of an ape-like ancestor stunted from not having been used. This again, however, is no fact, but a mere hypothesis.¹ The fact simply is that four smaller *vertebræ spuriae* attach themselves to the five *vertebræ spuriae* that have grown together into the *os sacrum*, and that these, under the name *os coccygis*, form the basis of the spinal column, and are directed from before of receiving, just as in Lamarck's explanation of the development of legs into wings from the endeavour of the animal to fly there has to be assumed at last an unparalleled endeavour, a differentiation of the whole purpose of life.

¹ Comp. Wigand, i. 200, Anm.

inwards, not, like the tails of animals, from behind outwards.

Thus far Hæckel has not succeeded in bringing forward a single fact to show that at any time a new organ had been produced by means of external influences. But now he makes a final attempt (i. 240) by bringing forward a pair of facts which, superficially viewed, have some show of reality, but when drawn forth into the light vanish into nothing. (a) The ringed snake in a free condition lays eggs, "but when it is kept in captivity, and no sand is strewn in the cage, it does not lay its eggs, but retains them until the young ones are developed." The difference between oviparous and viviparous animals is therefore here transcended through mere change of locality. Very fine, but this does not yet break down the boundary between oviparous animals and mammals. The ringed snake continues a snake, and no new organ grows upon it. Hæckel craftily conceals the fact that in the structure of the snake the distinction between oviparous and viviparous animals was already obliterated, and consists of a mere distinction of oviparous and viviparous procedure, while there is a morphological identity of organization. It is well known that there are many kinds of serpents which even in a state of freedom either lay their eggs or bring forth their young according to circumstances. A bird could never be in a position to retain its eggs and bring forth its young. The *Coluber natrix* does in that case simply what it is already by its specific character capable of doing, and what by instinct it is impelled to do. (b) The water-salamanders or Tritons live in their youth in water and breathe by gills. "At a later date a metamorphosis takes place in Tritons, as in frogs. They leave the water, lose their gills, and accustom themselves to breathe with their lungs." But if shut up in a glass of water, so that they cannot get out of the water, this metamorphosis does not take place, and they continue to breathe by gills.—And what does all this prove? Their metamorphosis is hindered by force, and they use the organ

which they already have, just as the ringed snakes used the *uterus*, which they already possessed, for the purpose of carrying and bringing forth their living young. Even in these two cases we do not meet with the origination of any new organ.

§ 162. *Continuation.—Counter Proofs.*

Although Darwin and Häckel cannot adduce a single instance of a morphological variation and the origination of a new organ being actually brought about by means of external influences, it is very easy, on the other hand, to produce positive counter proofs against their hypothesis.

A. Were that assumed "Law of Adaptation" correct, then we ought to see the classes and species in a present, it may be long drawn out, yet constantly continued, process of development. But what we actually see is just the very opposite. Not only do descriptions and pictures of the species of plants and animals that have come down to us from Hebrew, Egyptian, and classical antiquity precisely correspond with the present structure and condition of those species, the crocodiles, bones of Ibis, beetles, *atteuchus sacer*, etc., found in the catacombs of Egypt correspond exactly with the forms of those animals as now existing; and what is more, even the fossil bones of animals and imprints of plants, so far as they belong to extant species, agree in the most exact manner with the specimens now around us. Thus my honoured colleague Dr. Heer, Professor in Zurich, found in a peat-bog on the Upper Rhone 58 species of plants, belonging to 33 classes, 21 families, of which 24 still grow in Switzerland, the rest in southern countries (Heer, *Die Harmonie der Schöpfung*, Zurich 1847, p. 35 f.). Häckel knows of nothing that can be advanced against these facts except his own well-worded phrases. He says at the beginning of his Twelfth Lecture (i. 280): "Natural selection in the struggle for life acts so as to transform human society, just as it

modifies animals and plants, and in both cases constantly produces new forms." But when instances are asked for, he refers to the varieties of customs, practices, and institutions, and to the diversity in the expression of the human countenance, as if these were diverse forms of organic structure! He here practises jugglery with the ambiguous use of the word "form," which is used at one time to mean new organs, at another time to mean new dress or customs, or individual arrangement of the facial muscles! Such a proceeding stands self-condemned. Darwin is guilty of a similar misuse of the word Perfecting. (*a*) The more perfect individual should come off victorious in the struggle for existence, in which the less perfect succumbs. Hence also (*b*) a perfecting of organisms, that is, a gradual arising of higher forms, ought to be the result. Now it is evident that in *b* the word perfect is used in another sense from that in which it is used in *a*. This, indeed, can be proved from Darwin's own words. To the question as to how it happens that so many millions of the lower and the lowest order of animals still survive, in spite of natural and sexual selection, he returns the striking answer: What advantage can it be to the Infusoria, to an intestinal worm, or even to an earth worm, to be highly developed? To be perfect or perfected, in the sense of being highly developed, is therefore a quality, according to Darwin's own confession, which is of no use in the struggle for existence. Quite correct. A sound healthy earth worm is for the purpose of its being perfect. This is perfection in the sense of the proposition marked *a*. An individual which in this sense is more perfect than another individual of the same species, will be better able to keep his own in the battle of life than the latter; *e.g.* a healthy canary better than an epileptic, a strong birch tree better than a weak one. But of the perfecting in the sense of *b* we have no trace in any extant specimen of the perfect individuals of proposition *a*. The sound of the words is the same, the sense is different. More perfect in the sense of *a*, means better fitted for its own proper purpose;

more perfect in the sense of *b*, means corresponding to a higher order. In the sense of *a*, a solidly constructed watch, with simple machinery to indicate the hours, is more perfect than one less solid in construction; in the sense of *b*, a repeater watch is more perfect than a watch that merely indicates the time. But it is evident that if all less solidly constructed time indicating watches were broken up into atoms, and only the solidly constructed ones allowed to remain, a repeater watch would yet never originate from them.

B. A variation of a particular organ, or a growth of a new organ, in consequence of chance variation of external conditions of life, could not indeed occur, as even might be gathered from the passage quoted from Cuvier at § 155.¹ Each variation of one organ designedly conditions corresponding variation in all other organs (see *Obs.* 2) if the animal is not to cease its existence. Take the case of a plant-eating hoofed animal obliged from the want of vegetable food, occasioned by mere outward circumstances, to take to eating flesh. Let it be assumed, though this is not granted, that in consequence of its living upon flesh the upper part of the tooth of the animal became correspondingly changed, this would afford no material help. The animal would have neither claws to seize its prey, nor would its fourfold stomach, fitted for the mastication and digestion of grass, be suitable for the digestion of animal food. Teeth, jaws, the construction of legs, joints, and toes, and of the whole *ductus abdom.*, must be changed together, and consequently also the system of lymph and blood vessels, and the lungs and all the glands, and, not at last but at first, the entire nervous system. This, however, cannot be done mechanically by the adoption of carnivorous habits, but only by a process of development toward this end.² That such a transformation can be

¹ Wigand, i. 128, Anm.

² If a man were compelled to eat horse's food, oats and hay, would the structure of his stomach be changed on account of his food into that of a

effected only as the result of a long and gradual process, the Darwinians not only admit, but very strongly emphasize. Seeing, then, that the hoofed animal is in need of daily food, while the new food can be obtained and partaken of only after all these modifications have taken place, it follows with mathematical certainty that long before the "adaptation" has been carried out the animal must have perished for hunger. This will prove true in regard to other classes of animals, as well as in regard to hoofed animals. Hence all the hypotheses of this kind set forth by Häckel resolve themselves into colossal absurdities.

Obs. 1.—The whale should have originated from a hippopotamus, which no longer wished to walk upon land, but with its children and children's children remained in the water, so that in the course of many generations these hippopotami, which had taken to the water, got their feet more and more stunted, until nothing remained but what appears in the shape of fins. But then the hippopotamus is by its structure compelled to go now and then to land, both to lay in a stock of breath and to gather food for itself, which consists principally of rice and sugar-cane, and, to a very small extent, of fish. The idea that such an animal should, contrary to its nature, swim out into the sea, in order to feed upon herring fry, is therefore not even a hypothesis, but only a ridiculous and nonsensical fancy. The case is precisely similar with respect to the idea, already referred to in § 153, that certain of the lizard tribe had voluntarily given up the use of their feet, although the lizard was in a better position for catching the insects that served as its food, if it ran nimbly on its feet, than if it crept painfully on its belly; and even this it could not do if it had not something like feet along the ridge! Or the often quoted case of the ostrich, which has abandoned the habit of flying! The giraffe is supposed to have come by its long neck in this way, that, after having eaten all the foliage on lower grounds and shorter trees, it was then obliged to stretch up its head to the higher branches, and having done so for many generations, it had new vertebrae gradually formed. But either every lower twig in the land inhabited by the giraffe had been actually eaten up, and in that case the first generation of giraffes, which could not in a day or in a week acquire their long necks, must have perished

horse's stomach? On the contrary, the stomach remains the same as it was, and the man becomes ill.

of hunger; or there was so much feeding still within reach of the short necks that they might maintain their lives till the next spring; but then in the meantime new twigs would have been grown, for one must remember that Upper Egypt, with its luxurious vegetation, was the fatherland of the giraffe, and thus the necessity was gone for making the neck longer for at least another year. In order to make that giraffe-hypothesis conceivable, it must be assumed that for a hundred thousand years no foliage had grown except on very high twigs, and that the height was always getting greater! Besides, a herd of animals failing any longer to find food in one district, will rather wander into another region than pain their necks so fearfully by stretching and straining until new bones grow in them. This hypothesis, then, is just as absurd as it could possibly be.—That animals which gave themselves up to swimming should in consequence develop a swimming apparatus or fins, is not supported by any actually observed instance, but might possibly be regarded as conceivable. On the other hand, that flying mice (Häckel, ii. 261) should have grown wing membranes in consequence of their adapting themselves to a flying mode of life, is quite too comical. What is an indispensable condition of flying is to be at the same time the consequence of their flying! But these shrew-mice, Häckel would say, “must fly, otherwise they would no longer be able to find food on the earth’s surface.” Thus, then, they must either fly or starve; but since shrew-mice without wings could not fly, and yet wings they did not possess, for these first grew on them as a consequence of their flying, there remained for the poor things nothing else than the sad fate of the mouse in the *Cheirosophos*. But it would be good if Häckel would adapt himself to a rational mode of life.

Obs. 2.—Darwin and Häckel (*Nat. Hist. of Creation*, vol. i. 241) have themselves observed that in the case of varieties not one organ alone is changed, but as a rule several, and often such as stand in no perceptible connection with one another. For example, races of short-necked animals have for the most part also short tails: white, blue-eyed cats are generally deaf, etc. Darwin calls this the Law of Correlation. That is only a new proof of the truth of Cuvier’s remark. If this is found true in regard to uninherited distinctions of varieties, how much more will it be true of species, genera, classes, and orders! “It is,” says Wigand, i. 197, “the picture of an all-sided causal connection which meets us everywhere, the true type of organic unity.”—That law of correlation is simply a fact, an empirical law; but the connection itself is still left unexplained and is inexplicable.—The acknowledg-

ment of the law of correlation, the acknowledgment that this concatenation of properties has the importance of a law, is absolutely irreconcilable with the assumption of natural selection as a principle of explanation. For the idea of choice presupposes a multiplicity of variations, which are all alike possible, each one of which is therefore fortuitous. As chance and law mutually exclude one another, natural selection and correlation are two principles of explanation absolutely opposed to one another. Darwin simply refers to the fact of correlation without in any way explaining it. When he is not in a position to explain a thing by his natural selection, he takes refuge in "the law of correlation," and never seems to notice that in doing so he completely abandons the principle of his theory.

§ 163. (2) *Heredity and Transmission.*

Seeing then that in the region of actual fact no formation of new organs by means of adaptation is met with, it will be readily admitted that no transmission of organs originating by adaptation will be discovered. Even Darwin and Häckel have brought forward no instance of such from the region of observed facts. Instead of this, Häckel (i. 213 f.) adduces as examples of his law of transmission the quite heterogeneous facts, that have been acknowledged long ago, that disease germs, *e.g.* tubercles, tendency to consumption, and also monstrosities and peculiarities, *e.g.* albinism, are transmitted. But disease germs and peculiar physical constructions are not the same as the forming of new organs! Besides, from the transmission of disease germs and malformations only a regular deterioration and not a regular improvement of the animal world could be derived. That morphological peculiarities are not transmitted, Häckel himself must admit. A man whose leg has been amputated certainly does not beget a one-legged offspring. The young of a dog which has its tail hacked off still bring a tail with them into the world. Häckel himself admits that there are very few cases in which dogs, which have been for many generations bereft of their tail, bringing forth tailless pups. He adduces the

case of a bull who by a misfortune at his birth was without horns, begetting, in Paraguay in 1770, hornless young. But even in these exceptional cases they were not "new organs originating by adaptation" that were transmitted, but again only malformations, that is, stunted or curtailed forms of organs that normally were in existence.

Obs.—From the tendency of cultivated varieties to grow wild, that is, from the reversion to the natural specific type, we conclude to the constancy of kinds and species. In order to escape this unwelcome consequence, Häckel seeks (vol. i. 206) to explain reversion to the wild type by *metagenesis*. By this he understands the regular change of forms in particular species of animals by propagation. The mollusc *Salpa*, with horse-shoe-shaped eyes, produces by *gemmatio* (§ 67) a series of smaller animals with conical eyes; and these produce *Salpæ* by sexual connection. The case is similar with the little sea-buoys (*doliolum*), with the wood-louse, etc. This change of the mode of generation, first observed by Chamisso in 1819, has nothing at all to do with reversion to a wild type, but rather is analogous to the change of forms, such as is seen in the butterflies, batrachia, etc. In both cases it is a change belonging to the course of nature as such regulated by natural law, consisting in this, that the same morphological form is not immediately, but through an intermediate organism, produced in an intermediate form. On the other hand, reversion is a reaction of the natural law of development against a physiological change brought about by human caprice, and is therefore no change brought about in the regular course of nature.—Mutilation or stunting by disease is different from both. Such phenomena as microcephalus, impotence, etc., are simply the stoppage of individual development. Against the silly statement of Vogt, that these defects are reversions to the original stock of the apes, compare Virchow, *Ueber Menschen und Affenschädel*, 1870, pp. 27–33. In the assembly of naturalists at Leipzig in 1872, Vogt with his reversion theory was put to shame by du Bois-Reymond, who showed him that he had never yet examined a microcephalous skull.

§ 164. (3) *The Struggle for Existence. (a) Between Animals of Different Species.*

What man attains unto by artificial improved breeding, is accomplished in nature by means of the struggle for existence

"Every organism," says Hæckel (i. 163 ff.), "from the commencement of its existence, struggles with a number of hostile influences; it struggles against animals that feed upon it, and to which it is the natural food, against animals of prey and parasites; it struggles against inorganic influences of the most varied kinds, against temperature, weather, and other circumstances; but it also struggles (and this is the most important), above all, against organisms most akin and like to itself. The favoured individuals will gain the victory over the others, and while the latter perish more or less early, without leaving any descendants, the former alone will be able to survive and finally to propagate their species; as, therefore, it is clear that in the struggle for life the favoured individuals succeed in propagating themselves, we shall perceive in the next generation differences from the preceding one. If continued through a series of generations, it attains in a last generation a strength which distinguishes this generation very essentially from the original parent." Had this been so, we must have perceived a regular change in the animal kingdom, especially among the ephemera and insects generally, one generation of men extending over many generations of these. It would then be inconceivable that always still animals of the lowest order should continue to exist. But that such a regular change does not take place is admitted even by Hæckel himself. "What is most surprising," he says, vol. i. p. 140, "is the remarkably short time in which man can produce a new form; while wild animals and plants, one year after another (yes, one thousand years after another), appear approximately in the same form." The assumed effect of the struggle for existence is not a matter of actual fact. But how stands it with the cause? Under the notion of the struggle for existence two entirely different things were formerly included: the struggle against beasts of prey, and the rivalry between different animals of the same species.¹ The former is essentially a question of food supply, the latter pre-eminently one

¹ Wigand, i. 99 f.

of sexual relation. The former is evidently the more influential, because the animal daily needs his food, while coition takes place only at particular periods. What then is the state of matters with regard to food supply, and therefore with regard to the struggle for existence between animals of different species? Is it true that the "favoured individuals" are less frequently devoured than the less favoured? (a) By far the greatest numbers of animal species are just as passive before their devourers as (§ 160) the plants; and the carnivorous animals, just as little as the plant-eating animals, choose the weakest and feeblest specimens for food, and leave the "favoured individuals" alone. Many of the carnivora devour altogether without selection. The whale consumes hundreds of herrings and sea slugs in a mass, without making any distinction between the superior and inferior herrings; and on the part of these poor creatures flight is just as little possible for the most "favoured" as for the most unfavoured. The mole eats every maggot that it comes across, and the maggot has no weapons or means of flight. So also is it with the caterpillars, larvæ, wood-lice, etc. Bit by bit they are picked up by the birds, while there is no possibility of flight. Instead of the pure fancy of a "natural selection" and regular variation of species and classes, we find rather "the economy of nature" referred to in § 77, which is throughout directed to the maintenance of classes and species. (b) Then as concerns the proportionally much less numerous species, only found now existing in the more highly developed orders, which are not passive before their devourers, but are able to get the better of their enemies either by speed in flight, or by venom, or by actual fight (as in the case of the tiger and the boa), no one will deny that lithe individuals are superior to sluggish, and strong are superior to weak. A very nimble hare which successfully outran one fox will fall a prey to a still more nimble or still more subtle fox. Seeing then that the question here is not about a morphological, but always only about an individual difference, and that too on both sides, no morphological

variation of species can result therefrom (*Obs.* 1). And if Hæckel allows the non-flying ostriches alone to escape their enemies, he thereby overturns his whole hypothesis; for if it were correct, then must the flying ostriches, supplied with unstunted organs of flight, have escaped their enemies.— Besides this, however, as shown in § 158, there would follow from the struggle for existence only the continuance and regular transmission of properties already existing, and not the origination of any new qualities. Hæckel (vol. i. p. 287) explains the existence of wingless races of insects, the arachnidæ, millepedes, crustacea, by saying that the winged individuals had been carried by the wind into the sea and drowned, and only the wingless ones have survived. But it is the existence of wingless species, and not merely the continued existence of such, that has to be explained. We want to know how such species came into existence, and what was their origin. The assumption is that those wingless species had not previously existed; for if they had already existed, there would be no need for our inquiring about their beginning. And now this is served up to us as an explanation: Wingless insects have sprung from winged ones in such a way that now only wingless ones survive. But how could they survive if they had first to have their origination? ¹ This crazy conceit we meet with in almost every page of Darwin and his followers (*Obs.* 2).

Obs. 1.—Darwin has said that if on an island a number of wolves could find no other prey but swift-running animals, such as roes and stags, the consequence would be that the wolves, because the long-limbed among them could escape death from hunger, would be changed in the end into long-legged wolf-apes. But why then, for the same reason, should not the roes and stags become still longer-legged and nimbler than they were before, or even “adapt themselves to a flying mode of life”?

Obs. 2.—Before the Medical Association at Würzburg, in June 1872, Dr. Eimer delivered a lecture on a dark-blue lizard which

¹ Compare Wigand, i. 210. In no case can natural selection be regarded as the cause of the origination of the characteristic form, but only as the condition of the existence of it. One may also compare ii. 391.

is met with only on the isolated Mount Faraglione, in Capri, and never elsewhere. It is asked, How has this variety originated? In other words, By what causes have blue lizards been produced from green? Eimer correctly pointed out that that mountain rock was itself dark blue, and indeed just of the very same colour as the lizards, and argued that therefore these, being of the same colour as the rock, escaped the observation of the birds of prey. But now, instead of admitting here the instinctive power of the living monad present in so many species of animals, and commonly known by the name of a capacity for concealment, he says: "The thing is to be explained by natural selection. Among lizards which lived on the mountain, all the green ones were eaten by birds of prey, and so only blue ones remained to propagate themselves." Thus, then, blue lizards had their origin from the fact that only blue ones survived!! There were originally x green lizards existing, and no blue ones; the x green ones were eaten, and now we have remaining y blue lizards; therefore $x + 0 - x = y!!!$ By natural selection only the negative would have been explained, that no green lizards remained alive; but not the positive, where the blue ones came from, or how the green ones could change themselves into blue. But if such a change is necessary, a cause not unknown to us, but unknown to Dr. Eimer, must be brought forward, and then there need be no more mention of natural selection. The latter is nothing more than a phrase, by means of which the operation of chance, unintelligent causalities are irrationally substituted for the teleological operation.

§ 165. *Continuation.* (b) *The Struggle for Existence between Animals of the same Species.*

We turn now to the struggle between individuals of the same species. An actual battle of this kind scarcely ever takes place. One crow does not pick out the eyes of another; hares do not eat one another; no plant-eater devours another. Many species of animals live socially, so that individuals protect, warn, and defend each other. Darwin gives many beautiful instances of this, which show kindly dispositions, from which he deduces the high moral and intellectual standpoint of the animal kingdom. Even among carnivorous animals the cases are rare in which an animal devours its own young or weaker animals of the same species. Even a struggle for a common prey would rarely end in the death of the combatant, and

would not even then lead to the origin of a new species. The struggle of two rivals for one female is of more frequent occurrence, but it comes under sexual selection, first treated of in § 166.—In fact, Häckel has adduced no instance of a struggle between animals of the same species, but passes over to the vegetable kingdom, and affirms that by the autonomous sowing of a wheat field that had remained unreaped only the "favoured individuals" among the seeds that had fallen would germinate and spring up. Rather it would seem that the first to fall grow up, and those that follow find no room. That on our meadows, in spite of autonomous sowing, no specific variation among the grasses has appeared since the time of Linnæus, is known to all botanists. Häckel, indeed, seems to have felt that he made nothing of his wheat field. So he gives the thing an entirely different turn, when by the struggle for existence he seeks to account no longer for the development of higher forms, but only for the origin of different forms—the production of unlike forms from the same original basis by means of division of labour. "It is evident that a much greater number of animal individuals can live together in one and the same limited district if they are of various and different natures, than if they are all alike. In one and the same town only a limited number of workmen of the same craft can live together. The division of labour is therefore a direct consequence of the struggle for life. The different function naturally produces its reaction in changing the form, and the physiological division of labour necessarily determines the morphological differentiation, that is, the divergence of character" (vol. i. p. 271). Is it really necessary to begin by proving that the idea of the division of labour is not adapted for this? Labour is activity directed to an end, in the case of man consciously, in the case of nest-building birds, of bees, wasps, beavers, etc., unconsciously. But every animal species does its work only for the maintenance and propagation of its own race. Hence a division of labour is met with between individuals of the same species, originating, however, no new species,

but only contributing to the maintenance of those already existing. It is never found among different kinds and species. It cannot therefore be at once brought forward as an example of division of labour, that one animal eats hay and another mice. The expression is improper, in the second place, because eating and drinking are not forms of labour, but the immediate satisfaction of a need. Then among men it could not reasonably be called a work, if of those many workmen of Häckel one appeased his hunger with potatoes, another with dumplings, etc. How then should it be called a division of labour, if different species of animals require different kinds of fodder? And now, in the third place, this existing difference between animals that eat grass, and grain, and flesh, and fish, and insects, must have arisen from the fact that these animals, after having at first eaten the same kind of food, were driven from want of fodder, not to a division of labour, but to a partition of the food supply. If there were on an island a hundred deer, whose natural food, consisting of grass, moss, bark, twigs, was exhausted, ten of them forthwith resolved to eat oats, and because of "the physiological division of labour necessarily determining the morphological differentiation" were developed into horses; forty resolved to eat grass and became oxen; forty-nine resolved to eat mice and became cats; and one confined himself to chewing thistles. And this last was in all probability the one who made the proposal about a division of labour. For it was indeed very stupid to expect animals to set to the eating of a kind of food for which their bodily system was never intended. That from the change of function, in this case from the eating of a different sort of food, a morphological change of the organs (teeth, throat, stomach, intestinal canal, lymph vessels, etc.) would result, is a very doubtful position, sustained by no proof, but rather contradicted by all known facts. If one presented a canary with meal worms, it would not be transformed into a nightingale, but would die; a man will not be changed into a pike by eating raw fish.

Obs. 1.—Hybridism, that is, the crossing of various species, is another cause from which Darwin, more than Hæckel, is inclined to derive the origin of new species. Such crossing takes place between different races, *e.g.* of dogs, also between various classes of the one family, *e.g.* between the horse and the ass; but no new specific types are originated thereby in an outstanding line of perfection, but only mixed types. And in the second place, it is admitted that the bastards sprung from such mixing of different species and classes are all the more certainly barren and incapable of propagation the farther removed the two parents are from one another. Dogs of various varieties produce fruitful young, capable of propagating themselves, just as hares and rabbits, which really are also two very closely related species, scarcely more than varieties, not distinct genera. Animals of different genera, like the horse and the ass, produce unfruitful bastards. The only instance of fruitful bastards having been produced from different genera is the story of the goat-sheep of Chili, accepted by Hæckel (i. 275), but very much doubted by others. If this should be established, it is one exception by which the rule, by means of which the Author of nature has provided for the permanence of generic and specific differences is not overthrown. According to this rule: (*a*) the more diverse the classes of animals are, the less possible will it be for them to produce issue; and (*b*) the bastards begotten are incapable of propagation in proportion as their parents are in their organization diverse from one another. This much is certain, that the more highly organized genera and classes existing in nature cannot be explained as the bastard products of lower genera and classes.

Obs. 2.—Huber (*Allg. Ztg.* 1872, Nr. 336) calls attention to the absurdity that Darwin traces the descent of naked men from hairy ape-like animals, while evidently that hairy animal, furnished with terrible teeth, would have been much better fitted for the struggle of life. “The principle of natural selection furnishes no explanation of man according to his physical equipment, and if a power of intelligence far superior to that of the animal was not present at first to make up for the natural impotence of his organism, the primitive man would have been lost in the struggle for existence.”—The principle of natural selection is carried out *ad absurdum* in the striking treatise, *Ueber die Auflösung der Arten durch naturliche Zuchtwahl, von einem Ungenannten* (Hannover 1872). The author adopts Darwin's principles, and shows how by scientific necessity the assumed unlimited variability of species and natural selection must lead only to an extinction of specific and generic differences, and to reversion of all differentiated forms into undiffer-

entiated, and at last into a mass of primal slime. For the more complicated an organism is, the more perilous is its position. The falling away of existing organs may be strikingly explained from natural selection; the origin of new organs never can. Even the present current of thought, influenced as it is by Darwinianism, tends certainly to the abolishing of the distinction between man and beast, the overthrow of religion and morality, in short, to the bringing of man and beast into the closest relations with one another.

Obs. 3.—Mor. Wagner sets aside the struggle for existence, and puts in its place the hypothesis of migration. He attempts then to account for the origin of new species and classes by the spreading out of animals into other regions. But since he again traces the wanderings of animals to instinct, in which as we have seen, § 72, there is the designing hand of an intelligent creative power, there is nothing at all to be said against this hypothesis from a Christian apologetic standpoint. Nevertheless, objection must be taken from the standpoint of natural history. For only varieties can be proved to have sprung from changes of dwelling, never new actual species, still less genera, orders, classes. But then, since, according to Wagner, every separate migration and isolation calls forth only an imperceptible change, we must assume a constant and ever renewed isolation, if the result won in the first generation is not to be immediately paralysed again in the following generations. Comp. Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, p. 673 ff.

§ 166. (4) *Sexual Selection.*

Darwin's stalking-horse is sexual selection. He seeks in the first instance to explain therefrom only the secondary sexual characters, whereby male and female are distinguished, *e.g.* in respect of colour, plumage, weapons; but then it is further extended to the specific characters. Wigand, i. 168 f., shows how senseless this is.

(a) Formerly it was regarded as an established axiom that every animal had sexual connection with an animal of its own species, with one therefore morphologically like itself, not with one morphologically more perfectly organized. The *Deciduata*, to which bears, dogs, and cats belong, are more perfectly organized than the *Indeciduata*, to which sheep, cattle, camels, and sloths belong; but Darwin himself would not venture to

say that even a female sloth preferred to have connection with a dog rather than with a male sloth, a cow with a bear rather than a bull. He only affirms that of two males of the same species, that is, of two males morphologically and specifically the same, the one that possessed a finer individual, bodily structure would be preferred by the female, also of the same species, to a less comely or less vigorous male. No new, morphologically higher species, let alone a new genus, could ever be explained as resulting therefrom.

(b) But now, according to Darwin's own confession, this choice of the individuals of the race that are fairer or stronger among beasts, has not been generally proved. He shows (*The Descent of Man*, pp. 242-249) that sexual selection can first be met with among fishes, birds, and mammals. According to his own admission, morphological progress is not to be accounted for by sexual selection in the whole vegetable kingdom, nor among zoophytes, worms, molluscs, star fishes, insects, and crustacea. If, then, the whole vegetable kingdom, and the animal kingdom up to fishes, have been developed without sexual selection, why should the development not have been carried farther still without this crutch? As concerns fishes, immediate coition does not take place among them. The female fish shoots out her mass of eggs, then comes the milt and shoots her seed or milt over the roe that has been ejected. Darwin himself (*Descent of Man*, p. 341) refers to the fact that whole crowds of milts surround the spawning female, and thus shed their milt over the roes. Nevertheless he cannot give up the belief, that those males which are most conspicuous for their colour and decorations in presence of the females, are preferred by them, and that from this is to be explained the origin of the beautifully coloured species of fish. Can we call this by any other name than simple nonsense? How then would a female fish be able to show the preference it had for a fine coloured male, since it has no power over the roe when once shot out, and cannot keep back from it the great crowd of males! It is interesting, however, that Darwin

himself designates his view as a matter of faith! In the investigation of nature, however, faith has no place, but the love of truth and reason. We leave him his fish faith, and have not colliers' faith enough to find such brain spawn palatable.

Sexual selection, then, is naught in regard to fishes. As concerns birds, Darwin (*Descent of Man*, p. 408) admits the fact that a female, if its male partner should be killed, immediately associates with another. He expresses himself, however, at p. 410, in a contrary fashion, venturing a guess, that there may be old maids among the birds, who remain single because they have found no consort to suit them! As the rhyme goes: "O schwester die der sicher!" Therefore in reality birds associate from sexual instinct, and unconditionally. They languish apparently for their beloved, in spite of Siegwert and Werther! Darwin lays it down as a fact that in the breeding season the female will mate with the first male she meets; but here again he sets faith against fact, for he adds that yet Audubon does not doubt that the female makes choice of her mate. This time he must call in the assistance of Audubon's belief where his own faith seemingly fails. Again, on p. 420 Darwin carries out the same manoeuvre. It is said that a common game cock wanting his plumage will be accepted by the female quite as readily as one possessed of his decoration; but then Mr. Hewitt is convinced that the female, almost without exception, prefers the most powerful and the proudest males. It is also stated as a fact that the peahen without choice takes any peacock; but in another place she is described as coquetting and courting the male, but really open to any one, as he confesses, that comes near her.

We have now only the mammals to inquire about. At p. 522 we read: "The general impression among breeders seems to be that the male accepts any female; and this, owing to his eagerness, is, in most cases, probably the truth." But that choice is exercised on the part of the female, Darwin

conjectures, for the reason that among birds there is such a choice. And so the matter is proved by reference to Messrs. Audubon and Hewitt. Yet he adds: "It is scarcely possible that much should be known about female quadrupeds in a state of nature making any choice in their marriage unions." Finally (p. 524), he advances it as a fact that a female dog of nobler race will often fall in love with a wretched cur. This certainly does not favour sexual selection. In short, according to Darwin's own admissions, there exists in nature, as created by God, no such thing as sexual selection. It exists only in Darwin's own phrases.

Obs. 1.—Rubimeyer says of Häckel's writings (*The History of the Evolution of Man* and *The Natural History of Creation*): They form a kind of literature, we shall hope not of the future, but of the fancy, in which observations serve only as mortar for building stones supplied by the imagination.

Obs. 2.—In reference to sexual selection Wigand, i. 185, says: Why should one so persistently oppose the idea of a creative plan carried out in accordance with natural laws, including in itself all those fair forms, bright colours, and sweet notes? It is certainly much more conceivable and in harmony with the causal principle, that the idea, the picture which is presented in secondary sexual characters, has its origin in the same intelligent being, who is at the same time the originator of matter and its properties by means of which the idea becomes embodied in form, than to attribute this idea to an animal which is itself the product of material forces in accordance with that planning creative principle.

§ 167. *The Parallel between Embryogenesis and Phylogenesis.*

Darwin and Häckel seek further support for their theory in their "*embryological proof*."

A. They start with the hypothesis that the metamorphoses of many organisms, *e.g.* the caterpillar-butterfly, as well as the change of the mode of generation (*metagenesis*; see § 163, *Obs.*), can only be adequately explained on the assumption that the first parent was without metamorphosis, and that this first made its appearance as a variation in a later generation, and that now there has descended by inheritance to posterity (1)

the primary form, (2) the metamorphosed form, and (3) the season for the appearance of this metamorphosis, and the particular period of life at which it occurs.

B. Analogous to this metamorphosis is the embryonic development. It is a fact (see § 65) that the embryos of various kinds of mammals start in the moment of their origin from a simple cell, which in the case of the human embryo is 1-10th of a line in diameter. At first they are developed in a way essentially the same, or at least very similar, to the cell-heap which divides into leaves, are then rolled up, and form hollows and tubes. Thus in this process more and more the distinctions of orders, classes, and species become manifest, so that, *e.g.* in the human embryo, every organ takes the form of a human organ, and in each animal species in accordance with the type of that species. Darwin now brings forward a hypothesis analogous to the one explained, that the history of the species repeats itself in the history of the embryonic development of the individual. The primitive stage of the embryo, which in all mammals is essentially the same, presents the form of the first parent common to all these species, which is transmitted by him to them. The succeeding stage of the embryo, where distinctions of orders are already beginning to show themselves, is transmitted from a descendant of the first parent, who has already undergone certain variations. In short, just as in the macrocosm of nature the genealogical tree grows up gradually from the lowest form through variability and selection to the more perfect forms, so also the embryonic development of each individual of every principal branch, secondary branch, and twig of the great tree of humanity has repeated in it what contributed to the growths of the whole tree.

C. Still more frequently this proof is presented by Hæckel in the thought: If in the uterus, out of an embryo which in its earliest stage is indistinguishable from that of a dog, a man can be brought forth in the course of nine months, it would seem that much more easily in the course of millions of years

there might be produced from one of the lowest forms as a common parent dogs, cats, men, and all possible forms of being.

Such, then, is the embryonic proof. Can any one say that there is in it anything that deserves the name of a demonstration?

(a) "The whole deduction," says Wigand, i. 300 f., "has for its basis no other fact than that which was to have been explained. In order to explain it, four hypotheses are devised. It is assumed, 1st, That the parent form of the amphibia was an animal like frog-spawn; 2nd, that the metamorphosis of the amphibia of the present day made its appearance in the ancestor in consequence of an individual variation; 3rd, that this first showed itself at a later stage of life; and 4th, that this character, together with the season of its manifestation, has been transmitted to the descendants,—if all this be assumed, then indeed we have an explanation of the metamorphosis that is now found existing as a fact." The same may also be said in regard to the explanation offered of the development of the embryo. There is no vestige of proof produced. All that is said is—if this be so, then this also is so.

(b) But this assumption introduced with an If as a hypothesis is not at all possible (comp. Wigand, i. 303 ff.). By metamorphosis the image of a parent form, of an original begetter, in the caterpillar or larva, cannot be represented, simply because the larva has yet no organism for propagation, as it is still without generative organs. In a much higher degree still this is true of the several stages of the development of the embryo. The distinction between a larva which only possesses the property of developing itself into a higher form, and a larva-like animal which is capable of propagation, is already an enormous one; just as the difference between an embryo two months old and an animal externally like it capable of reproduction. "If the embryonic state is conceived of as a disclosing of the parent form of the species, so that according to Darwin, from the woolly hair of a human foetus

one may conclude to a hairy first parent of the human race, one may with equal right assume that this first parent was toothless, and was nourished during his whole life on his mother's milk, and that indeed not through his mouth, but through his navel. Yea, in consistency, we must assume that he had lived all his life in a sexually perfect condition in the uterus of his mother,"—like the marsupials who at least pass a long time in such a uterus-life. There is therefore no actual analogy discoverable between the stages of the development of the embryo and the advancing orders and classes of organisms. In the former case,¹ we have to do with histological and morphological distinctions; in the latter case, with the type of the organization, the relative position of the parts. "Were it true that in the history of the embryo the history of the species repeated itself, then one stage of development must represent the common parent form of an order, a later stage that of a family, a later still that of a genus. In a particular stage of the embryonic development one must be able to determine whether it is a fish, a reptile, or a mammal; in a later stage, whether a carnivorous animal, a herbivorous animal, or a man. But this confessedly is not the case. In the vegetable kingdom, one should be able to distinguish the family character from the leaf-stalk, the generic character from the shape of the flower, while it is admitted that, on the contrary, the character of the species already appears in the leaf, and the most important family characters first in the flower, fruit, and seed."²

(c) Granted that during the first stages the human embryo is not distinguishable by the senses from the embryo of a dog or other mammal, the assertion so petulantly made by Hæckel, that the one is precisely the same as the other, is still radically false. To seem to be the same, and to be the same, are two very different things. If it should ever happen that a human embryo should develop itself into a dog, or *vice versa*, then that statement would be corroborated. But seeing that

¹ E. von Baer in Wigand, i. 299.

² Wigand, i. 306 f.

nothing in nature is so well established as that every living being brings forth its own young,—a proposition which is rather confirmed than invalidated by abortions and monstrosities, since a human monster is never like any of the animal species, but is a man stunted and crippled in his embryonic development,—it follows that the embryos of the different genera and species are not the same as one another, but are generically and specifically different. Like causes have like effects, and therefore from the distinctness of the effects we must conclude to the distinctness of the causes. In an embryo which develops itself into a rabbit, other qualities must operate than in that which develops itself into a dog, even admitting that to the eye both embryos at first present the same form. It is the invisible power of the principle of growth, the life monad, by means of which these embryos are distinguished from one another.¹

(d) It is then an ascertained fact that those embryos in their early stages seem the same, but are really different. This is admitted to be the department in which Hæckel has laid himself open to the most serious charges of falsification. Even in the vegetable kingdom it is found that the embryos of most closely related families, like the Gramineæ and Cupressineæ, are even more decidedly distinguished from one another than the flower stage is in each, while, on the other hand, the embryos of far separated families more nearly agree together.² In like manner in the animal kingdom closely related groups differ generally in the embryonic life or in the larva stage, and unrelated groups are similar to each other in those stages.³ His (*Unsre Körperform*, p. 190 ff.) has proved that the earliest

¹ Comp. Wigand, i. 303: "It is not a particular stage, but the whole course of the development, the entire type of the form and organization upon which a comparison of two organic beings must be based." P. 306: "The undeveloped has in the nature of things not impressed its characters so sharply, particularly as in consequence partly those organs first make their appearance which are the bearers of the distinction. Nevertheless the distinctions are present, although at first only as elementary forms." Compare also ii. 100.

² Wigand, i. 306.

³ Clauss, *Grundzüge der Zoologie*, 2nd ed. p. 64.

development of germs, *e.g.* in the mode of the formation of the germ plate, follows completely different types, not only among different classes, but even within one and the same class. He shows that even where the later embryonic forms of related genera were relatively like one another, yet very soon the characters of class and order make themselves known. But, again, he also shows that the embryos of unrelated genera assume similar forms, *e.g.* that of the chicken in respect of the important proportion of size between head and rump is more closely related to that of man than the embryos of various mammals are to one another; and that generally related kinds of animals in their earliest embryonic stage are not, while unrelated kinds are, similar to one another. Darwin's embryonic theory, if it were correct, would lead with strict necessity to the conclusion that closely related forms have no common first parent, while unrelated forms have!

(*e*) To portray a genealogical tree on the assumption of the theory of selection and adaptation, with the embryonic theory as its basis, as Hæckel and his school have attempted to do, is simply impossible. This has been convincingly shown by Wigand.¹ A systematic classification according to a natural and not an artificial system is possible and proper; but this system can never be represented by the picture of a tree simple beneath and ramifying itself above, but rather by that of a net where all sorts of relationships are combined. Whoever would make a concrete representation of this to himself need only read, *e.g.*, B. Berge's *Book of German Butterflies*, so as to be convinced that four fundamental types of hexapodes are

¹ Wigand, i. 208-280 and 318, ii. 118 ff. What methods have been tried in the construction of such a genealogical tree have been pleasantly told by Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, p. 708. That mammals collectively had a common parent is proved by showing that they have all seven cervical vertebræ. But then the number of dorsal, lumbar, and cross or false vertebræ varies very greatly in different kinds of animals. If, then, one is justified in concluding to one common ancestor for the same number of cervical vertebræ, one would need, in consistency, from a diverse number of the other vertebræ, to conclude the impossibility of descent from one parent.

repeated in the four classes of the one butterfly type, and in the families of each class again the types of the four classes. There must therefore be some kind of butterfly species which inherited from the first parent of caterpillars the properties that constitute the caterpillar character, and others again to which have been transmitted the properties belonging to the neuroptera from a later parent; that is, the genealogical stem which bears those caterpillar classes must be separated into two main branches!

(*f*) But here now comes into view in its utter nakedness the perverse, yea, senseless Darwinian conception of the idea of heredity.¹ In reality, inheritance appears in the form of a plan by means of which the germ becomes capable, by means of mere development under the requisite external conditions, of running through all the successive phases, according to an inner law of life. In this way each preceding condition affords a sufficient cause for the succeeding stage. What is transmitted is not the abstract property, that in the progeny a certain phase of development will make its appearance at a particular period of life, because it had appeared in the parent and that at this period of life. It is rather the property of the germ that is transmitted, by means of which each successive phase of development results from the preceding as a necessary effect. For example, the development of the new year's shoots, the blossom, the fruit, must, by means of definite inner adjustments, such as the accumulation of reserve material, have been prepared for by the organism. According to Darwin, on the other hand, the appearing of the blossom on the plants, the appearing of the lungs, extremities, and organs of generation in the frog, is nothing but the repetition of a variation which made its appearance in the parent form casually at some time or other. Thus, then, the most important principle in nature, causality, is denied in the most decided way by Darwin, for he cuts up the development mechanically into a series of detailed changes, arising from

¹ Comp. Wigand, i. 308 f., whose words I have here repeated in substance.

chance variation and only externally connected, and represents "the law of transmission" as the single abstract cause of the course of development. This mechanical theory is closely related to the hypothesis of Pangenesis explained in § 152.

The embryonic development of the various classes of animals affords rather a positive argument against the theory of the improvement of species by adaptation and natural selection. The fact is undoubted, that the embryo of the mammal in its gradual development passes through a course physiologically the same as that of the lower animal organisms. At first the heart has not two chambers with their auricles, but is a simple bag, as in the lower classes of animals. At first there are present only a sort of gills, really not fit for breathing, which ultimately change into jaw-bones. But now if an embryo, which at first shows only simple imperfect organs, develop itself in the mother's womb into a perfect individual, then neither a process of adaptation, that is, the influence of chance external causalities, nor the struggle for existence, which the embryo has not yet to engage upon, can account for this perfecting. If, then, the embryo, without adaptation, and without the struggle for existence, simply in consequence of its law of growth, is developed into a being of the highest perfection, it follows that for the explanation of the origin of more perfect species and genera the assumption of adaptation and the struggle for existence is as superfluous as, according to §§ 161-165, it is impossible. Hæckel himself says (i. 309): "Evidently this most rapid and astonishing transformation of the individual in ontogenesis is in itself much more wonderful and astonishing than the corresponding but much slower and more gradual transformation which the long chain of ancestors of the same individual has gone through in phylogenesis." Certainly very wonderful for him who will admit no law of growth, but will explain everything from adaptation to chance outward influences, and shudders at everything which transcends this explanation as a "miracle." Neither an adaptation to such external causalities, scarcity of

food, change of dwelling, etc., nor a struggle for existence, has place in the experience of the embryo. But what then the causes are which here effect the continued development,—that question Hæckel does not work out, and he concludes as he had begun with an Achilles (§ 146).

Obs. 1.—That Darwinism is not in a position to explain the mental capacities of men follows from the investigation carried out in Bk. I. sec. 2 (comp. especially §§ 30–32, 36, 39, 42, 52, 59).—It is, however, worth considering how Hæckel (ii. 301) attempts to explain the origin of the intellectual powers: from the upright walk and articulate language which developed sounds by abstraction into words. That language does not produce ideas, but presupposes them, is already proved in § 49. In support of this we may further refer to the case of Laura Bridgman, as told by Maudsley in his *Physiology and Pathology of Mind*, 1868. Though born deaf, dumb, and blind, she has become a teacher in a Deaf and Dumb Institute. But now if language could have produced mind, we have next to ask, who or what has then produced language? And Hæckel answers us (ii. 300): that human language had its origin in the higher differentiation and perfecting of the larynx, which reacts again on the differentiation of the brain. Therefore the larynx forms abstractions!

Obs. 2.—While no two Darwinians or Hæckelians are agreed about all the propositions of this theory,¹ they are all at one in regard to this, that men are descended from an ape-like animal of the quadrumanous species. This is the aim of the whole theory, the end to which the whole network of hypotheses is directed. As might be expected, along with the whole flimsy structure, this *Pithecoïd* turret falls in the dust. But, specially as concerns the affirmed relationship between man and the ape, Lucä (*Hand und Fuss*, Senckenberg'sche Abh. 1865, and *Der Bau und das Wachsthum des Affen- und des Menschenschädels*, in the *Gäa*, 1873, Heft 10) has proved that the structure of the hinder extremities of the ape is essentially different from that of man; and that likewise the ape skull is from the first diametrically distinguished from the human skull in the form and tendency of its development. That the Neanderthal skull, as well as the skull found at Bux in Bohemia, show pathological monstrosities, is proved by Virchow (*Naturforschervers. zu Wiesbaden*, 1873) and by Woldrich (*Ausland*, 1873, Nr. 39). That, on the other hand, the fossil Engis skull possesses the perfectly beautiful structure of a Grecian skull, has been shown by H. Klein.

¹ The proof of this has been given in detail in Wigand's third volume.

§ 168. *Contradiction between Darwinism and Geology.*

Finally, it is so utterly impossible to "adapt" the Darwinian theory of descent to geological facts, that it seems necessary to throw these overboard in a body. This, however, is a very dangerous procedure. As it is an admitted fact that plant and animal species have not changed for thousands of years, many having been (comp. § 162) during the Tertiary period the same as they are now, Darwinians are obliged to grant that change through adaptation and selection takes place only by very slow and gradual evolution. But this causes them no embarrassment. They talk quite familiarly of millions and milliards of years which are required for these gradual processes.

A. In doing so, however, they involve themselves in contradiction, inasmuch as the longer the period during which that development has continued, all the more inconceivable does it become how so many of the very lowest orders, fungi, lichens, sea-weed, medusæ, worms, etc., are still existing, how they have endured for a million of years that struggle for existence without any of those consequences which this battle for life, according to the bold assertion of those gentlemen, ought to have had. Of the animal species of the primeval fauna two of the very poorest, *Lingula* and *Discina*, still survive, while the far more perfectly organized *Obolus* and *Orthis* came to an end and utterly perished with the Silurian period.

B. But they are further involved in a whole series of contradictions in relation to the ascertained facts of geology. Whether the so-called "primary" crystalline rocks (gneiss, granite, mica slate, etc.) owe their origin to the agency of fire or to that of water, or whether they have originated by metamorphosis, is still a matter of debate, the solution of which does not concern us. It seems, however, to be ever more and more firmly established that the greater part of the crystalline mountains is older in point of origin than the

sedimentary formations, and that they have not been first developed by volcanic agency from these latter, although supplementarily they may partly owe to them their elevation.¹ But it is beyond all dispute that the earth above and below those crystalline masses is covered with historical rocks, the so-called sedimentary or secondary formations, which have been formed by deposition in water and enclose petrified organisms. These formations form two groups. 1. To the lowest and oldest, the Palæozoic group, belong the Silurian, Devonian, Carboniferous, and Permian formations. 2. To the upper, the secondary group, belong the Trias formation (including the Bunt-Sandstein, Muschelkalk, and Keuper), the Jura formation (including the Lias, Oolite, and White Jura), and the Cretaceous formation. But these formations are not uniformly present everywhere. Here one is wanting, there another. Where there has been no deposit, there may not possibly have been any continent.² The uppermost formations are wanting most frequently, the lowest least frequently. Thus, *e.g.*, in a line from Amberg to Worms the Cretaceous formation is present only in a few places in French-Switzerland, under it appears the Jura as a broad ridge of rock until we come to Hersbruck, where under the steep western declivity of the Jura³ we meet with the Keuper, which covers the whole country down to Steigerwald inclusive. Under the western slope of Steigerwald appears the Muschelkalk; under this, in a line from Hammelburg to Wimpfen, the Bunt Sandstein (Red Sandstone), which ends with

¹ Comp. Fr. Pfaff, *Allg. Geologie als exakte Wissenschaft*, Leipzig 1873, pp. 145-163. On the other hand, basalt, trachyte, and most kinds of porphyry are of igneous origin. *Ibid.* pp. 129-144.

² Comp. on this point Fr. Pfaff, *Allg. Geologie als exakte Wissenschaft*, Leipzig 1873, p. 56 ff. and p. 73. It would seem that it is from the nature of ocean currents and the laws of diffusion that it must be explained why a particular deposit is formed in one tract and not in another. Hence then, too, the varying degrees of thickness of one stratum in different localities.

³ The steepness of these slopes is to be explained by a supplementary later denudation by floods of the Tertiary period.

the Harz mountains in the alluvial deposits of the Rhine valley.



From the inclination of the strata it has been concluded that bit by bit they were brought by very gradual upheavals and depressions out of their original horizontal position. In this manner at the present day quite gradually the west coast of Brazil and the south coast of France are being raised, while the east coast of Italy is sinking.¹

Here and there, however, these sedimentary formations, lying over one another like onion layers, are broken through, rent, and penetrated by crystalline rocks, which have been violently elevated, doubtless by volcanic agency of hot vapours from the centre of the earth, and that crust of the earth has been burst through, as *e.g.* the Alps. With these eruptions there were also associated important floods, those of the Tertiary period, which completely overturned masses of historical rocks, swept them down as boulders, and heaped up the fragments of *débris* in some cases to a great height, as in the Righi, the Speer, the Rossberg, the Uetli. The latter is called the Cainozoic or Tertiary formation, and the period of those repeated upheavals is called the Tertiary period. Among the organic remains of the tertiary formation there is found for the first time a vegetable world like that of the present; and also for the first time mammals in their fuller and more perfect development. Toward the end of the Tertiary period the Ice Age or Glacial period occurs, when, probably in consequence of the rapid evaporation of great quantities of water, a not inconsiderable part of the earth's surface must have been covered with glaciers.

¹ That also the rest of the deposited strata may have been originally laid down in an oblique position and were actually so formed, is shown, by Pfaff, *Geologie als exakte Wissenschaft*. p. 59.

This may be concluded partly from the occasional and isolated blocks, *e.g.*, of Scandinavian granite in the valleys of North Germany, which only when contained in icebergs could have been floated over the sea into Germany, partly from the ice-slips, which are made at the present day by glaciers on their rocky banks, which are to be found in many ranges and mountains which are now without glaciers.¹

(a) The Darwinians now find themselves obliged to assume that hundreds of thousands of years must have passed since the Ice Age. They have even advanced "proofs" of this. But what proofs! They have measured how many feet of slime is deposited in a year, then they have measured the depth of the alluvial layer of the valley, and divided it by the thickness of the yearly deposit. Thus they arrive at hundreds of thousands of years. The calculation is quite correct, if the river never was greater than it is now. The inconsequence of this and similar proofs has been shown by Pfaff (*Die Neuesten Forschungen und Theorien auf dem Gebiete der Schöpfungsgeschichte*, Frankf.-a-Main, 1868, pp. 41-85, and *Allg. Geologie*, 1873, pp. 285, 292, 317 f.). But he has also advanced a counter proof. He engaged upon careful experimental investigations as to the measure of the dissolution suffered, under the usual atmospheric conditions, by the various kinds of rock during a particular period, and has reached the conclusion that if, as is assumed, 224,000 years have elapsed since the Ice Age, not the faintest trace of the smoothness caused by the ice-slip could now be seen, and that at farthest the Ice Age cannot be put back more than eight or ten thousand years.

(b) If the organic species had been formed one from another gradually through a long series of quite small and unobserved changes, as Darwinism assumes, the case would

¹ It will be understood that our object is simply to give to such readers as are comparatively unacquainted with the science of geology a brief outline of its most outstanding principles.

have been altogether different. In the first place,¹ from the oldest formations down to the most recent, the number of the genera and species must have regularly increased in accordance with the Darwinian genealogical tree (comp. § 167, *c.*). Between the starting-point, when only the *Eozoön*, as the primitive form of all animals, existed, down to the present, when about 150,000 species of animals are recognised, ten divisions or geological periods would give the following numbers of species: 2, 10, 34, 111, 387, 1163, 3830, 12,614, 45,550, 150,000. But instead of this we find in the actually existing ten formations, from the Silurian down to the Alluvial of the present time, the following number of species: 29, 10,209, 5160, 4901, 303, 1310, 4730, 5500, 16,970, 150,000. The number of species rises enormously in the second or Devonian formation, and then continues sinking down to the Trias formation, then rises here again at first very slowly and afterwards with rapid strides. In the second place, according to Darwin's presupposition, the higher forms of the animal kingdom must first appear in the later formations, since, according to his own assertion, an infinitely longer time was needed for the development of a vertebrate out of an infusorium than for that of a mollusc. But here facts again tell us quite an opposite story. In the very lowest fossiliferous strata six classes of the animal kingdom appear, among them the Articulata, the fifth highest among the thirteen; while in the Silurian we have without exception all classes of the three highest, up to fishes inclusive: while in the Peruvian we have the Amphibia, and in the Jura all the thirteen classes. In the third place, one should certainly find among the petrifications those beings that mark the transition from one class and species to another. As a matter of fact, however, it is not so. Suddenly in a new stratum of a particular formation you come upon an entirely new world of plants and animals. In the Carboniferous measures there is a plant kingdom of lower orders indeed, but

¹ Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 2nd ed. p. 676 ff.

with a peculiarly luxuriant development and amazing abundance, and alongside of this, molluscs, crabs, even some vertebrate species, especially Ganoid fishes. Then follows the Bunt-Sandstein (Red Sandstone), poor in fossils. In the Muschelkalk we meet with bivalve mussels in great abundance, especially the *Terebratula*. This again is succeeded by an order of rocks peculiarly barren to the fossil seeker, the Keuper, where we come upon great tracts of rock which, excepting a pair of ferns, are absolutely devoid of organic remains. But suddenly in the Lias we meet a plentiful supply of the race of Saurians, which was previously represented by only a few individual specimens, *e.g.* *Nathosaurus*, *Mastodonsaurus*, *Simosaurus*, *Dracosaurus*; while alongside of them we have the *Posidonia* and new species of the *Terebratula*; in the Brown Jura, the *Pectinidæ*; in the White Jura, the *Ammonites* which show the greatest diversity, and also palms. In the Cretaceous formation we first meet with birds. In the strata of the Tertiary period, then, we come suddenly upon the great Saurian species, and there we have the foliage plants alongside of the horse, tapir, bear, lion, etc. In short, the case stands actually thus: in the Carboniferous period all the orders of the animal kingdom have already made their appearance,—radiata, mollusca, articulata, vertebrata, the latter indeed as yet only in its lower forms; in the principal successive periods some one of the lower or middle forms reached its highest development, *e.g.* the Saurians during the Lias period; then gradually still higher forms reached their highest development, while those that had clearly gained their summit fell back again; and each such period presents us with a completely changed plant and animal world, and is completely separated from the period preceding by the intervention of a period almost destitute of plants and animals.

(c) In order to get rid of these unwelcome facts, Darwin has started the hypothesis that there have been no catastrophes whereby a plant and animal world could have been overthrown so as to give place to another and a new one. There

have never been any sudden upheaval of mountains, but these upheavals have been slowly and gradually accomplished, so that, for example, 88,000 years must have elapsed before the most inconsiderable mountain of Wales could have attained its present height. Here Darwin has wrongly referred to Sir Charles Lyell (*Principles of Geology*, 1830), who has indeed expressed himself against a series of universal "cataclysms" affecting the entire surface of the earth, but has by no means denied the fact of partial catastrophes, still less the existence of geological periods sharply differentiated and distinctly marked off from one another. If serious objection may be taken even to Lyell's own theory, that version of it given by Darwin is utterly untenable. It has been invalidated long ago by detailed investigations (see *Obs.* 1), and the geological chronology that has been built up thereon is also proved quite untenable by the researches above referred to regarding the wasting power of the ice-slips.¹ But in any case, all this could not have served the purpose desired. Whether the mountains have taken a long time to reach their height or have arisen suddenly, the fact still remains, that the forms of the Darwinian transition from one species and class to another have never been found, and this difficulty cannot be got rid of by the sarcastic phrase, that this is an objection of the "dilettante" order.² For even if in the fossil tridactylous-hoofed animal an intermediate is found between the solid-hoofed and the animal with much divided hoof, there are yet again wanting all the stages of transition between these three families, and the whole

¹ From another point of view this is still more untenable (Pfaff, p. 686 f.). If 100,000 years were needed for the forming of a chalk-bed one foot thick, the remains of the numberless generations of marine animals, which during that period peopled the waters, must have so accumulated that there would be found scarcely any trace of mineralogical substances between their fossil remains. Instead of this, that mineralogical substance forms the mass in which those fossil remains are found scattered.

² Oscar Schmidt, *The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism*, 6th ed. London 1884, p. 295.

of the transitional stages are wanting between the thousands and hundreds of thousands of the different species and classes. (See *Obs.* 2.) That fact is not disproved, but rather confirmed, by the statement of Hæckel: "The petrifications are not completely preserved, the obvious records of creation which lie buried in petrifications are imperfect beyond all measure." Nor does it fare any better with the phrase, that until now only Europe and a part of America have been geologically examined in a sufficiently careful manner. For the transitional forms or intermediate generations between the shrew-mice and the bats that have lived in Germany, are surely not to be sought in Africa or China! Those intermediate generations, with their first slight and afterwards gradually greater additions to the flying membrane, and similarly the lizards with their always more and more curtailed feet and legs, etc., must have been found in Germany between their ancestors and descendants! And when, finally, Hæckel (ii. 5) says that the elevations and depressions of the different parts of the earth alternate with one another, that during upheaval there could be no deposit, and so the wanting intermediate forms are not retained, for this it would require drolly enough to be presupposed, since these transitional forms are equally wanting over the whole earth, that the periods of upheaval had occurred over the whole earth contemporaneously. But where in that case is the sea supposed to go? Thus, then, it is not really true that between the two palæontologically different strata periods of upheaval are always found. That, *e.g.*, the whole Jura range from Fichtelgebirg down to the Lake of Geneva has been formed in an interrupted succession by deposition from the Jurassic sea, is a fact proved by the parallel position of the strata, and admitted by all geologists. Nevertheless, after the Terebratulæ, Belemnites, and Saurians of the Lias, we have the altogether unrelated Posidonians of the Posidonian slate without any intermediate forms; and these again without any intermediate links are succeeded by the

Pectinidæ and other kinds of the Terebratula species of the Brown Jura. After the Muschelkalk, and before the Lias, is the deposit of the Keuper sandstone. It was not a period of upheaval but of depression, not of solid land but of water, since the Keuper sandstone could not have been deposited by the air. If, now, the species of the Terebratulæ of the Lias had originated by derivation and gradual change for those of the Muschelkalk, we must certainly have found the transitional forms in the Keuper sandstone. But in all Wurtemberg and Franconia no trace of such is found. Those clay slates and quartzite in North America, England, Bohemia, whose upper strata contain petrified plant and animal specimens, are in their lower strata absolutely without fossils.¹ The organisms referred to suddenly make their appearance, and one cannot say that it is anything in the sandstone that occasioned the disappearance of all organic remains from those lower strata, for it is just of the same kind as that found in the upper strata. In the lower Silurian formation, Cephalopoda, Crustacea, and fishes appear in rich abundance suddenly and without intermediate forms; while in the underlying Cambrian formation no trace of them is found. This is proved to be true in Bohemia as well as in England and Scotland, and wherever these formations are found and have been examined. Equally suddenly the Trilobites make their appearance, and that before the Cephalopoda which occupy a lower stage of development; equally suddenly too the fishes, as many as sixty species, appear; and in the same manner we meet in the coal measures with the Amphibia, and in the Keuper with the first mammals. So is it also with the particular genera within the same order. The Darwinian Belt himself says that the genera of Trilobites, *e.g.* Asaphus, Colimenus, etc., appear "like an enemy breaking in upon" the older Trilobites. No genus of marine Saurians passes over from the Trias to the Jura. Suddenly in one of the Jura strata appeared the Teleosaurus and the Pterodactylus, and

¹ Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, p. 681 ff.

alongside of them the entirely different *Ichthyosaurus*. Just as suddenly the families that had been present disappear, and partly just those which had been distinguished for abundance of species, as *e.g.* the *Sigillaria*, *Ammonites*, *Belemnites*, vanish contemporaneously with one and the same formation in the farthest removed countries of the world. Oppel distinguishes in the Lias fifteen zones, each of which contains a great number of petrifications found exclusively in it. According to the Darwinian view, the Jura formation arose in a million years. The Lias, with one-fourth of its thickness, followed with 250,000 years, and to each of its zones must be given respectively 16,666 years. But, again, according to the Darwinian theory, these could not suffice for such changes in the fauna as are found between two of these zones; so that Darwinism is here not only in opposition with nature, but also with itself; and if it had sufficed, even then the gradual change must have been made during the 16,666 years, and must therefore have been visibly represented in the petrifications of the zone. Since this, then, is not the case, since rather the species in the whole zone are permanent, nothing remains for Darwinism but to take the desperate leap into the fatal dilemma, that either in the quite short interval of time between the end of the deposition of zone *a* and the beginning of the deposition of zone *b*, that specific change suddenly took place, or that between zone *a* and zone *b* an infinitely long period had meanwhile elapsed, during which the sea with its shell-fish continued indeed to exist, but made scarcely any deposit either of minerals or of petrifications.

When we remember the closely concatenated relationship of organisms described in the former section, it will be readily understood that frequently a species may represent an intermediate form between other two species, but never as a transitional form in the Darwinian sense. In the one foot thick stratum of the so-called *Arietenchalk* is found a vast number of species and varieties of *Ammonite* aries alongside of one another; under it in the thicker Jura strata no single

Ammonite like the Aries is found, but rather in marked distinction the Ammonite angulatus. Darwinism considers the Saurians as the ancestors of the mammals and birds. In fact, the family of the Dinosaurians combines the character of mammals and birds with that of lizards and crocodiles. But the Dinosaurians are first met with in the uppermost strata of the Keuper, and reach their highest development first in the Jura. On the other hand, many birds and mammals are already found in the Keuper. Here, then, the ancestors were living in a later period than their great-great-grandchildren!

The appearance by a bound, without transition stages, of new species is emphasized by Lesquereux (*Kreideflora von Nordamerika*, 1874), and granted by the Darwinians Zittel (*Aus der Urzeit*, 1875, pp. 269, 322, 391, etc.) and von Hauer. Thus, then, we see that, quite apart from the violent upheavals and catastrophes of the Tertiary Age, during the periods of the quiet deposition of the secondary formations cataclysms occurred¹ in the sense, that repeatedly an entire flora and fauna, probably in consequence of chemical processes, was annihilated, to make room for a following one newly springing up, *i.e.* newly created. And thus, then, judged the discoverer of the primordial fauna, J. Barrande, whom one will scarcely rank among the dilettanti (*Trilobites*, Prag 1871, p. 268 ff.): "As the result of our researches, we must maintain that observation at first hand presents a radical contradiction to all the conclusions of the theory of Descent. In fact, the study of each particular race of animals shows that these statements are in direct opposition to the facts. The deviations are so numerous and serious, that the collecting of the actual fauna with diligence seems fitted to contradict that theory at every point, and that indeed on its first appearing as well as in its further development. Thus the theory is completely overthrown by the logic of facts." Göppert, the most thorough investigator of palæontological flora, expresses himself in a similar strain (*Jahrb. f. Miner.*

¹ Wigand, i. 282 f.

u. Geol. 1865, p. 300): "In presence of actual facts it is not conceivable how all these forms of palæozoic flora, differing so much among themselves, could descend in a straight line from one another, and in the end, according to the logical outcome of the theory, be descendants of the one primordial form, which under regular development through inheritance, individual variation, transmission of variation, struggle for existence, natural selection, had been brought into their present forms. All that can be conceded is that the doctrine of development or transmutation has to expect no support from the fossil flora any more than from the fossil fauna, as Reuss (*Lotos*, Prag 1862, p. 110) has most recently in my opinion most convincingly proved."

Obs. 1.—In reference to the cataclysm question, from a mass of counterproofs we here adduce two. K. W. Guembel (Bavaria, 1st ed. p. 40 ff.) sets forth in propositions the results of his careful geological researches in the Bavarian Alps: "The same strata of the secondary period which in Franconia reach scarcely 1700' in thickness, in the Alps reach from 5000' to 10,000'." The former are reclining and horizontal, the latter vertical, cast up and thrown irregularly about, and prove that violent convulsions, a receding of the mountain masses in the most terrible manner, must have occurred. Elevations and depressions by collision of upheaved and sharp pointed rocks must have taken place; a violent upheaval of the central Alpine range and a mighty pressure upward and outward. After the deposition of the Cretaceous formation, the first convulsions occurred during the Eocene Nummulite period. Then followed more powerful shakings, which served as occasion of the origin of the Trias formation. The crust of the mountains remained as yet unpenetrated, for within them no trace of the Trias is found. "First after the complete deposition of the Trias the main push and pressure took place from the side of the central masses upon the opposite ridges, and thus a folding of strata wherein the folds inclined to the centre of pressure. The mountain masses were raised to an abnormal height, and the earlier covering of the strata was rent." In the Glarner Alps is a mass of five leagues' breadth and sixteen square miles' surface tilted over (the Eocene at the bottom, the Sernifit, a kind of granite, at the top), and so elevated above more recent formations (Heer, *A. Escher v. d. L.* p. 192; comp. also Zittel, *Aus der Urzeit*, 1875, pp. 462, 469, etc.).

Obs. 2.—The fact that the transitional forms existing in Darwin's imagination are never found in geological reality, is not shaken by the circumstance that in particular genera such wealth of species and varieties appears that may be relatively represented as transitional forms between the species. We may refer specially to the Ammonites, as also to the Planorbides of the freshwater chalk from Steinheim to Würzburg. But as concerns the latter, the layerwise superimposed series of changes from one primary form, which Hilgendorff thought he had found, is not by any means established (comp. Sandberger: "Die Steinheimer Planorbiden," in the *Wiesbad. Naturf.-Vers.* 1873). Rather in every stratum are found all varieties of *Carinifex multif.*, and alongside of them two kinds of *Planorbis*, each in several varieties, but without transition of the one species into the other, still less from the genus *Planorbis* to the genus *Carinifex*. Comp. Pfaff, p. 689; Wigand, i. 427 ff.—The case is not essentially different with respect to the Ammonites. Here, too, nothing is established but a higher degree of variability. But no one surely will be so unreasonable as to draw the conclusion, that, because in these particular genera a great variability existed, and in consequence of this many varieties were present (not transitional forms, comp. Stutz, *Die Naturw. der freie Gott und das Wunder*, Zur. 1872, p. 66, Anm. 35), therefore such must be met with in all genera of all classes and orders. Among the Ammonites and Planorbides they are actually met with; in thousands of other genera and their species they are not seen at all. The same is true of the Sponges of the present age.

Obs. 3.—During the Pleiocene period Sicily lay 3000' below the surface of the sea, rose during the interglacial age, being joined with Africa, and then again sank somewhat. First, when the present flora and fauna existed, Etna and the configuration of mountain and valley in the island had their origin. "Three-fourths of the Pleiocene fauna belongs to living species. Most of the animals survived those elevations and depressions of the land. There was thus here a much slighter change in organic than in inorganic nature, a fact which is hard to harmonize with Darwin's hypothesis, and contrary to the assumption of an ever equable continuous change of plant and animal species" (Heer, *A. Escher v. d. Linth.* p. 111).—To the testimonies of Barrande and Göppert we add that of Smiarda (*Zoologie*, i. 150): "If we consider the Darwinian theory from the standpoint of critical natural science, it is evident that it leaves much to be wished for. It explains not the origin, it thrusts it back through endless series to a single type, or to a primary type, the primeval possessor of life, the primary cell."

Change in so little individual differences without cause is against the law of persistence, which prevails so universally in organic nature as well as in inorganic. Matter and its affinities change not without cause. It stumbles then on the law of causality. It sets chance in place of the law which invariably rules the world. By hypotheses, in which we call to our help the infinity of space and time, all deductions pass into a bottomless abyss. Allusions to unacknowledged stages of growth are inadmissible, for they have not been found by research, and are therefore capricious. An attempt to explain an unknown series of changes by another unknown series marks no advance. Such a procedure leads back to subjective methods, to the standpoint of opinion. It is an offence to exact method, and our age makes no account of nebulous theories of change." Finally, the compact and sharp summary of all objections against Darwinism presented by Wigand, ii. 55-57, ought to be carefully studied.

B.—THE ORIGIN OF ORGANIC LIFE FROM INORGANIC IN A MECHANICAL MANNER.

§ 169. *Examination and Refutation.*

It has now been proved that Darwinism has failed to explain the origin of higher organic forms from lower on the hypothesis of chance external occurrences, because these outward influences do not constitute a *causa*, and could not therefore accomplish what has been ascribed to them. We have now to examine the other position laid down in this theory, and see whether organic life can be originated in a mechanical way from inorganic matter. Häckel makes the bold declaration (*Hist. of Creation*, i. 23): "All natural bodies which are known to us are equally animated. The distinction which has been made between animate and inanimate bodies does not exist. Movements in plants and animals are to be explained from purely physical and mechanical causes." According to this, carboniferous limestone, brought into connection with nitric acid, would be matter possessed with life, and the movements of the animal, yea, the vibrations of the ganglia of the brain, from which thought originated, would

be a physical process in the same sense as the effervescing of the limestone. Should one thus regard the process that goes on in the remains of a dead dog as similar to that which takes place in the vital process of a living dog? Would the carcase be living (*beseelter*) matter in the same sense as the living animal? He who accepts this position reduces the whole thing *ad absurdum*. Alex. von Humboldt has judged differently (see *Obs.* 1). Even Hæckel himself cannot maintain this position out and out, and contradicts himself by saying (i. 30) that Darwin's theory does not indeed explain the properties of organic matter; but he comforts himself by the assurance that we nowhere arrive at a knowledge of first causes. Certainly not, if we do not ask and search out after these causes! With this lame Achilles he slips away (§ 146), and thinks that he has gained a right to venture a second time on a self-contradiction. He repeats the former assertion (i. 338), that organisms are animated, and that this view is most triumphant (triumphant through a theory that does not explain the properties of organic matter!). As given inorganic chemical material, we have to assume "simple little lumps of albuminous formative matter, or lumps of protoplasm." But this albuminous matter is itself a combination C.H.O.N., which is not independent of organism, but arises as a direct or indirect product of an already existing organism. Albuminous matter, too, is in itself invariably not animate, but a chemical combination. But if by means of an "or" a lump of protoplasm be substituted unobserved for this chemical combination, then, inasmuch as protoplasm is a living organized cellular substance with histological and physiological properties, this is a pure deception, an unworthy piece of chicanery, whereby the problem is juggled away before the eyes of the reader. For the problem is indeed no other than this: How from the chemical combination "albumen" do you get the organic living protoplasm!¹ No explanation

¹ If one (Wigand, ii. 136) set a little drop of fungus slime, which therefore chemically is quite similar to the living fungus-plasm, under the same

is given of this by that *quid pro quo*. But Häckel now indeed offers this explanation: "The analysis of carbon is the cause of all phenomena of motion." This proposition offers us something brand-new; for of an analysis of carbon chemistry has hitherto known nothing. C. was regarded until now one of the simple substances. Equally unsatisfactory is the predicate of this proposition. Organic being is distinguished, as has already been shown in §§ 65–66, from the inorganic, not merely by chemical combinations of a higher order which it brings forth in itself, but also and pre-eminently by the fact that in inorganic bodies only changes find place, each one of which is effected by a single external cause, while in organic bodies there are series of changes, which altogether are determined indeed by the substratum of certain outward circumstances (air, nourishment, etc.), whose succession, however, is not conditioned by a corresponding succession of external causes, but by a specific law of growth of the particular genus and species, and is therefore found equally in all individuals of the one species. In this aspect organic nature links itself to inorganic, just as a mathematical function to a number. (Comp. § 148, *Obs.*) A number, when one has manipulated it by additions, subtractions, multiplications, etc., is by such procedure so changed that the resulting product is wholly dependent on the kind and extent of such procedure. Just so inorganic matter is by each physical or chemical procedure operating upon it so changed, that the nature of this procedure quite determines the nature of the result. On the other hand, a function according to the value one sets down to x represents a series, whose constitution depends upon the power lying in the function itself. In like manner, every organic nature bears a formula of its being, that is, a law of its being, in itself, whereby the

surroundings as those in which a living spore of this fungus is able to develop itself, that drop does not organize itself, it divides not up into spores;—a significant proof of the difference between chemical matter and living plasm. In the latter, beside matter there is—life.

course of its development is determined. This most important characteristic of organic life is quite ignored by Hæckel. It thus becomes possible for him to lay down the proposition (i. 338): The formation of a primary cell is quite analogous to the formation of a crystal.¹ "If we cause any inorganic solution of salt slowly to evaporate, crystals are formed in it, which slowly increase in size during the continued evaporation of the water. In like manner the growth of organisms takes place . . . only not through addition of new particles to the surface, but by the newly added particles penetrating into the interior of the organism (*Intussuszeption*), in consequence of the semi-fluid state of the aggregation." To this may be likened the prescription of the old instruction book for painters: Carnations should be painted like roses, only quite differently! That supposititious "analogy" Hæckel next seeks to prove by a further assertion: "In the crystal there is an inner law of structure in consequence of chemical aggregation, *e.g.* the law of hexagonal or rhombic shape; alongside of this in the crystal we find adaptation to outward surroundings and pressure of the atmosphere. Both find place in the organism." This is simply an untruth. For the crystal is developed, however big it may grow, according to identical forms. For even the originating forms of a crystalline base are mathematically alike. From the normal octagonal form of the diamond or fluor may be developed an octagon, a dodecagon, rhomboidal twelve-sided figures, but never a tetragonal, rhombic form, etc. The organic cell, on the other hand, forms itself into different organs which are quite unlike one another. In plants it forms (*a*) through deposition one upon another,

¹ Compare, on the other hand, § 75, *Obs.*, and the passage cited there from Liebig. Also Wundt says (*Handb. d. Physiol.* 3rd ed. p. 129): "Schwann's theory, according to which the formation of cells should be a crystallization of matter capable of originating itself in the form of layers, is admitted now to be irreconcilable with any empirical facts." And at p. 127: "We know of one origin of cells only by propagation, not by primordial begetting."

cellular tissue (*parenchyma* or lengthened out parenchymal cells); and (b) through blending together, vascular tissue. It forms in animals (a) through deposition one upon another, the tissue of the upper skin and the glands, the muscles (corresponding to the prosenchyma of plants), and the crystalline lens; and (b) through blending together, the nerve system and the capillary system; and (c) through the specifically animal secretion of new cells, ligaments, bony tissue, and cartilaginous tissue. Where, then, is there among crystals any analogy to such variety of forms? Further, the crystal remains unchanged as it is, so long as no external causes operate upon it. Such causes are (a) mechanical in the narrower sense of the word, as pressure, cutting, splitting by a knife, which shatter the crystal; (b) chemical, homogeneous to it, which enlarge it, *e.g.* as when one lays a crystal of salt in a solution of the same salt; and (c) chemical, heterogeneous, which destroys by dissolving. In itself it is motionless and lifeless. On the other hand, the organic cell does not continue a single second as it is, but is in constant change under those outward conditions which remain the same. We have already called attention, in § 68, to the fact that the vegetable cell in itself as such has as its principle of growth, that its surrounding layer, the primordial slime, thickens into cellulose skin, depositing on the inner side new layers of skin and formations; further, that the protoplasm is diminished and vanishes, all moisture is absorbed from without; while in the animal cell the plasma maintains itself, forms in midst of it a germ, and from this germ exercises a dissolving activity, depositing upon the outside new formations. We see also here again the old law of growth, just as in the already cited case of the celebrated embryonic development of the germ cell (§ 65 f. and § 167), where the arrangement of the existing cells by endogenous cell-forming results in every species of animal in accordance with a specific law inhering in it. Thus, if a pregnant cow be pasturing alongside of a pregnant ewe on the same meadow and drink the same water, still the one brings into the world

a calf and the other a sheep. Thus, then, it is clear that the first forming of a germ cell capable of life has not the least analogy with the cutting of a crystal that is incapable of life. When Hæckel speaks of a crystal's "formative impulse," he uses instead of a scientific term a mystical phrase; and when he refuses to see in the organic cell the law of growth immanent in it, this is just again the lame Achilles, which cannot overtake the tortoise. Whenever and however first in the universe the simplest organic cell capable of development, that is, of life, came to exist, this much is certain, that it could only originate by reason of an active law of growth, that is, a life monad, which as such, *i.e.* as principle of a specific series of change, differentiated itself from the general physico-chemical laws. (See *Obs.* 3.) Inorganic matter is in reference to those laws merely dependent or passive. Organic living substance possesses in itself an actual activity which is not to be explained, as Hæckel seeks to do (*i.* 34), from external, physico-chemical influences (*Obs.* 4).

Obs. 1.—An antique gem represents in its upper portion a number of youths, opposite whom stands a number of maidens. The two rows are arranged like an orchestra, and between them stands a figure raising aloft a burning torch. On the lower half of the gem are the same forms, but the genius has his torch lowered and quenched, and the youths have sunk into the arms of the maidens. Humboldt explains the figures on this gem, if archæologically not altogether correctly, at least very ingeniously and with great power of insight. The genius with the torch is the power of life; the youths and maidens are the material elements of the body. So long as the power of life holds sway, those elements were held in a proper relation to one another, upon which the continued existence of the living body is conditioned. When the torch of life is quenched, then appears that chemical combination of matter which may be defined as corruption. (See Fr. Jacobs, *Vermischte Schriften*, vol. v.)

Obs. 2.—Were the origin of the organic germ cell a mechanical affair, it would be possible to produce such a cell by way of physico-chemical experiment. How every such attempt has failed is shown by Liebig, *Chem. Briefe*, p. 366; Huxley, *On our Knowledge of the Causes of the Phenomena of Organic Nature*, London 1863; Nägeli, *Ueber Entstehung und Begriff der*

naturhistorischen Art. p. 45 ; Funke, *Lehrbuch der Physiologie*, 1866, ii. p. 912 ; Smarda, *Zoologie*, 1871, i. p. 151.—What will not show itself in the laboratories, Darwin and Häckel seek to find in the strata of the rocks. A petrified primary cell has been designated by them *Eozoon* ; but King, Rowney, and Vogelsang have declared that this fossil is no petrification, but a simple globular fragment, such as may be met with in abundance in various kinds of rocks.

Obs. 3.—Compare Wigand, ii. 141 : “As generally where cells are empirically formed, this is the result of two factors, namely, on the one side of the substances which supply the material, and on the other side of a pre-existent substance, the mother cell, which gives power to that matter and fashions it in its way, we have no right at all to assume the spontaneous generation of the second factor, and, since it wants a mother cell, to lay it aside simply as superfluous, and to ascribe the effect wholly to the first factor. We must rather under all circumstances postulate for the second factor an equivalent in some sort of form, and indeed even in the form of a pre-existent adjusted and adjusting being. The assumption of a spontaneous origin, in the sense that the cause thereof lies actually in the properties of the substance serving as material—is absolutely unsupported.”


Obs. 4.—Häckel may very likely have seen the inconclusiveness of his deduction, for at p. 336, after having insisted upon the analogy between crystal and cell, he suddenly breaks off, and eludes the ticklish question about all that subsequently arises out of the cell. He afterwards, however, maintains (i. 345) : “We can conceive the formation of a kernel or nucleus in the simple little lump of albumen to take place in a purely physical manner by the condensation of the innermost central part of the albumen.” Why then do we not find the same condensation in plants ? “The more solid central mass becomes sharply separated from it.” We may ask : By what physical cause ? “It thus forms an independent, round, albuminous corpuscle, the kernel ; and by this process the moneron becomes a cell. Now it must have become evident from our previous chapters that the further development of all other organisms out of such a cell presents no difficulty.” But in the previous chapters Häckel had steadily set aside all questions about causes, from which the development of an embryo from a cell could be explained. At p. 292 he simply referred to the fact. He had described the observed facts that the ovulum becomes a mass of cells, forms leaf-germs, etc. On the other hand, the questions : By physico-chemical causes is this accomplished ? and, Can it be explained from such causes ? he has

not grappled with. And now he speaks (i. 345) as if he had explained all this long ago, and as if, so soon as only some albumen has condensed itself in the middle, the whole series of the organic processes of the development of the embryo were fully explained! This is merely the conjurer's trick, by which we are not to be blinded any more than we shall be frightened by the shriek of horror: "the teleological view of nature in consistency must behold in the crystals creation-machines (*sic!*) directed to the attainment of an end." Certainly the laws of crystallization are also purposeful, as this same Hæckel has himself taught. See § 74. He is here again involved in that confusion which was pointed out in § 159.

Obs. 5.—Seeing that the origin of organic life cannot be explained as proceeding from inorganic matter, Sir William Thomson, who is followed by Meibauer (*Die Physische Beschaffenheit des Sonnensystems*, Berl. 1872, p. 96), Helmholtz (*Theoret. Physik*, part 2, preface), and Quinet, has hit upon the happy thought that life is to be assigned to something without. "The first germs [of organic life] have flown down to us in the thin air that fills universal space," therefore from other spheres. Whether in those places organic life could be originated in a mechanical way from inorganic matter, and if so, how, upon these questions Achilles (§ 146) is silent. Probably those germs came from Utopia, where all things are possible! For the rest, we may see in Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, p. 737 ff., how physically impossible such a transport of organic being through space would be.

FOURTH SECTION.

THE DENIAL OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MORAL STATISTICS.



§ 170. *The Consequences of Materialism.*

A FALSE system is refuted when the foundations and proofs on which it rests are shown to be erroneous and are displaced by proofs to the contrary; but it also, secondly, refutes itself by means of the consequences to which it leads. The materialistic, mechanical, Darwinian system leads by the strictest consequence to the denial of all morality,—not only of all ethics in the higher sense, but of all morality. We do not charge these students of nature with an immoral life, nor with any conscious endeavour to overturn the foundation of morals in others. They themselves, or at least the better part of them, have and maintain personally respect for the injunctions of ethics, but know not, or will not know, that these injunctions, together with the authority which they still exercise over them and others like-minded, are an inheritance received from Christianity. Because, then, this remnant of ethics in them is found under the one roof with materialism, they suppose that these ethical axioms are embraced among the presuppositions of the materialistic principle, and are developed out of and based upon the same. Scarcely any of them have ever made an attempt to examine the ground on which those moral principles rest, but assume them as customary and convenient phrases. But whoever earnestly makes the

attempt to construct a system of morals on a materialistic foundation can at best only reach a common eudæmonism, and this in strict consistency degenerates into the denial of all morality. *A.* If there be no God, no self-conscious designing author of the world, and if man has no spirit distinct from his body, it necessarily follows that there is no moral law, no conscience. This conclusion is explicitly drawn by Oscar Schmidt in his *Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism*, 6th ed. Lond. 1884, p. 300: "That conscience is, like moral will, a result of education in some few races and tribes." Then it also follows that there is no essential distinction between good and evil, that what man calls good and evil can only be derived from the opposition of good and evil resulting from the action of a blind law of nature. Materialism itself draws this conclusion. Thus writes the materialist Forster: Are we agreed in regard to pain and pleasure, then follow the ideas of evil and good, right and wrong. In this way ethics is overthrown, and in its place remains only the commonest eudæmonist morality. "Avoid what would have bad consequences for thee, but be no fool, and avoid it only in so far as it has bad consequences." He then must be a fool who would put any restraint upon his lusts if their indulgence would cause him no injury. Surely then, if it is the highest and only moral precept to prepare for oneself as much enjoyment and satisfaction as possible, and put everything disagreeable out of the way, all moral precepts are overthrown which do not rest on the principle of egoism, but on that of reverence and love. Self-sacrificing love has in that system no place. Calls to love your enemies, to pity the wretched, forsaken, starving, to share one's own abundance with and to give one's life for another's weal, can only be regarded "as the results of education in certain races," but must therefore be also considered perverse, because results of education not grounded on that "alone valid" eudæmonistic principle. One, therefore, must in consistency proceed to extirpate those whims from the

ganglia of the brain; for which, however, no peculiarly vigorous exertion will be needed, since they, where materialism holds dominion, will soon enough of themselves fall away. *B.* But still further, even that common eudæmonistic morality cannot itself exist. For if all thinking and willing are natural occurrences resulting with natural necessity according to physico-chemical laws as functions of the ganglia of the brain (comp. Häckel's utterances in § 169),—an affection of organic matter,—then all freedom of will, all self-determination, yea, even animal wilfulness, is only an appearance. This conclusion, too, is drawn by materialism. Oscar Schmidt quite unblushingly declares (*Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism*, p. 299): "In so far as the more highly developed man acts in accordance with philosophical, moral, and religious principles, for which he is indebted to education and instruction . . . this command of will may be readily admitted, although we know that this 'freedom' is likewise the collective result of natural causes. But the more simple and uniform the conditions of life, the more do the dealings of men lose the semblance and character of freedom, and the more does the individual act after the influence of the tribe, that is to say, instinctively." And the instinctive action itself would bear the character of an act of merely natural necessity. All that a man actually does, good or evil, can according to such doctrine be nothing else than the product of the mixing of his juices, of the constitution of his nervous system, and of the events of the outer world reported to him through his sensory nerves, upon which the ganglia of his brain operate in a way determined by absolute necessity. With this statement, however, we have denied even that remnant of eudæmonistic morality, and a general indulgence is proclaimed for all sins, infamous deeds, transgressions, and crimes, in comparison with which Tetzels indulgences were harmless child's play. It is the morality of the Parisian Commune or of the International, into which materialism is driven as its practical conclusion.

It is the overthrow of all and every moral system and moral course, of all humanism. The assertion of Darwin and his school, that it is much more honourable for a man to have been developed from the animal creation than to have fallen from a sinless into a sinful state, is thus proved to be a vain jingle of words. That doctrine leads not upwards but downwards, from humanity to bestiality, just because it destroys the consciousness of guilt, the consciousness of having fallen from a state after God's mind into an abnormal one, the last remnant of truth (§ 141) which keeps the sinner still a man; and so it debases man into a beast. And thus it refutes itself. For this stands unshaken, that humanity, that is, the recognition of an absolute, ideal ethical requirement, because the recognition of an essential distinction of good and evil, is a real good, a very necessity. Even materialists unwillingly admit this. They take wondrous pains to assure us that their system will do no damage to humanity, and so become angry if one does not believe them. Now a system which by the denial of the spontaneity of the will and of moral responsibility strikes at the root of humanity, and reduces man to a worse than animal condition,¹ thereby demonstrates its thorough untruthfulness.

Obs.—In this connection the writing of a certain Dr. Post, *Einleitung in eine Naturwissenschaft des Rechtes*, is instructive, wherein he endeavours to deduce from Darwinism the ideas of law, but wanders into utter imbecility.

§ 171. *The Argumentation of Materialists.*

Now it is affirmed by the materialists that they can advance positive proofs against the idea of free self-determination. In moral statistics it becomes apparent that in any given number of men from year to year a certain definite

¹ M. Carriere in the journal *Gegenwart*, 1872, Nos. 12, 13, April, expresses himself in a manner quite similar to that in which we have done.

and constant percentage, not only of births and deaths, not only of marriages, but also of crimes, may be reckoned on, and that with such exactness that a definite percentage may be fixed for each kind of offence, yea, even for the special form of its manifestation, as *e.g.* suicide by hanging, shooting, drowning, etc., and also for each rank in society and for each period of life. Thus it is supposed to be clearly proved that human actions are not the products of free-will, but of a natural law. Morals, however, cannot for a moment be treated after this fashion, and just here special difficulties emerge. We have here, therefore, a twofold task presented: *A.* To test and prove the data of moral statistics, together with the legitimacy of the consequences deduced from them; and *B.* To make sure that morality is not thereby subverted, as well as the nature of the morality sought to be set aside by the materialists.

A.—MORAL STATISTICS.

§ 172. *The Facts.*

“The average man in France from 1826 to 1844 has with $\cdot 000218$ of his existence participated in accusations, and with $\cdot 000136$ of his existence in condemnations.” So, for example, speaks one of the results of moral statistics expressed in an “exact” form. That is, it speaks nonsense; for an “average man” no more exists than an average peewit or an average domestic cat; and if among a million men 136 be criminals, the other 999,864 do not participate with $\frac{136}{1,000,000}$ of their existence in these crimes; do not in fact participate at all. The form, therefore, in which those propositions are usually expressed is thoroughly misleading; but what as to the facts? Passing over the absurdity of the form, there is no doubt that the striking observation stands true—(a) that the number of marriages celebrated, and among them, again, the number of marriages celebrated in

particular ranks, and at particular periods of life, in a particular country, throughout a long range of years, present a remarkably constant percentage; and (b) that even the number of criminals, and also the number under each category, maintain an almost constant percentage.

Obs.—In England and Wales, for example, during the years 1858 and 1864, there were among the 1000 criminals 89 and 80 boys under sixteen years of age, 50 and 52 girls under sixteen years, 861 and 868 persons over sixteen years. In Prussia there was, in 1862, 1 criminal in a population of 2701; in 1863, 1 in 2714; in 1864, 1 in 2685; in 1865, 1 in 2657.

Before the Prussian Courts of Justice there were prosecuted—

	Under 16 yrs.	Between 16-24 yrs.	Between 24-40 yrs.	Between 40-60 yrs.	Above 60 yrs.
1862, .	46	1279	3019	1209	137
1863, .	41	1307	2685	1218	164
1864, .	49	1288	2743	1242	149
1865, .	37	1381	2777	1253	158

Among the accused parties were—

	Single Men.	Married Men.	Single Women.	Married Women.
1862, .	2522	2306	417	778
1863, .	2397	2238	497	846
1864, .	2447	2174	463	794
1865, .	2537	2281	497	871

In respect of occupation they were thus divided—

	Labourers.	Servants.	Artisans.	Merchants.	Officials.
1862, .	2339	597	440	263	196
1863, .	2050	621	497	259	199
1864, .	2151	523	466	281	181
1865, .	2636	557	454	284	165

During those four years there were discharged: 1046, 1183, 1159, 1113.

§ 173. *Crimes.—The proper Place of these Facts.*

We see here, then, that regularly fewer crimes are committed by boys than by grown-up men, and also fewer by old men than by those of middle age, more, however, by old men than by boys. Further, it appears that in the sixteen years

24 to 40, almost double the number of crimes of the eight years between 16 and 24 are committed, and also double as many as during the twenty years between the ages of 40 and 60. Thus, between the ages of 16 and 40, there is the same number of crimes for each period of eight years; but after that the crimes are less frequent, in advanced age they are fewer still, and in youth least of all.—The distribution according to occupations can have value only if, instead of percentage of population, that of the different callings be adduced. There are more labourers or factory-workers than artisans, more artisans than merchants, more merchants than officials. It is therefore quite to be expected that among the more numerous classes criminals should be more numerous than among those who are fewer.—Those, then, are the facts which constitute the residuum after deducting what is false and misleading in form or contents: (1) That more crimes are committed by men than by women; (2) more by persons in the full vigour of life, from 16 to 40 years, than by older people, and least of all old folks and children; and (3) that the whole number of criminals in proportion to the population under the same moral and social political conditions, *i.e.* in a particular state, during a particular period, remains constant.

§ 174. *Examination of Results. These affect not the Decisions of the Will, but their Execution.*

Does there then follow from this anything in conflict with the freedom of self-determination?—We must, above all, consider that free self-determination does not in the first instance refer to the performance of the act, not even unconditionally to the decision of the will in details, but to the ethical quality of the inner tendency of the will. In the position which he assumes toward God man is free, but only in so far as he has not forfeited his freedom (§ 117–119) and made himself the slave of sin. From the innermost tendency of will through inclination and wish, down to the decision of the

will, and from thence again to the performance, there is a long way in which man is not left to his own self-determination, but is surrounded by a multitude of influences, especially the social influences of his position in life. In order to lead to the commission of a crime, there is required not merely a sinful condition in general (to be a sinful man and to be a criminal are two different things), but it is necessary—(1) that sin should have inwardly obtained a certain dominion over the will, for a vice lies at the foundation of most crimes; and (2) that all those ways of thinking, not moral but eudæmonistic, resting on prudential considerations which are calculated to restrain a man already ensnared in sin and vice from the execution of a criminal thought, should have lost their power over him. To this class belong, for example, consideration for honourable relatives and friends, respect for public opinion, for the judgment of human society. In order to be able to perpetrate a crime, man must have first isolated himself from the ties of social life. This does not take into account the crimes committed under sudden passion; but the number of these is so small as to be inappreciable. He must first have snapped the cords that bind him to society, for the more of these bonds that exist the less will a criminal action be carried out. Thus the production of criminals depends essentially on his present social condition, on his having education and the nature of it, on the degree of earnestness with which criminal law is administered and public opinion brought to bear upon crime, on the dimensions of a starving proletariat, the easiness of his industrial calling, the honest or questionable character of his business, etc. And seeing that social conditions change not in a night but in years, yea, even through decades remain the same in a country, it affords an explanation of the third of those facts: the series of years during which in the one country an almost constant percentage in the number of crimes is maintained. Thus, for example, in France and Belgium, where education is badly managed, the number of youthful criminals is disproportionately greater than in Ger-

many. So also in countries where princes, from a misunderstanding of their right of pardon, allow no death sentence to be executed, or where an agitated manner in the commission of premeditated murder is regarded as proof of unaccountability, or a youthful age of seventeen years in the perpetration of criminal assault is taken as proof of incapacity to discern the criminal character of the action, and as ground for his discharge, crimes of violence increase in an alarming measure. And here now we see that that constancy of the percentage admits of important exceptions, which serve to confirm our contention. In every rapid change of social conditions the percentage of crimes changes; times of war, therefore, of revolution, and of famine are in this respect of special significance. In the revolutionary years 1848, 1849, the number of crimes increased: there were in France, during the five years 1846–1850, as many as 7430 convictions, in the five years following only 7104. After every war, as well as after a good vintage, the number of crimes of bodily violence is increased, because among the youth of the rougher classes brawling has been fostered, the horror of bloodshed diminished. In times of scarcity the number of offences against property is increased.

§ 175. *Continuation. Even the Will is not absolutely Free.*

In the second place, we must bear in mind the truth (§ 116 ff.) that sinful man, in proportion as he allows sin to have the mastery over him, becomes practically unfree in his willing, and the sport of circumstances and conditions surrounding him. In this way the first two facts are to be explained (§ 173). That only a very small percentage of youths under sixteen years of age are found among the criminals is just as natural as that none are found among sucklings and children in swaddling-clothes. Even the wickedness in man needed a certain time for its development; the path from inborn sin to open transgression is not traversed in a single day. The cases,

thank God, are rare where in childhood that bondage to sin reaches maturity, and such cases again are to be found only under utterly depraved and corrupt states of society. Youthful crimes, however, from monomania are not to be included here, because these are not so much crimes as products of spiritual disease.—In crime there has further to be taken into account, besides the will, also energy and opportunity. From the former, as well as from the predominance of cool deliberation and the extinction of the passions, it must be explained how in advanced age crimes become less frequent, and from both how they are less frequent among women than among men. Man stands amid the variously exciting relations of public life, woman the simpler relations of the home; woman is by nature inclined to passivity, man to activity; woman is timid, often faint-hearted; man by nature bold and enterprising. The whole range of those facts is perfectly explained from our presuppositions (§ 116 ff.). It affords the most decisive proof of the correctness of what we have said about the pathology of sin; but it does not therefore necessitate or justify in any way a denial of free self-determination as such.

§ 176. *Positive Proof to the contrary.*

Moral statistics itself, however, affords also further data which can only be explained on the assumption of the free self-determination of man. Above all, it is noticeable that those percentage statements are never absolutely constant. The numbers fluctuate up and down in separate years in a striking way; for example, the number of criminals in Prussia during the four years varied from 2651 to 2714, and there is still greater variation in separate provinces and departments. Sometimes the number of offenders in this province increases, and in that decreases, and sometimes the process is reversed. Generally those almost constant numbers can be obtained only by taking in a wide range; so soon as one descends to the concrete realities of circumscribed districts the constancy

vanishes. If among ten millions of men there is annually 1 offender in 3000, it does not follow that in every actual group of 3000 men there will be 1 offender; but in four towns of 3000 inhabitants one has perhaps in one year 4, and the other three may have no offender. If it were a law of natural necessity that operated, its applicability as law must tell in regard to all parts, as, for example, the law of the combination of O_2 with C in carbonic acid proves as true in regard to a gramme of carbonic acid as in regard to a kilogramme. Then the number of suicides have been pointed to, but here also the theory that denies freedom is found at fault. For the observation that among men suicide is more frequent than among women is of the less importance, inasmuch as here also the proportion is not constant, but even in the same country varies considerably (*e.g.* 28:9; 32:8; 27:9; 28:6; 20:4; 26:6; 21:4; 42:11, etc.), and inasmuch as the smaller number of female suicides is fully explained from the greater shrinking from pain and the greater timidity of the female sex, where for the most part suicides take place in consequence of unhappy or illicit love, and indeed generally in company with the loved one. The observation that in the hot season suicides are more frequent may be reduced to this, that then the blood is inflamed by the temperature, just as it is by drinking, and the passions are excited. The further observation, that suicides are more frequent among men on the first week days, among women on the Sundays, finds its easiest explanation in this, that men are wont to spend the Sundays and partly also the Mondays in revel and riot, and then at the beginning of a new struggle for life are in a despairing mood; whereas women on Sunday are forsaken of men and unemployed, have time at home to brood over their troubled thoughts. All this only confirms us in the view that (§ 174 f.) for the commission of crime there is required not only a sinful will, but also occasion and opportunity. Finally, the observation that in Germany there are more suicides among divorced people and bachelors than among married people, is explained

simply enough on the assumption of freedom of will and responsibility. In France, where marriage itself is often dissolute, and is only a mask for adultery, suicide is just as frequent among the married as among the unmarried.

Obs.—The assertion that with advancing years the inclination to suicide grows is altogether incorrect. It is demonstrable rather that during the period of life between 20 and 30 years suicides are most numerous, which may be simply enough explained by the fact that the passions of love are specially violent at that age. But how very inconstant the percentages are, is shown by the fact that among equal populations in Protestant Saxony there were in one million inhabitants during five years 202 suicides; in Protestant England, 62; in Romish Belgium, 56; in Protestant Denmark, 256; in Protestant Sweden, 67. Also in the choice of the mode of death there is no constant proportion. Among suicides in France there was the following distribution:—

	By shooting.	By drowning.	By inhaling charcoal fumes.
In 5 years, 1835-1839,	18 per cent.	33 per cent.	7 per cent.
„ 6 „ 1853-1858,	11 „	33 „	7 „
„ 11 „ 1848-1858,	11 „	31 „	9.2 „

Compare on this whole subject the able treatise of Dr. W. Schmidt, "*Moralstatistik und Willensfreiheit*," in the *Liter. Anzeiger* of Zöckler & Andreä, 1872, August to October.

§ 177. *Marriages.*

In order, however, to secure a pre-eminence to moral statistics, it has not been limited to crimes, but is applied also to matters that are morally indifferent, and an endeavour is made to show that, because these occur in a definite numerical proportion, they are wrought without freedom of will, according to the invariable necessity of a natural law. In this connection marriages especially have been pointed to. If man in any action whatever is free, it is certainly in marriage; and yet statistics show that in a definite number of people there is a definite percentage yearly of marriages; that among those marriages the greatest number of breaches on the part of husbands occurs between the ages of 25 and 40, and on the part of their wives between the ages of 17 and 27. In order fully

to understand this, it is only necessary to add that during the period of life from infancy up to 10 years in our country there are no marriages, and among people over 100 years of age their occurrence is rare in the extreme, which is certainly very remarkable, since "marriage is always supposed to be a free act." *Difficile est satiram non scribere!* For is marriage free in the sense that it only depends upon the will? For marriage it is necessary that maturity has been reached, it is necessary for normal marriage that the sexual instinct is not extinguished; but it is also unconditionally required, at least outside of Turkey, that the party be not already married. In this way already three great classes of the population are put apart as incapable of marriage. But it is further a condition of marriage that the party be able financially to maintain a household, and this again, in many different ranks, is altogether dependent on social position and national ideas of housekeeping. If, now, the performance of an act is so evidently dependent, not only on the will, but also on other conditions and dominating circumstances which are determined and regulated, partly by natural law, as the attainment of manly maturity, partly by social relations such as the laws of the State, how can one draw from the uniformity of statistics in regard thereto a conclusion upon the unfreedom of the will! The regulating limits lie not on the side of the will, but on the side of natural and social relations; and so it is admitted that during times of scarcity the number of marriages decreases. And why should only marriages be spoken about? There are other actions in which the individual is unquestionably very much freer and less under restraints than he is in reference to marriage. Of this class we may mention, for example, the acts of eating and drinking, those of walking, standing, sitting, lying. But now I can state, as the result of the most careful and exact statistical research, that in Germany between the hours of 8 o'clock evening and 11 o'clock night 3 per cent. of the population are found in a recumbent position, between 11 o'clock night

and 5 o'clock morning from 80 to 90 per cent.; that, further, the percentage of those walking under the age of 9 months is nil, from which point it rises at such a rate that man from the age of 6 to 24 years spends a greater portion of his time than at any other age in walking, running, leaping, and that this is true of males more than of females; and this especially presents itself as peculiarly worthy of attention, that in the higher ranks man between the ages of 10 and 18 years, during the months of August and September, spends a greater portion of his time in walking and less in sitting than at other times. It is also an undoubted statistical fact, that in Germany the mid-day hours between 11 and 2 o'clock and the evening hours between 7 and 9 o'clock are those in which 98·54 per cent. of the people are engaged in the act of eating. Shall we not then draw the conclusion from these statistical facts that the will is not free? The ability and desire for bodily exercise is just as naturally determined by a person's age as are the ability and desire for marriage. Harvest festivals are regulated by civil laws and ordinances, just as military service restricts marriages during particular years. And as the possibility of establishing a household depends upon social circumstances, so the possibility of eating depends on something having been cooked, and thus upon social customs which determine domestic arrangements. All this does not in the least infringe upon the freedom of the will. The old man who now walks little because he is soon tired and is physically in need of much rest, can therefore still rise and walk when he wills; and if I, departing from the usual custom, wish to have my mid-day meal brought me at 4 o'clock, no power on earth and no law of nature can hinder me from having it so.

§ 178. *Results.*

Those who by reference to the data of moral statistics seek to overthrow the doctrine of the spontaneity of the will

argue against us as if we, while speaking of free self-determination, thereby maintain or ought to maintain an absolute freedom, not only of the will, but also of the actual doing. The proofs of moral statistics can indeed only have reference to actual performance. But such an absolute freedom of action no one does and no one can affirm who is in his right mind. Every act is the product of two factors: of the will, and of the organs that carry out the will's behest. The latter are bound, conditioned, limited in various ways by outward circumstances. Now, if it happens, in consequence of this conditionateness of the organs for effecting a purpose, that definite proportions of men are excluded from the performance of certain actions, as infants are from running, children, youths, and married persons from marriage, the conclusion that the limitation must lie in the will is false. If in the production of a fact two causes *a* and *b* concur, and if the cause *b* is perfectly sufficient to account for some feature of this fact, it would be quite illogical to judge of this feature by the cause *a*. If not only the will but also the presence of ice are necessary conditions for skating, it would surely be absurd, from the fact that Germans are wont to skate only between the months of November and March, to conclude that Germans had no spontaneity of will.

Obs. 1.—Von Oettingen has composed his *Moralstatistik* with the best intention, but has contributed much more to the confusion than to the elucidation of the question. The way in which he attempts to steer a middle course, deceiving himself in an endeavour after conciliation, is quite erroneous. He says freedom may be "identical with social boundeness," whereas these two, not only theoretically but also actually, are opposed to one another. He lays down a complete apparatus of empirical laws, such as the laws of continuity and motivity, of tenacity, sensibility, normativity, etc., and wishes to prove therefrom that "the individual being moves as a moral subject only within the limits of society." In this way then man, if he were cast upon an uninhabited island, would be obliged as a moral subject to cease moving. Ought he then to curse God? Ought he then to bring his own life to an end? Compare in opposition to this §§ 101, 109, and the treatise of W. Schmidt

(see § 176, *Obs.*). Before the relation of the individual to the State and to the family could have been determined, the ethical relation of man to God existed, and it will continue to exist even should the social relations between man and man upon the earth be dissolved.

Obs. 2.—Rümelin, in his *Reden und Aufsätze*, Tübingen 1875, p. 25, has quite correctly emphasized the fact that “the opposite of the necessary is the accidental, but over against freedom stands compulsion or external necessity,” and that “our freest actions are those in doing which we have been most strongly influenced by motives.” He shows in a striking manner that statistical numbers represent no laws, but afford only “useful materials” for discovering social laws, only “historical testimonies” which prove the admitted position “that the individual is variously conditioned in his moral acting by society, by culture, position, rank, age,” etc.

B.—THE MORALITY OF MATERIALISM.

§ 179. *Failure of Materialistic Attempts to Construct a Moral System.*

What sort of moral system could materialism possibly originate and maintain, after having thrown overboard the ideas of free self-determination and accountability? All its attempts in this direction have proved utterly vain. There are not wanting indeed the most confident assertions that morality suffers no loss and is in no danger from this theory. Moleschott affirms that by this theory the ideas of good and evil are in no way endangered. He even makes an attempt to prove this. “We regard the will as a firmly established phenomenon of nature;” and from this he concludes that “the standard which determines what is good and what is evil is not a vacillating one.” He identifies or makes interchangeable the will and the measure, that is, the moral law. This law, then, according to his idea, does not stand superior to the will, but is a product of the will itself. Since, then, the will is not free, but is something called forth according to a natural law by motions in the ganglia of the brain, a pledge

is therein given that men at all times shall will the same, and so shall prize the same as good and judge the same as evil! But now experience teaches that men at various times have not been willing to define evil in the same way. The negroes in Central Africa are willing to regard cannibalism as very proper and quite allowable. The Turks do so in regard to polygamy, and the ancient Greeks did so regarding unnatural vice. And even now within the bounds of one and the same nation there are individuals who "are willing" to regard as evil and to repudiate murder, theft, adultery, and other individuals who "are willing" to commit murder, theft, adultery; and where the latter gain the supremacy, a state of things comes about like that of the Parisian Commune of 1871. Thus it is a fact, that between the will of the individual and the moral standard or law there is a very real distinction and antagonism, that indeed the moral law passes judgment on and condemns the will, and the will is disobedient to the law. If, then, according to Moleschott's idea, the will is a phenomenon of nature resulting from natural laws, the law that is in conflict with the will cannot possibly be the outcome of that law of nature, but must be a figment of the brain contradictory to the law of nature, a self-deception, an illusion. *Tertium non superest*; for the third supposition still possible, that the moral law is the product of one superior to nature, a self-conscious author of nature, is most decidedly repudiated by Moleschott. His confident assertion that the standard of good and evil according to his theory continues firm and is no way shaken is therefore but vain talk intended to dazzle and deceive short-sighted people. And, indeed, in another place he speaks explicitly thus: "The resemblance prevailing among men in their chief characteristics determines also the resemblance of their needs and interests, and thus forms a basis for the recognition universally of good and evil. But with the times, needs and interests change, and what to-day appears to man, what to-day to this and that nation appears to be good,

in consequence of changing needs comes to be the opposite. Morality and righteousness have no absolute value." Here he lets fall the mask, chatters no more of "an invariable standard of good and evil," deduces this standard no longer from a law of nature (that is, theoretically: for, indeed, that standard must remain the same through all times, just like the instinct of animals) — no, he here derives morality from changing circumstances. If once a country has become over-peopled, and the separation between rich and poor has become very marked, it may seem to be "a need" that the rich should be guillotined by the poor. But according to the moral principles of materialism, "the need" can never arise for the rich man to see in the poor his brother occupying an equal position in the sight of God, to regard himself as only a steward of goods lent him of God, with scrupulous reverence renouncing before God all miserly greed, in a free act of love offering a share of his own to better the condition of the poor. There is no God! There is no future! There is only the present, where every one must strive as much as possible for his own "interests" and seek to secure his own enjoyment!

Obs.—Quite as frankly J. C. Fischer says: "The distinction between good and evil means in the last analysis only need and interest. Hence to the individual, as to the race, very often the good is no good, and the evil no evil. Our views of good and evil change with changing needs. There is nothing absolutely good, nothing absolutely evil." Thus, then, the need and interest of the individual are the sovereign legislators!

§ 180. *The Materialistic and Christian Estimates of Man.*

The existence of a moral law, a measure of good and evil, and consequently of a distinction between good and evil, thus falls to the ground. Nevertheless Dr. Ernst Hæckel has the hardihood, in the introduction to his *Natural History of Creation*, to write: "The development theory of Descent is not detrimental to morality,¹ but actually advantageous."

¹ Compare with this the conclusion of § 157.

He even speaks of "the light shed by the doctrine of development" as rich in blessing. What can he mean by the words blessing and rich in blessing? He also says: "Our century, by the discovery of man's origin, forms the most significant and glorious epoch in the whole history of the development of mankind." Even Virchow in his celebrated lecture has given expression to the conviction that true culture and morality will not have reached its goal in Germany until the people have been freed from religious instruction about a supermundane God, and have had declared to them instead the conclusions of modern natural science. But Darwin speaks of the doctrine which is a fundamental position of Christianity, that the human race has fallen from a normal original condition into sin, as an insult to humanity, and thinks it a much more honourable thing for man to have been derived from ape-like animals, and to have been continuously advancing in development. He states this, however, in a singular way, in order to be able to extend to man his hypothesis of perfecting through sexual selection. So he lays down the proposition (*Descent of Man*, p. 594), that man in his primitive, half-animal condition, lived a purer moral life than this now witnessed among the rude Indian tribes; meaning that there was no polygamy, polyandry, and infanticide. Thus, then, even he assumes a depravation! And, in fact, in another place he expresses the opinion that the custom prevailing among many peoples of killing weakly children, is not so much an evil when the intention is to secure a vigorous posterity. Therefore infanticide would be an object of moral development to which the Darwinian perfected mankind would be right in subscribing and contributing? While he chatters thus about regular improvement, he cannot help skimming off such filth and retreating from a conclusion of which even he himself must again confess that it is a depravation, a falling away from original moral purity. How many weak-bodied, sickly, even crippled men there are, nurtured by Christian love and retained in life, who have

become conspicuously endowed men. This misdemeanour, however, must not again be repeated. There is no mind or spirit. Only a favourable development of body is of any value. Men are to be estimated by the standard applied in the cattle market to bulls and calves !

At another time Darwin says (*Descent of Man*, p. 95) : "The feeling of religious devotion is a highly complex one, consisting of love, complete submission to an exalted and mysterious superior, a strong sense of dependence, fear, reverence, gratitude, hope for the future, and perhaps other elements. No being could experience so complex an emotion until advanced in his intellectual and moral faculties to at least a moderately high level." He also speaks of the idea of a universal Creator of the universe as only slowly rising in the consciousness of man.¹ According to this, the idea, or more correctly, the knowledge,² of God would be a high point in the development, and whoever does not yet know God occupies a lower and ruder place. And yet he praises Häckel as a light of the world, and in conjunction with him wishes to induce mankind to throw overboard that "idea" ! This then should be the end of the development, that one is thrown back into the bog out of which he had been raised. It is supposed to be an insult to man to have it said to him : "Thou hast received from thy Creator free will ; thou hast misused this freedom of self-determination, and art fallen into a condition which is contrary to the divine will and to thine own truest and innermost nature. Selfishness, sensuality, hatred, envy, lying, murder, fornication, and impurity are things whereby thou dishonourest thyself and makest thyself unhappy. Thou hast been created for better things : thou also bearest in thy conscience something that answers to thy true

¹ Also, Oscar Schmidt, *Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism*, 6th ed. London 1884, p. 300.

² As though God were an "idea" produced by man ! He is who He is, from Himself and in Himself, and we have not to produce Him or to discover Him, but to acknowledge Him.

being. Thy destiny and thy salvation are of such account before God, that He allowed His own other self, His own Son, to go forth in thy condition and in thy wretchedness, and to suffer death, in order that thy destination to salvation and holiness might be restored thee. Consider with thyself: lay hold upon saving grace, which God offers thee." This, forsooth, is insulting to man! But he is honoured when Darwin, Häckel, and their followers announce to him: "Thou art created by no God, but by a fortuitous play of atoms the world has developed itself, and in it by chance causalities the animal kingdom has been originated, and through adaptation, natural and sexual selection, thou hast been thyself, O man, developed from a gorilla-like beast. Thou art only a species of an animal genus (Häckel, *Natural History of Creation*, chap. xix.), and like all other cattle thou hast only a short time to live on earth, to grow old, to end your days, and go to corruption. The ideas of a God, a moral law, a conscience, to which thou hast wrought up and with which thou hast alarmed thyself, rest on pure illusion. There is no moral lawgiver. What man calls good or evil, is the result of a distinction necessitated by the social needs of the race of apes developed into men,—a distinction expressed in one way to-day and to be expressed differently to-morrow. All that men do and strive to do, including the most cruel, shameful, and swinish acts, are the consequence of the necessary carrying out of this law of nature. So-called evil corresponds to the true essential nature of man, as well as the so-called good. There is nothing which is in itself evil. He would be a fool who would frighten himself with the thought of a God who does not exist, of an eternal state which does not exist, of a moral law which does not exist! Eat and drink, good soul, for to-morrow thou shalt die! But be comforted, thy race endures, and will by means of sexual selection develop itself into even higher forms of apedom, until some day a mighty avalanche or some universal volcanic outburst, or a sudden dash into the sun, will end the

whole comedy."—Thus it is that those who think themselves wise become fools.

That it is not an exaggeration to speak of "higher forms of apedom" is proved from an anonymous treatise published by Meissner of Hamburg in two volumes, under the title, *Schöpfung und Mensch*. In this treatise materialism is described as "the friend and furtherer of intelligence," metaphysics and religion as "hostile to and destructive of intelligence." This, of course, after a statement that it is "a colossal superstition" to believe in the existence of spirit. In this treatise it is required that it should be forbidden to take the word "God" into the mouth; and in the same work and by the same writer it is said: Natural law and human will say that what religion condemns as sin forms just the most important side of human nature, the side upon which man's capability of development rests. And, finally, we read in that treatise the following passage: "It would seem that originally sexual modesty did not exist. To the organs of generation man originally assigned no other properties than to other organs. The doing of this was the result of the conceitedness and servile spirit of religions." Thus bestiality is the morality of materialism. Jude, vers. 8, 13, 18, 19.

FIFTH SECTION.

THE PANTHEISTIC PHILOSOPHY.



§ 181. *Relation of Pantheism to Materialism.*

PANTHEISM, especially in its development by Hegel, regards "spirit" as the existing, and sensible perceptions as its phenomena, and would seem therefore to be the diametrical opposite of materialism, which views sensibly perceived matter as the existing, and spirit as a mere function of matter. And yet Pantheism is the high road to Materialism, as may be seen from the cases of Feuerbach, Comte, Littré, and Strauss. The roots of materialism already lie hidden in pantheism. From the *πρώτον ψεύδος* (comp. § 89) lying at the root of pantheism from Spinoza down to Von Hartmann, that consciousness is a limitation irreconcilable with the idea of the Absolute, there immediately follows the doctrine that the Absolute is neither conscious nor capable of sense perception. But if the Absolute is not personal, it follows in strict consistency that wherever in the world self-consciousness appears, this is brought about by non-self-conscious factors, by causes that have no personal existence, therefore by unconscious powers. Now these unconscious powers are just what is commonly called matter (§§ 26, 62). But so soon as one has reflected upon this proposition: unconscious powers are matter or adhere to matter, and combine therewith the above axiom of Hegel, materialism is in full bloom which takes matter for the ground and cause of consciousness. All the sooner must its votaries turn to this latter doctrine in con-

sequence of the artificial and imperfect attempt of Hegel to derive the origin and first movement of concrete things by a dialectic process from his misconception of the Absolute, as the absolute *nec-nec*, as the subjectively abstracted indeterminate Absolute.

Just then because a pantheistic view of the origin and development of the world contributes to the ultimate triumph of materialism, it must receive a thorough and separate treatment. The problems are: *A.* How has that *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* been formulated and supported by the several chief representatives of Pantheism? *B.* Has Pantheism succeeded in explaining from the premises of that *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* the existence and the continued existence of the world?

A.—THE *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS A LIMITATION, IN ITS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.

§ 182. *Spinoza.*

Baruch Spinoza, son of a Portuguese Jew in Amsterdam (born in A.D. 1632; died A.D. 1677), confirmed in his scepticism by his teacher Van den Ende, adopted with enthusiasm the philosophy of Descartes (comp. § 60), without, however, penetrating to its core. The starting-point: *de omnibus dubitandum esse*, suited him. He so completely misunderstood the central point rather inadequately expressed by Descartes (§ 60, *Obs.*)—the self-certainty of the Ego—that he (*Principia philosophia Cartesiana*, 1664, pars 1, propos. 1) rendered the proposition: *cogito, ergo sum*, by *de nulla re possumus absolute esse certi, quamdiu nescimus nos existere*. Thus with him the knowledge of other things was the end, and the knowledge of his own existence only the means to this end. His misconception is further shown in that he felt himself obliged to prove (prop. 3): “*Ego*,” *quatenus res constans corpore sum, non est per se cognitum*; and that only *quatenus cogitamus* is the *Ego*, the *primum cognitum*.

The dualism of *corpus* and *mens* as existing in the *Ego* having been dogmatically assumed as a fact and put down as an axiom, we are afterwards asked which of the two is sooner and more firmly recognised. Thus the idea of self-consciousness, or of his own absolutely conscious *Ego*, which was present, in a half concealed form indeed, but yet really present, in the philosophy of Descartes, is resolved into a relativity, and in this way utterly destroyed. From the first Spinoza fell back to the standpoint of a mere universal consciousness, where the being conscious was only one phenomenon alongside of many others. And so we never in his writings meet with the idea of self-consciousness, but always only the dualism of *corpus* and *cogitatio*. So one may say : Spinoza sought to traffic in misunderstood and undigested Cartesian ideas. Seeing, then, the inner connection between this and the fact that he does not recognise the idea of the spontaneous positing of an end, but only that of causality, he states as in need of no proof the distinction (*Princ. phil. Cart.* ax. 6, 7), that every idea has either a *possible* or a *necessary* existence, and that only a *res existens* can be the *causa* of a *res existens*, and (ax. 11) that *nulla res* exists, in regard to which one may raise a question about the *causa* of its existence. That then which has a *causa existentie* is *necessarium*. Thus he reaches the position that God is to be conceived as *prima causa*, which has an *existentia necessaria*. But he fails to observe (see § 96) that only a *causa* that posits an end and distinguishes itself from its effect by positing an end can be the *prima causa*. Inasmuch as he constructs the idea of God only from the category of pure causality, *i.e.* of necessity, he consistently reaches the conclusion (prop. 7, lemma 1), that a *res*, the more perfect it is, the more necessarily does it involve existence, that therefore God wills the world as it is and all that is and is done in it with necessity, must so will it; but that implies that it is not willed by Him, but is merely an evolution of His being and nature, the manifestation of God. In this way, then, he ascribes to God *intellectus* (prop. 9), but only as substantial,

that is, as meaning that all that *intelligitur* by us is founded in the substantial being of God as the abstract rationality (comp. § 83). On the other hand, he expressly says (prop. 12, coroll. 3) that God has no self-consciousness: *Deum non sentire nec proprie percipere, nam illius intellectus a nulla re extra se determinatur.*

While, then, from his *Principia philosophiæ Cartesianæ* we see how he came upon his peculiar system, the development of that system is presented us in his *Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata*, written in 1670, but first published after his death. This treatise affords the means of testing more exactly his endeavours to prove his position. He starts here also from the pure idea of causality (pars 1, defin. 1): *per causam sui intelligo id, cujus essentia involvit existentiam.* To this he adds his second definition: *ea res dicitur in suo genere finita, quæ alia ejusdem naturæ terminari potest.* He gives also the following as a further definition: *ea res libera dicitur, quæ ea sola suæ naturæ necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur*; and does not observe that in this derivation of freedom from necessity (comp. his propos. 32) a doctrine is affirmed which ought first to have been proved. From these premises, then, he derives the idea of "the one unlimited substance." "That can also be thought of as non-existent, whose *essentia* embraces not in itself *existentia*." "What has not its being in another must have it in itself." "What has its being in itself is substance." "There cannot therefore be two or more substances, because the one could not be the cause of the being of the other, since it lies in the very idea of substance that it is its own cause." This one substance he calls God.

(a) Spinoza thus conceives of God as the *prima causa* of all that exists. Nothing could be said against this, if Spinoza had only developed the contents lying in *causa* as well as in *prima*. This would have led him to the idea of a cause positing an end, and consequently self-conscious. For of a being which relates itself causally, therefore operatively,

without being necessitated in its operation by another being, a superior *causa*, we must conclude that it operates freely, therefore not in consequence of a cause necessitating it, but so that it freely determines itself to become a cause of that which does not yet exist, *i.e.* that it posits itself as an end. For were that being necessitated in its operation, *e.g.* by its "essence," then not it, but this its essence, would be the *prima causa*. But then there would need to be independent *existentia*, according to Spinoza's own correct axiom (defin. 1), ascribed to this "essence" of the being. Thus we would have a *deus supra deum*, and to this must we ascribe—unless it is to be necessitated by a still more primary *causa*—that freedom of operation which is synonymous with the positing of an end.

(b) Spinoza conceives of God as the *one substance*. Even in this there is a truth. In the last analysis there lies in all being as its basis the being of God (§ 91), not immediately, however, but so that the will of God forms the middle term (§ 91). But Spinoza does not bring forward the idea of the will, still less that of the end-positing will. In prop. 31, without more ado he throws together *voluntas*, *cupiditas*, *amor*, and *intellectus*, without inquiring what *voluntas* is. In prop. 32, he says: *voluntas non potest vocari causa libera, sed tantum necessaria*; and in pars 2, prop. 49, coroll., he says: *voluntas et intellectus idem sunt!* Thus he regards (pars 1, prop. 16) all finite being as issuing necessarily from the being of God. He explains all things of the world as *modi* of the one substance, *i.e.* (defin. 5) as *affectiones substantiæ*, and (prop. 18) God as *causa immanens mundi*.

(c) To this we now must add his assertion (defin. 2), that *terminatum* and *finitum* are identical, and also in prop. 28 he takes *terminatum* as correlate to *finitum*. In God, the *natura naturans* is the infinite multitude of all attributes, *i.e.* determinations of essence.¹ These, however, are in him

¹ Defin. 4: *Per attributam intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens.*

without distinction, and (pars 2, prop. 8): in a circle all right angles of all possible pairs of cords bisecting one another are contained without as such existing,—therefore contained in it potentially. First in the *natura naturata* do these *determinationes* apart from one another appear as such, and therefore also as finite. From this there follows (pars 1, prop. 31): *intellectus actu, sive is finitus sit sive infinitus, ut et voluntas, cupiditas, amor etc. ad naturam naturatam non vero ad naturantem referri debent.*

This assertion, that no actual *intellectus*, therefore no self-consciousness, is to be ascribed to God, follows as the ultimate consequence from fundamentally perverse premises; but even the postulate specially inserted for the support of this assertion, that God is an *ens indeterminatum*, is, apart from the formally false way in which it introduces the idea of a determinate, radically perverse. This is in need of a special consideration. Every definition should, according to Spinoza, be a negation of all other definitions. The absolute substance, however, is infinite being, the negation of all negation, therefore an *ens absolute indeterminatum*. He takes “determinate” sometimes (as in prop. 26) as the passive participle, “what is operated on by another, what is not of itself;” sometimes (as in ax. 3) as an adjective, “what forms a definition of essence in itself.” That these two are not synonymous is evident. In the former sense we heartily agree that God is an *ens absolute indeterminatum*, i.e. an essence purely self-determining and not determined or operated upon by another. In the other sense, however, the general statement is radically false. (1) Whoever is self-determined thereby gives himself a definition, otherwise he would bring himself to nothing, that is, would not determine himself. (2) And it is not true that a definition is exclusive of all others, or is their negation. If this were so, the simplest logical judgment would be impossible; for every idea that forms the subject of a proposition is a definition, and every idea that forms a predicate is also one, that is, is another definition. “Eye” is another along-

side of "seeing;" "sun" is another alongside of "shining." Yet the subject does not exclude but include the predicate. The eye is seeing, the sun is shining. We say at once: "the sun" is not "shining," and also "the sun is shining." In our subjective construction of the idea, the term "sun" is so to be distinguished from the term "shining" that the two terms will actually relate themselves negatively to one another, since actually "sun" is not equivalent to "shining," but is another idea. But only in the operation of reflection and disjoining, in which human thinking considers its elements apart from one another, has this negation any place; and it has this place only in so far as it is to be again undone in the judgment: "the sun is shining," which expresses the knowledge corresponding to objective truth, that one term as a definition does not exclude another. But while in a thing its properties, or in a complex of forces its several forces are affirmed and by no means negated, in a much higher sense the definitions which make up its spiritual content are affirmed in the self-conscious subject, the Ego, and the self-conscious Ego excludes these definitions just as little as they exclude the Ego or self-consciousness. (Comp. § 89.) If Spinoza were right, then he ought never to attribute to God the predicates of "substance" and "absolute;" for "substance" would be the negation of what is not substance, of mere essence or mere existence, and "absolute" is the negation of the relative. The idea of substance itself involves the negation of the non-existent.

Obs. 1.—Kirchmann (*Philos. Bibliothek*, ii. 158) has given a very fair reproduction of that proof offered in support of that $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu$ $\psi\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$, when he tersely states it thus: "The infinite would appear as the finished not infinitely: for the infinite is never finished." It must at least be said: "And the finished would be as infinite never finished." Instead of the speculative idea of the universal positivity, that is, substantial universality, which idea corresponds to that of the Absolute *per se*, Kirchmann substitutes the idea of "the finished," which is in itself already a relative notion. For whatever is "finished" has had a beginning, and was unfinished, and has become finished. In

the idea of the finished lies, therefore, that of becoming, and therewith that of relativity. And so the idea of the Absolute, or, Kirchmann would rather say, that of the Infinite, certainly excludes that of the "Finished." Only it is thereby in nowise proved that it also excludes the idea of substantial positivity, self-determining universality.

Obs. 2.—That Spinoza's Ethics do not transcend a doctrine of mere prudence has been acknowledged by Hamann, Baader, and even by Schopenhauer himself. Compare Fr. Hoffmann in Zöckler's *Lit. Anzeiger*, 1873, Apr. p. 256 ff.

§ 183. *J. G. Fichte.*

Leibnitz has combated the pantheism of Spinoza, and secured the victory by means of his doctrine of monads, which, however, is imperfect in this respect, that it resolves the essential distinction between mere forces and groups of forces on the one hand, and the life-monads and self-conscious monads on the other hand, into the relative distinction between darkly and clearly reflecting monads, "monads of perception and of apperception." Its deficiency, however, above all, rests in this, that it brings into full view only the side of perception, thought, knowledge, not that of the will,¹ and so does not transcend the mechanism of "pre-established harmony." Long after the doctrine of monads had been forgotten, and after the weaker side of the Leibnitzian philosophy had been reproduced in a lifeless system by Wolff, a new era began with Kant's *Critical Philosophy*. While Kant had sought to distinguish (comp. § 38, *Obs.*) what belongs objectively to the thing in itself and what is contributed thereto by the thinking subject, it was J. G. Fichte who reproduced at this formally more elevated stage of the development of thought the old proposition of Descartes about the self-certainty of the Ego. He did this, just like Descartes, proceeding first of all from the standpoint

¹ Inasmuch at least as by him the "entelechies" of the monads are finally reduced into "representations." The consequence is, that at last he reaches only an aggregation of monads, and thus does not get beyond a "Pre-established Harmony."

of the human individual Ego, but was of necessity led from that to the knowledge of the Absolute Ego, God, as lying at the basis of the being of the universe. But at this point he becomes one-sided by emphasizing the immanence of God in the universe at the cost of His transcendence, and of an absolute form of existence, and consequently at the cost of His very personality. He does not indeed conceive of the Absolute Ego as an inactive, mere existence, but with all definiteness as knowledge, thought, will, action, as spiritual and intellectual actuality, yet not as a knowing, thinking, willing, acting subject. He simply holds by the abstract idea of knowledge, will, etc. Why is this?

By a similar confusion of thought to that which appears in Spinoza, Fichte thinks that the Absolute Ego is "indeed a knowledge, but not a knowledge of something," because "something" would be a definition, a determining or positing which involves the negation of everything else. But in this term "something" there lies an ambiguity, just as in Spinoza's phrase *determinatum*. If by "something" a particular something is understood, it must be fairly admitted that the Absolute Ego has not, as we have, a limited knowledge of several particular objects, but it has the knowledge that embraces the universe, and in it every particular and detail. But if by "something" we understand the pure antithesis of nothing, then certainly we must maintain that the knowledge of the Absolute Ego is a knowledge of something. Should Fichte deny this, then that is equivalent to affirming that the Absolute Ego has a knowledge of nothing; but a knowledge of nothing is just the same as no knowledge. The idea of knowledge, conceived of in such abstraction from all cognitive contents, is self-destructive. A knowledge without contents, without anything known, is inconceivable, a *contradictio in adjecto*. Thus Fichte's Absolute Ego resolves itself into an inconceivability. An Ego which has no object of its knowledge, is not subject of the knowledge. Where there is nothing known, there is no knower. There remains only the

abstraction, knowledge, under which, however, after the withdrawal of the known and the knowing, nothing thinkable any longer remains. Or was it perhaps Fichte's opinion that the Absolute Ego is still the knowing subject, but has for the content of its knowledge only its own self? But even then the predicate "Absolute Ego" would be appropriate to every man lying in dreamless sleep or in impotence, since in such a man (as is incontrovertibly proved, § 58) the knowing power itself without the knowledge of an object is present. That the Absolute Ego of God, as author of the universe, must be the very opposite of this is clear. But it is also unquestionable that Fichte did not wish to be understood in this sense. He denies unconditionally and in the most decided way that the Absolute Ego is a knowing subject. If, says he, the finite Ego shall conceive of the Absolute Ego as something existing outside of it, this would be thinking of it as an existence; whereas, on the contrary, the Absolute Ego is no existence, nothing existing abstractly; it has no being outside of the finite Ego. The Absolute Ego, as pure absolute knowledge, without a knower and without a thing known, is nothing else than "the form of pure reason," the law which lies at the basis of all thinking and willing of the finite subject. Here we have the paralogism set forth already in its nullity in § 83, *in optima forma*.

It was a praiseworthy inconsistency that led Fichte to represent this abstract form of reason, not as the logical law, as was subsequently done by Hegel, but as the ethical. This we call an inconsistency, because by due sequence of thought he should have reached the conclusion that the ethical law, inasmuch as it is directed to the will of the personality, cannot be conceived of apart from a personal author, that it is conceivable only as the will of a personal being expressed as law. For the ethical law has undoubtedly a content, and is not by any means a mere abstract form. How, then, could an abstract knowledge, without contents, without a knowing subject and a known object, lay upon man ethical demands? It

just comes to this: in one breath the Absolute is described as without contents, and a definite content is assigned Him,—the deportment of a personal being is attributed to Him for contents, and yet again personality itself is denied Him! It is clear that Fichte, by his doctrine of the Absolute Ego, has again destroyed the very idea of the Ego.

§ 184. *Schelling.*

In his later writings Schelling verbally repeated Fichte's propositions. For example: "Vom Ich" (*Sämmtl. Werke*, i. 1, p. 200): "In the finite Ego is unity of consciousness, that is, personality. The infinite Ego, however, knows no object, therefore also has no consciousness and no unity of consciousness, no personality. The final end of all effort, therefore, may be represented as the widening out of personality into infinity, that is, as its destruction." At p. 209 he says: "God is something which we can only strive to realize in the infinite." We have here instead of the existing God, the God conceived of as in eternal becoming, that abstract knowledge and willing present in all concrete thinking and willing but never actually attaining to being and to thinking. The truth is here quite evidently turned upside down in a tremendous *hysteron-proteron*. All abstract ideas are in reality products of our subjective thinking. The finite Ego of man in his reflective consciousness (§ 53), in the way of subjective abstraction, forms for itself the ideas of subject and predicate of the proposition, and first then reaches by synthetical combination of the two unto a knowledge of real existence. Fichte and the Schelling of 1795 get rid of that former product of subjective thinking, the *abstracta*, by pointing at a distance to the second, the synthetic combination, explained not only as the objective, but also as the absolutely real ground of all being and thinking. Even in his *Naturphilosophie* (1786–1800) Schelling had not overcome this *πρώτου ψεύδους*. While Fichte had seen nothing in nature but the

material in which and with which ethical duty has to work, Schelling recognised in nature rather an independent form of the revelation of the Absolute Ego. Falling back upon Spinoza's dualism of the two attributes Extension (*corpus*, which, according to Spinoza, *Princ. phil. Cartes.* pars 2, is equivalent to *extensio*) and Thought, Schelling propounded the doctrine that the Absolute actually reveals itself in a polar contradiction, as realistic pole in extended matter, as idealistic pole in subjective thinking of the finite subject. Then the polarity repeats itself on the side of realism as matter and light, on the side of idealism as being and thought. But the Absolute itself is neither subject nor matter, but abstract intelligence without *intelligens* and without *intellectum*. Being also is denied to the Absolute: "God is never, as being is, what is represented in the objective world: if He was, then would not we: but He reveals Himself continually." The Absolute of Schelling's *Naturphilosophie* to all intents and purposes is not.

§ 185. *Hegel.*

While Schelling, from A.D. 1800 and onwards, began in his *Identitätsphilosophie* to transcend that Spinozist-Fichtean abstraction, inasmuch as he defined the Absolute on the one side as indeed still "absolute indifference" between the two poles, and so as negative, void, but on the other side as nothing less than the "identity" of the two poles, consequently as the most positive of all things, embracing in itself the whole fulness of all being and of all thinking;¹ Hegel, on the other hand, remained firmly rooted on the soil of that abstraction. He distinguishes himself from his predecessors only in this, that for the assertion that consciousness is a limitation correlate to finitude, he does not adduce a shadow of a proof,

¹ From this position Schelling did indeed afterwards, under the influence of Baader, advance to the recognition of a self-conscious personal God, though still he conceived of the same in a semi-panteistic way as one necessitated in the will to create.

but without more ado treats this proposition as an axiom that needs no proof. Consequently in his logic he starts from the assumption, that the Absolute is the absolute being identical with the absolute nothing, therefore the abstract being absolutely without contents. Thus, after deduction of all contents, something still remains over, which he conceives of as abstract logical form, as the idea in the sense of logic; not, however, as the idea of something, but as the idea *in abstracto*, which is neither subject nor object, but is present in both, is the object as realized idea, and in the subject as self-thinking idea. The idea in the abstract, however, is neither thinking nor thought, neither conceiving nor conceived, but the mere abstract logical form. But in truth this is in the object not the same, but is another from that which is found in the reflecting and abstractly thinking subject! Whether Hegel has been successful in explaining the actual world from these premises, we shall endeavour to show in a subsequent paragraph (§ 188). For the present it suffices to point out that his whole system rests upon that *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*, that consciousness is a limitation correlate to infinitude, as upon an utterly unproved hypothesis.

§ 186. *E. von Hartmann.*

Most recently of all, E. von Hartmann has again reanimated this proposition that the Absolute is an Unconscious one, and has reared upon this his PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.¹ Seeing that we have in great measure combated his erroneous premises in detail in our First Book,² a mere sketch of his system, with a repetition of some of his sophisms, will be here sufficient.

(a) Hartmann (see *Obs.* 1) knows nothing of the distinction between general or world consciousness and self-consciousness

¹ *Philosophy of the Unconscious*. Transl. by W. C. Coupland, 3 vols. London. Trübner 1884.

² Compare also my work, *E. von Hartmann's Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Gütersloh 1876.

(see §§ 58, 59); so he thus explains dreaming, somnambulism, unreflected thinking, the prognostications of genius, even the origin of language (see *Obs.* 2), to unconscious antecedents in the subject, whereas we have convinced ourselves (§§ 51–55) that in them all self-consciousness forms the presupposition. (b) Hartmann again refers to those vital functions of body and those functions of instinct which in the animal are carried on in an unconscious manner. He really concludes therefrom that there is operative in these functions a force in itself unconscious, and that this operates also in those series of phenomena referred to under the former head. Therefore a force operating upon the animal in instinct and operating with design in the vital bodily functions of animal and man (he himself proves and even emphasizes the designedness), is “unconscious,” not knowing itself, because its effect, in which and toward which it acts, is not known to the animal, and by implication by the man! With equal right might one conclude, that because, if I write a letter, the paper on which I write knows nothing about the letters of the alphabet chosen designedly and with care by me, therefore I, the letter-writer, must be unconscious in my writing! Hartmann here becomes guilty of a paralogism similar to that of Fichte and Hegel; because, while he finds the predicate “unconscious” applicable under different circumstances, in part rightly as under (a), in part wrongly as under (b), he makes of this abstract idea of predicate or property a substantial notion. Because here and there something comes about in a somewhat unconscious way, he concludes to AN UNCONSCIOUS which is operative in all these cases. Just as if one were to conclude from meeting with bloody weapons, bloody straw, bloody bandages, in a battle to the existence of A BLOODY which had called forth and effected the whole war!

And if, now, it is a leading principle of Hartmann’s that “the Unconscious works according to design,” and that especially it directs the entire development of mankind “according to a simple unique plan” (vol. ii. p. 1 ff.), and that

it "is not merely a control in general or in great part," but that it is "operative everywhere in the minutest detail" (vol. ii. 358), and is "clear-seeing wisdom" (vol. ii. 273; comp. ii. 54 and ii. 88), he ought also to have seen clearly that with all these attributes the attributes of "the Unconscious" is not logically compatible. Nevertheless he affirms (A. vi. vol. i. 167) that the several ganglion knots could operate according to design only by their having "impressions," and that these could have them only on the condition that they have consciousness. Just so, and yet the being who orders according to design and governs the whole world is to be able to operate in accordance with design without impression or consciousness! What a contradiction! (See *Obs.* 3.) Hartmann himself sees (vol. i. 83) that in the positing of an end these elements are involved: (1) the willing of the end, (2) the willing of the means, (3) the realizing of the means, (4) the realizing of the end. But he seeks to turn aside the inevitable conclusion therefrom by saying, that in (1) and (2) a causality between one mental fact and another is met with, in (3) a causality between a mental and a material, and in (4) a causality between one material instance and another; and then continues: "the finality is therefore not anything existing alongside of the causality, but only a definite connection of different kinds of causality." Then he thinks finality can be reduced to mere causality in order that he may lead us back into the Spinozistic channel of causality (§ 182), and thus in cold blood he destroys his own proof of teleology. In doing so, however, he forgets that between that (1) and that (2) must be interjected as middle term the knowledge of the working of a means in the direction of the end (§ 45), and that therefore finality cannot be reduced to mere causality, and a positing of an end cannot be conceived of without consciousness. It remains, therefore, that the ideas of "the purposive" and of the "unconscious" exclude one another.

Still more conspicuous is the contradiction where Hartmann (C. iii. vol. ii. 83) lays down the proposition that the

principal end which the unconscious seeks to reach in the world, and the goal toward which the whole course of the world harmoniously strives, is the emancipation of the intellect from the will, the possibility of which is given in consciousness. How can the Unconscious posit consciousness as the principal means for reaching its ultimate end? He himself asks this question (vol. iii. 123); but what he offers for a solution is only a repetition of the contradiction. The unconscious "thinks" indeed of consciousness as the means of which it would serve itself, but it conceives the same "not as consciousness, that is, not in the subjective form in which the subject of consciousness feels itself affected by its consciousness." How then does the case stand? The "Unconscious" wills, according to Hartmann's statement, as its final end that the intellect should emancipate itself from the Will (see thereupon § 187); the "Unconscious" then, according to Hartmann's statement, knows that the means corresponding to this end consist in this, that the intellect should no more exist merely in the form of objective rationality according to the design of natural law as existing, but also in the form of the consciousness of this rationality, that there are therefore perceiving, conceiving, present and past—comparing subjects which distinguish themselves as egos from the objects of their perception. Such subjects then as subjectively knowing themselves must "think" the Unconscious, and must know that this self-differentiation of the subject from the object is the means to that emancipation, and why this is so. Indeed, just such bold flashes of philosophic thought as this of Hartmann's are what it might be expected that the philosopher of the Unconscious should be inspired with (B. v. and ix.)! The "Unconscious" then understands philosophy, and knows what consciousness is. And yet, forsooth, it is itself without consciousness! This indeed is just as naive as when Strauss affirms that a mollusc born blind has made for itself eyes for the purpose of seeing (§ 154, *Obs.* 2)! Hartmann's doctrine of the Unconscious thus puts all logic out of sight. But

finally he contradicts himself; for, when he says (vol. ii. 105) that the differentia of a less intense consciousness lies in the poverty of the contents given it, he thereby admits the principle with which we have in § 89 overthrown the *πρώτου ψεύδους* of pantheism.

Obs. 1.—Hartmann's explanation of the origin of consciousness from the conductivity of the nerves has already received confutation in §§ 24 and 52. In another place (B. vii. vol. i. 304) he makes the statement, which according to § 32 is quite correct, that "equality" is no property that can be abstracted from perceptions. Instead, however, of reaching the simple conclusion that equality is no property of the object which could be abstracted from it, but that the thinking subject distinguishes things as equal and unequal, and that consequently the subject must carry in itself the category of equality,—and instead of finding in the ego, which continues the same and knows itself as continuing the same, the ground of the category of equality inhering in the subject,—he assumes as an axiom the unproved statement that "abstract ideas, as that of equality," are not innate to the mind. Thus he supposes that the mind, in order to be able to make this distinction, "must already possess the idea of equality,"—which is in contradiction to the axiom. This then leads him to the conjecture that the mind, before it has attained unto conscious thinking, had already reached the idea of equality,—where, however, the same difficulty, created for himself by Hartmann, would be repeated. From all this, then, he wishes to prove that an unconscious being can be conceived of. But this is not true, since even in the so-called Unconscious, but more correctly Unreflecting, thinking (§ 51), self-consciousness must already be presupposed.

Obs. 2.—Hartmann says (B. vi. vol. i. 294): "When the human mind begins to philosophize it finds a language ready made for it, fitted out with all the wealth of forms and notions; and it requires thousands of years only to find its whereabouts in this wealth of unconscious speculation." There is therefore here also an unconscious thinking hastening on to conscious thinking. This is a ridiculous *quid pro quo*. The ideas of things and actual events had been, when language arose, already in existence (comp. § 49): the ideas of the ideas first arose in the minds of the philosopher. But even those former presuppose, as, according to § 32, every forming of an idea does, a self-conscious subject. Whoever said "nuhat" (great) had from the variously diversified great things disjointed the like attribute of greatness, and synthetically bound them up in an idea. This was a conscious activity of self-conscious-

ness bearing in itself the category of equality. Thus did substantive ideas, such as father, mother, child, house, animal, etc., form themselves not unconsciously but consciously; and so, too, the ideas of altered being, of becoming, and of acting, as to grow, to come, to go, to beat, etc., and of being remaining the same, to stand, to lie, to sit, and finally the abstract ideas of being, doing, willing, thinking. Now comes supplementarily the philosopher, and seeks to gain the ideas of these ideas. He takes the different cases together, in which is applied the perfected idea "to be," and distinguishes and investigates the being as existence, the being as quality or essence, the being there (*Dasein*), the being so (*Sosein*), the being as substantial being, as absolute being, etc. Thus he deals, not with the old ideas for which there are words already, but new ideas which he first forms by abstraction, and for which he must also first create new words or terms. In the forming of ideas of ideas, therefore, conscious thinking precedes the construction of a language, just as such conscious thinking had preceded in the formation of the actual ideas.

Obs. 3.—Hartmann is great in contradictions! In B. x. vol. ii. 26, he will not by the Unconscious have anything understood that transcends the limits of the individual, and asks: "What need for bringing in the idea of God where the individual with the faculties known to us can alone be perfect?" And at vol. ii. 25 he says: "By providence one cannot think of anything conceivable." On the other hand, he says elsewhere that the Christian conception of God's providence, as determining all things and every particular, "is only confirmed by our considerations," naturally in the sense that one must think of God as unconscious, as a "blind will," ruling the world in "clear-seeing wisdom." But this now leads us on to Hartmann's metaphysics.

B.—CAN PANTHEISM AFFORD AN EXPLANATION OF THE WORLD ?

§ 187. *E. von Hartmann's Metaphysics.*

We have here only two systems to examine: (1) The one contributed to in a preparatory way by Spinoza and Fichte, reaching its full expression in Hegel, which explains the present being and mode of existence of the world as the process of the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity

issuing from the Absolute; and (2) the other, the way of which was prepared by Schopenhauer, and developed by Hartmann, which makes the world proceed from the dualism of "will" and "idea," and makes it go asunder again into this dualism. In order to attach our remarks immediately to § 186, we begin with this latter system.

In willing that the world be, the Unconscious is blind;¹ in willing that this world should be it is clear-seeing;—Such is the oracular utterance of Hartmann (vol. ii. 273), which forms the kernel of his metaphysics. A blind "will" and a clear seeing "idea" concur in the Absolute.

A. In order to understand this, we must consider more closely his doctrine of the Will. There are here again two heterogeneous circles of thought along which he moves. Thus, as he reduces teleology into causality, he reduces the will into a mere force. Force is in truth an operator which operates conditionally, but under given conditions must operate. We have, however, proved in §§ 42, 43, that, on the contrary, the will is a power that can, not that must, operate, that each act of willing is therefore not a middle term between a necessarily operating law of nature and its own operating, but the first term in a perfectly new series of causalities beginning with it, and so spontaneous, and that thus the subject willing distinguishes himself from his operation. Hartmann, on the other hand, reduces the idea of willing to that of force. The reflex motions, the very vital actions, the circulation of the blood, digestion, etc., are reckoned by him to the "Will."² Further, the will is with him a wider, more abstract idea than force. The will is not a special kind of force, but force is a special kind of will.³ Now, if the will operates compulsorily, this is only because

¹ Literally, "Only if the existence of the world was decided by the act of a *blind* will is this existence comprehensible; only then is God as such not to be made responsible for the same." Vol. ii. 273.

² "The immanent cause of every movement in the animal is the will."
"The ganglion knots of the trunk have a will."

³ Force is also explained in Gust. Knauer's *Anti-Hartmann*, p. 16, as an

Hartmann has made it operate quite mechanically according to the "motive" (vol. i. 260 ff.). "The will reacts upon the motive," and this reaction "has quite the character of a reflex operation." At another place he says: "The will stands under the law of causality, and follows with necessity the motives operating upon it." At vol. ii. 97 he says: "If the idea contains a motive at all, the excitation of the unconscious desire (which is itself unconscious, according to vol. i. 262) must certainly follow." Here the idea of the will as such is denied. The will is nothing else than a natural operation without any independence. Upon this idea of will Hartmann constructs (B. 1) his ethics, inasmuch as he explains moral virtues and vices, such as gratitude, revenge, love of parents, etc., as mere excitations of instinct (vol. i. 210 ff.).

With this first cycle of thought, a second stands in complete contradiction, where he separates the abstraction, the will, from the concrete phenomena of the will, and raises this in a purely Hegelian sense into an independent substantial idea, and explains it as one of the two constitutive factors or principles of the universe. But here he combines with the formal Hegelian substantializing of an abstraction a material idea of Schopenhauer. The latter had (*Welte als Wille*, i. § 1), from the fact that the objective world, which we make our own as the content of our perceiving and knowing, is given us not as produced by our own will but by another will, the will of the author of the world, God, reached the evidently false conclusions that "the world is will," and that the will "is the thing in itself," and that the world as such is in direct contradiction to the intellect, is groundless and indeterminate.¹ Laying hold upon this set of ideas, Hartmann now also maintains that the dull will is one of the two principles

accident-idea. Hartmann himself at vol. i. 260 defines the will as "latent force," and thus conversely subsumes the idea of the will under that of force.

¹ In regard to Schopenhauer we refer to Fr. Hoffmann, *Philosophische Schriften*, vol. ii. R. Haym, *Arth. Schopenhauer*, Berl. 1864. M. Venetianer, *Schopenhauer als Scholastiker*, Berl. 1873. Heyder, *Die Lehre von den Ideen*, Frankf. 1874, vol. i. p. 317 ff.

of the universe. He here indeed himself rightly admitted (A. iv. vol. i. 118): To will is always to will something; but instead of holding fast by this, and recognising that it belongs to the very nature of the will that it should be the productive positing of something that as yet did not exist, therefore of a content, and that only in subjective abstraction can the will empty itself of its contents (for we affirm of the will as subject of the proposition the idea of the predicate, that it has a content, as when we say of iron that it exists in space),—instead of this he now regards the will and its content as two substances objectively existing alongside of one another, “united” indeed, but objectively separable. And so he continues: “Wherever we meet with a volition, a representation or idea must be united with it,” and from this he concludes that the will is in itself utterly dull and stupid. The circular line encloses a circular surface, and cannot be conceived without a circular surface; hence it follows that he is “stupid” who will think of a circular line without a circular surface. From this it follows again that the will is a something exercising volition, that he is “stupid” who would think of a contentless or “stupid,” dull will.

B. To the theory of a mere “empty will” (C. xiv. vol. iii. 120) there is added as a second that of pessimism. When Hartmann was not able from his mechanical doctrine of the will to bring forth an ethical system, and consequently could not recognise in morality the final end of the world, he sought this (vol. ii. 356 ff.) in emancipation from all disinclination. This eudæmonistic, painless happiness, however, as might be expected (comp. § 129 ff.), he could not find in the world (see *Obs.*), and hence declares (vol. ii. 367 and vol. iii. 125) that “the non-existence of the world is better than its existence: no world were better than this, which nevertheless is the best possible.”

C. From the combination of these two principles the following proposition is obtained: “The fact of the origin of the world is determined by the mere unreasoning will.”

Everything in the world which is reasonable and working toward an end must consequently have another author. And so, while Hartmann calls his system "monistic," he sets forth a system of pure DUALISM with two original principles, the will and the idea. The will was at first "empty will without contents," and therefore "absolute unblestness." It was thus sensitive, yea self-sensitive, and yet without contents! The idea was at first "a non-existent being." Here we need no parenthesis, for Hartmann himself immediately adds: that "we find ourselves here in a region where our ideas by degrees leave us in the lurch." The unblest, in respect of contents barren, will is now guilty of the stupidity of "embracing" the idea, fructifying it, which is still non-existent with existence, giving to it reality, and so creating the world. That a world exists results from a stupid action of the stupid will. But how this world exists, the mode of its existence, is determined by clear-seeing wisdom. "The final goal of the world is the abolition of all disinclination." This does not mean that such is the final aim of the origin or existence of the world, for the stupid will when he fructified the idea with reality has no aim beyond getting rid of his own unblestness and disinclination. On the contrary, then, so long as the world has a being that end remains unattained. This "final end of the world" is therefore rather one that was first brought into being by the idea after the origin of the world. It is therefore not the final end of the world, but the final end of the procedure subsequently undertaken by the idea with the created world. The idea will make rightly what the will that is opposed to reason has made badly. It will compel the will to destroy again the being of the world, in order to destroy all disinclination. But because as unconscious idea it has no power over the will (it is then that "Unconscious," and so is not the author of the world), it has given it such contents, by means of which it enters into conflict with itself. It thus calls forth consciousness. With an end in view and with "clear-seeing wisdom," it arranges

nature (vol. ii. 83) "according to a simple unique plan, purely with a view to the originating of consciousness." Here then the idea over against the will has itself again a will, and that one which posits an end! "Consciousness must be a predicate which the will imparts to the idea." Pure nonsense! "The content of this predicate is the stupefaction of the will." The will therefore says to the idea, "thou stupefiest me," and consequently consciousness arises in the idea as a predicate! "It is stupefaction of the will at the existence of the idea not willed and yet sensibly felt by it." But the will had embraced and fructified the idea, and this surely as "will" it had "willed." Why has his little pet so suddenly turned against him! "The mind" (der Geist, who is that?) "before the rise of consciousness can have no other idea than those which, called into being by the will, form the content of the will. Then organized matter (but at vol. ii. 167, Hartmann proves that there is no matter) suddenly breaks in upon this self-contained peace of the Unconscious, and in the reaction of sensation occurring according to necessary law thrusts upon the astonished individual spirit an idea which falls upon it as from the skies, for it finds in itself no will to this idea." Previously we have seen that it is the idea that created consciousness, now it is said that it is matter that creates the idea. "This buttress of the will" (we should have thought it would have been of the spirit; unless this irrational will is itself the spirit!) "in the opposition to its domination is consciousness" (and so now an action of the will is no predicate of the idea). There is so much here of the stupefying sort, that if stupefaction succeeds in producing consciousness, this deduction must be capable of awaking to consciousness impotency and the lifeless corpse itself. Before there is consciousness in any natural being, the "Unconscious," according to Hartmann's assertion, has had over him undisputed sway. Even organized matter has to be organized by "the never-erring will of the Unconscious" (B. viii.). What then becomes of the organized matter as an "idea," which is

not begotten by the will of the Unconscious, but "falls upon it as if from the skies"? And how can the Unconscious, or the spirit or the will in the Unconscious, be astonished about it, seeing that all the while the origin of consciousness, together with all means which contribute to its origin, had been already determined by the Unconscious? It is thus quite evident that the dualism of the "will" and the "idea" stands in conspicuous and irreducible contradiction to the monistic theory of the Unconscious. And yet this is not by any means the greatest contradiction that we meet with here. What then should be the result of that astonishing origin of consciousness? "A conflict of the conscious notion with the will," which in the end "will have the result of abolishing all pain," because the number of conscious beings in the earth, irritated by the amount of misery,¹ "will embrace such a number of spirits and wills that it outweighs the spirits and wills of the Unconscious active in the rest of the world," and that it "secures the abolishing of the world will" and "willing is hurled out of existence, so that process and the world is abolished." For this end the crafty "idea" creates consciousness, that is, conscious being, because it foresees that these conscious beings by a vote of the majority (for Hartmann condemns individual suicide as quite needless) will in the future sometime decree the destruction of the world, and will thus bring all misery to an end. But the crafty idea might have effected all this in a more becoming manner. For since (according to Hartmann, *A. v.* vol. i. 167; *C. i.* vol. ii. 47; xii. vol. ii. 366-368) there is really no pain and no disinclination where there is no consciousness, the idea might by merely stopping the production of consciousness without any circumlocution have reached that which it would reach through this production only after such a long and extremely doubtful roundabout. It need not have called forth the evil, for which

¹ Vol. iii. 136: The other spheres "have scarcely reached a sufficient degree of coolness" to be able to afford a shelter for organisms. That depends on something else than cooling; see § 143.

such a salvation is needed. The production of conscious being, then, far from serving the purpose of abolishing pain, would have a result directly the contrary of this, and would really be responsible for bringing into the world pain which without consciousness would not have been possible. In short, this "idea" of von Hartmann is simply a Dr. Eisenbart, who makes straight limbs crooked, but does not make crooked limbs straight. It first created evil in the world, but it is not in any way able to remove it again out of it. For how, by a vote of the majority of men, the destruction of the universe should be brought about, is not very easily discernible by people who have not the misfortune to be wards of a thoroughly mischievous organization. It affords us no light on the subject to be told that "the carrying of that vote of general annihilation only depends on the perfecting of technical discoveries." Even dynamite would scarcely succeed in blowing up the universe into nothingness. One would need another explosive, imbecility, perhaps, to do this.

But the best of all is, that after this explosive, will and idea again exist dualistically apart from one another, as in the beginning. Now had the idea avoided the making of conscious being, pain and disinclination would never have arisen in the world (according to vol. i. 167, ii. 47, ii. 366 ff.). But the will continually gratified its thirst for contents, and thus all misery first came into the world, which can only be removed again at the cost of having the poor will hurled out at last as again "empty will" into its old "unblessedness," into the gnawing feeling of its own nothingness. And thus Hartmann's system contributes its own confutation. It proves that the "stupid" will was quite an intelligent fellow, but the clear-seeing notion had made the stupidest mess of the world. Instead of a Philosophy of the Unconscious, we have therefore a Philosophy of the Unthinking.

Obs.—The twelfth chapter of the third part, where Hartmann seeks in vain for painless happiness in health, youth,

freedom, easy competency, sexual love, the will, friendship, family life, etc., is admirable in its way. Oh surely, if one seeks his chief end, and therefore the satisfying of the infinite craving for happiness, in earthly, relative good, he shall find gall instead of honey! Of Christianity, too, he speaks there just as a blind man might speak of colours. He thinks that the doctrine of the divinity of Christ has its origin in the mysticism of the Neoplatonists, which arose 270 years after Christ. Such ideas completely put in the shade Prince Pückler-Muskau.

§ 188. *The Bankruptcy of Hegelianism.*

A. In his *Phänomenologie*, the groundwork of his system, where he develops, though arbitrarily and one-sidedly, the facts of consciousness, Hegel starts from general consciousness, which he designates simply "consciousness," and then proceeds to self-consciousness, which has self-certainty, and to which the objective world is only a "phenomenon." Man regards the world first as something having existence in itself, then as something existing for him. But in the whole investigation he makes reference only to the side of knowledge, and not to that of the will. Even at the stage of general consciousness the subject indeed appears not only as perceiving, but also as willing (see §§ 40-45); and we have already shown in Book I., especially at §§ 91, 92, what true and important results for the idea of design and for the knowledge of God follow therefrom. Hegel thus did not arrive at the distinction between subjective being and subjectivity in the strict sense, but constantly interchanges the one for the other. "Man perceives objects, recognises powers or forces lying behind the objects,"—therein, according to Hegel, general consciousness consists,—"then he comes to think of these powers as laws, things as the manifestation of the laws, and regards therefore the thoughts and consequently himself as the realizer or thinker of these thoughts as the one real being,"—this is self-consciousness. In the third place, he comes to acknowledge that the laws objec-

tively operating in the world are the same as those which have subjective thinking for their content, and are recognised as rational; so man philosophizing reaches the idea of reason, which is in itself neither subjective nor objective, but lies at the basis of subjective thinking and objective being alike, and is therefore "being in and for itself."¹ This is essentially nothing else than the "substance" of Spinoza, which manifests itself in extension and thought. Here, then, Hegel seeks artificially to construct, only at a subsequent stage, the phenomena of the will which he must have had in view from the beginning. Then he makes the reason develop itself as the subjective reason. Here it is first the observing reason which distinguishes the universally valid from the fortuitous; thus it is active reason which begins as desire in subjective arbitrariness, and afterwards comes into harmony with the objective law of reason as virtue; what kind of virtue issues therefrom we have shown in § 87 and § 108, *A*. From this originates "the exercise of the powers" in "labour," "common labour," "legislation." And here now does subjective reason become objective reason, that is, it appears no more as the reason of the individual, but as the universal spirit. From this universal spirit Hegel derives the idea of morality and the moral law. In this way he cannot reach a system of ethics (comp. § 108, *B*, *b*), but only a social morality.² He knows no ethical law which results from the relation of man to God, but only a morality which results from the common rational spirit of man; because he knows no self-conscious personal God (§ 82, *Obs.*), but in place thereof puts forward that reason which is neither

¹ With this the development sketched by us in §§ 79-92 may be compared.

² That even this does not reach remarkably far, the worthless article on Hamann that appeared in the *Jahrbücher für wissensch. Kritik* of Oct. and Dec. 1828 proves. Compare, in reference thereto, Dr. C. H. Gilde-meister, Joh. G. Hamann's *Leben und Schriften*, vol. vi. pp. 315-409. His social morality did not prevent Hegel from editing the *Bamberger Zeitung* in the interests of Napoleon I.

subjective nor objective. Religion is with him nothing else than this morality still veiled, as it were masked, that has not yet come to itself, not yet come to pure knowledge, still bound in the form of mental representation. This subordinated form must be overcome, and the whole process of the world must run such a course that it will be overcome, and that mankind from this stage of representation may work up to that of pure knowledge, that is, of reason knowing itself, or of the self-knowing idea, a stage at which morality appears and that which it is, as the universal human spirit giving laws to itself. On the quality of this law-giving, see § 108, *B, b*. The genuine sphere of morality therefore is not the Church, but the State; and so it is the task of the Church to lose itself in the State,—a thought which the Hegelian Rothe in his work on the Church, published in 1835, has carried out.

Seeing, then, that with Hegel the moral law resulted first from an intellectual development of the reason, and is in no way admitted to be a law implanted in man at his creation by the author of his being (in the sense of §§ 104–106), the inevitable consequence is that man at the lowest stage of his development is still without moral law, still lawless, and is just therefore described as not in conflict with law. That which Christianity calls inborn sin is nothing evil or abnormal, but is the normal state of nature. The moral consciousness on its appearance in the development of the reason assumes an attitude of opposition to this given condition, and passes judgment upon it. This, however, is itself again nothing else than a transitional stage of the development. And the delusion that man as sinful is in need of redemption belongs only to this transitional stage, and is mere appearance or illusion, as indeed all religion is mere illusion. In “Absolute Knowledge” man reaches true reconciliation, which consists in nothing else than the knowledge that what is called evil is a necessary element in the development of man; for everything actual is rational, is manifestation

of the process of reason reaching forth to a knowledge of itself. Thus Hegel by another road arrives at the same end as materialism—the extenuation and explaining away of sin.

B. With this ethical bankruptcy, metaphysical bankruptcy is closely associated. No one can deny that Hegel's system is distinguished by the strictest consistency; but its consistent deduction is from false premises (§§ 82, 83, 89, 182–185). And hence, just because he puts himself in opposition to the highest law of being, and the innermost, most inviolable truth of man, the conscience, he is at the same time incapacitated from explaining the origin, and the being, and the mode of being, of the world from his premises. In his logic he has made an attempt at such an explanation. From the reason, in that abstract sense, from “the pure idea,” he would have the universe originated; but since this reason seems to be neither rationality in the objective sense, as it appears in the laws of nature, nor reason in the subjective sense, that is, the complex of the laws of thought and of the ethical law, since rather it seems to be reason present in like form and measure in both subject and object, there are no contents left for it. It is, considered in itself, absolutely void of contents, the “indeterminate” of Spinoza. Thus there devolved upon Hegel the rare task of deriving from this mere indeterminate the whole fulness of the determinations and definitions present in the universe. The manner in which he seeks to bring this about may fitly be described as a piece of clever intellectual legerdemain. Objective rationality has nothing in common with the subjective reason, but the abstract logical form. There are, for example, in the world of objects operative causalities, and we the subjects think the category of causality: in the objects the genus exists in its particular species, and we the subjects subsume in our thinking the particular under the general. From these abstract logical forms, then, is it possible to explain the origin of a concrete content? The indeterminate

determines itself, goes over into its opposite, takes itself back into itself out of this opposition, negates the negation, and so originates being. The course of development is as follows. Reason as being in itself is in itself neither subject nor object, but pure abstract being; but since this is still quite indeterminate, and is thus without all definition and without all content, it is identical with the absolute nothing. But this nothing is not mere nothing, but it is the being nothing, therefore a nothing that passes over into being and Becoming. Through this Becoming determinate Being has its origin; and every determinate being (but we have as yet no "every," no particular definite existing things, but first only the abstract idea, Determinate Being) is a thing *per se*, that is, existing for itself, therefore an independent being which exists in space and time, and is a fact of experience. The ideas of space and time do not result from that deduction, still less then the existence of space and time. Thus Quantity is developed out of Quality, and this as specific; that is, a qualitative definition is the measure that fixes the quantity. Is it from this then that "the quantity determines itself as being indeed quality," that we deduce the specific weight of lead, or that of feathers? In this measure or specific weight the essence of the thing comes into view. The essence seems to be something different from being, but this is only "appearance," and in truth determinate being is rather the manifestation of the essence, and the essence is the basis of the being; but things are the existing essence itself, or the reality as union of essence and existence. But what things? We have, indeed, never yet got anything concrete! This unity appears again in the relation of substance to accidents; but since the accidents do not appear alongside of the substance, but actually make it up, there is found an interchange of operations between the two. The cause appears now to be itself conditioned by its consequences. It appears therefore as an originating cause, and from this results freedom or subjectivity. More

simple than with Hartmann is this progress of the subject from the object, and swiftly enough does it pursue its course. But it is not a bit more conceivable. "Being is because it has been posited." And so the origin of that which is posited is assigned to its being posited: the active is derived from the passive. Subjectivity is present as the notion, the notion as the general is only in the particular, the subsumption of the particular under the notion is the judgment, and from the judgment the notion broken up into its component parts reappears in the conclusion. Here the notion becomes determined as object; because its elements fall asunder, the mechanical relationship arises, and because the notion collects again its elements lying alongside of one another, the chemical relationship arises. Is it sulphate of lime, or acetate of oxide of lead, or what else? And since means and result are the same in the being of the universe determined in itself, the teleological relationship has its origin. As though the idea of end did not rather involve the distinction of means and result! But the universe determined in itself is the idea, and so the reason as being in and for itself comes into the human spirit as the idea, that is, as knowing itself. A refutation is unnecessary. The derivation from one another of the several logical formal ideas—being, nothing, becoming, determinate being, quality, quantity, measure, etc.—belongs to purely subjective thinking, which would not indeed be possible were it not that the thinking subject had already the existing world as given before him; for from it in the course of centuries these formal ideas have been abstracted, and that indeed by means of a very complex process of thought (§ 186, *Obs.* 2). But Hegel now speaks as if these abstract formal ideas had resulted of themselves, one from another, without an objectively existing world, and without a thinking subject, as if quite of themselves they grew out one from the other as the branches of a cactus; and now he would, from these abstract, and in themselves contentless schemata derive, and cause to issue forth, a concrete

actual world, and from them explain the concrete physico-chemical relations as well as the several logical and ethical laws of spirit! How absurd this is has been already shown by our parenthetical remarks. But even for the principle of the whole, the pure reason or the notion positing itself, there is no vestige remaining. The Hegelian, D. F. Strauss (*Gl.* p. 226), has openly and honestly confessed that the end of the world's development is the overthrow of the world. "Then will all living and reasonable beings, and all labours and strivings of those beings, all civil constitutions, all works of art and science, not merely be destroyed leaving no trace behind, but will not even have left a memorial in any spirit," because there is then no more any intelligent conscious being. That "self-end" which the world process "has in itself" is the pure negation of the end (§ 81, *Obs.*). This absolute reason which only creates in order to destroy is absolute unreason. That the absolute nothing comes to no better result than to fall back into absolute nothing is quite consistent; but the question as to whence comes the something lying between, the existing universe, remains still wholly unanswered.

And so now, if one compares Book First with Book Second, it will be found proved that the foolishness of God is wiser than the wisdom that turns away from God and directs itself against Him.

THE SECOND PART.



CHRISTIANITY AS A HISTORICAL FACT IN ITS ORGANIC
CONNECTION WITH THE GENERAL HISTORY OF
RELIGION.

INTRODUCTION.



§ 189. *What we do not learn from History.*

IF we cite the history of mankind as a witness to the truth of Christianity, either in its general form as a history of culture, or in its special form as a history of religion, we must at the outset clearly understand what precisely we intend to prove by means of it. Christianity has been defined in § 4 as the realization of eternal, absolute truth. Now it has been distinctly set forth in §§ 5 and 6, and still more fully in Part i. bk. i. div. ii., that the proofs from the history of man and the religions of the various races do not avail for establishing the truth of Christianity as such. No proof is afforded by the history of mankind for the existence of a personal God, or even for that of a moral law; for in so far as the human race has been left to itself, we see in it only sin, godlessness, heathenism: we see nothing but opposition to the moral law. All through the history of man left to himself we do not find the moral law objectified and fulfilled. It has place only within the individual man as conscience; and, regarded as such a subjective voice (using the term in the good sense, as explained in § 92), we have already treated it in Part i. bk. i. div. i. chap. 3, as the most important and characteristic fact of human consciousness. But seeing now that the objective history of man as left to himself shows only revolts against the moral law, errors, sins, crime, the dominion of self-will as *bellum omnium contra omnes*, it can afford us as such no proof for the being and rule of a personal God. In spite of all this actual depravity of mankind, the fact of a divine government

(§ 127) can be known, but only by the man who, in another way, whether it be by his conscience and the conscientious consideration of the facts of consciousness and of nature (Rom. i. 9), or by revelation, has attained unto the knowledge of God. Even when we take redemption into account, the historico-critical investigation of the sources from which a knowledge of redemption is derived (the New Testament Scriptures) finds its place, according to § 7, among the special theological branches as the so-called science of Introduction or Biblical Criticism. As such it constitutes, indeed, a division of special apology, but not of general and fundamental apologetics. One might think, however, that if he combined with the history of mankind left to itself the history of mankind under the influence of the operations of redemption, of Christianity, there would necessarily follow therefrom a historical, or more exactly, a religio-historical proof of the truth of Christianity as a redeeming power. In contrast to man under the ban and in the bonds of sin, we would have here a race made free from sin. The attempt has indeed been made once and again to demonstrate in this way the truth of Christianity, but this is only playing into the hands of the enemy. Observing their advantage, opponents have called attention to every sort of corruption appearing in the realm of Christianity, and have emphasized the undeniable fact that, under the ægis of the Christian name and the sign of the cross, much wickedness has been perpetrated as well as under the reign of heathenism. We are reminded of the two words, hypocrisy and fanaticism. The drawing of fair pictures will not banish this fact from the world. Whoever will make the converse attempt to draw from the existence of a race of men delivered from sin the conclusion that there has been a redemption, will only drive opponents to the opposite conclusion, that the asserted redemption has shown itself thoroughly impotent, since as little of that El Dorado of a race of men delivered from sin has been discovered on earth *post Christum natum* as before. But such an attempt is in itself a perverse

one. It ascribes to redemption effects which, according to the express utterances of the Redeemer Himself, it has not, and will not have, and for the present cannot and should not have. Redemption, indeed, creates the expectation of a future state of existence (comp. § 129 ff.), where sin and death shall be no more, where a sinless race (no longer bearing distinctions of sex, Matt. xxiv. 30) will exist. During the present state of existence, that of life in a mortal body, there is only a communion of the means of grace (not yet the completed consequences of grace). The blessing of redemption is offered to each individual as such, and to lay hold upon it is the individual personal act of each one. It is not at once, however, that the individual is thereby in this life made sinless. Far from a sinless race being existent, even the redeemed man has, until his death, sin as the old man within him (§ 139), with which he has to fight. On the other hand, the Redeemer most decidedly assumes that never will a company of redeemed men exist in which the unredeemed will not under the cloak of hypocrisy be intermixed, undiscernible by human eyes (Matt. xiii. 24–30).

§ 190. *What we do learn from History.*

In the heart of the individual man who has received Christ's salvation by humble faith, redemption shows itself to be a redeeming power (§ 139). In the history of the human race, it shows itself, as we have already said, only as the moving principle in a process of ferment and sifting which starts from it. This was the manner of Christ's personal activity among the people of Israel (Matt. iii. 12; John v. 25, 26), and of this same sifting activity He says that He would exercise it after His ascension over the whole *κόσμος*—the Gentile world (John x. 16, xii. 24; Luke xii. 49, 51). Now from history it can be proved that with the entrance of redemption a ferment in the history of the human race began of an essentially new quality, which did not exist in that of

man left to himself, which, where it enters, interrupts the process of a constant decline, and calls for and necessitates a decision for or against God, and thereby leads to a separation within the ranks of mankind, which becomes ever more and more clearly marked. This, we say, in opposition to pantheism and materialism which blindly maintain the contrary, can be proved from historical facts. These two theories of the universe, which are one at root, affirm that the human race has gradually developed from an undeveloped, even brutish,¹ at least "a not yet moral," and a "religionless" condition, and is conceived of in a regular progression toward a higher development. According to the pantheistic theory (§ 188), religion as such is only a relative stage in the development, and in the circle of the various religions Christianity is at best the most highly developed religion to which man has yet attained, but as a religion it is always only a stage in the development, which it must transcend for the higher stage of pure knowledge, so that from this higher, yea, highest stage (surmounted, however, since Hegel and D. Fr. Strauss), man looks down upon Christianity as upon a surmounted standpoint. According to the cruder forms of materialism, religion and Christianity are not at all a step upwards, but a step downwards, the development only of an impeding reaction. Both pantheism and materialism, however, assume that the human race has gradually advanced from a condition in which it had no moral law, first of all to a dull fetishism, then by degrees to a mythological polytheism, then to abstract monotheism, then to Christianity, and finally to pantheism.² The actual history of religions, however, shows at all points precisely the contrary. If we turn to the history of religion among the cultured nations of antiquity, taking as our guide the distinguished investigations of Max Müller, Spiegel,

¹ The theory of the development of mankind from an animal origin has been carried out in a special manner by the Englishman Sir John Lubbock. He has been answered by the Duke of Argyle in his treatise, *Primæval Man*, London 1869.

² Compare Hartmann, *Selbsterzsetzung des Christenthums*.

Lipsius, Ebers, Schrader, Duncker, etc., we find that in all cultured antiquity, the farther back we go into the past, there is a nearer approach to the knowledge of the one living, holy God, conjoined with a more wakeful ethical consciousness of the distinction between good and evil, and a more lively expectation of a coming redeemer; and that the farther down we come along the stream of time, the greater is the falling away from this primitive religion through moral levity in respect of the obscuration of the knowledge of God, down to the crudest polytheism, which again among certain nations is transformed into pantheism, and hand in hand therewith a regular moral deterioration in spite of all advances in the arts, civilisation, and culture. And if, besides, we give attention to the condition, language, and legends of the savage races, we find here also that, while the history of the remoter past is involved in obscurity, yet during the centuries open to investigation there has been a constant tendency downwards, but also on all hands clear reminiscences of an earlier better time, of which even here and there memorials are preserved. Of a gradual development of those races occupying a position near to that of the apes there is no trace. Upon the whole it must seem strange, if such a law of progress and upward development held good, that those races in so many thousands of years should not yet have made any advancement.

These investigations in regard to man as left to himself, which are to form the contents of the First Book of this Second Part, will thus afford us the historical evidence of the fact of an actual fall from God, by means of which the development became complicated.


For that assumed upward development, only to one nation of antiquity can appeal be made with any show of right. Only in one nation was monotheism maintained clearly and vigorously for hundreds and thousands of years, and the Christian religion, originating here, may be regarded as its continuation. This appeal to the nation of Israel, however, can be valid only if it be proved, I do not say that actually,

but only that possibly, this nation reached its monotheism by a process of self-development. But history here again also teaches us precisely the contrary. In Israel we have pre-eminently to do, not merely with monotheism, but with the knowledge of a holy God, and the knowledge of human sin and guilt, and faith in an act of redemption yet to be performed. For what we have to consider is not the mere reckoning of the number of the deities, but rather the essential quality of the divinity which is worshipped; and the thirty-three Adityas of the ancient Vedas approach far nearer the true, living and holy God, than the four vile gods of the Babylonians. Now the earliest historical documents teach us: (*a*) That in the Semitic group, to which the people of Israel belong, heathenism had sunk down to its very lowest forms in the earliest period, had become utterly divorced from truth, thoroughly impregnated with lies, a religion which no longer conceived the Deity and practised His worship as the ethically good, but directly as the ethically wicked (animal lust and devilish cruelty); and (*b*) that the Israelitish race retained, and ever and anon exhibited, the most decided inclination during all periods of its history, to return to this infamous religion of Baal. A religion which was the diametrical antithesis of that natural to the Semites, because it condemned what that enjoined, and awakened continually the slumbering conscience of the nation, cannot therefore be reasonably regarded as the product of a natural development of a Semitic race. It does not even give itself out as such, but claims to be a revelation of the living holy God. This investigation will form the subject of the First Division of the Second Book.

In the Second Division of the Second Book we have finally to prove from the history of the nations affected by the redemption, that is, of Christendom, how redemption as a moving principle has interrupted the process of decay, and has introduced instead a process of fermentation and sifting. In the successive stages of this process the truth of the proposition is ever again made good, that faith in the gospel, where

it is a power, adjusts the relations of society, and resolves its complications, rejuvenates the nations, imparts light and fruitfulness to intellectual development (science and art), and calls forth forms of social and civil life, in which the sanctifying power of the gospel, which redeems from sin and its curse, obtains at least a provisional or temporary form. Where, however, by the practice of a vile hypocrisy, graces and powers given by God with the gospel are placed at the service of a sinful, godless inclination (comp. Gal. ii. 17), a degree and kind of deterioration enters, much more terrible and startling than happens where the divine powers bestowed upon man in creation are turned to the service of evil lusts.

FIRST BOOK.




THE RELIGIONS OF MEN.



FIRST DIVISION.

THE CULTURED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY.



CHAPTER I.—THE RELIGION OF THE ARYAN INDIANS.

§ 191. *Sources of the History of Indian Religion.*

IN regard to the history of the religion of the Indians we possess a complete set of documents in the extremely rich Indian or Sanscrit literature, the oldest portions reaching back more than a thousand years before Christ. It may indeed be safely asserted that this literature had not been fixed in writing before the fifth or fourth century B.C., but had only been orally preserved (since, for example, words for writing, book, ink, etc., do not appear earlier). This literature, however, bears traces of the scrupulous, careful, and legally determined way in which, by yearly recitals and repeating, the Brahmins made their scholars learn by rote the sacred texts, down to the precise pronunciation of each word, and thus these texts were secured against errors. Similarly, at a much later period, about 900 years after Christ, with no less painful precision, the Hebrew texts were fixed in the written Masora. The absence of corruptions from the text, at least of the most ancient and most important of all the parts of Indian literature, the Vedas, is guaranteed by this, that they, being always treated as supremely sacred, were never translated out of their ancient dialect into the later speech called Sanscrit, but remained unchanged during periods when they were not, or were only imperfectly understood. It was reserved for the acumen of modern investigators in the comparative science of

language to reach again its linguistic-exegetical understanding. This literature, however, not only reaches back to an extraordinarily remote antiquity, and is thus from the period over which it extends very rich and complete, it is also accessible. The more important works are all now to be had in well printed editions, the others in numerous Indian manuscripts in libraries,—in Germany, especially in the new Strasburg Library. They are, besides, linguistically accessible, for the Brahmins, since the year 600 B.C., busied themselves with detailed investigations upon the construction and laws of Sanscrit. This work upon Sanscrit was completed by Bopp's researches, and by Lassen and others has been prosecuted with special reference to the older dialect of the Vedas. But, finally, the most fundamental and thorough investigations regarding the age of the different works in this literature, and regarding the older parts of it which most directly concerns us here (dating from 1800 to 200 B.C.), have been made by Professor Max Müller at Oxford, and set forth in his classical work, *History of Ancient Sanscrit Literature so far as it illustrates the Primitive Religion of the Brahmins*. Second edition. London 1860.

Note.—The Vyakarana or Grammar, Nirukta or Etymology, and Chhandas or a work on metre, constitute the three vedangas or text-books of the Brahman schools. The Grammar of Panini, dating from the fourth or fifth century B.C., is still extant, and forms the basis of all later researches in Sanscrit.

§ 192. *The Chief Periods of the Development of Indian Religion.*

In this literature we have unfolded to us in all its various phases the history of the development of Indian religion for a period of nearly 1500 years, and in it there is shown a regular and incessant deterioration from the worship of one invisible, living, holy God, until, during one period, we meet with the reverencing of mere forces of nature; then during another period, by means of an artful priest-hierarchy and

polytheistic ceremonial, we find a pantheism coloured by polytheistic ideas, and at last a pure and thoroughgoing pantheism. Max Müller distinguishes four periods, for the last three of which he assumes as a minimum period respectively 200, 300, and 400 years. As the last of these periods ends 200 years before Christ, the end of the first and beginning of the second would be fixed about 1000 years before Christ. There are several reasons, however, for assigning a somewhat longer period to the second and third periods. (See *Obs.*) The first is the period of the original Vedic religion (called by Müller the Chhandas or Poetic period), extending from about 1800 to 1400 B.C.; the second or Indra period is that in which the development of a priesthood, divided into classes, and of a fixed ceremonial begins (called by Müller the Mantra, that is, the Hymn period); the third is the period of Brahmanism (so designated by Müller), in which, in consequence of a complete catastrophe and change in the language, the priestly caste gained political as well as religious supremacy, and introduced a change in the doctrine regarding the gods; and finally, the period of Scholasticism (called by Müller the Sutra period, from the word Sutra, meaning a learned work), during which period the art of the scribe came into use.

Obs.—Colebrooke, in his *Miscellaneous Essays*, i. p. 108, has reckoned that a position assigned to the Colures in the calendar of the Veda points to the fourteenth century B.C. as the date of this calendar. It does not, however, appear that this calendar belongs to the earliest Vedic period.

A.—THE PERIOD OF THE ORIGINAL VEDIC RELIGION.

§ 193. *The Deity.*

The objects of worship are the Dêvas,—Gods,—perhaps nearly equivalent in meaning to Elohim. The word Dêva is common to all the Japhetic languages, from the root *div*, to enlighten, to shed beams. In Greek the word appears in Δημήτηρ, Ποσειδάων, Ποτι δᾶς, in Δεὺς (*Ζεὺς*), Δίος; in

Latin, as *Deus* and *Dius*, *Jus* (*Jovis*); in Persian, as *Daeva* (with a modified signification, see chap. ii.); in German, as *Tius*, *Ziu*; in Celtic, as *Dia* (connected with *día*, the day, as in Latin *deus* is connected with *díus*, *dies*); in Chinese, as *Thian* (the old Chinese God of heaven, later called *Thiân-ti*=Heaven's Lord); in Japanese, as *Ten*; in the language of the old Maya races of Central America, as *Teotl* (where *tl* is merely an ending; comp. J. G. Müller, *Urreligionen Amerikas*, p. 472) or *Teo* (Pyramids of Teotihuacan, that is, Dwelling of the Gods; comp. Müller, p. 458); in the old Peruvian legends (prior to the Inca period), as the appellative *tici* in *Illatici*, *Contici*, *Tici Viracotscha*; also in *Tici-caca*, that is, the Sea of the Gods (comp. Müller, p. 314). The existence of a common form of the word which designates God is a proof that the Japhetic tribes in early times, before their dispersion into separate nationalities (but yet after their separation from the Semites and other groups of races), worshipped this one God. To the particular Gods of their later polytheistic religions they do not give any common designation. Thus, for example, to the Sun God the Indians and the Iranians, closely connected with them, give the name *Mitra*, the Greeks *Φοῖβος*; to the blue heavens the Indians give the name *Indra*, the Greeks *Ἀθήνη* (from *αἶθω*); to fire the Indians give the name *Agnis*, the Iranians *Atars*, the Greeks *Ἡφαίστος*, the Germans *Logi*. The root-word *Varuna*, *Ὀὐρανός*, is common to the Greek and Indian languages, but is used in a different acceptance in each.

The *Devas* of the oldest Vedic period have the cognomen *Dêvâs Manôś*, the gods of *Manu* (that is, those worshipped by *Manu*). But *Manu*, as we shall afterwards more fully show, is that one of the patriarchs of the human race who alone survived the great flood, and corresponds therefore to the *Noah* of the Old Testament. How the plurality of the *Dêvâs* was understood may be seen from the *Rig Veda Hymn*, 8. 30 : "Among you, ye *dêvâs*, there is no one little, no one young : ye are all great. Be praised, ye destroyers of the enemies, ye

three and thirty, ye holy gods of Manu. Defend us, help us, bless us, let us not err from the path of our fathers, from the path of Manu. Be present, ye gods altogether (*viṣvêdêvâs*), and be worshipped of all men, give us your powerful protection, give it to the cattle and the horses." Here a plurality of gods is spoken of, and even their number is fixed at thirty-three: yet the statement that among them there is no distinction as to greatness, shows that no polytheistic conception in the ordinary sense is intended. The hymn belongs to the pastoral age.

Instead of *Dêvâs* we find also the term *Âdityâs*, the Eternals (from *âditi*, eternity; and this again from *âdi*, the beginning, the first). So *Rig Veda*, 2. 27, 3: The *Adityâs*, who behold all evil and all good, and to whom everything, even the most remote, is near; and v. 11: "With them the right is not distinguished from the left, the east from the west." They are therefore eternal, omnipresent, and omniscient, and their knowledge is employed upon the ethical condition of men. They are called also "sons of eternity" and "the watchers." In a hymn to *Varuna* it is said of him: "He, the wise son of *Aditi*, will make our paths straight. The Watchers (*pâlas*—the rest of the *adityâs* are intended) sit around his throne." Their dwelling is the higher invisible heavens, which, as the sphere of eternal light, is carefully distinguished in the *Vedas* from the visible heavens, the firmament, which is the sphere of the air and visible lights (the sun and the stars).¹ The *Adityas* "neither sleep nor nod." They pervade all space. They abhor sin and punish crime (2. 27, 5 and 11); for sin is contrary to their nature, which is perfect light and purity. They are therefore holy in the ethical sense (*sancti*, not merely *sacri*). A manifoldness of an omnipresent, omniscient, holy essence cannot *eo ipso* be regarded as a polytheistic plurality of Gods individually distinct.

This position is further confirmed by what is said of the

¹ R. Roth, "Die Höchsten Gottheiten der arischen Völker," in *der Zeitsch. der deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, 1852, H. i. p. 67 ff.

particular Devas. Mitra, that is, Friend, is the God of the Sun, or more precisely, of the Light of Day. Varuna, the All-embracing, in later times the God of Water, is in the older Vedas the God of the Starlight that illumines the night (Varuna, from the root *vr*, to encompass, embrace). At the brightening of the dawn, Varuna mounts the golden car with Mitra; at the setting of the sun he mounts a brazen car (v. 5, 6, 8). But now of each of the two it is said that he is the creator of the universe. In the hymn of Sunahsepha, Varuna is first invoked alone, then Varuna and Mitra conjoined,¹ as the Lord of Heaven and Earth. Besides Varuna and Mitra these are occasionally mentioned by name as Adityas: Ardshaman (Benefactor), Bhâga (He who blesses), Ansa (Partaker, Companion), Daksha (The Discerning One). Among the Dêvâs we also find the following: Agni (Fire, *ignis*), Indra (the God of Heaven), Soma, the Marutas (Gods of the Winds), and the one female deity Usha (the Dawn), who occupies a more servile or subordinate position. Of anthropomorphic relationships, such as marriage or the derivation of one God from another, there is no trace. The four: Varuna, Mitra, Indra, Soma, are most frequently referred to and invoked. No objective superiority, therefore, is predicated of any one, nor yet of all the four. To each of the four the statement applies,—he is the greatest of all Gods; but also Agni has attributes which put him in a position of equality with the four. Thus it is said, 2, 1, of Agni that he is the Lawgiver of the Universe, the Lord, Father, Brother, and Friend of Men; of Indra it is said (10, 86), *visvamâd Indra uttara*, Indra is higher than all; of Soma it is said (9, 96), he is *bhuvanasja râdsha*, “King of the Existing,” and “King of the Higher Heaven” (the heaven of the Gods) and of the earth; of Agni, Surya, Indra, and Vishnu, and, finally, of Varuna, it is said 2, 27, he is king of all Gods and men. Thus, then, it is clear that those Dêvâs are not regarded as

¹ The Indian word for this coupling is *Dwandwa*, corresponding to the “Varuna-Mitra pair.”

individuals distinct one from another, but as the *πρόσωπα* of the one invisible holy God, as various modes of manifestation, in which the one discloses his infinitely rich nature, in each of which he is still the highest, the one God. There is also apparent a clear consciousness, which is very persistent, that all these gods are but names for the one God. In one hymn, which does not belong to the oldest period (Rig V. i. 164), we read: "They call him Indra, Mitra, Varuna, Agni; he is also the fleet-winged heavenly Garutmat. That which is one, the wise name by various terms. They name him Agni, Yama, Mâtarisvan."

Obs.—From the fact that Varuna, Mitra, Ardshaman, Bhâga, Ansa, and Daksha are those Devas who are occasionally distinguished in some of the Vedas by the express use of the predicate *aditya*, Roth, in the work above referred to, concludes that these six, perhaps along with a seventh unknown to us, were in the very oldest period the only supreme Gods, and that at first Indra, Agni, and Soma were secondary objects of worship, Ardshaman, Bhâga, Ansa, and Daksha having a place of honour superior to them. Since, moreover, the names of those six *Adityas* mostly express purely ethical conceptions, he assumes that in the earliest times God was worshipped as a purely spiritual-moral being, and that the powers of nature were first introduced merely as secondary deities. There are, however, weighty reasons against this position. The Iranians also worshipped Mitra, and that, too, as the God of the light of day and of the sun (see chap. ii.); a clear proof that, before the dispersion of the two races, and so before the rise of the special Indian religion, he represented this creative nature-power of God, and that by his name "the friend" it was not an abstract ethical idea that was expressed, but an adequate appellative one given to the one God in the creative light of the day as a friendly manifestation. Similarly among the Germans the God of sunlight was called *Fráuja*, Freyer, Frô, that is, the mild, the joy-bringer (Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 190 ff.). Varuna, the All-embracing, appears everywhere as a divine power manifesting itself in nature, and as *Οὐρανός* was originally common to the Greeks and to the Indians, although by the former this word was afterwards reduced from a name of God to an appellative designation of that work of God. And so likewise Ardshaman, Bhâga, etc., may not have expressed abstract moral or social ideas, but have been *cognomena* of *πρόσωπα*, in each of which some one creative power of God

manifesting itself in nature, and the corresponding ethical entity, were personified. In the light of day the Creator manifests himself as friendly, in the starry heavens as infinite, all-embracing; Ansa was perhaps the moon, in which God manifested himself as the companion, the attendant; Bhâga was perhaps the rain, in which he appeared as dispenser of blessing. But those six Devas, expressly called Adityas, cannot possibly have had any precedency over the rest, such as Soma, Agni, Indra, etc.; for to Soma and Indra, quite as much as to Varuna and Mitra, is the title "the highest of the Gods" given, and the number of the Adityas is definitely stated as thirty-three. Roth, however, seems to be right in saying that the name Indra is first employed after the separation from the Iranians. It then took the place of the older name Trita (Trta) common to the Iranians and the Indians. The word Trita means the serpent-slayer. Trita, then, is the name given to the deity as the promised slayer of the serpent; Indra is the name given him as the national God of the Indian race.

§ 194. *The Form of the Worship.*

During this earliest period (from about B.C. 1800 to B.C. 1400), the outward form of divine worship was quite simple. The social and political conditions were similar to those which we find existing in Mesopotamia and Palestine in the time of Abraham; petty shepherd kings living peaceably alongside of one another, save for occasional feuds that were little else than robber-raids. The father of the family was priest, hymn composer, and head in worldly affairs over his house; and just so the tribal chief (*râdshan*) was over the tribe. As such the importance of the chief rose with the growth of the tribe to something like princely rank. Every such king had a Purôhita (literally, *præpositus*) at his court, who was his minister, his friend, companion, and counsellor in war and peace (that is, his vizier), and to him was assigned the control of worship and the management of priestly affairs. It was not then a priestly caste that raised itself to a position of political influence, but it was a political order to which the *râdshan* transferred his own priestly functions. The order of the Purôhita was a hereditary one, like that of the family

bards among the Celts, and so this led by degrees to the establishment of a hereditary priestly caste. There is also another particular in which the institution of the Indian priesthood resembles that of the Celtic bards rather than that of the Druids; the special business of the priest was not to slay the victims, but to offer prayer. The priest had to recite the hymns during the sacrificial action, which was itself performed even in all subsequent periods by subordinate and serving members of the priestly order. The notion that the engaging in prayer is the honourable office of the priest in the more precise and the higher sense, makes its appearance in the subsequent periods as a principle so firmly established and exercising such control over all the regulations of worship, that we may confidently conclude that it must have had its origin in the earliest ages. But even in the course of the first period the function of prayer was distributed into the actions of praying and singing; and toward its close in the Vedas, *arkins* (praying priests) and *gâyatrins* (singing priests), are distinguished,—the first germ of the later distinction of divers priestly ranks. The ceremonial seems to have been very simple. Even in the first period the sacrifices undoubtedly consist of animal sacrifices (horses, oxen, sheep), and of meat-offerings (rice-cakes).

Obs.—The legend of Sunasepha, in a Brahmanical writing of the third period, seems to Max Müller to contain a reminiscence of a time when even human sacrifices were offered. Sunasepha, who had allowed himself to be sold, and to be made a victim in place of another, in order that the sick father of that other might be restored, prays to Indra, and Indra grants him his life, and makes the man whole without a sacrifice. In reference to this the Brahmanical writings say: “the Gods took men for victims, but thereafter made the spirit of the victim pass into the horse, then into the sheep, and at last into the rice-cakes.” If in the earliest ages human sacrifices were indeed actually found (although the Vedas contain no traces of these), this was (since one sinner cannot repent for another) clearly a delusion, which had, nevertheless, at its basis a deep consciousness of guilt, and the acknowledgment that every man by reason of his sin was worthy of death. For only want of

culture (*Rohheit*) can explain such human sacrifices as simply the result of want of culture. It must then be still greater want of culture, if a warrior should sacrifice his life, not for the saving of his soul, but for a mere earthly good, his fatherland, and have such a sacrifice demanded of him. The human sacrifices in the worship of Moloch, of which we shall speak farther on, are of quite another sort.

§ 195. *The Spirit of this Divine Worship.*

The inner spirit that pervades the worship is of more importance than the outward ceremonial. The older Vedas are thoroughly permeated by the consciousness that God is holy, and that man is a sinner and in need of redemption. Sin, however, is regarded as a power enslaving the will of the individual, as, in short, original sin. In this way expression is given to a truly filial confidence in God as the Merciful One, a consciousness of sonship, so that in their tone and spirit many of these primitive hymns remind us of the Psalms.

HYMN TO VARUNA (7. 86). "Wise and mighty are the works of him who has rounded the wide firmaments. He rules in the wide, glorious heavens. He wrenched apart the starry vault and the earth. Say I this to my own soul? How can I reach unto Varuna? Will he receive my offering with displeasure? When shall my soul be at rest reconciled to him? I ask, O Varuna, because I long to confess my sin. The wise all say this unto me: It is Varuna that is angry with thee. Is it for an old sin, O Varuna, that thou wilt destroy thy friend, who always praises thee? Be gracious unto me, thou invincible Lord, and I shall quickly turn unto thee with praises, deliver me from sin. Pronounce us free from the sins of our fathers, and from those which we have committed of our own free will; free me like a thief who has eaten of the stolen beast; set me free, as one sets a calf free from the rope. It was not our own doing, O Varuna; it was involuntary; it was a poisoned stab, it was passion, chance, thoughtlessness. The old man is inclined to seduce the young: sleep itself brings transgression. Let me without sin give

satisfaction, as a slave to a generous master, our God, our helper. The Lord God enlightens the foolish: he, the Most Wise, leads his worshippers unto salvation. O Lord, Varuna, may this song be pleasing to thee. Give blessing with what we have and what we do. Surround us always, ye Gods, with your blessings."

ANOTHER HYMN TO VARUNA. "Take me not yet, O Varuna, into the dark, damp tomb; have mercy, Almighty One, have mercy: When I walk trembling, like a cloud driven by the wind, have mercy, Almighty One, have mercy! Mighty and radiant deity, from want of strength I have strayed into false ways; have mercy, Almighty One, have mercy! Thirst came upon the worshipper, though he stood, as it were, in the midst of water; have mercy, Almighty One, have mercy! When we men, O Varuna, commit a transgression against the divine nourisher, when from thoughtlessness we transgress thy law, have mercy, Almighty One, have mercy!"

In a Hymn to Indra (2. 27) it is said:—"Whatsoever sin we have committed against thee, O Indra, let the bright, glowing light of day shine on us, let not the long darkness overtake us."

A Hymn to Varuna. "Although, men as we are, we all alike from day to day transgress thy laws, O divine Varuna, give us not over to death, nor to the blows of the furious, nor to the wrath of our enemies. To propitiate thee, Varuna, we soothe thy spirit with songs, as the waggoner soothes his weary horse. Take away thy lash that beats me down; I only long to win salvation, as birds long to reach their nests. When shall we bring hither the man who gives victory to the warrior? When shall we bring Varuna, the far-seeing, that he may be propitiated? They do this the one with the other, Mitra and Varuna; they are never wanting to the believing petitioner. He who knows the place of the birds that fly in the air; he who knows the ships upon the seas;—he, the upholder of the course of nature (*dhrtavrata*), who knows the twelve months and the source of each of

them, and knows the month which must therefore be intercalated,¹—he who knows the pressure of the wind according to length and breadth and power, and knows those who dwell in the height,²—he, the upholder of the course of nature, Varuna, enthroned upon his cloud; he, the wise one, enthroned here to rule. From thence beholding all wonderful things, he sees what happens, and what will be. He, the wise son of eternity, would have our paths made straight all our days; he desires to lengthen out our lives. Varuna, who there wears the golden coat of mail,³ has put on his glittering garment; the watchers (see § 193) are seated round about him. The God whom blasphemers cannot rouse to wrath, nor the tormentors of men, nor those conspiring to wickedness,—He who gives glory to men, and that no mere partial glory, shedding it upon our very body,—unto him longingly looking from afar my thoughts turn, even as cattle turn to their pasture. Let us converse together, for my honey is presented; thou eatest what thou lovest like a priest (*hótri*). Now, saw I the God who seeth all; I saw his chariot in the sky; he must have accepted my prayers. O hear this my cry, Varuna, be gracious to me and help me; I have called upon thee, O wise God, thou art Lord of all, of heaven and of earth, whilst thou art passing hear. That I may live, remove the upper cord, loosen that which binds me in the midst, and undo that which fetters me below.”

§ 196. *The first Germs of Decay.*

In these hymns, noble as they are in their way, there is an obvious defectiveness as compared with the Psalms. There is no trace in them of a profound consciousness of personal guilt. In those Vedas there is rather a tendency to roll the guilt away from oneself. While David sings:

¹ The Indians had therefore even then a year of twelve equal lunar months with a lunar leap-year.

² The stars.

³ The firmament or the starry heavens.

“Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned, and done this evil in Thy sight; when I kept silence, my bones waxed old,” etc.—the Vedic singer is only too readily inclined to throw over the guilt of his sins upon original sin, and in this way to forge excuses for them. If he has sinned, it is an involuntary act (literally, “a necessity”), a poisoned inhalation, an accident, a piece of thoughtlessness: “We men, such as now we are, daily transgress the laws of God.” Here we see the first slight germs of that extenuation of sin which necessarily led to the confusion and obscuration of the knowledge of God, and ultimately to Pantheism. And hand in hand with this, we mark now and again a suspicious tendency to make the desire for peace with God and reconciliation subordinate to the desire for the good things of earth. These were at first professedly regarded as tokens and proofs of the reconciled mind of the deity, but soon came to be desired for their own sake as an end in themselves, for attaining unto which the entreating of God was only a means. The following hymn to Indra, a prayer of King Vashishta, for victory, expresses a spiritual consciousness of a filial relationship; but still in some of its verses has much more resemblance to the prayers of the Homeric heroes to their Gods (*e.g.* *Iliad*, i. 37 ff.) than to the Psalms.

HYMN OF VASHISHTA TO INDRA (7. 32). “Keep not far from us, so that any one of thy worshippers should miss thee. From afar, come to our festival. Or if already thou art here, listen to our prayer. For those who here worship thee,—settle upon their drink-offerings, as flies settle on the honey. Worshippers, longing for salvation, raise their desire to Indra, as we set our feet upon a path. Yearning after fulness (*vasu*), I cry unto thee, who holdest in thine arm the thunder, and who art a good giver, as a son says of his father. These drink-offerings of Somajuce, mixed with milk, are consecrated to Indra. Thus armed with a thunderbolt, come along with thy horses, to drink thereof with pleasure! Come to the house! O that he would hear us, for he has ears to

hear. He is besought for riches (*vasu*) ; will he refuse our prayers ? He could give hundreds and thousands ; no one can hinder him, if he wills to give. He who prepares for thee, O serpent-slayer (*vrtrahan*), abundant drink-offerings, and pours them out before thee, this hero thrives with Indra, not despised of men. Be thou, O mighty one, the shield of the mighty, when thou dost urge the warriors against one another. Divide the portion of him whom thou hast stricken ; bring us the furniture of him who is hard to conquer. Offer Soma¹ to the Soma-drinker, to Indra, God of the thunderbolt ; roast what is to be roasted, secure his protection ; Indra, the bountiful, is a blessing to him who brings him an offering. Murmur not, dispenser of Soma ; give strength to the great God that he may give his benefits. Only he who is persistent in offering succeeds, endures, and flourishes. The Gods will not be mocked. No foe will compass the ear of the bountiful worshipper ; none shall hold him down. He who is protected by Indra and Marutas comes into stalls full of food. The mortal, whose protector thou wilt be, O Indra, when he fights, shall secure his prey. O brave one, be thou the guardian of our chariots and our men. His portion is exceeding great, like the spoils of a conqueror. No enemies can subdue him, beside whom Indra is with his horses. May he (Indra) to the officer give strength ! Praise the holy Gods in a song that is not slight, that is good and beautiful. Many snares does he escape who keeps near Indra while he offers his sacrifice. What mortal thing can injure him who is rich in thee ? By faith in thee, O mighty one, the strong man gains spoil in the day of battle. . . . We have no other friend but thee, no other happiness, no other father than thee, O mighty one ! . . . We call upon thee, brave one, like un milked cows ; we praise thee, O Indra, as he who rules all that is moveable, as he who rules all that is immoveable. There is none like thee in heaven or on earth : none such is born nor will be born. O mighty Indra, we cry

¹ The juice of the Soma-plant.

to thee, when we fight for our cattle and horses. Give all this, O Indra, to those that are good, whether old or young; for thou, O mighty one, art the riches of the old, thou art invoked in every battle. Drive away the hostile, mighty one! Make it easy for us to win spoil. Be our protector in the fight, the benefactor of our friends. Indra, give us wisdom, as a father to his sons. Teach us about this journey: let us soon behold the sun. Let not unknown powers of evil, knaves and wicked ones, overthrow us. By thy help, O brave one, let us cross the boisterous waters of eternity."

It thus further appears that in the idea of these offerings there is no thought of expiation, but only of a present agreeable to God and fitted to secure his favour. The God comes invisibly and sits upon the drink-offering as flies upon honey. Thus a light-hearted view of sin led directly to a depravation of the idea of God (comp. § 136). If, now, the deity, although still in theory thought of as holy and omniscient, yet in practice was invoked not so much for the forgiveness of sins and power to repent and reform, as for friendly indulgence with our daily present weakness and for earthly blessings, it could not but happen that in the idea of God the idea of the creative and sustaining power penetrating nature should gradually come to the front, and the idea of personality and holiness be put into the background, and that in this way an identification of the powers of nature and the deity were brought about. We find, indeed, the first germs of this already in the ancient Vedas. It appears, for example, in the worship of the Fire God Agni. The physical attributes of fire were transferred without more ado to the God operating in the fire and present therein.

HYMN TO AGNI (7. 3). "Thou art neighing like a horse that longs for its food. When he steps out of his strong prison, then beats the wind upon his flame. Thy path, O Agni, is like darkness (for smoke). O Agni, thou from whom issue the undying flames as from a new-born man-child:¹ the

¹ The God is thus always new-born when a flame is kindled.

lurid smoke ascends to heaven ; as a messenger art thou sent to the Gods. Thou whose might in a moment extends over the earth, as soon as with thy jaw thou hast grasped thy food : like a conquering host thy flame leaps forward ; with thy lambent flames thou seemest to devour the grass. Men worship him only, the ever young Agni, as a horse in the evening and at dawn : they worship him in their tent (house, hearth) as a guest : the light of Agni, the revered man, is kindled. Thy appearing is beautiful to behold, thou, O Agni, with shining countenance, when thou gleamest on the hand as gold ; thy glance comes as the light of heaven : thou glancest like the beaming sun."

Thus in the flame ascending to heaven Agni himself ascends to heaven : hence he was regarded as the messenger who is sent by men to the Gods, and in the somewhat later hymns (at the end of our first period) he is expressly represented as the priestly mediator between man and the Gods.

HYMN TO AGNI (8. 11). "Thou, O Agni, art the guard of holy deeds : thou art a god in the midst of mortals (dwelling bodily upon the earth) ; thou must be honoured with offerings. Thou, mighty Agni, must be celebrated at the festivals, thou who like a carrier bearest the offerings to the Gods. Fight and drive among our enemies for us, O ascending God (*Jātadēva*), our ungodly enemies, O Agni. Thou art the same in many places, and Lord over the whole people ; we call on thee in battle. In battle we call on thee, O Agni, for help ; for we need strength, we cry in need to the giver of precious gifts. Thou art old, to be celebrated by offerings : thou sittest as priest from of old until this day. Fill thy body and give us prosperity."

From the latter part of this hymn it is evident that the identification of the God with the element was not intended in the sense of Fetishism, as though fire as such was to be worshipped as a God. Agni remains a personal God.¹ He

¹ The Indians were not yet able to explain fire as a physical process of combustion ; but they distinctly recognised the administration of a law,

is not at once and without more ado unconditionally present in the fire, but his attention, therefore his voluntary presence, must first be entreated. He may, however, as the omnipresent one, be present at one and the same time in all sacrificial flames. Therefore the fire is a manifestation of the God, and of his powers and attributes. But just therein lies that pantheistic germ, that the visible world is conceived of as the manifestation of deity. Just as the fire is identified with Agni as his manifestation, so also the morning dawn is identified with Ushas as her manifestation. She "comes into every house" (i. 123), "brings happiness" (i. 48), "remains unaffected by age" (i. 113). It is said of her,—

(IN A HYMN TO USHAS, 7. 17),—"She glimmers over us like a young wife, awaking every living thing to go forth to the work of the day. The fire (of the morning sacrifice) is kindled by men: she brought light, dispelling darkness. She arose, beaming far and wide, and pushes her way through everything. The mother of the cow (that is, the morning cloud), the leader of day, she shone fair, beautiful to behold. She, the favoured, who turns about the eyes of the God (that is, Mitra), who leads his beautiful white horse, Ushas appears, revealed by his rays: with glittering treasures she follows every one. Thou who art a blessing, where thou approachest, drive far away the hostile; make wide the pasture-range; give us health. Remove hatred; bring treasures. Raise to prosperity the worshipper, O mighty Ushas. Shine on us with thy highest beams, thou glittering Ushas, who prolongest our lives, thou beloved of all, who givest us nourishment, who givest us prosperity in cows, horses, chariots. Thou daughter of the firmament, high-born Ushas, who celebratest Vashishta with songs, give us riches high and wide. Ye Gods altogether, protect us always with your blessings."

and of a practically operative law, and therefore of an intelligent force in this manifestation, and thus occupied a position far above the dulness and flatness of modern materialism.

Pious faith in the Gods was even in the first period by no means universal. As there was a Cain among the sons even of the first human pair, so there were naturally, in all ages and among all races, godless, frivolous individuals. The hymnist, in Rig Veda, 8. 21, 14, complains of increasing deterioration among the rich. "Thou, O Indra, findest no rich man among thy friends; wine-bibbers despise thee; but when thou thunderest, when thou rollest up the clouds, then art thou addressed as a father." Finally, let this further be observed, that the victory of Indra over the serpent, a reminiscence of an ethico-religious kind of that primitive tradition common to all races of antiquity, of which we read the historical germ in the third chapter of Genesis, begins to get, even in separate hymns of the Rigveda (1. 32, etc.), a naturalistic explanation. This took place during the period when the Indra worship raised itself above that of Varuna. Vritra (the serpent) is now explained as the cloud-born, and as the personification of the dark storm-cloud: Indra bursts this cloud with lightning, and thus it carries off the water, but rains it down upon the earth.

B.—THE INDRA PERIOD.

§ 197. *Its Liturgical Character.*

By a gradual transition, yet such as could scarcely be described as altogether without any outward political catastrophe (see *Obs.*), a new state of affairs arose when, about the close of the first period, the worship of Varuna retired into the background to give place to that of Indra, who now came to be regarded as in a special sense the national God. In proportion as the veneration for the Gods became less deep, so did also the productivity of sacred poetry wane, and in its place there succeeded an age of an essentially conservative character (from about B.C. 1400 till B.C. 1000), which guarded and collected the productions of the former period, just as in

Greece the age of the Diaskeuastæ follows that of the Epic poets, or in Christendom the age of the Apostolic Fathers follows that of the Apostles, or the age of Orthodoxy that of the Reformation. During this period the characteristic performance was the collecting of the ancient hymns of former periods under the title of the Rig Veda, and the grouping of them under ten *mandalas* or series, which was done, according to Brahmanical tradition, by Krishna dvaipâjana vjâsa. The arrangement is systematic. Each of the first seven mandalas begins with hymns to Agni, in each hymns to Indra follow, and then to the Gods as a whole: the eighth mandala contains hymns to Prajâtha; the ninth to Soma; the tenth begins at least with hymns to Agni. Hymns to Varuna and other Adityas are found scattered throughout. From this arrangement it appears that it was made in a period when the worship of Indra and of Agni had already won a prominence over that of the other Adityas. Each mandala bears at the top the name of a particular Râdsha family. The second is ascribed to Gritsamada, and the fourth to Vâmadeva, the fifth to Atri, the sixth to Bhâradvâja, the third to Visvâmitra, the seventh to Vashishta, etc. But although the names of particular poets are given to the different hymns, it must be understood that the name which the whole mandala bears is that of the ruling family in whose reign and under whose protection its separate hymns were composed. Hymns of very various dates throughout the first period were here gathered together in a *corpus memoriale*. Thus the very first hymn of the first mandala contains the words: "O Agni, who art worthy of the praise of ancient and of living poets." This hymn is written by Madhutshandras; but previously his father Visvâmitra had sung: "I have chanted, O Agni, these thy ancient songs, and have added new songs to the old." Thus the long continuance of the first period is established. Very many of these old hymns do not indeed possess any liturgical character, and have no connection with liturgical actions, but are free individual outflowings of prayer. Others

are connected with the act of sacrifice (as, for example, that numbered 7. 32, quoted in § 196), but are utterly without connection with the fixed ritual of a more recent period. Only a few hymns were added in the second period, but these are so decidedly composed for definite liturgical purposes that they bear the character of liturgical formulæ rather than that of religious poetry. To these belong: (*a*) The Aprî-hymn for the sacrificial ceremonial of the same name; it is repeated with slight variations in the seven mandalas; (*b*) newly composed liturgical hymns, which under the name of *khilâs* are added to the ten mandalas as a separate appendix; (*c*) separate hymns, which are indeed included within the mandalas, but are evidently from their contents to be assigned at the earliest to the time of transition to the second period (as 3. 28, and 36. 1. 162; 4. 50, etc.). Among those of the second period we meet with hymns which present two entirely new characteristics. In the first place, there is an external organized priesthood divided into classes, and hand in hand therewith a distinction of different orders of sacrifices and libations. A regular distinction of two priestly castes has been framed out of the germ of a distinction between petitioners and singers (§ 194), the *hotri* and the *udgâtri*, each having his own function in the performance of sacrifice. The *hotri* derives his name from an old word, common to the Indian and Iranian languages,—Sanskrit *hu*, Iranian *zu*, to sacrifice, corresponding to $\chi\epsilon\omega$, $\chi\epsilon\nu\omega$, whence the Iranian *zaotha*, a priest, is derived. The *hotri*, therefore, had the higher rank; he had to address the hymns as prayers, while the *udjâtri* had to sing the songs (*sâkhas*). The slaying of the victims for sacrifice, especially horses, and other such aids, demanded the presence of a servile order, called *âvayas*. And as we find the *hotris* and the *udjâtris* distinguished (*e.g.* 3. 36. 10), so, too, the acts of worship are definitely fixed, for example, a libation three times every day (3. 28. 1). The other new characteristic is of a more inward description.

Obs.—The popular epics, which were first collected about

B.C. 500 in the Mahabhârata and the Ramâyana, but redacted in more recent times, were present even in the third period, and must at least have been in existence in the beginning of that period. (Particular episodes, that is, the epics of the Mahabhârata, contain in their easily distinguishable original components no reference to the Brahmans: where such references occur, they are palpably shown to be injurious latter interpolations. See § 198, *Obs.*) Still older than those popular epics must be the material that constitutes their contents; just as we regard Attila and Dietrich of Bern as chronologically antecedent to the composition of the Niebelungenlied, or the Hellenic voyages into Asia Minor as antecedent to the Homeric poems. The battles against foreign intruders from the north, narrated in the Mahabhârata, and the battles against the aborigines of the south, narrated in the Ramâyana, must certainly have occurred during the second period; and a period of more than two hundred years must be allowed for them. An epic is wont to group things in shorter periods than what is required for the actual accomplishment of the incidents. Such considerable wars against common enemies must have led to the union of various small shepherd-tribes under one chief prince, and so to the formation of greater kingdoms or states. That ten such like states were then existing may perhaps be concluded from the ten mandalas. By this means there was called forth, on the one hand, a separation between the priestly affairs and the civil government, and hence the organization of a priestly class, and that, too, of one all the more richly organized as the power of the nation advanced, and therewith the organization of an imposing ritual; but, on the other hand, brought about mostly by the diversion of the mind to the glitter and attractions of the world, a liturgical externalization of religion, a loss of productivity of religious poetry in proportion to the increasing productivity of the ceremonial.

§ 198. *Its Polytheistic Character.*

More important than the development of a priesthood and ritual is the inner transformation which passed over the religion of the Indians. Varuna, the All-embracing, from being the God of the starry firmament, came to be regarded as the God of the sea, and the rule of heaven passed over completely to Indra. The consciousness that Varuna, Mitra, Indra, Agni, Soma were only different names or *πρόσωπα* of the one God, if it still lingered here and there in faint traces, is yet in

general so beclouded, that the Gods are represented as separate beings, existing quite independently of one another. While in the ancient hymns, originating in the first period, only one deity is invoked in any one hymn, that is, the one God, under one particular name, and thus the *viṣve-devas* (the Gods collectively) are addressed quite in the sense of the Hebrew *Elohim*, that is, as the fulness of the Spirit and of the powers of deity; in the hymns of the second period, even in one hymn, a plurality of deities are enumerated as independently existing. For example, in 8. 13. 21: "Mitra, Ardshaman, Varuna, and the Maruts." In this hymn there are evidences of an inquiry being already occasioned in regard to personal integrity, and it ends in a eudæmonistic prayer only for earthly goods.

(8. 13. 21.) "May ill befall him, the enemy, the cursing mortal, the double-tongued, who would give us the blow of malefactor. Ye Gods, favour the upright. Ye know the hearts of men. Come to the true man, and come to punish the false, ye *vasus*.¹ We pray for protection of the hills and the protection of the waters. Heaven and earth, save us from all evil. Lead us, ye *vasus*, under your blessed guidance as in your ship through all dangers. Give long life to our offspring, to our families, to ourselves, ye mighty Adityas. O Mitra, Ardshaman, Varuna, and the Maruts, grant us a residence free of evil, full of men, splendidly and triply barred."

(Liturgy for the Sacrifice of the Horse, 1. 162.) Mitra, Varuna, Ardshaman, Adshu, Indra, Ribhu, and the Murats do not point back to us, if we at the sacrifice celebrate the virtues of the swift horse, sprung from the Gods. If ye lay the appointed offering before the horse, decked with the ornaments of rich gold, then the speckled goat to be offered bleats in the front; and it goes on the way dear to Indra and Pushan.² This goat, appointed for all the Gods, is at first

¹ Ye "rich." A similar idea to that of the Iranian *baghas*.

² Cognomen of the Sun God Savitar or Surya, who now appears alongside of Mitra, just as among the Greeks Helios appears alongside of Phœbus Apollo. Savitar signifies *producer*; Pushan signifies *sustainer*.

with the swift horse reserved as Pushan's share: Tvashtṛ himself rises to praise this freewill offering that is brought along with the horse. If thrice at the right time men lead the devoted horse about, which goes to the gods, then comes first Pushan's share, the goat, which announces to the gods the sacrifice. The hotri, the adhvaryu, the avaya, fills the channels round the altar with the well-pleasing and satisfying sacrifice.

Obs.—The episode of Nala in the Mahabhârata contains an old epic legend, which, in respect of contents, belongs wholly to this second period; for, apart from single interpolations, which evidently belong to a later redaction, this episode does not embrace the slightest reference to Brahma and Brahmanism. The Brahmans, indeed, appear in the courts of the kings; these Brahmans, however, stand in no connection with the story itself, but are merely linked on by the redactor—ornamental figures or supernumeraries. Nala, the king and kshatriya (warrior caste), is celebrated as a diligent student of the Vedas, while in the Brahmanic period the knowledge of the Vedas was permitted only to those of the Brahmanic caste. The God Brahma and the God Vishnu are not even referred to, are indeed rather excluded; as only these four deities have a place given them: Indra as the God of heaven, Varuna as the God of water (Apâmpatis), Yama as the God of the earth and the world of the dead, Agni as the God of fire.

§ 199. *Worship of Ancestry.*

The religion of the Indians had thus gained in the second period a thoroughly polytheistic character. The gods are still essentially only personifications of separate powers of nature; in the Nala episode simply personifications of the four elements, air, water, earth, fire. Hand in hand with this polytheistic basis, there now also appears the first germs of a worship of ancestry, which was to reach its full development in the following period. The performance of sacrifice appears in the later hymns of the Rig Veda as a thread, which serves to bind the living with their departed ancestors, and through their mediation with the gods. Evident expression is thus given to the consciousness that the past generation was more pious and stood in closer relation to the gods. While in the

hymns belonging to the first period it was only said: I see in spirit those who in past times brought offerings; in the third period every Brahman formally invokes by their names the ancestors of his family over his sacrifice, entreats their intercession with the gods, that they may graciously accept the offering. This is quite analogous to the invocation of saints in the Romish Church. The transition to this is found already in the second period. A special technical term, *pravarā*, was introduced to indicate the invocation of ancestors. The Rig Veda (10. 56. 1) teaches the union of the soul of the departed with a new glorified body. "Turn to thy home, free from all defects, unite thyself with the body blooming in full vigour." Comp. Kāgi, *Der Rig Veda*, Zurich 1879, p. 58 ff.

C.—THE PERIOD OF BRAHMANISM.

§ 200. *Brahma*.

The third period, from B.C. 1000 to B.C. 600, we designate, in agreement with Max Müller, as the Brahmanical, that is, as that of the worship of Brahma as the supreme God, and also, as that of the Brahmans (*brahmanas*) as a fully organized creed of priests and theologians, and also, finally, as that of the brâhmanas, that is, of the sacred theological writings of those Brahmans. The first of these elements is connected with religion, the second bears upon the constitution of religion, and the third refers to literature. In all three this root *brahma* occurs, as the name of the god, in the name of the priests, and in that of their writings. But the root-word is itself much older. It is an original Aryan word; only in the Veda periods it had a different meaning. In the Vedas the word *brahma* occurs, but only in the appellative signification of prayer. (See *Obs.*) It has a different sense in those more recent orders of sacred writings, the prose brâhmanas, that is, Brahmanical writings, composed by the Brahmans. Here, in the first place, we meet with a caste, that is, a genealogically

distinct order of brahmanas, who arrogate to themselves, to the exclusion of the caste of the Kshatriyas, the warriors and rulers, the management of liturgical sacrificial ceremonies, together with certain associated financial and political privileges.¹ A kind of hierarchical government has risen up; the Brahmanas exercise sway over the Kshatriyas. In the word brahman, as such, there now appears nothing new. The word, as such, means petitioner, in accordance with the original meaning of the root-word brahma. But—and this is the second point—this root-word has itself, during the period in which that hierarchy arose, changed its signification, and is now no longer “petition,” but means him who is the object of our petitions, that is, the deity.

Obs.—Even the older meaning of brahma, *petition*, is a derivative one. The fundamental root, *brah*, Iranian *brç*, is to grow. By the word *baraçma*, *growth*, which in the form of its derivation corresponds sufficiently nearly with the Sanscrit Brahma, the Iranian religious writings mean a bunch of palm twigs or other twigs, which is held in the hand during prayer, or even had lain in front of him on a stand, which was a sort of fortune-bringing magic wand, securing a hearing to our prayers. Now, since the Indians during their prayers and sacrifices, down to the latest times, took in their hand a bunch of kusha-grass, and still do so, since therefore this practice, common to both races, is thus an original and primitive Aryan custom, it may be confidently assumed that the word brahma, even among the Indians of the very earliest, pre-vedic times, meant the plant held in the hand during prayer, and that at first the meaning of an act of prayer was only a secondary one.

§ 201. *The Origin of the Brahman Religion.*

The deity indicated by the word Brahma was a deity in a philosophical sense, a product of speculation, evidently originating from a reaction against polytheism, but bearing a tinge of pantheism. The Adityas had been at that time reduced to the number of twelve subordinate genii. Indra

¹ This separation of the priestly and warrior professions reminds one of Winifred, who forbids clerics to serve as soldiers under a penalty of being regarded and treated as *homicidæ*.

was no longer the supreme God in the mythological sense, as king of heaven. But Brahma, at least in connection with Vishnu, appears as supreme God, as the deity immanent in the world. The inclination toward pantheism latent in the Indian religion has been pointed to in § 196. It was this tendency which had led to the nature-worship of the second period, where the existences of nature were regarded as the revealed deity itself, and hence as constituting a plurality of gods. Some here and there, no doubt, retained still in their thoughts the consciousness of the supernaturalness of this god, and his distinctness from his creation; as in the beautiful hymn of the second period (10-121): "In the beginning sprang up the source of golden light; he was the only Lord of all that is; he established the earth and the heavens. Who is the god to whom we bring sacrifices? He who gives life and strength, for whose blessing all the radiant gods, the separate powers of nature, are craving, whose shadow is immortality, whose shadow is death (*i.e.* who casts to his creatures immortality or mortality, as one casts his shadow). Who is the god to whom, etc.? He who by his power is the one king of the breathing and waking world, he who rules everything, man and beast. Who is, etc.? He whose power called those snow-clad mountains into being, that ocean, with its various rivers; he to whom those lands belong, as if they were his two arms. Who is, etc.? He by whom the heaven shines, and the earth is firm; he by whom heaven, the highest heaven, was established; he who spread the lights in the firmament. Who is, etc.? He before whom heaven and earth, firm founded by his will, tremble inwardly; he by whom the advancing sun shines. Who is, etc.? Wherever the mighty whirlpools rush, wherever one sows and kindles fire, there stands he who is the one principle of life in the shining gods. Who is, etc.? He who by his power looks out from the clouds, to give strength and gleam upon the sacrifices; he who is God over all the gods. Who is, etc.? O' that he may not destroy us, the creator of the

earth ; he, the righteous, who created the heavens, who created the vast gleaming ocean !”

From what has been quoted, it is quite evident that the author of this hymn had risen above polytheism to a conception of the unity of the God who rules in all the gods, that is, the powers of nature. But he also manifestly represents this God as one freely ruling over those gods, as the creator, who looks over the clouds, who, according to his own will, makes mortal or gives immortality, who governs the world. That is not pantheism, but panentheism, and therefore monotheism. And it is very striking and suggestive to find that this poet also still retains a consciousness of the righteousness of God. Alongside, however, of these last echoes of the good old monotheism of the first period, a current began to set in, even during the second period, in the direction of a pantheistic speculation, which indeed rose above polytheism to a conception of the unity of God ; but, instead of resting in devout reverence in the knowledge of the one God, in order to know him as the just one, ruling in holiness, and in order to ask, how shall I be freed from guilt and sin ? it rather pressed the mad-like question, whether the Godhead has independent self-existence ? In this sense the following ode of the tenth Mandala is composed :—

“Neither something nor nothing existed ; that glittering firmament was not, nor was the broad cloud-land of the heavens stretched out. What enveloped all ? What covered and concealed all ? Was it the bottomless abyss of the waters ? There was no death there, and there was nothing immortal ;¹ there was no distinction of day and night. The solitary One breathed into himself without breathing. Another than he there was not. Darkness was there, and

¹ According to the context, this does not mean that there do not yet exist any mortal or immortal creatures, but that the distinction between death and immortality does not yet in itself exist, so that as yet there is generally no distinction at all. Out of this distinctionless abstract unity is the universe evolved, as is also conceived by Spinoza and Hegel.

everything was at first enveloped in gross darkness, in a sea without light. The germ, which had lain in the pod, broke forth, one nature, by means of glowing heat. Then first love came upon him, the new germ of the spirit; yea, poets in their hearts distinctly admit pondering this connection between created and uncreated things. This spark, which penetrates all, comes it from earth or from heaven?—Then were seeds sown, and a mighty strife arose, nature below, and force and will above. Who knows this mystery? Who shall here declare whence, whence this manifold creation sprang? The gods themselves came later into being. Who then knows out of what this great creation arose? He from whom all this great creation came. Was it then his will that created, or was he a mere blind, will-less power? The loftiest seer, who is in highest heaven, knows this, or perhaps even he knows it not.”

After the gods of the second period had been identified with the powers of nature, there was sought out speculatively and presupposed a primitive divine essence, an absolute; lying at their basis was the basis of all existence. This, however, was conceived as abstract distinctionless unity, and therefore was reckoned dark. This, indeed, was quite inconsistent, since even the antithesis of light and dark, as well as that of life and death, must be represented as not yet determined. While, then, our modern pantheism, by means of hair-splitting distinctions (§ 188), calls the world forth from the absolute, the author of this singularly profound hymn acknowledged that the fire of love was self-kindled in that dark substance, and must have called forth the positing and reconciliation of the opposition. But the question whether this had been a process determined by the will of the absolute, or a mere involuntary one, is left undecided, and even the second correlated question whether the absolute is conscious or unconscious.

Precisely this Absolute, of which it cannot be decided whether it be self-conscious or not—a product of philosophical

speculation—is that which we find during the third period under the name of Pradshâpati, universal Lord, and again as the supreme God, who is the subject of adoration (brahma), and is therefore soon without more ado designated by the proper name of Brahma. What was a philosophical speculation became thus established as a dogma. Still this worship of Brahma does not by any means occasion the abandonment of the older national gods; the likelihood of this happening was made still less by the fact that the theistic conception of Brahma was soon superseded by the pantheistic. We might point to Neoplatonism as a precisely analogous phenomenon.

§ 202. *The Priesthood, Worship, and Liturgical Literature.*

The liturgical ritual did not only continue in force, but gradually increased with and in consequence of the hierarchy of the Brahmans, and in consequence of that liturgical development there was also a rich development of hierarchical distinctions. The most important of these was the distinction of the hotri, adhvaryu, and udgâtri, as three separate orders of priests. The hotris had to utter over the sacrifices the ancient hymns, collected long before in the Rig Veda, so far as these were of a liturgical character; the udgâtris had to sing the songs which had existed in a detached form even earlier, though only now in the beginning of the third period for the first time put together, for liturgical purposes, in a *corpus memoriale*, which remained for a while unwritten, and was called the *Yadshurveda*; the adhvaryus had to undertake the ritual operations, and so to utter the liturgical formularies, which, about the same time, were collected in the Samaveda. All sorts of formulæ of magic, blessing, and cursing, which concerned not the priestly ritual, but were of a private nature, were finally collected in a *corpus memoriale* as the Atharvaveda. But as the third period advanced commentaries on the Vedas became necessary, for in the beginning of this period a change passed over the language, and the old dialect of the Vedas

was distinguished from the modern popular dialects as the Sanscrit, the literary language of culture. Among the Brahmans there now arose different kharanas or schools, independent of and in conflict with the Gotras, that is, the genealogical generations of the Brahmans. In these schools prose interpretations of the Vedas were now set forth, delivered orally and got by rote. These commentaries were regarded as *sruti* or divinely-revealed doctrines, in contrast to *smṛti*, human research, and were designated by the name *Brahmanas*, works of the Brahmans. They were: the Bavricha-brâhmana of the hotris on the Rig Veda; the Tittiriya-brâhmana and the Satapatha-brâhmana of the Adhvaryus on the Yajurveda; and the Chandôga-brahmana of the Udgâtris on the Samaveda. Besides these we have the Gopatha-brâhmana on the Atharvaveda, and other similar works, such as the Aitareya-brâhmana, etc. The contents of these Brahmanas, subsequently committed to writing, consist of a conglomeration of antiquarian and philological notices and absurd explanations and fables, that remind one of the Talmud, although, as might naturally be expected, occasional pearls are found in the heap of mud. This, however, is made conspicuous, that the understanding of the original sense of the hymns of the Rig Veda, as well as that of the old songs and liturgical formularies, had been lost. The hymns, composed for an entirely different purpose, namely, for the non-liturgical simple sacrificial worship of early times, were conceived of as though they had been constructed quite appropriately for the elaborately determined ritual of the above-named threefold order of the priestly caste. In this way currency was given to the most ridiculous misunderstandings. In several hymns of the Rig Veda (e.g. in 10. 121, as quoted in § 201) it is asked, Who is the god to whom we bring sacrifices? or again, To what god shall we offer sacrifice? This reads in the Vedic dialect: *Kasmai dēvāya havishavidēma*. The Brahmans have now seemingly taken the interrogative pronoun *ka* for a proper name, introduced a new god, *ka*, and named after this god a new sort of sacrifice, *kaya*. In the

Rig Veda the sun has oftentimes the poetical epithet, the golden-handed. The Brahmans to explain this name have devised a fable worthy of the Talmud.¹ In a battle the hands of the Sun God were hewn off, and he has golden ones constructed and put on in their place. On the other hand, these Brahmanas contain several remarkable old legends, such as the already quoted (§ 194, *Obs.*) Sunasepha legend, and the later legends connected therewith (§ 207) referring to the flood. The very early notion, too, belonging to the first period, that the several gods are only *πρόσωπα* of the one God, independently of the Brahma idea, comes to view here once again. So it is once said in the Aitarayabrâhmana: "Agni is the first among the gods; Vishnu the last; between the two come all the other gods. Agni is all the gods; Vishnu is all the gods." Ritualism covered the whole life of the Indian. Important was the Dikshâ ritual, that is, the initiation of the youth at his first sharing in the sacrificial worship. This initiation was viewed as formally a kind of new birth. "The initiated," it is said in the Aitareyaveda, "is led back into the embryo. The priest sprinkles him with water; water is seed." He is thus begotten a second time. "He is then led into a hall; this hall is the mother's womb; he must then bundle up his hands, like a new-born child; then he is put into a bath." This quasi new birth, however, was only conceived of in a magical way; there is no idea present of moral powers, requirements, and accomplishments. Religion as superstition had severed itself more and more completely from ethics. The Kaushîtakibrâhmana contains a collection of pedantic rules as to errors in regard to the ritual, which must be rendered harmless by expiation. The division of the priests into classes became, as time advanced, always more and more complicated. At the close of the period a fourth class

¹ This fable has nothing in common as to origin with that of the Edda about the biting off of the hand of Tyr (Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, Vorr. pp. xi. vii. and p. 188). Tyr, as the God of War, is one-handed, because he can only grant victory to the one side.

was added to the earlier three, and to it the name of Brahmanas κατ' ἐξοχήν was given. Each of the four classes was parted into three subdivisions. Then for the first time was added the several servile classes of those who slew the victims and cut them up, and performed various other menial offices.

§ 203. *The Schools of Philosophy.*

Generally when, among a cultured race, religion, by identifying itself with superstition, puts itself out of connection with ethics, there arises a philosophical system of ethics, or at least a philosophy which draws into its domain the ethical problems or repudiates them. During the period of the Brahmanical hierarchy, revelling in the enjoyment of the highest political influence and consideration, while the people were held bound in the bonds of a complicated ritual on the foundation of a pantheistically tinged polytheism, philosophical ideas, sometimes theistic, more frequently pantheistic, of one absolute deity were developed in the esoteric theology of the Brahmanical schools according to a Talmud-like hair-splitting erudition, which sometimes took a permanent shape in the formal schools of philosophy. First of all, the speculative doctrine of Brahma was developed in a series of works, writings we cannot call them, for they, too, were only composed orally, and learnt by rote, and only at a later period committed to writing: these are the Upanishads, properly, the meditations of the anchorites. Their contents are purely philosophical, and they contain manifold attempts to make clear, under the most varied forms and names, the nature of that absolute, that original essence. This is designated sometimes by Brahma, sometimes by âtman, *self*, sometimes by Sat, *the existent*, sometimes by Atsharam, *the impassible*. Here and there we find it conceived of as self-conscious personal essence, as in the Bavricha-Upanishad: "In the beginning of the world, âtman was alone, and there was nothing outside of him. He thought: I will create the worlds, and he created

these worlds." Similarly, Brahma is named in the Tattiriya-Upanishad, "the true, omniscient, eternal One, from whom ether, air, fire, water, earth, and all things have their origin." But it is more frequently the pantheistic conception that makes its appearance. In the Chandôga-Upanishad, Sandilyas expounds: "The âtman in our heart is Brahma," and therefore a god arriving at a consciousness of himself in a finite subject. In the Upanishad Brhadâraṇyaka it is said: "A husband is loved, not because thou lovest the husband, but because thou lovest the âtman in him. If we love prosperity, goods, etc., we always love the âtman. Just as salt put into water makes the water salt, so the âtman may be separated from the elements and resolved into them again. If there were two substances, the one would see the other; but since the divine being is alone, how can it know anything at all or its own self?" Here we have *Spinoza ante Spinozam*! In other Upanishads the existent one (Sat) is spoken of,—“it was one, and desired to be manifold: and therefore it created the light, which passed over into water.” Again, in other passages Brahma is defined as “the undeveloped” (avyakṛta), so that the world is thus the developed God, and God is the developed world. In the Chandôga-Upanishad he is once explicitly defined as the *asat*, that is τὸ μὴ ὄν, the non-existent out of which the *sat* arises. It is easily seen that such philosophical investigations, if once set agoing, would not be long confined to the quiet orders of the anchorites (tâpasas). These found disciples, and were sought after by scholars. About B.C. 600, during the transition from the second to the third period, regular philosophical schools and philosophical systems representing such schools were formed. The Nyâza philosophy (from nyâza, *becoming* or *proper*) was a moral philosophy on a pantheistic basis. The Sâṅkhya philosophy (literally, *rationatio*), founded by Kapila, was a pantheistic dialectic. Of a similar character was the Mimâṃsa system (from Mâ, *to measure*). Only in the Yôga philosophy (from Yudsh, *to join*, hence yôga, *union*, that is, with the deity) does the old gold

of the original Vedic religion for the last time reappear in the form of a theistic mysticism; and the didactic poem Bhagavadgîtâ, in which the Yôga system is laid down, belongs to the very noblest utterances, outside of the domain of revelation itself, that have been expressed in reference to the nature of God and his relation to man.

Obs.—The Bhagavadgîtâ is in the form of a conversation between a King Ardshuna and Sribhagâvan (exalted divinity) appearing to him, that is, the deity incarnate in Krishna. Ardshuna was to fight in a holy war against an army in which were his own brothers, relations, and friends. Quite unnerved, he drew back trembling: the God approached and encouraged him. He shows him the possibility of pleasing and serving God without deeds, in deedless contemplativeness, by ascetic exercises. Krishna: "Thy cowardice is sin. Thou art afraid to fight against thine own people. Before thine own were, was I. And even they are immortal. Fear of bodily death is sin: and likewise it is sin to love earthly goods. All is appearance, only one thing really is, that which has its being in eternity, which fills all heaven; that is God. He is not born, he dies not. He is not to-day; he was not yesterday; he is eternal. Whosoever lives in God, he knows not fear, love, and hate. To love God, to do his will, is the one duty of man, is his one source of blessedness. Happy they who in unruffled stillness lead a life of contemplation, losing themselves in God. All desire after finite possessions, all desire after finite love, all pain from finite loss they have escaped. Covered up like the tortoise in the vestment of his own inner being, your upturned eyes are directed toward me. He who leads such a life fears not. Changelessly quiet he goes on, until at last he vanishes in divine pains." Ardshuna: "If, then, the vision of God is a duty, why is, in addition, the arduous duty of the battle laid upon me?" Bhagavan: "Man always does something; the spirit is restless. He exercises the powers with which I endowed him, and these he must exercise, were it only in breathing. The right use of these, however, is to apply them to my service. All other use of them is sin. Not this or that should he long for, and so squander his life-powers; his one endeavour should be to serve me: he should expend his powers in doing my will! Not for the sake of success shouldst thou act: success lies in my hand; let it suffice thee to have obeyed me, to have loved me. Thou art not guide of the world; I am. I am self-consciously existent from eternity: thou art of yesterday. I guide and control the order of the universe: I

give and I withhold success, as it suits my purposes. It is for thee to obey me. In this thy blessedness consists, and happy indeed, then, thou art even if no success crowns thy toil, even if thou fallest down in my service. Thy spirit surely shall outlive that which thou doest. With me in view, thou enjoyest unbroken rest in all labour, and in the midst of outward repose thou accomplishest the work of loving me. So is thy work not mere work. In the fire of absorption, in the divine is it purified. Thou engagest not upon thine own work : loftily thou standest above it. To love God is the one good deed. This love of God is the element of truth in all outward works ; it is the truth in pain, with which the ascetic robs himself of breath for an hour, with which for a year he holds his limbs firm fettered." Ardshuna : " But if, then, the inner act of the spirit is not better because an outward act has been added—if we serve thee as well with prayers as with battles ; why then dost thou nevertheless demand that we also serve thee outwardly in thy government of the world ?" Bhagavan : " The renunciation is eternal (of eternal worth) only if the sinful heart be renounced. Mere cessation from action, so long as it is confined purely to the outward, is itself again an action. True renunciation, true withdrawing from life, is that in which thou tearest thy spirit away from the service of the finite in all outward acts or conditions of life. Thou canst not indeed completely withdraw thyself from life, from sharing in my government of the world. Thou livest, thou workest by thine acting—thou workest upon the world also by thy not acting, that is, I work through thee. Thou art my instrument, consciously or unconsciously." (Quite properly. Comp. § 127.) " But then art thou free, then art thou blessed, then art thou a true ascetic, if thou servest me consciously. Thou doest what I require : the result is no affair of thine, it comes not to thee as a reward. In thine own self lies thy blessedness : it is thy one delight, that thy soul is united with my spirit. Freed from all finite pleasure, freed from all joys which never are without pain, not striving after my good will by works of outward devotion, but conquering the impulse towards sin,—thus art thou free. For he who knows me, who am the father of all holiness, the Lord of all worlds, who am love, he is blessed." In this striking and profound manner is the moral law developed. Apart from revelation, the very best philosophy could not proceed farther. To Ardshuna's question : how it happens that one with the best intentions often sins, and how must one then begin to struggle against sin ? Bhagavan has no satisfactory answer. A profound knowledge of sin is wanting, and therefore, also, the idea of atonement. Sin, indeed, no longer appears as a necessary moment in the process of develop-

ment, but yet it is represented only as a relative drag, as a gradual depravation for ever reappearing. "From time to time," says Bhagavan, "as piety becomes enfeebled and sin increases in strength, I come down and am born as man. Then do I punish the wicked, and establish piety. He then who rightly knows me, ever mounts higher, until he attains unto me." It is a weak, dreamy, glimmering presentiment of the truth that God's redeeming help must come; but as to what it is to consist in, man left to himself knows not, and cannot find. Over against these relative recurring depravations it sets the relative redemptive operations of God, recurring incarnations, the purpose of which, however, is only to direct and to enlighten, not to expiate. Once more this aspiration rises one degree higher. Once, after he had spoken of the necessity of man's being enlightened, Bhagavan says to Ardshuna: "Thou must believe; only through faith comest thou to the knowledge, which leads thee into the peace of God."

D.—THE INDIAN SCHOLASTIC PERIOD.

§ 204. *The Dissolution of the Religious Consciousness.*

The Yoga philosophy represents not dawn but twilight. Its influence, like that of all deep mysticism, was restricted to a narrow circle, and was soon utterly extinguished, whereas the systems of the pantheistic schools increasingly affected the whole mass of the people. Indeed, it could not but follow, that the struggle which was always vigorously maintained between the Brahmanical schools of Sankhya, Nyaya, and Mimansa should tell upon the people, and lead to an unsettling of the religious consciousness of the people, that is, to scepticism. Worship was no longer seriously rendered to the gods; a doctrine that the all is one, reminding us of that of the Electics, became more and more prevalent. Everything that exists, the concrete, the determined, was more and more distinctly recognised as *mâyâ*, appearance, semblance, and the abstract *âtman* was considered as alone real. Strabo (xv. 59) relates of the time when Alexander the Great reached the borders of India, that the Indians considered the earthly life as an embryonic state and death as the entrance into the true

life; but there was no belief in personal immortality, as in the older Vedas, *e.g.* Rig Veda, i. 125. 5, "Who gives alms attains the highest place in heaven and is ranked with the gods;" and similarly, too, in i. 150. 3, there was rather only a belief in the absorption into the universal abstract primary substance.¹ Hence the stoical contempt of the contrast between good and evil, pleasure and pain, as set forth by Strabo. In this way, however, Brahmanism cut away the ground from under its own feet. If the people no longer believed in the gods, they had no need of any order of priestly mediators. Hence we find, even as early as the beginning of the fourth period (B.C. 600—B.C. 200), convulsive efforts made by the Brahmans to exclude and restrain the people composing the warrior and agricultural classes from access to the esoteric wisdom. Whereas in earlier times every one knew the Vedas by heart and used them in their devotions, it was now strictly forbidden that any one should communicate anything from the Vedas to women, and indeed it was no longer allowed that a man of the people should even hear the Vedas, unless when the Brahmans repeated them at a sacrifice. The art of writing became known in India about B.C. 600, and came into use for letters and private correspondence;² but the Brahmans denounced as a serious offence any attempt to produce a written copy of any Veda or any sacred text, evidently from a fear lest in profane circles it should become known and read.

§ 205. *Sākya-Mouni.*

All this, however, could not secure permanence. The Brahmans had acted tolerantly toward the various philosophical systems, because the representation of these systems did not on their parts dispute the authority of the sacred books, the Vedas, Brāhmanas, and Upanishads, but sought

¹ Even the Yoga mysticism taught "a losing of self in the pangs of a new divine birth." See § 203, *Obs.*

² They wrote on bark or cotton cloth.

rather to derive and support their systems from them. But now with Visvâmitra and Jaunaka there arose an opposition to the priestly privileges of the Brahmans. Both were princes, therefore Kshatriyas, and as such claimed the right to be allowed themselves to offer sacrifices without the intervention of Brahmanical priests, just as in the early Vedic periods, and they actually made the attempt in those regions over which they ruled. So far their procedure was somewhat analogous to the Reformation of Luther. The opposition, however, soon went farther. Sâkya-Mouni (born B.C. 477) was, according to the statements of later Buddhist writings composed about B.C. 250, himself a Brahman and a disciple of the Brahmans; but according to other less probable accounts, he was of princely or Kshatriya descent. However this may be, he sided with the party of the opponents, and gave its death-blow to the monopoly which hitherto Brahmanism had enjoyed. He did this by not only repudiating the exclusive right of the Brahmans to offer sacrifice, teaching a sort of universal priesthood in opposition to a particular or restricted one, but definitely formulated the proposition, that without any priestly mediation, and without any belief in the holy books, a man might attain unto salvation, union with the divine. The sacred books of the Brahmans he treated as forgeries; his own bold assertions he founded on a consistent pantheism; he only stated the conclusion of premises which had been already given in the Brahmanic religion of the third period. If abstract being is alone existent and everything concrete, especially all personality, is only appearance, and if the whole world is only an inevitably necessary process of the introduction of the phenomenal, and of the unavoidable sinking back again of the concrete phenomenon into the abstract primary being, then it is evident that every man will, quite inevitably, and without any priestly intervention, attain unto this end of "annihilation" (*nirvânam*, from *vâ*, *pain*, and *nir*, *extinction*). How long he will take to reach it depends only on himself. The more energetically he resigns himself to the

Nirvâna-Quietism, the sooner will he be delivered from the pain of existence whose continuance is only a soul-wandering, and be lost in that abstract primary being which is non-existence.

§ 206. *The Reaction of the Sutra Theology.*

This doctrine of Sâkya-Mouni was at first only the teaching of a Brahmanical sect. The mass of the Brahmans, however, saw with horror how this sect increased and won supporters. Brahmanism on its part now made all conceivable endeavours to assert itself over against the dangerous sect and to secure new fields. As Sâkya-Mouni had with zeal and success availed himself of the aid of the art of writing in spreading his doctrines, the Brahmans could no longer afford to proscribe this means of communicating their views. They now also took advantage of the art of writing. Not only the three classes of the sacred books were committed to writing, but alongside of them now grew up a vast mass of Brahmanical theological literature, the works of which are embraced under the common names of *sûtras*, and are distinguished from the three classes of the sacred books, Vedas, Brâhmanas, Upanishads, which are regarded as *sruti*, revelation, as *smrti*, merely human research. It was in fact a philologico-theological system, which was set forth in a series of writings. The several sciences (*vêdangâs*) were now separated from the mystical conglomeration of the old Brâhmanas, set forth more distinctly, and expressed in written compositions under the form of *versus memoriales* (see *Obs.*). Even in the political department the Brahmans sought to regain and re-establish their former power. An opposition between classes had by this time become habitual, in part growing out of original tribal differences. This the Brahmans sought, about B.C. 400, to intensify by means of painful legal enactments for the separation of the four castes (the Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, or parents, and Sûdras, or servants), which have from that time persistently continued, constituting the germ out of which the complicated caste system of the present day has been

developed. All this, however, was of no avail. A powerful king in Pâtaliputra, Asôka by name, in B.C. 250, called a great council of wise men, Brahmans and princes, to decide the controversy between the Brahmans and the followers of Sâkya-Mouni. This council, with the king at its head, decided in favour of the doctrines of Sâkya-Mouni, the enlightened, the Buddha, and from this dates the victory of Buddhism over Brahmanism. In Further India, though Brahmanism has indeed continued to exist down to the present day, it has been always sinking deeper into polytheistic superstition, pantheistic non-morality, and deceitfulness, until it has become an ossified system of caste distinctions. In the regions north of India, Buddhism reigns supreme. Thus we do not meet with any upward development in the history of the religion of India as a whole, but rather a continuous deterioration from the original worship of holy, omniscient, invisible Adityas, as the unity of the spirit of God, through polytheistic nature-worship, and pantheistic polytheism down to the dulness of consistent pantheism. The light and superficial conception entertained of sin, the stupefying and lulling asleep of conscience, are very distinctly and decidedly important factors in this steady depravation.

Obs. 1.—The Vedangas were:—1. Sikshâ, rules for proper pronounciation; 2. Chhanda, a treatise on metre; 3. Vyâkarana, grammar, system of forms and propositions; 4. Nirukta, etymology; 5. Kalpa, religious ceremonials; 6. Jyotisha, astronomy and chronology. It is quite conceivable that, so soon as the art of writing came into literary use, there sprang up a more general literary activity directed to calling up into consciousness the past of the nation. Historians, indeed, the Indians never had had on account of the want of the art of writing, and oral tradition was never carried beyond the fragmentary legends of the heroes. But about A.D. 500 a great number of these were gathered, and formed the two epics, the Ramâyana and the Mahabhârata in its older form. At a later period, after the appearance of Buddha, Vyâsa committed both epics to writing, added to the Mahabhârata a series of disconnected heroic legends as episodes, and edited both epic works in their present form. About the time of Vyâsa, the Manavadharma-sastra, or Manu's Code of laws, was written, a collection of Brahmanical laws, which were now antedated and put forth

fictitiously under the name of Manu, the Indian Noah. Also the dramatic poet Kalidâsa, known by his *Sakontala*, belongs to this age. A succession of scholars—Sannaka about B.C. 400, Katyâyana, B.C. 350–300, Asvalâyana, etc.—wrote “*Anukramanis*,” learned treatises on the Vedas. About B.C. 500, Panini wrote the first grammar; Katyâyana afterwards revised and edited it.

Obs. 2.—On the progress of Buddhism in Thibet and Mongolia, see § 265.

§ 207. *The Tradition of the Flood.*

The specific form of deterioration, which the ancient primitive theism underwent among the Indians, is made apparent from a comparison with the religious history of the other principal Aryan branch, the Iranian, which kept hold of the true conception of the consciousness of guilt and the conflict with sin in a much more vigorous and earnest manner. But just before passing over to consider them, we would ask, whether any reminiscence remains among the Indians of the primitive history of the human race. No reminiscence is anywhere found of an old tradition about the creation of the world. That so-called tradition of the creation, which is found in the *Gopatha-brâhmana*, is in fact no tradition, but a philosophically constructed allegory (see *Obs.*). Just as little trace is found of any reminiscence of the fall. In *Soma*, indeed, which is at once the life-dispensing sacred plant and deity, there is an unmistakeable reminiscence of the tree of life in Paradise (*Gen. ii. 9, iii. 22*). This tree appears as personified in a god of life (§ 212). Apart from this, the recollection of the Indians only reaches back to the flood. The legend of the flood is found in Indian literature in various forms. The earliest form is that of *Satapatha-brâhmana*, i. 8, i. 1 :

“They brought to Manu in the morning water that he might wash. When they poured it on their hands in washing, a fish (that is, a little fish present in this basin of water) fell into Manu’s hands while he washed. It spoke to Manu: Keep me, and I shall protect thee. Manu said: From what wilt thou protect me? The fish said: The flood will overflow all creatures: I shall protect thee from it. Manu said: How can I serve thee?

The fish said: So long as we are small, we are surrounded with many dangers: fishes prey on fishes. First, then, you must put me in a basin; when I outgrow this, break it, and carry me to a pond; when I have outgrown this, put me in the sea, so shall you be saved from destruction. He soon became a great fish. He said to Manu: In that very year in which I shall be grown up, the flood will come. Build thou a ship, and call upon me, and when the flood rises, go into the ship, and I shall protect thee. Manu brought the fish into the sea, after he had tended him in all these ways. And in the year in which the fish was fully grown, Manu built a ship and called on the fish. Then when the flood rose, he went into the ship. The fish came swimming to him, and Manu bound the tow-rope of the ship to the fish's horn. The fish carried it away beyond the northern mountains, the Himalayas. The fish spoke: I have protected thee; bind the ship to a tree. The water cannot overflow thee so long as thou sittest on the mountain. When the water sinks, thou mayest descend. Manu glided down with the water; hence the saying: Manu's gliding over the northern mountains. The flood had swept away all creatures, and so Manu was alone. He went meditating a hymn, and desiring company. He brought a Pākayadshna offering: clarified butter, curdled milk, whey, and curds he offered to the water. After a year a wife was brought to him. She arose, running and dropping fat; and where she stood, there was clear butter. Mitra and Varuna came and said to her: Who art thou? She said: I am Manu's daughter. The gods said: Say thou art ours. She said: No. I belong to him that begat me. Then longed they to have her as their sister, and she was half willing for this. She went and came to Manu. Manu said: Who art thou? She said: I am thy daughter. He asked: How so? She answered: By the offering which thou gavest to the waters hast thou begotten me. Praise me with offerings, then wilt thou be rich in seed. Every blessing, which thou wishest, will I give thee. So he glorified her in the midst of his sacri-

fice. He went with her, meditating a hymn, and wishing successors, and begat of her his posterity."

The episode of the Mahabhârata, called Naubandanam, the building of the ship, was composed at a later period, but has for material, which it works up in a poetic fashion, an older and purer form of the legend of the flood. The whole of the absurd story about the butter daughter of Manu, fabricated only to show the meritoriousness of sacrifice, is there wanting. The growth of the fish, and the fearfulness of the flood, destroying every living thing, a flood over which Manu's ship danced like a drunken woman, is given in more detail, and the fish is expressly declared to be an Incarnation of Varuna. The legend had therefore received this form in the second period, when Varuna was no longer the god of the starry heavens, but the god of the sea. There is no word here of any sin of man calling forth the flood as its punishment. Varuna, appearing in the form of a fish, says,—clearing that debateable point with great cleverness: "The time for the washing of all flesh has come." There is, however, another highly important feature in the Naubandanam. The seven Rishis are during the flood with Manu in the ship, and on the recession of the flood bind the ship fast to a mountain. Now the seven Rishis (Bhrigu, Angiras, Viswâmitra, Vashishta, Kasyapa, Atri, Agista) are in the Brâhmanas therefore, in the third period, represented as the fabulous, mythological first parents of the seven Brahmanical families (gôtrâs). Such a derivation of the descent of the Brahmans naturally was not possible before there was a system of Brahmanism, therefore not before the third period. The Rishis are also at the same time described as sons of the sun and the atmosphere; and this belongs to an older period, like the Rishis themselves, who already appear in the matter contributed from the second period to the Naubandanam. May not these seven sons of the sun and the atmosphere be the seven colours of the rainbow? While the grey flood covered the earth, there was colour only in Manu's ship, and after the flood a rainbow

fastened the ship to land—these may be reminiscences of what is related in Gen. ix. 12, 13.¹ Since the name and person of Manu are mentioned in the Rig Veda, and are met with also in the Iranian legends (§ 210), this tradition of a flood covering the highest mountains of the earth, from which only one man saved himself in a ship, must have existed among the Indians during even the first period in a form no longer extant.

Obs.—The philosophizing legend of the creation in the Gopatha-brâhmana is as follows:—Brahma, on account of the heat of his creative activity, began to perspire. This perspiration formed the water. In it Brahma saw his own image, and over it fell in love with himself, and begat Bhrigu and Atharvan. Atharvan is the pradshâpati, the ruler of the world. He then begat the author of the Atharvaveda. Then out of his own fat Brahma created the earth, from his body the atmosphere, from his head the heavens. Then created he the three Gods, Agni, Vayu, Aditya, and from these proceeded the Rig Veda, the Yajurveda, and the Somaveda. This figment, devised for the glorification of the Atharvaveda and Brahmanism generally, could only have been regarded as an ancient creation-legend, at a period when the Vedas were still unexamined, and the Brahma religion was supposed by European scholars to be the primitive religion of the Indians. It is just as little entitled to rank thus as Hesiod's theogony is to be styled an old creation-myth of the Pelasgians. Similar, but yet more complicated and artificially concocted theogonies are to be found in the more recent Brahmanical writings.

CHAPTER II.—THE RELIGION OF THE IRANIANS.

§ 208. *Sources of Information.*

The sources from which our information of the religious history of the Iranian race may be gathered are: *A.* Religious intimations, references, and notices in the inscriptions of the Persian kings of the Achæmenian line: Cyrus, Darius

¹ Friedrich Rückert, to whom, while with his help reading the Naubandam in 1837, I ventured to make this suggestion, heartily approved of and adopted it.

Hystaspis, Xerxes, Artaxerxes I. and II. Specially important is the Behistun inscription of Darius Hystaspis. *B.* The sacred writings of the Eastern Iranians, composed in the old Bactrian, or so-called Zend language, and known collectively under the name of the Avesta. These writings are: 1. The Vendidad, vidæva dâta, anti-Däva law, the proper book of religion and law, and the second oldest part of the Avesta. It contains principally laws. The narrative or mythical sections appear, like omitted portions of lost writings, to have been added at a later period to the Vendidad. 2. The Yazna, consisting of seventy pieces. The first twenty-eight of these are liturgical prayer formularies; the rest are Gâthâs or metrical hymns, and these form the very oldest portion of the Avesta. The proof of this is given in Spiegel, *Die heil. Schriften der Parsen*, i. Einleit. p. 13. These hymns are put in the mouth of Zarathustra, or other mythical persons, or the priesthood generally. 3. The Visparad, in manuscripts between the Vendidad and Yazna, occupying therefore the second place, embraces later additions to the liturgical prayer formularies, and is thus an appendix to the first part of the Yazna. 4. The Khoda-Avesta, intended as a private book of devotion for laymen, contains partly prayers, some of them of later date, and composed in the modern dialect, especially Yashts, or prayer-songs to the genii on the particular days dedicated to them, partly religious legends and doctrines. *C.* Notices in Herodotus, Plutarch, etc., on the religion of the old Persians and other Iranian peoples.

§ 209. *The Age of the Avesta.*

Spiegel (*Die heil. Schriften der Parsen*, vol. ii. p. 210 ff.) has very convincingly shown from Vendidad, ii. 63 ff., and Yazna, 19, 50 ff., that the Avesta was committed to writing in East Iran, and indeed not before the rise of the Achæmenian dynasty, but after this, at a time when East Iran or Bactria, and West Iran or Medo-Persia, formed two empires. In fact,

the Avesta allows the tradition of the Persians to have been first written down in the age after Alexander the Great, and so speaks the text of the Avesta itself, inasmuch as there is no mention there of writing, but only of oral tradition. The sacred writings of the Iranians were therefore all written down at the same time, like those of the Indians. It is indeed in itself quite conceivable that such a universal overturning as took place under Alexander the Great, while it disturbed the peaceful condition of separate peoples, would lead to the fixing in writing of that which hitherto had with quiet confidence been left to oral transmission. Moreover, when the most distant groups of nations were brought into communication with one another, when foreign languages sounded in the ear, and the existence of all the kingdoms was blotted out or endangered, a very reasonable doubt must have arisen as to whether the sacred liturgical songs and traditions could any longer be transmitted in a pure and undisfigured manner by oral tradition. When, further, they had before their eyes, in the Græco-Macedonian invaders, an example of a nation using the art of writing, and came to know the advantages of written communications, it is easily imagined that among the Iranian people also the priesthood would now avail themselves of the hitherto despised means of fixing their sacred documents in writing, though this had been proscribed before as unholy.

Notwithstanding the lateness of the period at which the Avesta was committed to writing, it does not by any means follow that the text, as such, was of so late an origin. It may have been transmitted, as was the case with the Vedas, by oral tradition for centuries. Indeed, it must have been orally transmitted for a considerable time, just because in the text, as such, there is no mention of writing, and because in it strata from very different ages are quite recognisable. What its age may be, however, can be decided only (*a*) from the contents, especially from the condition of the religious system which is represented in it; and (*b*) from a comparison with the religious notices on the monuments and in the Greek

writers. Now what is found in the way of prayers to the gods and liturgical notices on the monuments agrees so exactly with the Avesta, that it becomes quite apparent that the religious system of the Bactrians represented in the Avesta was precisely that which prevailed in the age of Cyrus and down to that of Artaxerxes II. in Medo-Persia during the sixth and fifth centuries before Christ. This, however, does not exclude the view that it may have prevailed even at an earlier period. The prophet, who received the revelation of this religion from Ahuramazda, is called in the Avesta Zarathustra, in Greek Zoroaster, and he appears already in the Avesta as one around whom a tissue of myths has been woven. Consequently Zarathustra must evidently have lived in an age prior to that of the Achæmenian dynasty.

§ 210. *The Age of the Persian Religious System.*

This Perso-Bactrian, or, more briefly expressed, Parsee religious system, cannot be dated back to the early times, cannot be regarded as the original religion of the Iranians, and those err most of all who suppose that it should be identified with the oldest Vedic religion of the Indians, or at least treated as a full sister of that religion. The contents and character of the system on the one hand, and the earliest Persian traditions on the other hand, witness against such a view. 1. The religious system of the Avesta is not a natural development, it is not a religion like that of the Vedas, but a religious system in the strictest sense of the word, resting on a philosophy or philosophical theory. The earlier elements, that have now become religious and mythological, are laid out and arranged, as we shall by and by convince ourselves *in concreto*, in the interest of a particular philosophical standpoint. In the religious system of the Avesta, therefore, as developed in the Iranian region, we have represented to us a stage analogous to that of Brahmanism in the history of the Indian religion, without, however, the disadvantage of great

inward diversity.¹ 2. The traditional notices are in thorough agreement with this. They first of all afford a negative confirmation, by showing that between Parseeism and the Vedic religion there existed no immediate or direct connection. It is told, not merely in Berosus, Suidas, and Clemens Alexandrinus, but also in Vendidad XIX., that Zarathustra was born, not in East Iran, in the neighbourhood of India, but in Ragha, now Rai, the ancient capital of Media; that he went from thence to Balkh, the capital of Bactria, to the court of a Bactrian King Vistaspa (not to be confounded with Hystaspis, the father of the Persian King Darius), where he obtained a favourable hearing for his doctrine. At this point we obtain the aid of Firdusi, who supplies us with positive statements. In the eleventh century after Christ, Firdusi made a collection of the oldest legends of the Persians in *Shah-nâme*, the Book of Kings. Notwithstanding the lateness of the period at which that was done, all the occasional notices and allusions contained in the Avesta so precisely harmonize with his story, and these, on the other hand, receive so much light and illustration from the legends reported by Firdusi, that no doubt can any longer prevail among scholars as to the extreme antiquity of the matter, and its faithful rendering by the annalist. The chronicle of Firdusi begins with the creation of the world, which resulted from a conflict between Ahuramazda and Angromainyus, and then proceeds through the list of the earliest mythical kings, Hooshyanga, Takhmourupa, Yima, who belong to a paradisaical age. Yima was succeeded by a wicked king, a tool of Angromainyus, Azis Dahâka, who ruled in Babylon, and was of Arabic, and therefore of Semitic extraction. He was overthrown by a descendant of Yima, Thrætona, a son of Aîthwyn. Manu-cithra, seed of Manu, was a grandson of Thrætona. Thrætona divided his kingdom among his

¹ Since Zarathustra at the latest must have lived about B.C. 700, his Reformation of the Iranian religion synchronizes with the Deformation of the Brahmanical religion (B.C. 1000-600). We shall by and by explain the inner distinction intended by the words Re- and De-formation. (Compare § 215.)

three sons, Iradsh, Salm, and Tur. Thraetona, whose descendant is called seed of Manu, is by this circumstance identified with the Manu of the Indians, while evidently the three sons are to some extent parallel to the sons of Noah (see more details in § 323). It is thoroughly characteristic in this connection that, whereas the primitive tradition, which is preserved in its purity in Genesis, has retained the idea distinctly that all races of men are sprung from the three sons of Noah (Gen. x.), the Parsee tradition views the matter from a narrow particularistic standpoint. Quite unconcerned about the rest of the peoples of the world (see *Obs.* 1), that tradition takes into consideration only the Aryans or Iranians, the Sairimians, Salms, or Sarmatians, and the Turanians, and traces these back to the three sons, Iradsh, Salm, and Tur (Yasht, 13. 143).

Down to the time of Thraetona the Persian tradition runs parallel to the biblical primitive history from Adam to Noah. From this point, however, it gives attention exclusively to the national struggle between Iran and Turan. The kingdom and people of the Turanians are unhesitatingly set down as representative of Angromainyus, the evil principle. The king of Turan, Afrâsiâb, called in the Avesta, Frangrasé (Yasht, 19. 55 ff.), fights against Manucithra, grandson of Thraetona and son of Iradsh, and Manucithra takes vengeance on Afrâsiâb for the death of Iradsh. At last, however, Afrâsiâb obtains the mastery, and Iran is again for a long time under bondage to Turan till a deliverer arises in Kaikabod, called in the Avesta Kavi Kavâta (Yasht, 19. 71 ff.), who then concludes a treaty of peace with Turan. But revenge for bloodshed leads to new conflicts, in which Afrâsiâb is slain by the Iranian king, Kavi Husrava (Yasht, 19. 74). Since, however, the latter is descended on his mother's side from Turan, the dominion does not continue with him, but belongs to Vistaspa (Yasht, 19. 84), who is of pure Iranian blood. During his reign Zarathustra goes to the court, is received, declares the will of Ahuramazda revealed to him, and then the religious system is introduced which still continues to exist among the Bactrians and Persians.

No thoughtful person will deny that those conflicts between Iran and Turan, although in report mixed up with fabulous incidents, must nevertheless have a historical foundation, just like the conflicts of the Indians reported in the heroic legends of the Mahabhârata and Ramâyana, or like those of the Trojan war in Homer. In them, too, we have the key for understanding the religious system of Zarathustra. A decay of the indigenous popular religion must have preceded such an artistic and philosophical religious system, and the cause of such decay is directly found in the frequent subjection of Iran to the Turanian power. On this account a foreign, non-Aryan religion, the Turanian, had either become dominant, or had at least got mixed with the Iranian, and the latter was corrupted and destroyed. Zarathustra, coming from the west, where the Iranian religion remained, if perhaps not altogether free from foreign admixture, yet at least free from Turanian corruption, seeks now to restore it. At the same time it is quite conceivable that the Turanians, who had conquered, but yet were hateful to the Bactrians, were represented by him as the direct slaves and agents of Angromainyus. The question only is, whether it was the old, primitive Iranian religion which Zarathustra brought with him from Media, or whether not even there also religion had passed through a period of decay and change. That something of the kind happened is suggested by the legend of the Babylonian Semitic invader Azis Dahâka, who had long held West Iran in subjection, and who, just as well as the Turanian kings, is represented as an agent of Angromainyus. But even apart from this legend it is in itself quite natural that in West Iran, in Media, where the Iranians came most closely into connection with the Semitic Syrians of the Euphrates district, the Nabatheans and Chasdim, their intellectual and religious influence should here and there be seen. Spiegel has shown that in fact traces of Semitic influence are shown in the Zarathustrian religion. But where two religions so fundamentally different as the Sabæan fatalistic system of the Nabatheans and the pantheistic system of

the Iranians came into contact with one another, philosophical reflection must of necessity have been awakened, the attempt must have been made to unite or dissociate the fundamentally diverse views according to some speculative principle. Precisely this phenomenon meets us in the Zarathustrian or so-called Parsee religious system, to the more detailed examination of which we now address ourselves.

Obs. 1.—The Manu of the Indians and Iranians we meet with among a third Indo-Germanic race. Among the Germans, Mannus is the son of Tuisco the son of Wotan, the first parent of all men. But among the Germans, too, instead of the unity of all races, the unity of all peoples known to them is made prominent (known to them, that is, at a prehistoric period),—the unity of the three principal Teutonic groups, the Ingævones, Istævones, and Hermiones, and they call the three sons of Mannus, Ingo, Isto, and Hermino, the fathers of these three tribes (Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 318 ff.).

Obs. 2.—Avesta is derived from apestâk, which corresponds in some degree to the idea of text, *i.e.* the text, even while yet unwritten, of the sacred books. Zend means commentary, and designates the Huzvaresh translation (huzasthra or huzvaresh means *bonum sacrificium habens*; and in Sanscrit would be *subhâtâ*). Later translations were made under the Sassanidæ. The further course of development of the Parsee religion and literature, necessary for an understanding of the following sections, is in brief as follows: Artaxerxes Ochus introduced into the worship images as representations of the gods. After their subjugation by Alexander the Great their language was changed, and with the loss of dominion the Parsee religion lost its splendour. Then, as well as afterwards, under the domination of the Scythian Parthians, from B.C. 200 till A.D. 116, Greek influences prevailed, and in the second century after Christ Christianity also made its appearance in Persia. The Sassanidæ, A.D. 226–651, first restored again the national Parseeism, and persecuted the Christians, while they were quite tolerant toward Judaism and Nestorianism. The language, by the disuse of the old inflections and terminations, had assumed that form which is commonly described as the Huzvaresh. This appears on Sassanian coins and medals, in the Huzvaresh translation of the Avesta made under the Sassanian rule, and in other literary products of that time, among which the Minokhired, conversations of a Parsee with the Heavenly Wisdom, is the most important. This is written down partly in the Pehlevi style, an ideogrammatical sacred writing, in which synonymous Semitic words

were used in place of the Persian words. But even after the overthrow of the Sassanian dynasty by the Arabs (A.D. 651) the Huzvaresh language was retained with the Parsee religion down to the ninth century, at least as the language of the learned. During this later period there sprung up the Bundelesh, treatises on cosmogony, the Bahmanyesh, prayers, and the Arda-virât-nâme, imitation of the ἀναβατικὴν Ἡσαίου. The language of the people had meanwhile, since the time of Yesdigerd I., been modified by changes in the pronunciation, such as the tendency in Media to employ the softer sounds, until the Parsee dialect was formed. About A.D. 900 the greater portion of the Persian people adopted Mohammedanism. Only in the province of Yezd has Parseeism continued, as in an oasis, unto this day. Crowds of Parsee Persians fled to Gujerat in India. After the adoption of Mohammedanism in Persia, about the eleventh century, the Parsee dialect passed over into the New Persian, that of Firdusi. From the ninth century the Persians were the teachers of the Arabs of the empire of the Califs in the arts and sciences. Among the Parsees who migrated to India, two mobads or priests, Neriosengh and Ormuzdiar, translated, in the fifth century, the Yazna, out of the Huzvaresh translation, and the Minokhired, into Sanscrit. In like manner were produced translations of the Avesta into Gujerati, and also new independent literary works, *e.g.* the Sad-der, the Hundred Gates, known to us in a Latin translation by Hyde. From the Gujerati Parsees have come the complete manuscripts of the Avesta and of the other Parsee literature which Europe now possesses. First of all Hyde in Oxford (A.D. 1700) sought to collect from secondary and tertiary sources the religious system of the Parsees. Through him and Frazer the manuscripts of the Avesta were brought to England, but no one could read them. The Frenchman Auquetil du Perron went to India as a common soldier in 1754, in order to have an opportunity of studying the writings of the Parsees; he brought further manuscripts with him, and in 1771 he published the Zendavesta, as he called it, in a translation which he compiled wholly from oral explanations of separate words got from the Parsees, without any acquaintance with the language and its laws. First E. Burnouf in Paris (1833-1835), an expert in Sanscrit, found the key to the scientific decipherment of the old Bactrian language of the Avesta; and Spiegel, by a collation of all existing manuscripts and wide researches of his own, rendered the most valuable assistance; while, on the other hand, Haug's attempt to understand and explain the Avesta from *à priori* speculations of comparative philology without reference to the Parsee tradition, can only be regarded as a retrogression.

§ 211. *Ahuramazda and his Ameshaspentas.*

We pass on now to consider the religious system of the Persian inscriptions and of the Avesta. In the former, Daryawus (Darius Hystaspis) invokes only Ahuramazda by name as god, and along with him only "the other gods who may besides exist." In the inscription H. there is also special mention of vithibish bagibish as gods of different clans. Vithija бага is the god, guardian deity, of one particular vith, a particular tribe. Plutarch, too, tells (*de fortit. Alex.* 1. 2) that the Persians had worshipped θεοὺς βασιλέους and θεοὺς πατρώους. In the inscriptions of Artaxerxes II. and Artaxerxes III., besides Ahuramazda, Anâhita and Mitra are also mentioned by name. Here and there, too, in the inscriptions there are references to hainas, *hordes, bands*, as hostile beings.

All this is confirmed and illustrated by the Avesta. The supreme God is Ahuramazda, the Lord, the great possessor of knowledge, from maz, *great*, and dâo, *to know*. There is also named the spenta mainyu, the spirit of increase or the holy spirit, for spenta has both meanings. It is regarded as an organized being, endowed with the best body (Yazna, 1. 1-2, etc.), and possessing a soul (fravashi). In the beginning of the world's period of 12,000 years he created the heavenly (mainyava) or spiritual world, and at a later period also the earthly world. In Yazna, 37. 1 ff., and in the inscriptions, he is designated creator of the universe and creator of light, the earth, and everything that is good. He dwells in the garo-nemâna, the highest heaven. The most perfect of his creatures are the Ameshaspentas, the immortal holy ones (Yazna, 39. 8, etc.), also described as the truly wise, the good kings. These are six in number, and with Ahuramazda seven; hence he, too, is spoken of as an Ameshaspenta, although it is said of the other six that they are separated by a great gulf from him, their creator.

These six Ameshaspentas are the following:—1. Vohu-mano, in later form, Bahmann, the good spirit, the good disposition,

called by Plutarch *θεὸς εὐνοίας*, regarded both as an abstraction and as a personal being, the watcher and guardian of pious men, among whom he maintains peace. 2. Asha-vâhista, Ardibihist, the highest purity, called by Plutarch *θεὸς ἀληθείας*, the watcher over fire, and so over life, the dispenser of immortality and joyousness, the protector from sicknesses. 3. Khshatra-vairja, Shahrêvar, desirable for the empire, *θεὸς εὐνομίας*, presiding over metals (gold), and having care of the poor. 4. Spenta-armaiti, holy wisdom, *θεὸς σοφίας*, in the Avesta the feminine and womanly principle, daughter of Ahuramazda (Yazna, 46. 2), dispenser of wisdom, and protectress of the earth. 5. Haurvatât, allness, fulness, *θεὸς πλούτου*, presiding over and guarding the water-courses. 6. Ameretât, immortality, *θεὸς ἐπὶ καλοῖς ἡδέων*, presiding over the vegetable world, dispenser of the means of nourishment and feeding herbs.

From this it will be seen that we have to do with no mere simple natural development, but with an artificially constructed religious system. The nature of the Ameshaspentas in general, indeed, corresponds to that of the Indian Adityas. Both are represented as presiding over or ruling the world. While the Adityas, however, are originally concrete divine powers controlling concrete natural phenomena, the Ameshas appear to us as hypostatized abstract conceptions: goodness, purity, usefulness, wisdom, fulness, immortality. In regard to three of them, the second, fourth, and fifth, we find a reference to fire, earth, water, but the fire here does not appear as a natural element, but as the imparter of life; and the earth is scarcely an element, at least the metals, and that in their social significance as gold, means of exchange, wealth, are already excluded from it. In like manner, in regard to the sixth, the vegetable world is not taken into consideration as such, but in respect of its usefulness as food and fodder. From the fact that in Yazna, 38. 2, wives of Ahuramazda are mentioned, without being particularly named and more fully described, it may perhaps be concluded, with Spiegel, that this Avesta

religious system had been preceded by a mythological national religion, where Ahuramazda had wives, sons, and daughters, and that now when Zarathustra elevated these mythological persons into abstract philosophically conceived essences, he at the same time reduced them to the rank of creatures of God.

§ 212. *The Yazatas.*

Besides the Ameshaspentas, there exists also a multitude of genii, Yazatas, worthy of having offerings presented, who, together with Ahuramazda and the Ameshas, are included under the general idea of the gods, bagas, literally, the blessed. Particular days of the month are sacred to the Yazatas. These are as follows:—(1) Âtars, the fire genius, son of Ahuramazda, who exists in every flame and in every flash of lightning, but at the same time also as a personal deity. As lightning he slays the evil spirits. Particular sacred fires, in which again one and the same Atars was always present, had their seat on particular sacred mountains, not perhaps volcanoes, where sacred fires had been kept up. 2. Âpo, water and the water-god. 3. Ardvi-sûra Anâhita (Vend. 7. 37; Visper. 1. 18; 2. 20; Khoda-Av. Yasht, 5), the surging, strong, pure deity, who was also worshipped by the Syrians in Damascus, Sardis, and Armenia under the name of Anâhita. She was goddess of the water, and at the same time of animal fruitfulness. 4. Apaûm Nâpât, moisture of waters, or navel of the waters, has his dwelling in a particular lake, from which all waters of the earth spring and flow forth. 5. Hvare, sun and sun-goddess. She is furnished with swift horses. 6. Mão, the moon. He produces growth in plants (Yasht, 7). 7. Tistrya, the star Sirius, overseer of the stars, director of the clouds, and opponent of the Deva or demon of barrenness and scarcity. 8. Gêus-ûrva, the bullock soul. When Ahuramazda began to create the visible world, he created first a bullock. Angromainyus slew it. From its body there sprang up species of corn, while its soul ascended to heaven (Yasht,

29). 9. Mithra has a thousand ears and ten thousand eyes, possesses wide pastures, is god of light, specially of the forenoon, is sleepless, all-seeing, governor of the whole world, warrior, and conqueror, with horses of light drawing his chariot (comp. § 193); before him goes Verethragna, the god of victory. The directress of his chariot is Ashis-vanghuhi (comp. Usha, § 196); but Parendi, the good law, prepares his way. Mithra himself is a wrathful god, an avenger. Ahuramazda has appointed him his chief priest, and he is as deserving of honour as Ahuramazda himself (Yasht, 10. 1). 10. Sraosha, the hearer. He is guardian of the world from midnight till morning, is sleepless, wakens the cock, who by his crowing disturbs the evil spirits. He too drives with horses. He is therefore evidently the listening god, and presides over the night. 11. Rashaurazista, the enemy of thieves. 12. The Fravashis, in later form Fervers. This term means partly the souls of gods and men in general, partly special genii of the stars, whom Ahuramazda has appointed as protectors against the Devas. 13. Verethragna, in later form Behram, the god of victory (see 9), represented sometimes as a bullock, sometimes as a horse, as a bird, as the wind. 14. Râman, genius of the air, nimble and strong, on a golden chariot. 15. Vâta, genius of the wind. 16. Daena, genius of the law. 17. Ashis-vanghuhi (see under 9), daughter of Ahuramazda, and goddess of blessing and fortune, specially also of sexual fruitfulness. 18. Arstât, straightforwardness, rectitude, a female genius. 19. Asman, genius of the clouds of heaven. 20. Zemyad, genius of the earth. 21. Manthra-spenta, the sacred writing and its genius, is described as the soul of Ahuramazda (Vend. 19. 48). 22. Amaghra-raosaa, unending light.

Besides these Yazatas there are also Cadhâtas, otherwise deities, *e.g.* Twâsha, the firmament; Misvana, the house, especially Haoma. The latter is in sound and sense identical with the Indian Soma (§§ 193, 195). It is also, just like it, a species of plant and a deity,—the tree of life personified as a deity (comp. § 207). But even as a plant it appears under

two forms. The white haoma grows in heaven, and confers immortality (comp. Gen. ii. 9, iii. 22). The yellow haoma, an earthly variety of the white, grows on earth, and its juice plays an important part in offerings, prayers, and liturgical actions (§ 216). The soma plant of the Indians was the *Asclepias acida*. It has not been told what plant the yellow haoma of the Persians is. The god Haoma came to appropriate the tongue and the left eye of the animals sacrificed. By a fault of the eye and the tongue did our first parents (Gen. iii. 6) lose possession of the tree of life. Compare § 216 and § 224, *D*.

When we consider that these inferior deities, the Yazatas and Cadhâtas, are scarcely at all mentioned in the Vendidad and in the Gâthâs, but play an important part in the Khoda-Avesta, those formularies of private devotion and the worship of those *πατῶν θεοί*, it is evident that we have here to do, except in the case of Anâhita, with old Iranian, pre-Zarathustrian gods, whose worship had held its ground among the people, and which Zarathustra, who wished to restore the old Iranian religion, had no wish to contest, but only, in the interest of his philosophical monotheism, to assign to them a subordinate position. And if proof of this statement be required, the most satisfactory proof may be found just in this, that we have here divine names and divine forms which are common to the oldest Indian and to the Iranian religion, such as Mithra answering to Mitra, Ashis answering to Uscha, Haoma answering to Soma. Besides this, there are other deities precisely similar in nature, though known under dissimilar names; as Atar, who corresponds to Agni, Hvare to Savitr, Asman to Indra. That the water-god, Apo, has not the same name as Varuna, may be explained very simply on the ground that Varuna was not originally the water-god among the Indians (§ 193), but became this first during the Indra period. For the rest, it strikes us that the Iranians have intended a reduplication by the reproduction of many of their old gods (the Yazatas); compare 2 and 4, 10 and 11, 14 and 15, 16 and 21, 9 and 22.

§ 213. *Angromainyus with his Devas.*

The philosophical and systematic character of the religion of Zarathustra or of Ahuramazda has been already satisfactorily enough proved, but this will become yet more evident when we apply ourselves to a consideration of the evil powers. Over against the circle of good gods and spirits centring round Ahuramazda stands a circle of evil gods and spirits, the creations of Angromainyus. Angromainyus, the hurtful, destructive, deadly spirit, in contrast to Ahuramazda, the spenta-mainyus, the *semper augustus*, or *σεβαστός*, the increaser, or the holy spirit, is likewise an independent, self-existent deity. He is at least never described as a creature of Ahuramazda, who had fallen away from him, but is considered as in himself and originally an evil being. "These two spiritual principles, the twins, cause from the first good and bad to issue forth from them" (Yazna, 30. 3). But if original being be ascribed to him, there is no attribution of absoluteness. He is powerless in presence of Ahuramazda, yea, even before his prophet Zarathustra (Khoda-Avesta, Yasht, 3 and 15 and 17). Other men, too, by means of the offerings which they present to the good gods, can bind and limit the might of Angromainyus. In particular he wants foresight, and therefore wisdom. He never sees beforehand the consequences of his own actions, and hence as a rule makes a wrong use of his means. He has, nevertheless, been successful in defiling the creation of Ahuramazda, for he has brought into it sin, death, and all kinds of evil. His dwelling-place is the dark hell. He, too, has a bodily form, that of a serpent (Vendid. 21. 5, 6). He has created hosts, *hænas*, or, according to the inscriptions, *hainas*, of evil spirits. The circumstance, therefore, is here well worthy of notice that that same word which, among the whole series of Indo-Germanic languages, is used to designate the idea of God as such, or even specially that of the supreme gods (*dêva*, *Δεὺς*, *Ζεὺς*, *deus*, *Diespiter*, Old High Germ. *Zio*; Lithuanian, *Dievas*;

Celt. Dia), serves in the Parsee religion to designate the evil gods. Thus the word *dæva* corresponds almost to the modern sense of our English word demon. These *dævas* are partly *mainyava dæva*, invisible, spiritual, who are hostilely arrayed against Ahuramazda, partly *varenya dæva*, earthly beings, who terrify men. Over against each one of the Ameshaspentas there stands a particular corresponding *dæva*; *eg.* to Bohumano corresponds Akomano, to Spenta-armaiti corresponds Naonghaiti, to Ashavâhista corresponds Andra. This latter name is in sound related to, or perhaps identical with, the Indian Indra, who or whose name has thus been transformed into that of an evil demon, like the word *dæva* itself, just as out of the German goddess Hulda has been made the gloomy mistress of hell. Here the artificially systematic character of the Zarathustrian religion becomes specially noticeable. Certain particular *dævas* also are arranged over against the Yazatas. Among them Aeshma, the demon of anger; Astô-vîdhotus, the demon of death; Bûsh-yausta, the female demon of sleep, opponent of Mithra; Apaosha, the witherer, opponent of Tistriya, etc. Of an inferior order, perhaps demons answering to the Cadâthas, are the Drugas and the Pairikas, or, according to its later form, the Peris. To the former belong Yahi, the demon of lewdness; Nasus, the demon of corruption, etc. The Pairikas are demons of seduction, idolatry, dearth.

§ 214. *Theogony and Cosmogony.*

In regard to the history of the two divine departments, the theogony and the cosmogony, the Avesta indeed yields only occasional hints, which, however, agree so perfectly with the Bundelesh (§ 210, *Obs.* 2), that the theogony and cosmogony contained in the latter may be taken as in all essential points representing the ancient doctrine. According to the Bundelesh, Ahuramazda and Angromainyus lived apart from one another, separated by the whole extent of the atmosphere, the

one in light, the other in darkness, both originally of equal power, but the latter without any prevision of the future. Each of them created, not begat, his own sphere of divine beings. So soon as Angromainyus perceived or learnt of the existence of Ahuramazda, he began to hate him. Ahuramazda, understanding that the conflict, if he should forthwith begin it, would have a doubtful issue, proposed a truce of 9000 years, and Angromainyus in his blindness agreed to it. This period was employed by Ahuramazda in the creation of the visible material world. It is immediately evident from this that the Zarathustrian dualism has nothing to do with the later Manichean-Gnostic dualism of spirit and matter, but is fundamentally different from it. With Zarathustra matter is not evil nor the instrument of evil. Ahuramazda places the material world as a bulwark between himself and Angromainyus. He created it in six *gahandars*, periods (Yazna, 19. 2; comp. 30. 4); first of all the visible heavens, then the water, then the earth, then trees, then beasts, and then men. (See *Obs.*) Three thousand years after the conclusion of the peace, Angromainyus broke it, for he began his attack upon the creation of Ahuramazda. His *dævas* broke up the earth into seven *kareshvares*, continents, which are now separated by seas. Ahuramazda then created upon the earth the first bullock and the first man (Yazna, II. and Visp.). Angromainyus slew the first bullock (comp. § 212, 8), but his seed was entrusted to the moon, and thence proceeded the various species of animals, while from his carcase sprang up the various kinds of grain. This important place which is given to the animals shows that this legendary element is very old, dating from a period of the simplest forms of pastoral life. Angromainyus slew also the first man, Gayo-maratan, the mortal of earth (Yazna, 14 and 24 and 26 and 67), and from his seed proceeded the first human pair, Meshia and Meshiâna (etymologically identical with *manusha*, *man*). At this point we come into contact with the legend already given (§ 210) from Firdusi. According to it, the history of the world con-

sists in a conflict between the servants of Ahuramazda and those of Angromainyus, in which sometimes the one, sometimes the other side prevails. This struggle assumes a new form, and enters on a decidedly favourable stage, with the sending of Zarathustra. Ahuramazda has taught by means of Zarathustra in what way, and by what prayers and offerings, the influence of the Dævas might be destroyed, and how man might secure after death an entrance into heaven. For the latter purpose two prayer-formularies are specially important: Ashem vohu, and Yathâ ahu vairyo. The former runs as follows: "Purity is the highest good. Blessed be he! Blessed be he! the best of the pure in purity." The other runs thus: "It is the Lord's will that he should be the ruler of purity. From Bohumann the gifts are received for the works which are done for Mazda in the world. The kingdom is given to Ahura, when one lends his treasure to the poor."

Obs.—The similarity between the creative periods of the Avesta and those of Genesis is very striking.

GENESIS.	AVESTA.
1. Light.	1. Heaven.
2. Separation of the Waters.	2. Water.
3. Earth and Plants.	3. Earth.
4. Planets.	4. Plants.
5. Fish, Birds.	5. Animals.
6. Mammals, Man.	6. Man.

§ 215. *Relation between Religion and Ethics.*

The Avesta religion stands high above the Greek, and occupies a position like that of the oldest Vedic religion, in that it keeps religion and ethics bound to one another in the closest bonds, or by means of a reformation binds those bonds anew. Ahuramazda is a holy God: we can use this word without desecrating it. The ethical system of the Avesta is thoroughly pure. Its supreme law is that of truthfulness: every lie is an abomination to Ahuramazda (Herodotus, i. 183); the Persians had a great abhorrence of taking oaths. Ahuramazda also demanded sexual purity. Polygamy was, indeed, as in

the Old Testament, permitted, and marriage with near relatives was favoured. In this connection we may compare the cases of Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, and Gen. xxiv. 3, 4. On the other hand, whoredom and unnatural vice were regarded as sins which could be atoned for by no repentance, but would unfailingly lead to hell. Robbery, theft, and murder were forbidden as grave sins, as also anger and discord, and above all, idolatry. These sins could be atoned for by penance and active repentance. Among these acts of atonement are mentioned pre-eminently the slaying and destroying of serpents and poisonous reptiles, and krafstras or the creations of Angromainyus; yet not these alone, but also the performance of noble deeds. Then three days after the death of a man his soul comes to the bridge Chinvat, which leads into heaven, but is as thin and sharp as the edge of a knife.¹ At the entrance of the bridge the deeds of the dead man are weighed (Vendid. 19, 20 ff.). He who has confessed his sin, and outweighed and overbalanced it by good, is led by a fair genius over the bridge to Ahuramazda in heaven; but those souls that have served the Dævas are thrown over the bridge down into hell. In heaven there are three paradises, degrees of blessedness, outer courts of Garo-nemâna, the dwelling-place of Ahuramazda. This decision of the lot of souls, however, was not the final one. Three thousand years after the appearances of Zarathustra, the grand decisive battle between Ahuramazda and Angromainyus is to be fought. It will be preceded by the resurrection of the dead² (Khoda Avesta, Yasht, 19. 98 ff.), and this again by the appearance of a redeemer, Saoshyans, who will gain the victory over Angromainyus. Saoshyans, however, is himself (Yasht, 13. 98 and 128 and 142; comp.

¹ There is also among the Indians (Rig Veda, 9. 41. 2) a story of a bridge similar to the bridge of Chinvat among the Iranians.

² Theopompus, too, in the time of Alexander the Great, spoke of the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead as a Persian doctrine. It was in fact the simple and necessary consequences of the doctrine that the body was created by Ahuramazda, and that death came into the world by Angromainyus.

also 19. 92) no other than one of the three sons of Zarathustra risen again. The other two are called Ukhshyat-ereto and Ukhshyat-nemo. Saoshyans, literally the useful, is also called Asvat-ereto, the lofty one among the embodied, and bears the cognomen Verethradsha, the victorious. The host of risen ones will fall upon the host of the Angromainyus (Yasht, 18. 85 f.), and "the evil-doer Angromainyus will be brought low and stript of his dominion."

§ 216. *Liturgical Forms.*

In all Iranian countries there appears along with the priestly class one Iranian stem or family, the Magians, understood to be hereditary. From this we may account for the contemporary spread of the Avesta religion among the Persians and Medes, as well as in Eastern Iran. The priests were called Maubeds, masters of the house, or doctors, dispensers of charity, helpers. This priesthood was divided, according to the functions discharged, into various classes or offices. The zaota, etymologically the same as the Sanscrit hota, hotri, had to repeat the prayers, the hâvanân had to beat the haoma (§ 212) in a mortar (hâvana), the âtarevaksho had to make to grow, or to keep up the sacred fire, the âberet or Frabereta had to bring forward the necessary offerings, the âsnata had to cleanse the sacred vessels, the ræthviskare had to cleanse unclean men, the sraoshâvæza had to hear confessions.

The worship embraced all occasions in the life of a man from his birth onward. The newly-born child was bathed (Vendid. 16. 18 f.), which otherwise had no special religious significance. For the first seven years the child was free from guilt; all the guilt of his sins falls upon his parents, from whom he has inherited sin. From the fifth year onward he should be instructed about good and evil. In his fifteenth year he receives the holy girdle, aiwyaongana, similar to that among the Indians, which he must wear

through his whole life, and by it he is marked out as a worshipper and servant of Ahuramazda. This girdle consists of seventy-two woollen threads, and is worn by the priests; black wool may not be used. Marriage, *nairithwana*, is represented in the Avesta as a *mithra*, a sacred contract, which must not be broken (Vendid. 14. 63 ff.). To give a daughter in marriage is a good, sin-atonement act. Marriage between near relatives, *caetvôdatha*, is specially praiseworthy. No special marriage ceremonies are spoken of in the Avesta. In the present day, however, a woman among the Parsees can never have herself divorced from her husband; the man can have divorce from his wife only on the ground of adultery, barrenness, witchcraft. The dying should pray to *Yatha ahu vairyo* (§ 214). When he is dead, a *Nasu* (§ 213), a demon of corruption, immediately rushes down upon him and settles upon his body. To protect from this a dog is brought in, who by his bark drives off the demon. The corpse must be carried out naked by two men (Vendid. 3. 44), laid on stones or bricks (8. 25 ff.), at a place called *kata* or *skemba* (8. 25; 5. 34), where it is exposed to the birds. The bearers of the corpse must then wash themselves with the urine of their nearest relatives and of the cow in order to be purified. It was regarded as an abomination to burn a corpse. Fire, because sacred, must not be brought into contact with a dead body. It must not, however, be buried, because the sacred earth would thereby be polluted. For a similar reason, it must not be carried out while it rains. Lamentation and weeping over a dead body are forbidden (Vendid. 3. 37). According to later Parsee writings, the corpse is after a time brought from the *kata* to its resting-place, *Dakhma*, where it lies exposed to the air on piles, in order to be kept from contact with the earth. Since graves, resting-places, of the Achæmenian kings are expressly mentioned, a similar custom must have prevailed in their time. The bodies should be (Vendid. 5. 128; 8. 28) gnawed but not eaten up by birds and dogs.

All fire must be kept away for nine days from a house where a man has died (Vendid. 5. 123 ff.). A woman, who has had a still-born child, is, by that dead body, rendered unclean, and must in order to be purified drink from three to nine drops of cow's urine mixed with ashes (Vendid. 5. 149 ff.), and wash her naked body with cow's urine. On menstruation, see Vendid. 16. 21 ff. Whoever has become unclean through contact with a dead body, must (Vendid. 9), at a place fixed upon by himself, allow himself stript naked to have his different members one after another in a regularly prescribed order sprinkled with cow's urine from a spoon by a priest, and then rubbed with earth. Sleep, too, is a work of Angromainyus, and therefore it is meritorious to pass the night awake (Vendid. 18. 14 ff.). Wetting the feet with one's own urine, just as among the Indians (Nalas 7 ; Song 3), as well as emission of seed in sleep, causes ceremonial pollution, and purification is secured by means of the oft-repeated utterance of particular forms of prayer (Vendid. 18. 91 ff. and 101 ff.). In the morning, upon rising, wood should be laid on the fire (18. 43). The right of presenting offerings belongs exclusively to the priests. The offerings, however, have not the significance of atoning sacrifices of blood. No one is allowed to kill the creatures of Ahuramazda. Their death could not be pleasing to the God. Creatures of Angromainyus, serpents, reptiles, beasts of prey, should indeed be slain, but they could not, as unclean things, be presented to Ahuramazda. No manner of beasts of either class, therefore, is suitable as an offering. But since man for his nourishment, or for the stilling of hunger excited by Angromainyus, is obliged to kill clean animals, whereas he properly ought not to kill them, he must atone for the wrong thus done by presenting through the priests the tongue and the left eye as a gift to Haoma. In this way the life of the beast is preserved.¹ Still more significant is the offering

¹ The remark in § 212 is hereby confirmed. Hunger, as such, is viewed as correlative with sin, because coming through the fall. The lust of the eye

Myazda (Yazna, 3. 2) or Draona (Yazna, 11. 20), consisting of little bits of flesh, laid on cakes of bread, and eaten by the offerer, along with which, while particular ceremonies are performed, haomo juice pressed from the yellow haomo plant is drunk. The offerer hereby dedicates himself and his body to the God of life (Yazna, 11. 25), presents himself, therefore, as a living sacrifice to the God. Since he partakes of the food and drink offered to the God of life, he surrenders himself to the God, and thus submits himself to the power of God, that he may bestow upon him eternal life. These offerings it may be assumed would be accompanied, on the part of the priests, by prayers, such as are found in the Yazna. For this purpose the Yazna and the Visperad, and not less the law-book, the Vendidad, must have been used by the priests. In all liturgical performances, offerings, prayers, etc., an important place was given to the Baresma (comp. § 200), a bundle of twigs of date palms or pomegranate trees or tamarisks, a symbol of living and life-giving power, which was carried in the hand by the suppliant as well as the priest, and was sometimes laid upon a special pedestal. Then, further, there was the consecrated water, Zaotha.

Obs.—With reference to the reckoning of time, mention is made in the Avesta of the ten months' continuance of pregnancy. This postulates lunar months and so a lunar year. So, indeed, in all Indo-Germanic languages the fact that one word stands for moon and month leads to the conclusion that originally they all reckoned by lunar months. It is no objection to this conclusion, that among the Indians Mānu came to have the general meaning of light, and that tschandra came into use with the meaning of month. During the period of the Sassanidæ, the Persians had a solar year of 365 days, divided into 12 months, as is shown by the Huzvaresh translation.

and the tongue, in consequence of which man lost the ford of the tree of life, and was obliged to have recourse to earthly nourishment, must be atoned for by the offering of the eye and tongue of the slain animal to the God of life and of the tree of life, in order that he may restore to the animal the life of which he was deprived, for the sake of supplying to man the means of life.

§ 217. *The Monotheism of Zarathustra not of Semitic Origin.*

After the representation of the religious system, and the worship of the post-Zarathustrian Iranian, drawn from primary sources, the important question still remains to be answered: What conclusions are we entitled to draw from this secondary or tertiary system in regard to the original, prehistoric religion of the Iranian race? We have decided (§ 210) that the Avesta religion belongs to a much more recent time, and to a much later stage of the religious development, than the Veda religion of the Indians in its first period. The Avesta religion was a deterioration and pollution of the old Iranian religion, through preceding Turanian, and perhaps also through heathen-Semitic influences, and owed its origin to a national religious reaction against foreign religions. It is not a mere rejuvenating of the ancient worship. Zarathustra (§§ 210-213) reared on a speculative foundation a systematically constructed product. Then the important question arises, as to whether in this respect he is entitled to rank as a reformer, whether his fundamental philosophical ideas are only a further development of the principles which had already been given in the old Iranian religion, or whether he has borrowed these fundamental ideas from the religious system of a foreign race, so that he should be called not a reformer, but a corrupter of the Iranian religion? In short, has he borrowed his fundamental monotheistic idea, according to which all good divine principles whatever are only creations of the one God, Ahuramazda, and should be honoured only as exalted creatures, and has he, further, borrowed these so-called dualistic principles, according to which a kingdom of darkness and of evil spirits is set over against the kingdom of God, from the Semitic Assyrians or Chaldeans? We are obliged by the weightiest considerations to decide against the latter supposition. In general it may be said first of all, that Zarathustra could not have borrowed Monotheism

from a source where it was not to be found. We reach the conclusion in chapter v., the Sabæism as well as the Bel-Moloch religion of the heathen Semites had no more resemblance or relationship to the monotheism of Zarathustra than the air-hole of a cellar to the sun. Indeed, we find that it presents the sharpest and most contradictory opposition to the Ahuramazda religion. It presents a merely unconscious, unfree, fatalistic, blind natural power, to which without distinction is referred good or bad, good and evil, which slays again the very being produced by it. If one chooses to conjecture that Zarathustra met with Israelites of the ten tribes scattered in B.C. 722,—they were indeed transported to Assyria, to the borders of Media, but certainly not into the neighbourhood of Rhagä,—and that he learnt from them to believe in a self-conscious, free, holy Creator, he may do so. From the heathen Semites, at least, Zarathustra could not have come upon his religious and philosophical ideas.

Let us now seek to investigate the facts more closely. A heathen Semitic influence can certainly be pointed to in the Parsee religion, but it is more recent than the age of the Avesta religion,¹ and is in direct contradiction to its fundamental ideas. In some passages of the Avesta (Vendid. 19. 33) it is said that Ahuramazda created in the *zrvana akarana*, the infinite age, or more exactly, the infinite antiquity. It is also said (Vendid. 19. 44): "Praise thou, O Zarathustra, the created clouds of heaven, the infinite age, the air which moves in the heights." Here the infinite age is connected throughout with the creations of Ahuramazda, and is no longer ranked as a deity superior to him. When now Berosus, the well-known priest of Bel in Babylon about B.C. 300, writes (ed. Richter, p. 59): *Ante turrin ac priusquam generis humani sermo multiplex factus est et varius, post*

¹ The assertions of the later Nabathæans (Spiegel, ii. 216), that they had once ruled all Iran, that the Iranians had for 1300 years been worshippers of the stars, and then fell away to the Magian religion, are, as Spiegel has already shown, of no historical value.

Xisuthri autem in Armeniam navigationem, Zerovanus, Titan et Japethostes principatum terræ tenure, and when he further tells that Zerovanus, quem hic Zoroastrem magum, Bactrianorum regem fuisse dicit, qui fuit Medorum principium ac deorum pater, wished to subject the two and so war broke out between them, etc., this is a confused myth, in which Zarathustra is made contemporary with Japhet-Japetos and the Titans. It is nothing less than a confused combination of Greek, Hebrew, and Iranian traditionary elements, which is only recorded by Berosus, and is at furthest a reminiscence of an ancient conflict between the Iranian and other religions. It is still, however, deserving of notice, that the name Zerovanus makes its appearance here as representative of the Magian, and therefore of the Iranian religion. From this it might be already concluded, that Zervana was not a Semitic, but an original Iranian name of Baga; but in fact Zrvana is an Iranian word with an Iranian etymology. Accordingly these two passages from the Vendidad contain nothing which must have been borrowed from the Semites. In the more recent Parsee writings, alongside of Zrvana akarana we find a Zrvana daregô cadâtha, that is, the period of the 9000 years from the creation of the visible world till the overthrow of Angromainyus. In those writings originating during the age of the Sassanidæ, especially in the Minokhired and in the glosses of the Huzvaresh translation, Zrvana akarana appears as a kind of deity of fate, like the Bel of the Babylonians; yet even there not as a fate superior to Ahuramazda, but as subordinate to him, so that he can freely act in all things. Only a sect among the later Parsees, the Zervanites, regarded Zervana akarana as the supreme eternal deity, from whom the two deities Ahuramazda and Angromainyus were derived (Spiegel, ii. 2, p. 220). Now this is a Babylonian, therefore a Semitic idea. It arose, however, as we have said, among the Parsees only during the age of the Sassanidæ, and even then only among a small fragment. The Avesta knows nothing of this, but rather teaches the opposite.

Obs.—In regard to the worship of the stars the case is the same as that of Zrvana. Astronomical observations of the stars, and reckonings by means of them, were certainly made by the Iranians at a very early period, and it is admitted that the Magians under the Achæmenian dynasty occupied themselves with the study of the stars and astrology. But an influence in determining fate is never attributed to them in the Avesta. The stars are described as watchers or wakeful guardians of the kingdom of light against the kingdom of darkness; hence astrology could only mean, that from the ascension of a star one might conclude in favour of a new victory of the kingdom of light, and so expect a favourable occurrence, etc. In Vendid. 5. 46; 6. 106; 7. 122; 19. 78, a purifying power is also ascribed to the stars. Only in the period of the Sassanidæ did astrology among the Parsees assume an absolute sooth-saying character. The single religious element, of which it might be supposed that it had been taken from Semitic heathenism, is the name or rather the cognomen of Ardvi sûra anâhita, the Yazata of water and fruitfulness (§ 212, 3). This cognomen must have had currency already among the Iranians in the pre-Zarathustrian age, and Zarathustra may have allowed it to remain alongside of the other Yazatas, since this Ardvi was nothing else than a duplicate of Ashis-vanghuhi (§ 212, 17), this genuinely Iranian Yazata, hence including in itself nothing specifically foreign or Semitic. But now it may be asked generally, whether this Anâhita came to the Iranians from Damascus and Sardis, or was not rather, on the contrary, introduced among the Syrians by the Iranians. Since anâhita is an Iranian and not a Semitic word, the latter supposition is undoubtedly correct. The Babylonian Anatuv, wife of Anu, is of more recent origin, and its similarity of name to the Iranian Anâhita is purely accidental. (See § 255, *Obs.*)

§ 218. *The Monotheism of Zarathustra is Old Iranian.*

To the negative proof that Zarathustra did not derive his monotheism from the heathen Semites, we have now to add a second positive proof regarding its origin, by showing that the idea which Zarathustra, as a true reformer, restored, by giving it a more definite, systematic, and, as it were, scholastic form, was obtained from an old Iranian source. That the Iranian religion in its very earliest shape, about B.C. 2000, must have been identical with the most primitive form of the Indian religion, is clearly proved by the divine names and customs,

which are common to both religions. Among the Iranians and also among the Indians, the gods were called watchers of the earth (lôkapâlâs), and the general idea of the Ameshaspentas is not distinguishable from the original idea of the Adityas. So, too, as we have seen in § 212, the Indian Soma is represented by Haoma, the tree of life and the god of life; Mitra is represented by Mithra; Ushas is represented by Ashis, the god of the daylight; Savitr and Hvare are common to both religions as gods of the dawn. Then we have divine beings which are essentially the same, though known under different names, Agni and Atars, Indra and Asman. But even setting these altogether aside, we have still to notice the identity of Gandarĕwa, mentioned in later Parsee writings, but evidently belonging to the old Iranian tradition, with the Indian Gandarva, the god of love, and the identity of Kĕrĕsani with Krsanu. In like manner, too, we observe the etymological identity of Drukh, the name of an Iranian Dæva, with the Sanscrit root *druh*, *to kill*. Also human legendary beings are identical, as pre-eminently Manu (§ 210), likewise the Iranian serpent-slayer Thrætona is the same as the Indian serpent-slayer Trta, and Keresaspa is identical with the Indian Krâsasva (Ramây. i. 31. 10). Then we must add to all this the identity of religious customs. The Indian during prayer holds in his hands the kusha grass, the Iranian holds the baresma, and the Indian word brahma, corresponding to that Iranian word, assumed in the very earliest times the meaning of prayer (§ 200, *Obs.*). The root-word for priest is the same in both, zaota, hôta, hôtri. The practice of girding with the sacred girdle is also the same. Wetting the feet with one's own urine is regarded by the Indians and by the Iranians as placing them under the influence of evil spirits. It, therefore, is an established fact, that both religions are from a common root.

Immediately after the separation of the Iranians and Indians, that is, during the first Vedic period, the consciousness was fully present among the Indians that the Adityas

did not represent a multitude of separate deities in a polytheistic and mythological sense, but only the fulness of the creative powers of the one God and that the holy God, and that in each of these Adityas it was always the one God who was worshipped. And the farther back we go into the past, the more distinct do we find the consciousness among the Indians. In the second, the Indra period, it dwindles away and gives place to a polytheistic conception. We should therefore expect that in the common terms of both religions that consciousness would have expression given it in the most energetic manner. A primitive monotheism, or Elohimism, as we might call it, since there is no real distinction between the *elôhim* and the *adityas*, constitutes that common root. Among the special powers of the one, self-conscious, holy god, whom the Iranians and Indians, while united, worshipped, was Mitra, the divine power of light, Soma or Haoma, that of life. Those creative powers of the one God were also manifested in fire, in water, in the dawn, in the firmament, and in the starry heavens. The course of development of the Iranian religion, after the separation of the two peoples, will thus have had in general a certain analogy to that of the Indian, inasmuch as even among the Iranians a polytheistic and mythological conception of the several divine powers found place. This, however, occurred in a different way than among the Indians. We found, with Spiegel, manifest traces in the Avesta of wives, sons, and daughters being ascribed to Ahuramazda (§§ 211, 212). There are also indications of a pre-Zarathustrian, mythological conception of Ahuramazda. This, however, just furnishes a proof that Ahuramazda as such had been worshipped by the Iranians as the highest of the gods, and the father of the gods before the time of Zarathustra, and was not by any means a mere product of the Zarathustrian philosophy, as Brahma was of the Brahmanical philosophy. In its polytheistic, mythological degeneration the Iranian religion was already in possession of the supreme God, the monarchical crown, which was wanting in the Indian

polytheism of the second period. In the pre-polytheistic period of the Iranian religion, Ahuramazda must have been the name in use to designate the one God, who had in himself possession of all the divine powers. And if one considers, further, that they were Turanian oppressors (§ 210), who favoured or violently enforced a probably Shamanistic polytheism, it will not seem an over-bold conjecture that, at least in a circle of the noblest of the Iranians, along with the national resistance, the monotheistic reaction against that mythological conception of Ahuramazda as a father of the gods and the consciousness of him as the one and only God, would never be wholly extinguished. It was this consciousness discovered by Zarathustra, as a genuine relic of the old Iranian religion, among the best of his race, which he, as a reformer, made again a common possession of the Iranian peoples. The conscious, reflective, systematic definiteness with which he did this, and especially the conception of the creator as contrasted with that of the begetter, may be fully explained from this fact. The notion (§ 217) that Zarathustra came to know the Israelites of the ten tribes, and through them something of the Old Testament, and in this way obtained his idea of the creator, or at least had been aided in giving definiteness to its statement, is seen to be at any rate quite superfluous. But it may also be shown to be impossible, not so much because Rhagä lay far from the Assyrian frontier,—for why should not a man like Zarathustra have once taken a journey to Babylon?—but because in that case his doctrine of the evil deities would have assumed an altogether different form. This we must investigate in further detail.

§ 219. *The Dualism of Zarathustra is not of Semitic Origin.*

In his decided inclination to combat polytheism, in the definitely monotheistic endeavour which leads him to reduce Ameshaspentas and Yazatas to creatures of Ahuramazda and to describe all idolatry as an abomination, we see how

certainly Zarathustra would with joy have laid hold upon the Israelitish doctrine (comp. Job i.; Zech. iii. 1 f.), that even the tempter of mankind, the serpent, was a creature, a fallen creature of God. Of this we find no trace. With him Angromainyus is an independent being existing over against God, about whose origin he knows nothing and ventures upon no explanation. He found among the Iranians the doctrine of Angromainyus and his Dævas, and only incorporated them in a systematic form into his system. When we remember that in the primitive tradition which we find preserved in its purity in the book of Genesis, no solution of the question whence the seducer comes is attempted, that, therefore, man originally knew simply nothing about this, it will be understood how a people retaining a lively consciousness of sin and guilt, feeling evil to be a centralized enslaving power standing over the will of the individual, attributed to this power misery as the curse of sin, as well as sin itself, conceived of this power as a superhuman, and in this sense as a divine or demoniacal power, and assumed its existence simply as a given fact, without being able to explain or wishing to explain its origin. This the Iranians had done before Zarathustra, and precisely the same position is taken up by him. The case is not so bad with regard to this so-called dualism. The doctrine is never speculatively or in an *à priori* fashion developed in the Avesta that there must be, and why there must be, two primary beings. The evil god is simply there, and that indeed before the visible world has been created, in an ante-temporal era. The Avesta religion has only this negative defect, that it does not rise to a knowledge that evil from its very nature is not independent, but can exist only as a quality of will in created individuals. An acquaintance with the Israelitish religion, which knew nothing at all of an evil god, would have helped Zarathustra to overcome this defect. Nevertheless he has at least guarded himself against actually representing Angromainyus as an absolute being (§ 213), and so his dualism in the end is reduced to his passing over

altogether the question of the origin of Angromainyus and evil. The thought that Angromainyus may have fallen by his own fault does not occur to his mind, which must have been the case had he possessed acquaintance with the religion of Israel. He has only the old Iranian conception of the existence of a demoniacal, divine kingdom of evil and misery, as something existing in itself, and yet he cannot allow himself to suppose that a being in itself evil could have been created by God.

§ 220. *The Dualism of Zarathustra is Old Iranian.*

We have designated the doctrine of the kingdom of Angromainyus an old Iranian view, but we have still to give the positive historical proof of this statement. Belief in a kingdom of darkness lies at the root of all the national traditions and national customs. The very early pre-Zarathustrian tradition, corresponding to the record of Genesis (§ 210), not only sees in the struggle against Turan a conflict with Angromainyus, but also has in Yima and Thrætona, the serpent-slayer and opponent of the kingdom of darkness, beings which bear the same names and are identical with the personages in the Indian traditions, only that in the Indian tradition those conflicts with the serpent are not represented as of so fundamental a character, but rather as separate chance incidents, and in the earlier stages (§ 196) were described as natural occurrences. But as concerns the religious customs of the people, it would be mere foolishness to believe that that liturgical practice, which has at its foundation the conflict between Ahuramazda and Angromainyus (§ 216), which has, moreover, left its impress upon the whole life of the Iranians from Bactria down to the Euphrates, should have been forced upon those people by the caprice of a single individual. Had this been so, then indeed the personality of Zarathustra would be one of such unexampled power,¹ that

¹ If the case of Mohammed be here adduced, it ought to be remembered that he did, indeed, abolish the liturgical ceremonial of the Sabæans, Jews,

it would be utterly inconceivable that there should now exist only a few vague and contradictory notices about him and his times. Such an audacious undertaking must undoubtedly have led to a long, severe struggle between the old Iranian and the Zarathustrian religion, of which, however, no trace can be discovered! If, then, anything is certain it is this, that Zarathustra found already before him the mass of those practices as national religious customs, and only gave them a regular form and set them forth as laws. But then he also must have met with the belief in the kingdom of Angromainyus and in the struggle for existence against that kingdom,—the belief in the Dævas, the Nasus, the Drayus, and the Pairikas, and in their evil and malicious influences, and in the means by which they might be overcome.

§ 221. *Separation and Division of the Indians and Iranians.*

But if this so-called dualism was already present in the old Iranian religion, we have in it the fundamental distinction between the Iranian and the Indian religion, and undoubtedly a principal cause of the separation of the two great families. Indeed, this difference seems from the first to have caused a hostile feeling, for the Iranians applied the Indian word which, among the Indians, designated the gods, to designate the evil gods, and have placed the heavenly god of the Indians under these evil gods, retaining for him the name of Indra. When and where did this division of the two families

and Christians, but except circumcision, which was already in existence among Sabeans and Jews, he introduced no liturgical ceremonies. How completely different are the funeral observances and the bestowal of the dead, the cow's urine purifications, the sacrificial formularies, and the prescribed prayers of the Avesta, where everything down to the least detail is determined in the most complicated manner! Moses alone can be compared with Zarathustra. But how completely different were the surroundings of Moses from those of Zarathustra, even setting all higher divine influences aside! And how many of the injunctions even of the Pentateuch—circumcision, purifications, and sacrificial rites—were already old patriarchal customs!

take place? Modern fables, which say that the Iranians entered India over the Himalayas along with the Indians as originally one nation, lived with them there, and afterwards separated from them and turned back to Iran, or that the Iranians originally lived in Iran, but had once made a great raid into India, are proved to be untenable. Among the countries reported in Vendid. i. as having been created by Ahuramazda, therefore, as lands known to the Iranians, Hepta-hendu, the seven Indies, India of the seven streams, the Punjab, is mentioned just at the very end, as if it were the Ultima Thule. From this it follows that the Iranians about B.C. 700, or perhaps even earlier, had come to know of the existence of that land, but not that they had ever been there. In the vocabulary of the Avesta no single word is found for any specifically natural products of India, such as rice, Indian species of animals, etc., at least none which are identical with or related to the synonymous Sanscrit words, which must have been the case had India been their common home (Spiegel, ii. p. cvii.). The separation of the two races must have taken place north of the Himalayas.

Which of the two, then, was it that remained more nearly faithful to the old religion? Were the Indians also originally conscious of a struggle with the kingdom of darkness? Or did neither of the two peoples originally know anything about it, so that the Iranians first concocted this theologoumenon after the separation? When we consider that even in India the law prevails, that during the night following the burning of a dead body no food can be cooked in the house, we shall not hesitate in deciding the question according to the former alternative. There had been an understanding among the Iranians that there should be no cooking, because fire must be removed altogether from the house, lest it should be polluted by contact with the dead.¹ Among the Indians this law no longer prevailed; for they now burned the dead bodies,

¹ Evidence that in the earliest times the Indians did not burn, but that they buried their dead, is found in the Rig Veda, 9. 41. 2.

and so brought the fire into immediate contact with them. But clearly this law had originally found expression among the Indians. Death must have originally appeared to them also as the operation of an unholy being, hostile to God, which was effectively present in the corpse. There are many indications of such views. In the Nalas, the heroic tale originating in the Indra period (§ 198, *Obs.*), an evil spirit Kali enters into Nalas, because he defiled his feet with his urine, exactly according to the fancy of the Iranians. But among the Indians those evil spirits play a part only in the legends, not in the religion. They appear so little in the religion, that even that Kali holds intercourse and conversation quite pleasantly with the highest of the gods (*Nal.* vi. 1 ff.). The whole of the Indian religion had in early times certain pantheistic characteristics. The immanence of God in His creatures was firmly held, and thus for centuries, throughout the first period, God was regarded as the one God, and, in theory at least, as the holy One, but already in this first period sin was extenuated (§ 196) and attributed rather to the weakness of men. How very different was the earnest struggle, engaging the whole life, though in superstitious forms, against the spirits of darkness, which found expression among the Iranians! Seeing that the Indians made light of sin, and accordingly soon also of the holiness of God, their knowledge of the nature and character of God was consequently of necessity gradually darkened. They were obliged to adopt the doctrine that God in like manner is active in the evil as well as in the good, that He is identical with the world, and that the world is the manifestation of God. In contrast to them the Iranians have maintained a lofty and important principle of truth.

Obs. — In what way the partition and separation of the two peoples were accomplished cannot be with any degree of certainty conjectured. Possibly it came about in this way, that the Indian people entered into a sort of commercial treaty with the God and kingdom of darkness, since they sought to

appease and mollify the evil god by sacrifices, as we find done in so many uncivilised countries; whereas the Iranians regarded every such attempt as an abomination, and looked upon it as the duty of each individual man to fight against the evil god. If this were so, then we can understand how the Iranians would say, the gods of the Indians are false gods, or in Aryan phrase, the Devas of the Indians are false gods, and that therefore they would no longer name their Iranian true gods by the same appellative with which the Indians designated their Indian gods, but would give this designation, deva, to evil spirits, and designate their own gods bâgâs, those who distribute, those who bless. In like manner the conviction that the Indian god of heaven, Indra, is not the true god of heaven, must have led to the giving another name, Asman, to the Iranian god of heaven and the subordinating of Indra or Andra under the Dævas. Comp. Vendid. 10. 17: "I contend with Indra, I contend with Saura (a name of Siva), I contend with Nâonghâiti (name of Asvina)." The Indian god Siva appears to be nothing else than the god of the kingdom of darkness raised by them to a place among the good gods. The separation of the two races can scarcely be put later than B.C. 2000. It is interesting that the Sarmatian or Slavic races have as an appellative for God, gods, the same word as the Iranians, namely, bog. In the Peruvian language we meet with huaca (vaka) as the designation of the old pre-Inca gods. (J. G. Müller, *Urreligionen Amerikanischen*, p. 271.) This vaka, however, is not identical with bâgâ, but is derived from the Malay wak, *to see* (comp. § 281, *Obs.* 1).

§ 222. *The Darker Side of the Iranian Religion.*

The Iranians have maintained over against the Indians an important element of truth, a living consciousness of the moral law, a consciousness that sin is not to be toyed with, that there is a mighty force operating in it, with which an earnest struggle must be waged. And therefore among them there has always been maintained (§ 218) a knowledge of the one God, and so a reformation, a systematic and consistent restoration of the primitive monotheistic belief, was possible among them at the very same time when the degeneration of Brahmanism took place among the Indians, the victory of polytheism by means of a system of pantheistic speculation. Nevertheless the Iranian religion also carried in itself the seeds of

decay and untruth, though these were of a different kind. Already before the separation of the people there was present in this common primitive religion a mythologizing tendency, which split the unity of God into a multitude of divine powers, and although both races retained for centuries the consciousness that this was not a multiplicity of gods, but only the several powers of the one God, and although even this consciousness among the Iranians continued bright, and was restored by Zarathustra in all its definiteness, still even the Iranians were not able altogether to overcome that polytheistic tendency. It was really intended in a monotheistic sense, when Zarathustra described with greater distinctness that the Ameshaspentas and Yazatas were creatures of God; but on this very account they were regarded as individual persons. They were now no longer mere creative energies of God, but creatures outside and alongside of God, and thus also participating in divine worship. Thus, then, there arose a sort of polytheism, a worship of subordinate beings, like the saint-worship of the Romish Church. This led directly to superstition. For particular concerns application must be made to particular Yazatas. In the forenoon Mithra is appealed to for protection, at night prayer is addressed to Sraosha. Rashaurazista is a protector from thieves; Haoma helps in sickness; Ashisvaughuhi saves from the loss of children, etc. So, too, every day of the month had its own particular patron. And this subordinationist sort of polytheism consistently led in the time of Artaxerxes II. and III. to the erection and worship of images of Baga, and so to idolatry.

This, however, was only one germ of degeneration, the other was that reckoning of the evil powers as divine, as self-existent beings, evil in their very essence, created evil. From this there proceeded directly a perplexing confusion between sin and misfortune as evil generally; both were in like manner creations of Angromainyus; evil as misery was not punishment from the side of God for sin, because trouble and sin alike are brought into the world only by the wicked-

ness of Angromainyus. This led again by necessary consequence to an identification of corporeal with moral and spiritual facts, and thus opened the way to a blind superstition. The superstitious fancy, that defiling the feet with their urine gave inlet to evil spirits, was already present before the separation of the peoples (§ 221); and so was it also with the idea that a dead body is something offensive to the deity. The Iranian religion got quite overgrown with such superstitions, and this, indeed, unquestionably occurred (§ 220) in pre-Zarathustrian times. As Angromainyus is the creator of serpents, reptiles, and venomous beasts, so he is the author of sin. Thus sin is not regarded as the evil self-determination and decision of will on the part of man, but is something by which man has been bewitched.¹ The Indian casts the guilt of sin on God, and so the Iranian is inclined to cast it on the devil, or Angromainyus. He deals with sin more earnestly than the Indian, but the guilt of his sins he seeks not in himself, and consequently he attains unto no true repentance, to no consciousness of guilt and of suffering for sin. Evil as misery is not divine punishment of sin, but rather sin only operates through evil, and is itself only an evil or misfortune. The immediate consequence of this view is a perverted estimate of the moral quality of separate actions. That religion was closely bound to ethics among the Iranians of the Avesta has been heartily admitted, but the really noble features of this ethical system (§ 215) were seriously obscured by giving to ceremonial errors an importance equal to that given to moral offences. The burying or burning of a dead body is just as great a fault as murder or impurity. Transgressions of the ritual law must be atoned for as well as errors of a moral nature. And again purely external actions, such as the slaying of reptiles and beasts of prey, are regarded as meritorious and expiatory just as much as really noble actions.

¹ Contact with a dead body, the omission of purification, must be assumed if a man fall into moral delinquency, or commit a moral offence or crime!

§ 223. *The Depravation of Parseeism.*

All these elements of weakness, especially the one last mentioned, would necessarily lead to a decay of the religion, to a process of deterioration. In the Vendidad there occur parentheses, which in respect of language cannot be more recent than the Achæmenian period, *e.g.* 8. 83-97, where even for such acts as were declared to be unpardonable, *e.g.* unnatural vice, an atonement is nevertheless laid down, and indeed a very light one—to praise the law of Mazda. And so in reference to other sins, even in the original, genuine parts of the Vendidad, purely external, ceremonial penances were described as availing quite as much as inward repentance and improvement. How in such a case it fared with the moral state of the nation is shown us by the well-known history of the Persian empire, its luxury and sensuality. Parseeism soon reached the point where ethics became completely overgrown by the ceremonial, and in this way rendered superfluous, where making amends for sin committed was left wholly to the priests, as a business which they would discharge for money on behalf of the laity. This stage was reached by Parseeism in the time of the Sassanidæ. In this, as well as in its determined hate against the gospel, it affords a striking analogy to the Popish Church.

We find then, upon the whole, among the Iranians, as among the Indians, a regular deterioration. Certain facts and inferences have made it seem to us unquestionable that both peoples possessed originally the knowledge of the one living, eternal, invisible, and holy God, and we can see clearly how the two races, each in its own particular way, sank from that high position in the course of two thousand years. The one minimized sin as such, and sank through pantheistic polytheism into pantheism; the other regarded sin as indeed a dismal power, but then shoved the guilt of sin over upon that power away from himself, and so in spite of an energetically attempted resistance to polytheism, it fell

into the arms of a polytheism differently decked out, into a subordinationist polytheism and a superstitious legalistic externalism.

Of a still more ancient period during which there was, instead of this *decrescendo* process of these two thousand years, a *crescendo* process,—a primitive age, during which those Aryan races were raising themselves toward that pure knowledge of God, and were working up from perhaps a fetich or even ape-like condition,—no historical nor even legendary traces or documents exist. This process of working up exists only as a fashionable article in the heads of modern savants, an *à priori* creation of the brain. All historical data, as well as the profound and learned investigations of a Lassen and Burnouf, a Max Müller and Spiegel, have brought us the same report. They show us those two Aryan nationalities always only in a course of religious decline, and the higher we go in their history, and the farther back in the examination of the memorials of their religions, the nearer do we get to a pure monotheism. Now this is in itself in thorough harmony with what Holy Scripture tells us of the state of mankind in Abraham's time, B.C. 2000, when still in Mesopotamia (Gen. xxiv. 31, 50, xxxi. 49), and in the persons of the Canaanite kings Melchizedec and Abimelech (Gen. xx. 3 ff., xxi. 22 f.) we meet with a quite similar form of primitive monotheism, and knowledge of the one invisible God. Thus we reach the conclusion that the traditions of the Iranians, as well as of the Indians (§ 207), so far agree with the primitive tradition of Genesis, that the possibility of that modern hypothesis of a period of working up from the ape-like condition through fetichism to monotheism is absolutely excluded.

§ 224. *The Iranian Tradition.*

While among the Indians only a feeble reminiscence of the tree of life in Paradise is found, and a somewhat clearer

reminiscence of the flood (§ 207), the Iranian tradition embraces much more. It contains a reminiscence of Eden, of the serpent and the fall, and of the flood.

A. Yima¹ appears as bearing to earth its golden age. He lived in the garden (vara) of Yima. Yazna IX. calls Yima a son of Vivanghas, the first man. The first man is thus reduplicated in a legendary manner in Yima and Vivanghas. During his time men and animals were immortal. He could look on the sun without being dazzled. There was then neither old age, nor death, nor sin. According to Khoda Avesta, Yasht, 19. 34, Yima afterwards fell into sin by yielding to seductive speech; pride and self-confidence stole into his spirit; Ahuramazda forsook him, and he lost the gift of immortality. A trace of this tradition is also found in Yazna, 32. 8. The abandoned reprobates of the last ages of the world are here described with their excess of wickedness, and in this connection it is said: "Of these wicked men spoke Yima, the son of Vivanghas, who taught us men to eat pieces of flesh; from these I wish to be separated, O Mazda." Evidently he desires to have it admitted that his sin is not like the profligacy of these reprobates. But his sin consists in this, that he "taught us men to eat pieces of flesh." It lay, therefore, in the use of a hitherto unknown kind of food, which in one respect reminds us of the forbidden fruit of Paradise, and at the same time points to the first use of flesh after expulsion from Paradise (comp. Gen. iv. 4, 20).

B. In Vendidad, ii. 4 f., Yima is called expressly the first man, and there is no word there of Vivanghas (comp., however, ii. 46). It is there told that Yima did not fulfil Ahuramazda's commission, that he should be the bearer of the law, and thereupon God said to him: If thou wilt not obey me, Yima, by observing and carrying out my law, then

¹ Comp. upon him Windischmann, "Ursagen der arischen Völker," in the *Abhandlungen der bair. Akad. d. W.*, vol. vii. div. 1; and Westergaard in Weber's *Studien*, iii. 402 ff. In the Rig Veda, 10. 14. 1, and 10. 16. 4, the first man is called Yama, son of Vivasvant.

spread over the worlds, and make them fruitful (people the earth with posterity). To this Yima consented. (Here we have a reminiscence of the facts that Yima was indeed first parent of mankind, but did not fulfil the divine law and will.) Yima now increased the earth, that is, the race of men upon the earth. He split the earth with his golden *sufra*, which R. Roth translates *fan*, and Spiegel renders *lance*, though the latter acknowledges that it is etymologically identical with the Sanscrit *surpa fan*. One might here think of a concave spade or mattock, and so find a reference to the first cultivation of the land. But after the human race had become very numerous and the earth was peopled, the assembled Gods declared to the assembled men that evil of winter would come upon the material universe. The later translations and commentaries, in short, the later Persian tradition, is unanimous in declaring that this winter means the rain of *Malkoshan*,¹ that is, a fearful time of rain. This, too, corresponds with what is expressly said in the *Vendidad*: "There was snow in great quantity fallen upon the mountain-tops; forth from it water flows, behind it is the thawing of the snow; cattle must away from the meadows, from the peaks and from the valleys (there is thus no place for them in the middle, nor above, nor below); then the clouds came down upon the material world." Yima was now to make a square space of the size of a riding school, and bring therein men, cattle, and birds, especially the seed of the best men, finest cattle, and best trees, all in pairs (ver. 78). He was to make nine bridges, passages, or storeys, over one another with this space. Into the upper storeys he was to bring the seed of a thousand men, into the middle over that of six hundred, into the lower that of three hundred. Thus there was in reality only three floors. The upper storeys were thus

¹ A foreign word first introduced into the Persian during the age of the Sassanidæ (comp. § 210, *Obs.*), which again means rain; the Hebrew מַלְקוֹשׁ. Hence "rain *Malkoshan*" means rain of rain torrents, that is, extraordinary, unheard of, heavy rain.

wider than the lower. Into this space or into these enclosures he was to bring men and beasts by his golden *sufra*, which here again must either mean spade, shovel, as if Yima was to have thrown up together those who should be saved, or more probably it is to be taken in the general sense of hollow, depression, *curvum*, and signifies a boat. Then it is said, ver. 92: Round about on the side of this enclosure he made a high door and a window, which lighted the inner parts. All this Yima did, and, ver. 101, the water was gathered together there to the height of a *hâthra*, a thousand paces more than a *parasang*, and so 19,000 feet. Here the narrative breaks off. That we have here a reminiscence of the building of the ark is evident. It is not to be regarded as borrowed from Israelitish sources. The Iranian tradition has no idea that it was a ship that Yima built; but the remembrance of the three storeys and of the window was still retained. That Yima the first man survived till the flood and built the ark cannot surprise us. He seems here to be represented simply as the surviving first parent, still living among his descendants, who have already peopled the earth far and wide. His fall is beautified, and represented in as mild a light as possible, his peopling of the earth magnified to the fullest extent, and to the later population of the earth is consequently attributed the flood, while he now takes care for the saving of his posterity.

C. The serpent form of Angromainyus (§ 213) is itself a reminiscence of the serpent of Paradise. All ordinary serpents, however, are in the Avesta the creation of Angromainyus. The serpent of Paradise therefore seems to be again distinguished from Angromainyus. In Yazna, 9. 21-27, as second Ahuramazdan hero or workmanship of God after Yima is named Thrætona, in modern Persian Feridun, the son of Athwya, who slew the serpent Dahâka, which had three heads and three throats, and was created by Angromainyus for the destruction of the world. In like manner, also, in Yazna, 9. 38-39, Keresaspa, the son of Thrîta, is mentioned

as third Ahuramazdan hero, who slew the green poisonous serpent Sruvara. We have here evidently one and the same legend in a reduplicated form, as it had been adopted by different Iranian tribes (comp. under *E*). Thrīta is mentioned in Vendidad, 20. 1 ff., as the earliest physician, who preserved from death. Evidently Thrætōna, as well as Thrīta, is to be regarded as identical with the Indian serpent-slayer Trita. Another form of the same legend is (Khoda Avesta, Yasht, 19. 41) that Keresaspa slew the demon Gandarewa, provided with golden heels. In all those legends the form always turns upon the promised seed of the woman in the third chapter of Genesis, which should tread upon the head of the serpent, and indeed in the last there is a deformed reminiscence of the heel-thrust; for if the demon-serpent has a golden heel, which the man Keresaspa takes off, this implies that it was not the demon who was wounded by Keresaspa on the heel, but Keresaspa that was there wounded by the demon. Also in the Yazna there is found elsewhere an intimation that the struggle did not yield an immediately decisive victory for Keresaspa. He had, it says, cooked his food in a vessel over the serpent Sruvara, not observing it; when the fire scorched it, it sprung out from under the vessel, and the bold one rushed back in consternation (Yazna, 9. 36–39).

D. Closely connected with the legends of serpent-slaying is that of the tree of life in Paradise. In Vendidad, 20. 13 ff., Ahuramazda says: In order to withstand sickness, to withstand death, to withstand suffering, to withstand fever, corruption, and pollution, which Angromainyus has brought upon the bodies of men, I have brought forth healing herbs, in hundreds, in thousands, round about the Gaokerina. The Gaokerina is a designation of the white Haoma of Paradise (§ 212 and § 216), the tree of life, which confers immortality, to which man can no longer approach. Its symbol is the earthly Haoma. Around the Gaokerina Ahuramazda has placed the medicinal plants. They do not confer immortality, but they keep death off for a long space.

E. In the tradition as it appears in Ferdusi there are characteristics combined with the name of Thrætona which are borrowed from the history of Noah. It is conceivable that when once the clear remembrance of the primitive history of the human race had passed out of view, the notion would arise, that in the man, who had preserved mankind during the flood, the promised slayer of the serpent had already appeared, and that thus the serpent-slayer was identified with Manu-Noch. So, too, in the legend preserved by Ferdusi, the division of the world, that is, the world known to the old Iranians some 1800 or 1500 years before Christ, between the three sons of the survivor of the flood, is ascribed to the serpent-slayer Thrætona. His three sons are Iradsh, Jir, and Salm, the progenitors of the Iranians, Turanians, and Samabians or Slavonians. But even in the Avesta this tradition is already found. In Yasht, 13. 131, Thrætona's grandson is called Manucithra, seed of Manu; and since this very Manucithra is described as the very same as the son of Airya, Manu cannot have been his father, but only his grandfather. Airya is the progenitor of the Aryans or Iranians: Iradsh is only, according to Ferdusi, a later form of the name Airya. The genuine serpent-slayer of the Iranian-Indian tradition was evidently Thritha; for while the Iranians regarded the historical person of Manu as the fulfilment, or at least a fulfilment, of the promise of a serpent-slayer, they gave to this Manu the additional designation of Thrætona, and so there was introduced into the Iranian myth a second serpent-slayer.

Thus, then, we see, just as among the Indians (§ 207), so also in a still wider measure among the Iranians, the most unmistakeable reminiscences of the primitive position, which has been preserved to us in its purity and completeness in Genesis, are found among the Iranians. What is sober and plain in Genesis, appears in that tradition deformed, erroneous, misproportioned, intertwined with falsehood, also reduplicated. Since the era of rationalism it has been customary to conclude from the harmony between heathen tradition and the account

of Genesis, that the heathen nations had quite similar traditions, and that therefore that related in Genesis is only entitled to rank as a legend like one of these. A more irrational conclusion than this could not be imagined. It must still be asked: How came it about, and how was it possible, that people so different and of such diverse origin and far removed residences as the Indians, Bactrians, Medo-Persians, and Israelites, in an age when no sort of connection existed between them, were able to tell each about its own progenitor the same incidents? This indeed was done down to the enumeration of the minutest details, as, for example, the window in the ark and its three storeys (comp. Gen. vi. 16). This can be explained only on the supposition that the first parents of the one family of nations were really identical with those of the others. The universal prevalence of the tradition obliges us to conclude that it had one common, universal source. One family of nations would have known nothing of the progenitors of another family of nations, unless the progenitors of the latter had also been their own progenitors. That tradition has been transmitted by those common first parents of the Semitic Israelites and of the Indo-Germanic Iranians and Indians through all those different races. In immediate connection with this we have the further result, that the common ancestors, if they told to their descendants those stories of Paradise, the fall, the slaying of the serpent, the flood, and the ark, must also have survived all these occurrences. We shall not, however, press this conclusion; we shall still admit the possibility, singular though it would be, that those common ancestors did not actually outlive these events, but had only dreamt of or fabricated them. But even upon this supposition we do not get over the fact that the common parents of the Semites and the Indo-Germanic races had already possessed the knowledge of the one living, holy God, and had faith in Him; for this belief constituted the foundation and the contents of that common primitive tradition. In the following investigations we shall endeavour to show, that among all the

families of the nations of the earth, reminiscences of that early tradition have been preserved. This compels us to conclude that the common parents of the whole of mankind possessed those traditions of Paradise, the fall, the serpent-slayer, the flood, the ark; and that, therefore, faith in a knowledge of the one holy God was a common spiritual possession of the still undivided human race. Together with this goes also the following result: that particular races as separate tribes, or that the whole human race, had gradually raised themselves from an animal condition to the elaboration of an idea of God. In the light the history of man had its beginning, and from this light it has fallen, and from the earliest age we find a prevailing twilight which in the course of a thousand years has continued sinking into ever deepening darkness.

CHAPTER III.—THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS.

§ 225. *Affinity with the East Aryan Religion.*

It is admitted on all hands that the Greeks, Iranians, and Indians all belong to one common stock. What degree of culture the Greeks had reached when, together with the Italians, Celts, Slavs, and Germans, they separated themselves from the East Aryans, the comparative study of languages shows. Even at this early period they were already in possession of cattle, sheep, horses, geese, and dogs; they had houses with doors, and lived in towns; they had waggons, and yokes, and ships that were provided with rudders. This is proved from the fact that the words used to designate all these objects are common to the Greek and Sanscrit (Old Bactrian) languages. It should not therefore cause us any surprise if we find, reappearing among the Greeks, the very same ancient deities as had previously been worshipped among the Indians and Iranians. Attention was early called to the fact that the term *Deva*, which expresses the abstract idea of God, recurs in the Greek *Δεὺς*, *Δη-μήτηρ*, *Ποτι-δάος*, *Διο-*

νύσος; and, seeing that the root-word Deva is not degraded by the Greeks, as it was by the Iranians, to signify evil spirits, it is perfectly evident that in that religious and national separation between the Indians and Iranians, to which reference has been made (§ 221), the Greeks took their place, intellectually and spiritually, alongside of the Indians. It does not, however, by any means follow that they must have continued to reside in the same locality as the Indians for any long period after that separation. This, indeed, could not have been the case, for many deities, which among the Indians and Iranians were known by the same names, when they reappear among the Greeks have different names assigned them; for example, Mithra stands for Πᾶν and Ἥλιος, and later, Ἀπόλλων,—only Varuna answering to Οὐρανός, and Usha answering to Ἥώς, retain traces of the same original names. Therefore it is proved that the Greeks separated themselves from the Indians in that primeval age when Varuna was still regarded as the god of the starry heavens. The separation of the three national stems appears to have taken place at the same time, but each of these has carried with it the germs of its own distinctive mental and spiritual development.

Obs.—gaus	βοῦς	açva	ἵππος	damas	δόμος
awis	ῥίς	juga	ζυγόν	dvara	θύρα
sthura	σταῦρος	aksha	ἄξον	naus	ναῦς
hansa	χίην	vastu	ἄστν	plava	πλοῖον
çwan	κύων	veça	οἶκος	aritra	ἔρετρον

§ 226. Sources.

The Greeks make their appearance in history at a much later period than the Indians and Iranians. Their written literature, indeed, began earlier than the application of the art of writing among either of these two peoples (among the Greeks about B.C. 600, Indians about B.C. 500, Iranians about B.C. 300). Among the Greeks, on the other hand, there is wanting that unwritten literature, faithfully preserved in

memory and transmitted by tradition, which, among the Iranians, reached back to about B.C. 700, and among the Indians back to about B.C. 1800. The Homeric poems, which originally were preserved only by oral tradition, were first reduced to writing about B.C. 600, and these constitute the oldest literary works of the Greeks. These, it is well known, are not religious but poetical. As concerns the religion of the Greeks before B.C. 560, we have absolutely no direct sources of information. We can only indirectly reach conclusions on this subject, partly from separate scattered allusions and references, and partly from the etymology of the names given to their gods. In consequence, however, of the diligent and thoroughgoing investigations which, in recent times, have been made in this department (especially by Duncker in his *History of Antiquity*), we may still gain a tolerably complete idea of the Greek religion as it existed about B.C. 1500, immediately after the immigration of the Greeks into Europe.

§ 227. *Fundamental Characteristics.*

We now see (*a*) that the Greek religion, just as little as the Indian, has preserved that consciousness of a great conflict between the heavenly kingdom and the powers of darkness which is so prominent a feature in the Iranian religion—that is, it appears only in very faint traces; and (*b*) that the evidences of moral earnestness, of the consciousness of the holiness of the gods, which are found in the Indian religion down to the time of the Yoga-philosophy, are entirely lost in the Greek religion. The Greek divinities, so far back as we can trace them, are merely powers of nature, not personal essences, but, as it were, poetical personifications of natural phenomena. Thus (*c*) in the Greek religion the ethical and the religious elements are separated the one from the other. It was only in the later periods that the worship of the gods had assigned to it a subordinate place as compared with ethical ideas, and even then these were not of a personal-

ethical, but only of a social and political kind. (*d*) From the fact that the divinities of the Greeks are merely personifications of the powers of nature, their religion has from the beginning assumed a purely polytheistic, and indeed a pre-eminently fanciful, character. For the powers of nature are many, and they appear independent of one another, each effective in its own sphere. The Greeks had before this time lost every trace of the idea of a spiritual creator, at once operating in and ruling over nature. Upon this point we may express ourselves with perfect confidence, inasmuch as the whole course of the development of the Greek religion from B.C. 1500 to the age of Pericles in B.C. 400 can still be traced.

§ 228. *First Period—that of the Pelasgians.*

What we are to understand by the name Pelasgian is one of the still unsolved problems of history. According to Herodotus, i. 57, the Pelasgians were related to the Dorians very much as the Celts were to the Germans. The Pelasgians were the oldest inhabitants of Greece, and the Thessalo-Dorians were a race quite distinct and separate from them, which, at a later time, had migrated from Epirus into Thessaly, and from thence into Greece proper. This is the opinion which has long prevailed amongst scholars. Herodotus himself, however, contradicts it when he says that Epirus was the native land of the Pelasgians; for if it was from this same Epirus that the Thessalo-Dorians sprang, then they must be one and the same with the Pelasgians. Indeed, there has never at any time been any appearance in Greece and in the Greek language of a mixture of two different languages, as there must have been if the Greeks had been a mixed race formed out of two different peoples. The Greek language no doubt was split up into different dialects, but these were distinguished only in pronunciation, like High and Low German, while the vocabulary in all the dialects was the same. There was no

appearance of a mixture like the mixture of Celtic and Teutonic roots in the old English, or the mixture of both, with Latin roots, in the modern English and French languages. Hence, in the domain of philological and historical science, we may thoroughly convince ourselves that the Pelasgians were not a distinct race from the Dorians or Hellenes, but that only by the name Pelasgian an early primitive period in the civilisation of one and the same Greek race was indicated. When Asios of Samos, about B.C. 750, says, in Pausanias, viii. 1, that the Pelasgians were born of the soil (as does also Hesiod, *Fragm.* 135), this only means, that no older inhabitants of Greece than the Pelasgians were known, and that no tradition lingered among the people of these Pelasgians having at any previous time passed over from Asia. On the other hand, it is important to observe that the name of the Pelasgians is associated with Dodona, the site of the ancient oracle. According to the *Iliad*, xvi. 234, and Hesiod, *Fragm.* 191, the Pelasgians dwelt in and around Dodona, and according to an ancient tradition (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 1), this city was founded by Deucalion, the ancestor of the post-diluvian race of men. When, in the *Odyss.* xiv. 315; Aesch. *Prom.* 830; Strabo, 325, Pausan. i. 17, the inhabitants of Dodona are called Thesprotians, this is clearly synonymous with Pelasgians. Thessaly, however, especially Pelion, as well as Dodona, is mentioned as the residence of the Pelasgians (Hellanicus in Dion. *Halic.* i. 11, 17; Steph. Byz. *Αἰμωλία*; Apollon. *Rhod.* ii. 1240; Eustath. *ad Iliad.* ii. 681); it is also reported that a "Pelasgian Hera" was worshipped in Thessaly (Apollon. *Rhod.* i. 14, iii. 66). There is also a third place, Bœotia, which has been associated with the Pelasgians; the legend (Diod. Sic. iv. 72) supposes the Pelasgians to have been derived from one Pelasgos, and regards him as a son of the Bœotian river Asopus. And in the name of the Bœotian city Larissa, modern philology has discovered λᾶς to be the Pelasgian designation of the old Pelasgian walled towns. But the primitive inhabitants of Argolis were also Pelasgian (Aesch.

Supplem. 250; Apollod. ii. 1, viii. 1, etc.; Pausan. ii. 22, viii. 22), and in like manner those of Arcadia (Pausan. viii. 2, 3, and 38; Apollod. iii. 8. 1). So we see that Pelasgian was a name which embraced all the Greek races. According to etymology, it means, "the ancient-born, the people of the olden time." It was also a name which the Greeks of the olden time did not give themselves, but by it they were designated by the Greeks of a later period. And specially would those Greek races (chiefly at Athos in Lemnos and Imbros, and at the Hellespont) be so designated, which did not join in the subsequent development of Greece, politically and in respect of culture, but continued to occupy the stage of culture belonging to that olden time, which continued, that is to say, to live in rude fortified towns, *τύρροις*, practising piracy, and taking no part in the common sacrificial rites that were observed by the more developed races.

§ 229. *Continuation—the Principal Divinities.*

Concerning the religion of the Pelasgians, Pausanias shows (Pausan. i. 14, ii. 171) that they, as an agricultural people, worshipped Demeter. Driven away from Thessaly, they introduced agriculture into Attica, and built there a fortified town. When, again, they were driven out of Attica, they emigrated to Chalcidica, to Crete, Mysia, Lydia, and Troas, and from their *τύρροις* were called Tyrrhenians. That they were being gradually crushed out and driven into more and more remote localities is unquestionable; only this was done, not by any foreign invaders, but by the more advanced among their own tribes. But something further and more precise than the meagre account which Pausanias gives of their worship of Demeter may be discovered in regard to their worship of the gods. Dodona was situated (Hes. *Fragm.* 80) in Hellopia, and, according to Paus. x. 12; Soph. *Trach.* 1167; *Il.* xvi. 233 ff., the *Σελλοί* proclaimed in Dodona the will of the gods. The *σ* when used as an initial letter in the ancient

Greek corresponds to the aspirate in more recent Greek. The *σελλοί* are the *έλλοί*, the "hellenes;" the root is *σέλας*, the German *Helle*, light; the same root lies at the basis of the word *ήλιος*, and also of the word *σελήνη*, that is, *έλενα*. *Σελλοί* was therefore a common appellative designation of the gods, as those who saw clearly into the future, and who could make known what was to come. It was *Ζεὺς*, however, who was the special object of worship at Dodona. He appears purely as a Nature-God, that is, as the god of the atmosphere and of the atmospheric heaven with its clouds, as the *νεφέλη-γερετής*, as Homer continues to describe him. Next to him the Hyades (the constellation which announced the rainy season) and the Water Nymphs, who were thought to be daughters of Zeus (Pherec. *Fragm.* 46), were worshipped at Dodona. The rivers rushing down from the mountains were called "Bulls of Zeus," also "Sons of Zeus," and were honoured with offerings of bulls at Achelous near Dodona, and at Alpheios and Spercheios (Hes. *έργ.* κ. *ήμ.* 735 ff.). We find here the standpoint of an agricultural people, to whom, in the hot and dry climate of Greece, rain to water the fields is of all things most indispensable. As a well-watered region, Dodona was sacred to Zeus; hence to the river Achelous, (from *άχα*, that is, *aqua*), as well as to Zeus himself, offerings were brought. As the rivers fed by the rain were the children of Zeus, the mountain peaks were his dwelling-place. In Thessaly, the peaks of Olympus, Lykaïos (from *lok*, *lux*), and Ithome were seats of Zeus and his worship, just as in India the Himalayas were the throne of Indra, and in Iran the Haraberezaiti was the dwelling-place of the gods. Zeus himself, although the dispenser of rain, is not on that account a god of darkness, a god of the clouds; but just as in the Indian religion, after it had become polytheistic, Indra is enthroned above the clouds in the light of heaven, so also is Zeus enthroned by the Æolians far above the clouds in the pure ether as the god of light. To him, as well as to Indra, are oxen, as agricultural animals, sacred.

He, as well as Indra, travels on horses, because he travels swiftly. On the other hand, there is no trace among the Greeks of the allegory of the cloud-cleaving of Vrtra. For the contest of Zeus with the rebellious Titans (*Il.* xiv. 277 ff., viii. 479, xv. 224 f.), as well as the identical story of his contest with the giants (*Odys.* vii. 58, x. 113 ff.), does not belong to the present course of nature, but appears as something belonging purely to the past, to a state of things once and for ever concluded. It has therefore not a single point in common with the contest between Indra and Vrtra (a nature-myth originating long after the separation of the Indians from the Iranians and other Aryans, § 196), but is rather to be connected with the old primitive tradition, common to the Indians, Iranians, and Semites, of a contest between the gods and the kingdom of darkness. The constant war of the elements, which the Indians of the second period represented as the rending of the cloud-god Vrtra by the lightning-flash of Indra, was represented in the polytheism of the Pelasgians in quite another form. Alongside of Zeus there is introduced a female divinity, Pallas, the goddess of the blue heaven. She subdued the Gorgon, that is, the black, baneful, mischief-threatening storm-cloud, which sought to cast a gloom over the brightness of heaven, and for this end she shakes the ægis, that is, the thunder-storm, from ἀίσσω, not from αἶξ, and hurls her lightnings at the Gorgon, so that the clouds dissolve, and the serene heavens shine forth again. Then, as a token of victory, she carries away, and places in her shield, the head of the Gorgon surrounded with lightning-flashes (*Theogon.* 270 ff.). She has the cognomen Ἐλεσίη, the bright; Ἀθήνη, the gleaming, from αἶθω. In the Homeric age she appears as the daughter of Zeus, and the principal divinity after him (*Il.* v. 875 ff.; *Od.* xvi. 260). Indeed, she is nothing but a reduplication of Zeus, and essentially identical with him. At what time this reduplication of himself separated from Zeus, we do not know. It seems that by Zeus was under-

stood the creative power, while by Pallas was meant simply the blue heaven as that which was created by Zeus, and that then this creation of Zeus was itself raised into a divinity. As the reduplication of Zeus, she has also ascribed to her a share in that conflict against the giants, a story which, as we have seen, belongs to the absolute past. A similar reduplication occurred in the case of the Grecian sun-god; indeed it is the very same divinity that appears under four different names. His oldest name is *Πᾶν*, that is *φᾶ-ων*. Under this name the Arcadians, a race that occupied the standpoint of the Pelasgians, worshipped the sun and the sun-god. Among the other tribes is found the form *φοῖβος*, "the enlightener," derived from the same root. And as by the Indians, the light and sun god Mitra is called "the conqueror of evil, protector and avenger," and by the Iranians "the all-seeing one," the Greeks gave to their Phœbus the cognomen *ἀπέλλων*, "the defender" (*ἀλεξίκακος*), which was modified into *Ἀπόλλων*.¹ The sunbeams are his arrows by which the dragons and monsters of darkness are slain. In this, as well as in the combat with the Titans or giants, we have traces of a reminiscence of the contest between God and the kingdom of darkness. He is therefore also worshipped as God the Defender, as the victory-giving God. And as in the sunshine the stormy sea becomes calm, so those birds, the dolphin and the swan, which sport themselves on the calm surface of the water, are sacred to him. He feeds the clouds as his children, but he is also the centre of worldly prosperity, for it is he alone who brings the crops to maturity; he is therefore the God of the harvest. As the God of Light, he holds up hidden wickedness and crime to the light of day; he is therefore the revenger of evil.

¹ Such is the now generally accepted explanation. But it still remains questionable whether *Ἀπόλλων* is not the original proper name, identical with the old Assyrian sun-god *Bi'lu* (§ 250), the German god of the sunshine; *Phol* (Grimm, *Deutsche Myth.* 3rd ed. § 205 f.), the Etruscan April, and the Slavic *Bjel-bog*.

This attribute, therefore, is not ascribed to him because he is thought of as a personally moral being, as holy and omniscient in the sense of the oldest Veda religion. It is not the consciousness of the holiness of the deity which lies at the root of this feature of character, but the poetic fancy out of which arose the phrase, "bringing crime to the light of day." Phœbus Apollo is the discloser, and so the avenger of crime, bringing forth into view what before had been concealed, not by reason of moral holiness of will, but by reason of the physical attribute of the light of day. And because the heat of the physical sun produces drought, hunger, fever, and pestilence, so those evils, where they appeared, were considered to be punishments inflicted by Phœbus for some hidden offence that remained unatoned for (an idea superstitious rather than pious), and from thence arose the demand, to have the angry sun-god propitiated by sacrifice. Thus then has the sun-god been developed from a mere power of nature into an anthropomorphically determined personal individual, into a personification and person created by the poetic fancy, and now the sun itself, *ἥλιος* (from the root *σελ*—*έλ*-), was distinguished from him, the God of the Sun and of the Light. From this position the final step was taken in personifying this "*ἥλιος* himself, and placing him as another god alongside of Phœbus. Phœbus was then conceived of as the god of light, and Helios as the driver of the chariots of the sun. Thus we see, if we call to mind that Surya or Savitr (§ 198) is set beside Mitra, how similar mythological processes may be carried out quite independently of one another, in two distinct and long separated races. The reduplication of the sun-god in Greece was, indeed, never so strictly and consistently carried out as that of Mitra and Savitr in India, but Phœbus Apollo and Helios are constantly interchanged with one another.

§ 230. *Continuation—the other Pelasgian Divinities.*

Zeus, Pallas, and Pan-Phœbus were the three principal divinities of the Pelasgian Greeks. With them were connected a number of lesser divinities, concerning whom we have scarcely any direct information coming down to us from the post-Pelasgian period; but the close connection or affinity which subsists between them and the Indian divinities, justifies us in coming decidedly to the conclusion, that they had also been brought with them from Asia, and had been objects of worship in the Pelasgian period.

1. Alongside of the male sun-god stands Artemis, the female moon-goddess. Her oldest name was *Ἑλένα*, that is, *αἰελήνη*; and the later Ionic tradition which appears in Homer, of the abduction of Helena, lies at the foundation of the old nature-myth concerning the moon-goddess Helena, who at the time of her last quarter is encircled and carried off by a hostile power of darkness into the eastern heaven, disappears to the west of the sun, but comes again into view as the new moon, to the east of the sun, in the western heaven. The giving of a human form to these nature-myths is precisely analogous to the humanizing process to which the old German myth of Sifrid, in the Nibelungen legends, was subjected in medieval times. The more recent name Artemis was originally only a cognomen, an epithet; Helena is *ἄρτεμις*, "the uninjured," because uninjured she always comes back from her monthly disappearance. For this reason, as well as from her womanly gentleness of countenance, she would, in the post-Pelasgian period, by way of poetic personification and fanciful allegory, be protectress of virgins and virginity. As the moon-goddess, she drives a team with golden bridles (*Il.* 6. 205). Because the moon sheds forth beams of light like the sun, Artemis, as well as Phœbus, is represented as bearing arrows. And because, after nightly storm and rain, the billows are calmed by the rising or coming in sight of the moon, Artemis is the

“wave smoother.” For similar reasons, resting on facts of nature, she is the protectress of the nightly roaming hunter of the forest, and also, because the dew was ascribed to the moon, she is the protectress of the plains. We see that in the representation of these divine forms no other power is active but the poetizing fancy which creates allegorical representations.

2. To the Indian Uscha corresponds *Ἥως*, the goddess of the dawn. The morning star, which appears in the early dawn, and again in the twilight as the evening star, was conceived of by the Greeks, as well as by the Indians, as twin brothers. The Indians gave them the name of *Açvinas*, the Greeks called them *Διὸς κοῦροι* (*Dioscouri*), “the attendants of Zeus,” young servants of the bright heavens. They were regarded as signs of help and victory. Their connection with the morning and evening star was early lost, and only occasional traces of it are found.

3. Among the Greeks, Prometheus Pyrphorus corresponds to the Agnis of the Indians; as a deity he early falls into the background, and fades into a mere legendary hero, for divine honours were never, in fact, given to fire, as such, by the post-Pelasgian Greeks. In the Pelasgian age, however, Prometheus may perhaps have been worshipped as a god. In other respects the Prometheus legends are in no way connected with the Indian worship of Agnis. Fire was called by the Indians, “that which is hidden in the two sticks,” because it was obtained by the rubbing of two sticks together, while by the Greeks fire was supposed to have been brought by Prometheus from heaven, in the form of glowing pith, in the hollow stalk of a plant. Thus the conception, in the one case and in the other, was quite different. The connection is more apparent when Agnis is described as “the ox brought forth in a watery bed,” the lightning produced in the womb of the clouds; and Prometheus, by the Greeks, as grandson of Oceanus, offspring of the sea mounting up to the clouds. The name Prometheus was at first evidently a cognomen occupy-

ing a secondary place, by which an older name was displaced. With such an older name we meet in "*Ἡφαίστος*, that is, the lightning falling from heaven; but soon Hephæstus, the god of the heavenly lightning-fire, and Prometheus, the semi-god of the earthly hearth-fire, come to be separated from one another. That both were originally identical is evident from the fact that Hephæstus was always regarded as the guardian and patron god of the *ἑστία*, the household hearth. And even before the time of Homer, this Hestia was itself personified as a deity, and looked upon as the guardian spirit of the home.

4. It may be readily conjectured that from a very early period the sea and earth were also worshipped as divine nature-powers. At all events *Ποτιδάος*, or in its later form *Ποσειδάων*, was worshipped as a deity in the Pelasgian period; in *Odyss.* xiii. 143, Zeus points out Poseidon as "the oldest and best of the gods." He causes the springs to flow, and he dries them up. As *Αἰγέυς*, "the disturber," he moves the waves, as Zeus does the clouds; earthquakes were also ascribed to Poseidon. Next to him stands, as a reduplication of himself, *Ὠκέανος*, originally only an appellative for the sea. In Homer, when people had begun to distinguish between the ocean discovered outside of the Pillars of Hercules and the Mediterranean Sea, it came to be used as the name of a special god, who was regarded as the fountain, "the source of all the gods." In this expression was given to a theory in natural philosophy similar to that of Thales. The fruit-bearing earth was called by the Pelasgians in Dodona simply *Διώνη*, "the goddess," or *Δημήτηρ*, "the motherly goddess," and stands as such over against *Δεῦς* or *Δίος*, the bright heaven, as the womanly producing principle. In later times (according to Hesiod, *ἔργ.* 561), the earth itself, as belonging to Demeter, was raised, under the name of *Γαία*, into a goddess, as Helios had been alongside of Phœbus, and from a poetico-philosophic point of view was designated "the mother of all." Demeter was also worshipped as the goddess of the homes (the settled

agrarian colony), and so of the family and organized community, of the *θεσμοί*.

5. In contrast to Zeus, as the god of the bright, clear heaven of day, were placed, in the Pelasgian period, two female divinities: in the first place, as we have said, Dione, as the goddess of the productive earth, fertilized from heaven; in the second place, Hera, as the goddess of the dark heavens. Hera had been already worshipped by the Pelasgians in Thessaly.¹ She is the goddess of the dark heavens, not merely of the night, but also of those darkened by day through clouds, in contrast to Zeus, the god of the light-blue heavens. Hebe, the goddess of spring, together with the Graces, the gifts of spring, are called the daughters of Hera, evidently because the starry heaven, with its change of the signs of the Zodiac, brings about the change of the seasons and the yearly reappearance of spring. Hera's servants, therefore, are the Horæ (the seasons), together with Iris, the rainbow which appears in the dark heaven. The Argos pheasant (as representing the starry heavens) is sacred to Hera, and, as the goddess of the nightly heavens, she would also be entreated as the protectress of the hearths.

6. In Pelasgian times *Διο-νύσος* (from the root *νυχ*, moist, meadow) was worshipped as the god of moisture and fertility; of the buds and sprouts. The rain was sacred to him. At a very much later period he was identified with Bacchus, the god of the Thracian people, and worshipped with orgies.

7. Finally, Hermes is also a god which may be assigned to the Pelasgian period. He slew the many-eyed Argus, and brought darkness over the starry heavens; he craftily drove away the cattle of the sun-god; he wears (Apollod. i. 6. 2) the invisible cap, the helm of Hades; he overcomes the eyes of men with his magic wand, so that they sleep, sends them

¹ Duncker's theory, that Hera was originally along with Demeter a goddess of the earth (all such reduplications are of more recent date), and was first in the Homeric age raised up into heaven to Zeus, cannot be accepted from this circumstance as tenable.

dreams, and carries away the souls of the dead into the lower world. So he is also the god of darkness, of sleep, and of death; therefore, also, the god of the nightly storm and tempest; but because he is the rain-bringer, he is also the god of fertility (Hesiod, *Theog.* 444; *Il.* ii. 101 ff.; 14. 491). But in no way does he appear as an evil god, hostile to Zeus. Darkness is to the Greeks only a natural phenomenon.

§ 231. *Second Period—that of the Formation of Legends.*

We could not describe the primitive Pelasgian form of the Greek religion and its divinities without indicating its difference from the notions regarding those divinities which obtained currency in a later age. We have therefore been obliged occasionally to refer to the poetico-allegorical personifications of the separate divinities originating in later times. In this way we have already overstepped the limits of the first period, and have given a description of the second period, reaching down to the Homeric age. Poetico-allegorizing personification of the ancient nature divinities, that is, the powers of nature, a reduplication of many of these, and thus a more decided impulse in the direction of anthropomorphic humanizing, and so in that of pure polytheism,—these are the characteristics of this second period, extending from about B.C. 1500 to B.C. 1200. One thing only can be recovered with certainty. Just like the form of the divinities, the ancient Aryan legends have undergone fantastical metamorphoses, and this has given rise to new legends. Then, too, a reduplication of the legends has taken place, since one and the same original myth has assumed a different form in different tribes, and then come to be regarded as distinct myths.

1. The primitive tradition of the slaying of the serpent, which among the Indians was at an early period obliterated and explained away in a physical sense, but was kept pure among the Iranians, appears among the Greeks under two, or rather under three different forms. First, among the Argives,

it appears in the legend of Hercules, who slays a sea monster (*Il.* xx. 144, xxi. 441), and in doing so is bitten by a sea crab in the heel (Apollod. ii. 5. 2; comp. G. Pfeiderer, *über die Genesis des Mythos*, a Memoir, 1874, p. 4 ff.). It corresponds to the Iranian combat of Thraetona with the serpent Dahâka.¹ Neither among the Greeks nor among the Iranians do we find any trace of a physical explanation of this conflict, as the scattering of the thunder-cloud by the lightning, as is done by the Indians of the Indra period. In this instance, the Greeks retained in its purity the substance of the ancient tradition; only this combat with the serpent is reduced to a single incident with a local significance, and the universal redemptive significance of the serpent-slaying is, if not quite forgotten, at least much defaced. Here and there, indeed, Hercules is still considered by the later poets to be in some sort an expected redeemer of the world. For the rest, even in Homer's time, the Greeks confounded the form of Hercules with the Hamitic-Phœnician sun-god Melkart (§ 251), who was worshipped in Bœotian Thebes; and in so far as this happened, the meaning of the old legend was quite obliterated, and a poetical and physical interpretation was given it. In this way Hercules came to be considered as the sun-god, who conquered the signs of the Zodiac one after another, and fought his way through them all. This mode of treatment, however, imported from Phœnicia, was never able completely to make its way in Greece. Phœbus Apollo continued the sun-god of the Greeks, and that Phœnician construction of the myth had ultimately no other effect than yielding to those who sang of Hercules an additional series of tales about their hero. Quite another construction of that primitive tradition of the serpent-slayer makes its appearance among the Ionians, in the legend of Theseus, who likewise slays a sea monster. A third, and indeed a still older form, but one which for that

¹ The victory of Hercules over the three-headed monster Gergoneus is a reduplication of the legend, which again has its counterpart in the three-headed serpent Dahâka (see above, § 224).

very reason was, at the time when it was recorded, much more disfigured and overgrown, is the legend of Jason. Jason, too, slays a terrible serpent. How this legend came under poetic treatment to be wrought out into the story of the Argonauts, is well known. The Greek no longer understood the old meaning of the serpent-slaying. All these old legends were to him simply a playground for his fancy. In the legend of the combat which Zeus had with Chronos and the Titans (§ 229), there also lies, as Duncker rightly perceives, a reminiscence of the combat with Vritra (§ 196), and therefore also of the combat of the gods with a kingdom of darkness. (On Japetus, compare § 248 B.)

2. The legend of the flood has been kept tolerably pure among the Greeks. Among different tribes, however, it occurs in different forms. The Pelasgian immigrants in Bœotia and Attica told of a king of the olden time, Ogyges, in whose time a universal flood swept over the human race (Pausan. ix. 5; Censorin. *De die Nat.* 21). The Pelasgians in Arcadia and Samothrace traced their origin to Dardanus, who, in that universal flood that swept over mankind, was saved in a skin-covered boat (Lycophr. Cassandra, 71-85). According to the post-Pelasgian Greeks, it was Deucalion, a son of the fire-god, who lived in Hellas, that saved himself and his wife Pyrrha, during the flood that swept all men away, in a ship which grounded on the rock of Pindus, and, when the flood began to abate, sent out a dove to search for the land (Plut. *Moral.* ed. Wytténb. vol. iv. p. 891). Neither among the Greeks nor among the Indians is there any trace of an idea that the flood was a judgment. That at such a time, when from recollection or from geographical erudition the Greek knew nothing of the Asiatic mountains, he should assign the landing of the ship to a mountain known to him, was quite natural. The conception of a flood reaching up to the rock of Pindus was decidedly that of a universal flood, not that of a local inundation, and nothing is more absurd than the oft-given interpretation: local inundations among several races

may have given occasion to their legends of the flood. A local inundation, be it ever so terrible, if it is to continue local, must be bound in by mountains or heights, and can, therefore, only extend over the depressions of a valley; and in that case, for at least a portion of the inhabitants, flight to the neighbouring heights would be possible. The idea of an inundated valley, and that of a flood covering the highest mountains, have so little in common, that the one can never be supposed to give occasion to the other.

3. The giant and hunter *Ἰφίτων* (*Odyss.* xi. 309, 571; *Il.* xviii. 486) reminds us of Nimrod (*Gen.* x. 10). It should be observed that the Septuagint, the Chaldea, and the Syrian translations render by *Ἰφίτων* the name of the constellation *כִּסְיָא* (*Isa.* xiii. 10; *Job* xxxviii. 3).

4. New legends also were, during this period, constructed by the Greeks on historical bases. The early inhabitants of Thessaly, who were celebrated horsemen, afforded material and occasion for the legend of the Centaurs; while the stone fortresses built by the Pelasgians gave rise to the legend of the Lapithæ; and there is also a lingering recollection of the ancient feud between the two. The tradition regarding minstrels of this prehistoric age, similar to the Vedists of India, who sang their odes around sacred fountains, is embodied in the legend of Orpheus.

§ 232. *Third Period—the Heroic Age.*

About B.C. 1000, the Viking expeditions, or hostile excursions of the Greeks into Asia Minor began, in which the coast borders were conquered and small States founded. The remembrance of these inroads of adventurers is embodied in the legend of the Trojan war. This phase had a mighty constructive influence upon the religion of the Greeks. While among the Indians the priestly caste of the Brahmans had supremacy over the Kshatryas, among the Greeks, on the contrary, the warrior princes gained a most decided supremacy

over the priesthood, and thus the priests and sacred minstrels came to be in rank and spirit thoroughly dependent upon the hero warriors. Hence it happened that while in earlier ages the sacred minstrels had chanted the praises only of the gods, those hero princes, as though they had been equal to the gods, now claimed to have their deeds celebrated by the singers, and this was readily accorded them. Thus arose those songs in praise of the heroes, out of which were gradually developed the Epic, so-called Homeric, poems. The heroes are represented really as men standing among the gods (*Odyss.* iv. 78), but yet as engaged in familiar discourse with the gods, and, indeed, some of them as on one side the offspring of divinities, Achilles as son of Thetis, the Atridæ as sons of Tantalus and Zeus. But in proportion as the heroes are idealized into some sort of demi-gods, the gods are themselves degraded and reduced to the rank of men. The singers, too, who praised the heroes alongside of the gods, praise the gods under the image of the heroes. If the heroes are children of the gods, the gods must be begetters of children like men; if the heroes converse with the gods, these must wear a human form in order to converse with the heroes (*Odyss.* 1. 96 ff.). In short, there arose the Homeric world of the gods, which is *toto cælo* different from that of the ancient Pelasgians and post-Pelasgians. There arose a fanciful mythology of a purely polytheistic, and indeed anthropopathic, though not purely anthropomorphic, kind. Thus were the forms and types of the several deities essentially modified. Hermes, the god of darkness and sleep, was changed into a messenger of the gods; Hephæstus, the god of lightning, is reduced to a lame artificer, who must forge their weapons for the other gods; the moon-goddess Helena becomes a merely human individual, the adulterous wife of Menelaus. On the other hand, Ares, the war-god (who must have already existed even in and before the Pelasgian period, since, among another Aryan group of tribes, the Germans, he appears under the same name Ear, Er, though perhaps originally he was only the human founder of

the Aryans,¹ and so was identified, § 224, with the Airya, or Eradsh of the Iranians), was placed in the foreground among the higher gods. But foreign deities also were at this time introduced. In Asia Minor the Greeks fell in with the heathen Semitic worship of the goddess of birth (Lydian: Cybele; Phrygian: the great mother; Teucrian: the Idæan mother; Phœnician: Cythera or Astarte); and they adopted her, changing her, however, with their innate national sense of beauty and decorum, from an obscene goddess of grossness into the youthful goddess of love and gracefulness, Aphrodite. In the Baal of the heathen Semites they recognised (and according to § 229 perhaps rightly) their own Apollo; of him they formed an anthropomorphic conception, but by no means after the pattern of the oriental Baal. This reconstruction of the religion, however, did not proceed without protests being made against it. The cleft between the new world of the gods of the poets and the old world of the gods of worship could not escape observation. And now this religious difference identified itself with an antagonism of race. Among the luxurious and light-hearted Ionian tribes, the fanciful poetic religion found a ready entrance, while the more earnest and strict Dorians held fast by the older form of their religion. In regard to ethical conceptions, also, a similar distinction may be noted between those two tribes. Among the Dorians there was greater moral earnestness. Whilst, in the Ionic poems of Homer, the murderer has nothing to fear except the vengeance of the relatives, by the Dorians, on the other hand, as we see from the Delphic oracles, the murderer is considered to be defiled, and must be banished to a distant land; only on a foreign shore can he be cleansed, by means of an expiatory offering, that is, by the sacrifice of an animal, whose blood must flow over his hands, while he invokes Zeus *καθάριος*.

¹ That Aryan tribes in their struggle against tribes of a foreign race should invoke the protection of the original founder of their own race, and that he in this way should come to be regarded as the god of war, is very natural.

After he has been thus reconciled with the gods, he must further render a free-will offering as an atonement, and finally make up his quarrel with the relations of the murdered person; then only may he return to his people. Thus, by the Ionians the punishment of the murderer would be regarded as an affair of private right, while at the foundation of the Dorian custom lay the consciousness of an objectively divine and civil right of punishment. In addition to this came the well-known antithesis of aristocracy and democracy. The relation of these two classes became a directly hostile one during the time of the Doric migration. The Æolians and Dorians being thrust out by the Thessalians, left Thessaly. The former wandered into the Cadmean Thebes, the latter into the province of Doris, and, when this district could no longer contain them, into the Peloponnesus, near Sparta, into Argolis and Corinth. The Ionic race which had dwelt here fled, forced out and driven away by the Dorians, to Attica. This superiority of the Dorians led to a sort of religious reformation.

§ 233. *Fourth Period—that of the deepening of the Religious Sense under Doric Influence.*

In Bœotia and Doris, as well as in the Peloponnesus, the Dorians from about B.C. 900 found in the temple and oracle of Apollo at Delphi, the centre-point of their religious life, and the rallying point of their political life. The low rationalistic view which regards the oracle as nothing more than a cunning piece of priestcraft, or supposes that the priestess in uttering her oracles was completely at the bidding of the political party that had the ascendancy, should require no serious refutation. The period of direct soothsaying, where sacred poetic inspiration and psychico-pathic excitement were yet bound together in one, was indeed past and gone, but still much lay between this soothsaying and downright conscious fraud on the part of the priests. To the Dorians the Delphian

sanctuary was no humanly fabricated organ of pious fraud, but an actual sanctuary. The deepest ethical truths and ethical requirements of what their conscience gave witness to them as demands made upon man by God, seemed to them to be concentrated in a continuous living intercourse of God with men, in that place where the god gave forth his responses. As the basis of that consciousness, the priestess is wrought into a psychico-pathic condition closely resembling that of somnambulism, which is not of an involuntary, but of a quite voluntary origin, so that it could be continued and called forth anew, as in the case of the inspired during the war of the Cevennes. And as the ethical system of the Dorians was no mere private ethics, but a system of social ethics which determined their municipal and national duties, the responses of the inspired Pythia extended to civil matters. When, therefore, the Delphic oracle expressed itself in accordance with the aristocratic constitution of the Dorians and against the democratic constitution of the Ionic tribes, this was not the result of fraud, but a thoroughly natural and unconstrained product of a mental tendency that had been determined by the course of history. The aristocratic form of constitution was held in the consciousness of the Dorians as something holy and consecrated, just as in the present day, among Christian-minded men, the maintenance of a monarchical form of government and opposition to social democratic revolutionary ideas, are regarded as a Christian duty. In this way the Delphic oracle gave to the aristocratic constitution of the Dorians, and especially to the Lycurgian legislation, its divine sanction. But even upon the Ionic tribes this oracle continued to exert an unmistakeable influence. From this, in large measure, resulted that peaceful relationship in which the Peloponnesian Dorians continued to live with the Ionians that still remained in Elis. Those Ionic Elians brought their offerings to Zeus at Olympia. But as Zeus was a god worshipped by all the Greeks alike, the Spartans also took part in these sacrificial feasts, and in this common

celebration of the Olympic festival the political peace between Sparta and Elis was fairly secured. As a result of this religious intercourse, the Ionic tribes soon began to take part in the worship of the Pythic, that is, the Delphic, Apollo. The influence of the Delphic oracle did not, indeed, extend so far as to lead the Ionic tribes to abandon their democratic constitution (attempts were occasionally made in this direction), but it went so far as to lead to the introduction, about B.C. 800, of a stricter moral consciousness, and especially a stricter conception of criminal law among the Ionians, and particularly in Attica. But along with this there sprang up a more serious conception of the nature of the gods. The gods whom poetic fancy had thus humanized came, under the influence of the Ionians of Asia Minor and the Homeric legends of the heroes, to be again revered as supernatural, indeed as ethical powers: Apollo, as the guardian of the moral life, the pure stainless god, the revenger, and at the same time the expiator of evil; Zeus, as the protector of eternal justice; Athene, as the goddess of prudent counsel. These three were now the highest divinities. It was essentially the same religion as that which we meet with in the writings of the tragedians Aeschylus and Sophocles. The sacrificial festival of Demeter at Anthela, which the Doric-Thessalian tribes had been wont to celebrate in common since the olden times, had now come to possess a more than local significance. It gave the impulse to the Amphietyonic Council (about B.C. 750), and the Amphietyons put themselves also in close connection with the Delphic celebrations, indeed they declared the yearly Pythic festival at Delphi to be equally binding with their own Demeter festival as a condition of their league, and so they took it under their protection. Thus the different tribes came to have a more complete religious unity, which found expression in the common national name "Hellenes," which now came into use. Although as yet no civil unity existed, not even a similarity of constitution, the consciousness of derivation from a common stock in respect of nationality and religion

was nevertheless kept alive. Hence now at Delphi also value was attached to the legend of Deucalion. The landing place of Deucalion was now said to be the rock of Parnassus; Hellas was now designated the province of Dodona; Deucalion, from being ancestor of the human race, was changed into an ancestor of the Greeks, the "Hellenes;" and so *Ἕλλην* became a common name for all the Greek races. The deepening of religious life in Greece proper followed in a remarkable manner this reformatory process simultaneously with the Zarathustrian Reformation among the Iranians, and with the Brahmanical Deformation of the Indian religion.

§ 234. *Fifth Period—that of Artificial Systems of Religion.*

This reaction against the fanciful anthropopathic polytheism of the Ionians, which originated with the Dorians, and resulted from their political supremacy, did not long endure. A variety of causes contributed to this new deterioration of religion. From the time of Psammeticus, Egypt, which had been previously hermetically sealed against foreigners, was opened up (B.C. 670), and Egyptian influences asserted themselves powerfully in Greece. The Hellenes began to regard Egypt as the original seat and source of ancient wisdom, to transfer naturalistic and pantheistic religious ideas from Egypt (see under § 250, *Obs.* 2), and to interpret the Greek conception of the divinities in accordance therewith. This was the more easily done, since the old Pelasgic religion was nothing else than a pantheizing adoration of the powers of nature, that is, of the divine as immanent in nature. In this way the ethical ideas which during the Doric period had been associated with the sacrificial worship were again thrown in the background, and continued to be set forth only by the tragic poets, and in place of this ethical religion arose one compounded of cosmogonic and physical conceptions, which spread all the more quickly on account of the peculiar inclination of the Hellenic race, in accordance with their

mental characteristics, for subtle speculations in philosophy and natural philosophy. The Æolian poets of Bœotia, of the school of Hesiod, now sought in a purely theoretical manner to develop a conception of divine things in accordance with their own subjective speculative opinions, and to combine in one systematic whole the different legends which already for the most part had undergone great changes. This was a philosophizing and systematizing movement similar to that of Zarathustra, only with this important difference, that Zarathustra (§ 218 and § 220) fell back upon the fundamental ideas of the Aryan religion, whereas Hesiod, in his *Theogony* (about B.C. 630), and his disciples made their changes in an unhistorical and thoroughly arbitrary way. The evil spirits, gods of darkness (Cronus and the Titans, § 231, 1), came to be regarded as the ancestors of the good spirits, gods of light. The legends (not myths) were artificially constructed so as to represent the evil spirits as overthrown by the good in a sort of revolution. The gods of darkness, however, were not therefore regarded as morally wicked, but as the raw beginnings and first deposits of a course of development. Hesiod's fundamental idea was thus a thoroughly pantheistic one. The first and still raw productions in the forthcoming of a world are overcome by higher forms of development. In the kingdom of Cronus, as represented by Hesiod, we have a picture of barbarism; in the kingdom of Zeus, a picture of Hellenic culture. Thus evil is conceived of as advancing toward the good, though still imperfect. At the same time foreign myths, such as the Eteocretan and Carian, were mixed up with the Greek, and the elements of the old Greek religion were often misunderstood and misinterpreted in an amusing manner, as when, for example, the Aegis of Pallas (§ 229) was changed into a goat's skin, as if derived from *αἴξ*, a goat. The battle of the Titans was transformed into an attempt of the older gods to recover their dominion.

§ 235. *Sixth Period—that of Polytheistic Superstition or Utter Decay.*

As at an earlier period the Epic poets of Asia Minor, grouped together under the name of Homer, had encouraged among the Ionic races a polytheistic conception of deity, so now over the whole Greek race a fresh impulse was given in the direction of such a polytheistic conception by means of the theogonies of the Æolians. It was now, however, no longer a mere childish fanciful anthropomorphic conception, constructed on the basis of a special theory in natural philosophy. A chaos of divinities and myths had arisen in which order could no longer be found, old forms of religious thought were mixed up with new philosophical ideas, that which was of Greek origin with that which was foreign. In the saint-worship of the Romish Church, in a precisely similar way, the historical germs were inextricably mixed up with old and new legendary material, and the uneducated laity fell into a rude polytheistic idolatry, giving, for example, veneration to a black image of the Virgin in Altötting, and in addition to this to a white image of the Virgin in Einsiedeln, and to various other images of the Virgin, and making pilgrimages to them. The Apostle Paul in the Acts of the Apostles xvii. 22 calls it *Δεισιδαιμονία*. That circumstance in which the Athenians during a pestilence let loose a number of cattle and in every place where one remained standing erected an altar to a *Δεὸς ἀγνώστου* (Diog. Lært.), is a truly characteristic voucher for the polytheistic superstitions which conceive of the divine as split up into so many fragments, that even the largest number possible of these fragments put together fails to yield satisfaction to man's religious necessities. That in these times, that is, at the beginning of the Persian war, the Delphic oracle sank into a mere institution of priestcraft, is undeniable. Religion, degraded into superstition, and Ethics became now (in the age of Sophocles and Socrates) entirely separated. Ethics continued under the influence of philo-

sophy ; the popular, unreflective religion degenerated into pure superstition. Even during the Persian war, and from that time down to the age of Pericles, the Ionic culture in the Hegemony of Athens secured for itself the intellectual supremacy, every remnant of the old religious earnestness that had been conserved by the Dorians entirely disappeared, and in Athens, even during the time of Euripides, there grew up that light and frivolous cast of mind which views all divine worship as merely a play of fancy and sport. It will, indeed, be readily admitted that this age produced men of noble natures who had a deeper religious consciousness, and who longed for power to overcome moral evil, or at least for comfort and composure with regard to the future state of the soul. Such men sought satisfaction to their consciences in the Eleusinian mysteries, a secret confederacy distinct from and antagonistic to their national religion and forms of worship. This esoteric private religion bore a strangely exotic character. In respect of its forms and worship it was, indeed, closely allied to the religion of the Thracians, and included a Dionysus (§ 230) or Iacchus conceived after the Thracian manner. Dionysus was worshipped in the mysteries as dispenser of immortality of life continued after death and a future existence of bliss ; but even this worship was rendered in a superstitious manner, devoid of all ethical elements, and characterized rather (Aristophan. *βατρ.* 324 ff.) by a wild frenzied procedure. These mysteries simply diverted the people from the belief in their old gods, without being able to afford them anything better. How little real interest the nobler Greeks took in their religion is shown by Aristophanes—who was himself so conservative-minded and so disinclined to frivolous conceptions—in his *Frogs*, where he makes a mock of Hercules. In the time of this poet, the highly cultured Athens afforded the unpleasant spectacle of a people to whom *inwardly* nothing was sacred, least of all the moral law, of a people who, nevertheless, or perhaps rather for this very reason, held fanatically to an *outward* ritual once for all sanctioned by the

State, and who therefore put out of the way by a judicial murder the one man who possessed a developed conscience, and at least the dawning knowledge of the one invisible holy God. His disciple Plato, indeed, was allowed to carry out with impunity the development of his profound ideas, but they found no appreciation and understanding. Plato's voice sounded like that of a preacher in the wilderness, and Aristotle, with his empiricism directed entirely to this present world and to the mechanism of the rational operations of man's subjective thinking, gained over Platonism an easy victory. Thus closed the intellectual development of Greece in the irreconcilable separation of an irreligious and godless philosophy and a polytheistic superstition void of all ethical contents.

§ 236. *Conclusion—Sketch of the Religion of the Romans.*

Our acquaintance with the religious history of the Greeks, as distinguished from that of the Indians and Iranians, begins at that period when the Greeks had already decidedly sunk into a polytheism which was something lower than even that of the Indians during the Indra period. That among them also polytheism had been preceded by a primitive monotheism can no longer be seriously disputed, but from this we may with confidence conclude that they had dwelt with the East Aryans in Asia at a period when (as we now know from chap. i. A.) there was still prevalent among them the primitive monotheistic conception of God. Besides, there is a remarkable parallel in the course of the three Aryan religions previously considered, so far as we can follow it. In all the three there is an innate tendency to conceive of God simply as immanent in nature, which leads from monotheism to polytheism. In all the three there appears between B.C. 1000 and B.C. 600 an attempt to recover lost ground, a period of reaction; among the Indians, in the pantheistic, and consequently not reforming, but deforming Brahma theology;

among the Iranians, in the truly reformatory system of religious philosophy of the Avesta (Zarathustra's); among the Greeks, in the Dorian reaction and the system of natural philosophy developed in the Æolian theogonies. But even the best of these attempted awakenings, that of Zarathustra, contained in it the hidden germs of a new and yet more complete decay; and the history of Greek religion teaches us this important lesson, that even the highest earthly intellectual culture of man is not capable of producing religion or arresting the process of religious deterioration. The development of human culture and religious development lie in two altogether different planes, and move in contrary directions. What determines the unarrested religious deterioration is the will perverted from God, apologizing for evil, trifling with what is holy. Never in these three noble cultured races of whom we have hitherto treated has man succeeded in reaching to a knowledge of God, but, even after honestly prosecuted attempts, has always sunk back into an ever deeper blindness, and come to adopt a religion which was no longer a religion, because its object was no longer a holy God. To the history of these three Aryan cultured races of antiquity we might now add a fourth; only it is on the one hand impracticable, and on the other hand it would yield no new results. It is impracticable, because the Roman religion, in so far as its beginnings fall within the historical period, has already the appearance of a mixture of the religions of various nationalities, and because the question of its original constituents has not yet been definitely settled, but is still a matter of controversy, as is indeed the whole subject of the early history of Rome and of Italy generally. This much only can we say with certainty, that the most ancient and most original of the deities of the Latins and other Italians were related and analogous to those of the Pelasgians. A more exact investigation of the subject, however, would for our purpose contribute nothing new. This we know thoroughly well, that in the Roman State at a very early period the entire province of religion was in a one-sided

way subjected to the *res publica*, the public civil ordinances, so that the connection of the worship of the gods with the subjective and spiritual, with the life of the soul and the moral being of the individual, was very soon entirely lost, and that from being a consecration of the State, religion was soon reduced to the condition of a political engine in the service of the State,¹ till it shrank up into a mere civil ceremonial, and in this way came to be a *superstitio*, in which, by reason of advancing culture, even in Cicero's time, no man any longer believed, but which, in a hypocritical fashion, was retained only (as in the persecution of the Christians), with all the greater and more bitter fanaticism, as a civil ordinance. Here then also we have a further deterioration from polytheism into irreligion.

Obs.—Among the old Latin deities Ju-piter (from Dius-piter = diespiter) corresponds substantially and nominally to the Pelasgian Zeus; Mars similarly corresponds to Ares. Vesta is a female Hephæstus (§ 230), a guardian of the domestic hearth. They were worshipped originally, not by means of images, but by means of symbols,—Jupiter as a rock; Mars as a spear; Vesta as a flame. Quirinus (god of war?) was an ancient Sabine god; the two-faced Janus was one of the primitive Italian deities, who would give success to a war or a course of action undertaken. Juno, Minerva, Hercules were divinities among the old Italians, but in their worship at a very early period, especially in Southern Italy, so large a Greek element was mixed up, that its original Italian form can no longer with any certainty be set forth. Apollo and Diana are imported Greek divinities. To ancient Italy, on the other hand, belongs the worship of the Manes, spirits of the departed, rendered, not so much in order to secure their help and succour, but rather to make their helpless condition the more endurable. Alongside of this may be mentioned the worship of the Penates, the divine protectors of the home. In order to compensate for the human sacrifices, which had been, even in prehistoric times, abolished (comp. § 194, *Obs.*), bulbs and little images were cast into the Tiber. Each head of a family (as in the Veda period among the Indians) was by right of birth a priest; but where it was a

¹ The passion for misapplying religion as a means for reaching earthly ends seems to float in the very atmosphere of Rome as a spiritual *aria cattiva*, for it continues still to prevail on one of the Seven Hills.

matter of national interest and importance, the publicly authorized colleges of priests came forward, the *flamines* and *pontifices*, along with the *augures*, *harauspices*, the *Salii* and *Fetiales*, and soon the whole department of religion was made subservient to the purposes of the State.

CHAPTER IV.—THE RELIGION OF THE EGYPTIANS.

§ 237. *Sources.*

The first and principal source of information regarding the religious history of the Egyptians is to be found in their own monuments, their temples and sepulchres, with the portraits of the gods, and the hieroglyphic inscriptions. There is certainly a rich field existing here for wider research, yet those previously made are sufficient to enable us, with some measure of clearness, to understand the characteristics of the religion of the Egyptians and their history. The existing temples, in respect of their origin, belong to two distinct periods of Egyptian history, which, by means of the period of the supremacy of the (Semitic) Hyksos in Lower and Middle Egypt (see § 241, *Obs.*), are, in point of time and character, separated from one another. Under the old Pharaoh dynasty, which preceded the Hyksos period, art, as sculpture and painting, appeared in a purely individual form, mere portraiture, with no trace of the ideal; in the more recent period an endeavour was made to give a representation of soul and feeling.¹ The fragments of Manetho, high priest in Hierapolis about 280 B.C., constitute a second source of information, as they appear in Josephus and in the *Chronicon* of Eusebius. The third source is found in the accounts of the Egyptians given by Greek authors. We give in succession simply the result of investigations by Rougé, Lepsius, Brugsch, and Ebers.

¹ Dr. C. Friederichs, *Kunst und Leben, Reisebriefe aus Griechenland, dem Orient und Italien*. Dusseldorf 1872, p. 117 ff.

§ 238. *The Gods of Lower Egypt.*

1. The principal god was Ptah (by the Greeks identified with Hephæstus), the god of fire and light. According to Manetho, he first of all, for the long period of 9000 years, had reigned alone, without the existence of another god. (A reminiscence of an originally existing monotheism.) In the Egyptian inscriptions he is called "the father of the father of the gods," "Lord of the heavens," "Lord of the gracious visage," "Father of *Men*" (the goddess of truth). He is represented (*a*) as a naked child, to indicate the beginning; (*b*) as a ruler, of a green colour, with sceptre, whip, and Nilometer in his hand; (*c*) as an egg balancing itself on a potter's wheel, that is, as a *tatamen*, "former of the world," with the inscription: Ptah who rolls his egg in the heavens. The Scarabæus (beetle), rolling his earth ball, was therefore sacred to Ptah, and in pictures is sometimes made to represent his head. There was a temple of Ptah at Memphis.

2. Ra, son of Ptah, the god of the sun's disc, "father of the gods," "he who is enthroned in the sun's disc," "he who is revealed in the abyss of heaven." He had a famous temple in Anu (On, Heliopolis). The sparrow-hawk, the light-coloured ox, and the cat were sacred to him; the latter because her pupils enlarge with the advancing day. A prayer to Ra, on a gravestone in the British Museum,¹ runs thus: "Venerate the God, the child of the heavens, who begets himself anew every day. We praise thee who shinest in the clouds of heaven to give life. Ra has all power in the depths of heaven. He it is who watches, he it is who brings life gleams to the pure."² When thou travellest through the upper regions, the gods who approach thee tremble for joy." Ra, as dispenser and governor of all earthly life, is the father of the Egyptian kings. He is

¹ *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, iv. 375.

² That is to say, the earthly, bodily life.

represented as a ruler of a red colour, with the sun's disc on his head, around which a basilisk twists itself. He holds the sceptre in one hand, and in the other the symbol of life. Frequently he is represented with a sparrowhawk's head instead of a human head. On very ancient monuments he is represented as fighting with the serpent Apep (compare § 241). Religion was, according to the conception of the people, pure nature-worship, only in the myths of the priests a remnant of an ethical leaning still existed in a reminiscence of a conflict between a kingdom of light and a kingdom of evil. So in the following myth: "Ra appears in the heaven during the first hour as a child, his finger in his mouth. Then he moves in a barge from east to west each hour by a new door, saluted continually by new good spirits, that is, the purified spirits of men. In the afternoon hours these spirits consult together how they may help Ra against the serpent Apep, who would devour him. They cast a cord round the monster. Twelve spirits under the guidance of Seb, the god of the stars, draw the serpent aside. So Ra moves on during the night, as a black god, through the underworld from west to east, reproving evil (according to another representation, rather shutting them all up in his gondola). The twelve gates of the hours of night are guarded by crocodiles."

3. The goddess Nut, the goddess of the visible blue heavens, represented as a blue star-decked woman.

4. The goddess Neith, worshipped in Sais, the conceiving and producing nature-power, "the lady of the heavens," "the mother of the gods," "the cow who bore the sun." Her appearance is dark-green, like Ptah; she wears a red crown and a sceptre of lotus. The hawk was sacred to her. On a fixed night an illumination with lamps was prepared in her honour, in Sais, and through all Egypt.¹

¹ Led astray by this, Herodotus (ii. 59) and Plato (*Timæus*) identify Neith with Athena, honoured in a torchlight dance, with whom, however, she has not the least in common.

5. The goddess Pasht had her temple at Bubastes on a clear tributary of the Nile. She appears to have been associated with Ra, as Neith was with Ptah. For on the monuments she is represented as bearing the sun's disc on her head, and the cat was also sacred to her; also she often has a cat's head instead of a human one. At her feasts the flute was blown, rattles were sounded, and wine drunk in rich measure. Without doubt she was the goddess who, by means of the warm rays of the sun, rendered the ground fruitful.

6. Chunsu, the god of the moon.

§ 239. *The Gods of Upper Egypt.*

The worship of Upper Egypt was precisely similar to that of Lower Egypt, nature-worship overgrowing every lofty conception of the one eternal, consciously holy God.

1. To the Ptah of Lower Egypt corresponds Amen or Amun, that is, the hidden one, who had his temple at Thebes. Like Ptah, he was the prime author of all life and being, and was so far a reminiscence of the true God. He is represented as of a blue colour, standing or sitting on a throne, with two upright feathers on his head, as the symbol of rapid movement or life.

2. To Ra corresponds the divine pair, Mentu and Atmu: the former, the rising sun and light of day; the latter, the setting sun and luminary of night, leading through the lower world.

3. Kneph (Chnubis, Num), worshipped at Syene, was the god of the yearly overflow of the Nile, the lord of the water distribution, and so of fertility. His colour was green: the ram was sacred to him; instead of a human head, he occasionally wears a ram's head with a pair of horns bent downwards and a pair standing erect, and a coiling serpent between the latter pair. At a subsequent period, and especially in the Ammonian Oasis, he was blended with Amun, under the name Amun-Kneph. What a degradation of Amun!

4. To the Neith of Lower Egypt corresponds Mut, the mother. She was represented with the high cap, the queenly headdress of Upper Egypt. She is the goddess of darkness, the secret darkness of the earth's womb. To her, as to Neith, the hawk was sacred.

§ 240. *The Myths according to Greek Tradition.*

This knowledge of the gods derived from the Egyptian monuments is completed by means of the myths of the Egyptians, which are transmitted to us through the Greeks. The source from which we now derive our information is indeed somewhat late, but the myths themselves are doubtless of older origin. They certainly afford the proof that the Egyptian religion, although it was gradually reduced to pure polytheism, to the worship of the several powers of nature, was originally something else and better. Seb and Nut begat two pair of children. Osiris and Isis (so called by the Greeks, called by the Egyptians Hathor), Typhon (Egyptian Set) and Nephthys. Osiris, who taught the Egyptians agriculture, is the god of husbandry; but Set, with seventy-two warriors, conspired against him, put him in a coffin, and cast this into the Nile. Isis with grief sought all around for the dead body of Osiris, found it on the sea-shore, brought it back to Egypt and buried it. Horus, however, the grown-up son of Osiris, fought and conquered Set, and Osiris was not dead, but became ruler of the lower world.¹ Several detached papyri confirm this myth, in so far as they designate Set the all-powerful destroyer and waster. According to Plutarch, it is intended by this myth to represent the destruction and withering up of vegetation during the seventy-two hottest days of the year. But this cannot have been the original meaning of the myth, otherwise Osiris must again, in later times, have returned to life, whereas he remains in the lower world, and the conquest of Set must

¹ Diod. i. 10. 13 ff. Plutarch, *de Iside*, 12-20.

be understood as having some sort of reference to the overflow of the Nile. Since, however, Plutarch¹ himself declares that Typhon (Set) is the god of the Simoom and of the nightly darkness, of the desolate salt sea and all venomous animals, and finally, also of moral evil, especially of lying and slander, it is very evident that that myth had no such narrowly limited meaning, and cannot have referred merely to the seasons of the year. And this is now confirmed by the Egyptian sources, the monuments with their inscriptions. Hesiri was called "the king of life," "the lord of unnumbered days," "the king of the gods." To him, as to Ra, the heron was sacred; Hesiri was also designated in old inscriptions as "the soul of Ra." In contrast to him was Set, evidently the evil spirit of darkness and death, and thus, in that Osiris myth, we come upon a well-worn reminiscence of the victory of evil over good in the fall, and mixed up with it we have a lingering recollection of Cain's murder of his brother.

§ 241. *The Ancient Religion of the Egyptians.*

But even this form of the myth is not the oldest. The Egyptologists, Lepsius, Brugsch, and Ebers, have shown that the name Set was first given as a secondary appellation to that evil god, and that during the previous age, during the "Hyksos-period," Set appears simply as the war-god; evil has been hitherto represented by the serpent Apep (comp. § 238), which, in the assumption of the form of a serpent, involves a significant reminiscence of the primitive tradition (Gen. iii.). But he generally appears on those old monuments in another, or at least a differently regulated world of the gods. Although Herodotus (ii. 40) relates that in his time Osiris and Isis were the only gods common to Lower and Upper Egypt, Hesiri (Osiris) in fact appears from those monuments as the highest god, as the sovereign of the spirit world. He it is

¹ Plutarch, *de Iside*, 19 and 54.

who as Ra wanders through the visible world; "Ra" (Phra = Ra with the article) is merely the visible manifestation of Hesiri. But the lower world, as the kingdom of soul and spirit, is the proper home of Hesiri; he reigns there in his individual form. Every morning he begets Ra anew. The fabulous bird Bemu is sacred to both, who every 500 years is revived in the flames at the temple of On. Bemu is called "the palm tree" (thence translated by the Greeks into *φοῖνιξ*). But the palm tree as a hieroglyph means the year, and this is also represented by the heron, as the heron returns into Egypt with the yearly overflow of the Nile. Hence the heron is also called Bemu, and thus from a combination of the two significations the "bird bemu." The "bird bemu," the palm bird, was therefore originally nothing else than a symbol of the change of the seasons in its yearly course; but since the Egyptians had a year which fell behind the true solar year by about one day every four years (they had no intercalary year), it was only after four times three hundred and sixty-five, that is, after 1460, or more exactly 1468 years, that the Egyptian and the solar years came again into agreement, and thus the bird bemu could indicate a longer period. Every human soul is a part of Hesiri, and its aim is to become united with Hesiri after death; whilst Ra, daily new-born as Herpecru ("Her the child;" Greek, *Ὅρος Πά*, or even Harpocrates), traverses the ocean of the visible blue vault of heaven in a chariot drawn by planets and fixed stars, and also nightly conveys in a ship, over this ocean, the constellations of the zodiac, thus enthroned high over this ocean of the heavens, the blessed god. Men's bodies belong to the earth, their souls to heaven, and their forms to the lower world. By man's death the body is borne back to earth, the form (shade) goes into the lower world, the soul goes—but not immediately—into the heavens. A 3000 years' purification is necessary before it can come to Hesiri, and till then it still requires its body. The body must therefore be preserved as a mummy from corruption, in order

that the soul may still continue in connection with it. This is an outline of the sporadic, and, in the earlier times, inadequately recognised characteristic of the older Egyptian religious system. We find in it still the spiritual conception of the deity ruling *over* nature, not yet that grossly polytheistic conception which loses God *in* nature. But we find even here a pantheistic tendency; the deity is conceived of in an unfree process (of natural necessity) of self-generation or self-manifestation: the evil of man is consequently a part of the revealed deity, and tends to final reunion with—it is well called losing itself in—God.¹ The visible physical world was regarded as a manifestation of deity, as Ra is the manifestation of Hesiri. It is conceived of, indeed, as a manifestation in the form of an emanation. Ra is represented as undergoing a new birth every day; for an emanation is necessarily for a definite period, in order that there may be a final absorption into the divine. Any exemption on the part of the gods from the ordinary course of things in the world never seems to have been dreamt of. Hesiri is not the creator and lord of the world, but the soul of the world, as if in a purely mechanical fashion he daily begat Ra. From this emanational pantheism the Egyptian religion sank down to the polytheism described in § 238 f. But this earlier religion of the Egyptians is yet not by any means the oldest form. Emanuel de Rougé² has shown that the Egyptians in the primitive period worshipped one God, “the one being who truly lives,” “who has made all things, and who alone has not been made;” that this One was known in different districts under different names, which only in later times came to stand for different gods; that the stars were regarded

¹ In Papyrus Harris, Ramses III. only says indeed, “I descend into the lower world; I am joined to the vast circle of the gods in the heaven, on the earth, and in the depths.” Here, however, it is only the first time immediately following death that is spoken of, and the final and eternal end.

² Compare Victor von Strauss and Torney, *Essays zur allg. Religionswissenschaft*, 1869, p. 26 ff.

as symbols, then as manifestations, and finally as emanations of this one God; that thus it constitutes a profound theosophy—according to which God, while unbegotten, constantly begets Himself, and so is called in an ancient Egyptian hymn, “the One of the One.” In Heliopolis this led to a sort of Trinitarian doctrine, embracing Atum, the unapproachable deity, Chepher, the Scarabæus, as a symbol of the self-creating Father, and Ra, who manifests himself in the sun. This is a Trinity of emanation. In Memphis, again, they associate with the father a mother, with whom the son is begotten, and soon there succeeds a multitude of deities. And so the transition is clearly marked from primitive monotheism to emanational polytheism. A text which belongs to a period 1500 years before Moses says: “He has made all that is; thou alone art, the millions owe their being to thee; he is the lord of that which is and of that which is not.” The sepulchres of the ages which cover the first seventeen dynasties contain as yet no representations of the gods. The Papyrus Paise in Paris, dating from B.C. 2300, contains quotations from two much older books; from a writing of the time of King Sneferu, about B.C. 3500, in which this expression occurs: “The operation of God (neter) in creation is a thing that cannot be understood;” and from a writing of Ptah-Hotep, about B.C. 3000, in which it is said that creation is of God (neter). “This is the command of the God of creation: the peaceable may come and issue orders. The eating of bread is in conformity with the ordinance of God; can one forget that his blessing rests thereupon? . . . If one give way to overweening pride, then God who created him in his bloom brings on him humiliation. If thou art a prudent man, teach thy son the love of God. . . . He who surrounds the old man with tokens of love is well-pleasing to God. Let not thy heart boast of thine own stores, for they are given thee by the liberality of God. Love of God is obedience: disobedience consists in the hatred of God. A good son considers the grace of God, which yields prosperity,” etc.—

Everywhere, except in the introductory chapter, in which Hesiri is addressed under the designation Hunti, and in the 42nd chapter, in which Horus is once referred to, God is still always designated only by the appellation *neter*,—a proof that the monotheistic conviction, notwithstanding the existence of the early beginnings of a mythology, which appears even in the name Ptah-Hotep, still continued to assert itself with unabated vigour.

Obs. 1.—In order to reach any decision regarding the transformation of the god Set, it is necessary that first of all the controversy about the Hyksos should be investigated. The story of the Hyksos is told by Manetho, a high priest of the Egyptians, who lived about B.C. 280 (*Josephus c. Apion*, i. 14), and so a witness of a very recent period, but one who had ready access to early sources of information,—who had, however, entered on elaborate researches and ventured on hazardous combinations, so that he may have been led into error on these matters. He relates that under the Egyptian king Timæus, a people of a despised race had forced their way into his land from the east, and had made one of their number, Σάλατις, king. This man had laid Upper and Lower Egypt under tribute; fortified the east against the Assyrians; strengthened and guarded the town Abaris lying to the east of Bubastis; and reigned for nineteen years. His successors were: Beon, who reigned for fourteen years; Apachnes, for thirty-nine years; Apophis, for sixty-one years; Janias, for fifty years; Assis, for forty-nine years. After the Hyksos dynasty, or the Shepherd kings, had ruled for a period of 259 years, Alisphragmuthosis attacked Abaris, and allowed the Hyksos freely to retire. These, who numbered 240,000, withdrew into Syria, and there built Jerusalem. Manetho, however, continues the story (*Josephus c. Apion*, i. 29): an Egyptian king, Amenophis, wished to become possessed of a power of vision like that of the gods; and, acting on the advice of a great and wise man, who could prophesy like the gods, he sought to reach thereunto by sending out of the land to the stone pits lying to the east of the Nile the lepers and the unclean, who numbered about 180,000, and afterwards preparing Abaris for their residence. There they chose for their governor the priest Osarsiph of Heliopolis. He commanded them not to worship the gods or the sacred animals of the Egyptians. They called in the aid of the Hyksos who had migrated to Jerusalem, who numbered 200,000 men. Amenoph, unable to offer any resistance, sent his son Sethos to a friend, and himself fled into Ethiopia. The

invaders then destroyed the Egyptian temples. At a later period Osarsiph assumed the name of Moses, and was, along with his people, after thirteen years, beaten by Amenoph and driven from Egypt.—Similar accounts are given by Chæremon and Lysimachus (*Josephus c. Apion. i. 32-35*), and by Diodorus (xl. 3, xxxiv. 1). There has been much discussion over this matter, as to whether by the Hyksos we are to understand the Israelites. In modern times the prevalent opinion has been against such an identification (Ebers, *Ägypten und die Bücher Moses*, 1868, vol. i. p. 198 ff.). The Hyksos were Syrian or Arabian invaders of Lower Egypt; Osarsiph, on the other hand, is (Eisenlohr, *Der grosse Papyrus Harris*, Leipz. 1872) identified with Moses, and his troops are to be distinguished from the Hyksos. Before we enter upon this discussion, we may call attention to the circumstance that the two accounts of Manetho, (1) about the Hyksos, and (2) about Osarsiph and his lepers, seem so like one another, that it must undoubtedly be admitted as a possibility that Manetho mistook two different renderings of one legend for accounts of two different occurrences, and that instead of identifying them he erroneously combined them. The “unclean” of Amenoph seem very similar to the “despised people” which fought with Timæus: the numbers, too, are nearly the same; and the scene of both is Abaris. This name reminds us of עברִי. In the first story the assessments which the Hyksos king, Salatis, imposes upon the Egyptians, reminds us of the financial arrangements of Joseph, the chief steward in Gen. xlvii. 13 ff.; but in the second, the godlike prophet, by whose counsel Amenoph is induced to send the lepers out of the land, reminds us of Moses, who gave his counsel in the form of a command, and by means of miracles induced Pharaoh to follow his advice.

Without, however, wishing to lay any undue stress upon this possibility, we pass on to the consideration of the more important question: Is there no old Egyptian sources of information as to that subjugation of Egypt under a foreign race? Ebers has made mention of some such sources, but the most important is the great Papyrus Harris, deciphered by Chabas, containing the proclamation of Ramses III. Its historical interpretation, however, is rendered more difficult by Eisenlohr when he takes the chronicle of Manetho as his starting-point and the foundation of his explanation, instead of looking first of all at this new record itself, and treating the Papyrus as a thoroughly independent statement, and then, after understanding it thoroughly, comparing it with the Pentateuch, that old Israelitish document, which shows, as is proved by Ebers, exact acquaintance with old Egyptian customs and

institutions, and must even on this ground be regarded as ancient. We shall do this now, which he failed to do.

PAPYRUS HARRIS.

Egypt had fallen into decay. Every man did as he pleased. For many years there was no supreme ruler who had authority over all affairs. The land of Egypt was in the hands of the princes of the provinces.

One put another to death in a fit of jealousy.

Thereupon other times came in the years of famine.

A Syrian captive made himself a prince among them.

He brought the whole land into subjection under his own control.

He gathered together his own relations.

He plundered the treasures of the land.

They had made the gods like men. No longer were sacrifices brought into the sanctuaries of the temple. The images of the gods were thrown down and left lying upon the ground.

Then the gods set up their own son as prince over the whole land, Ra Setinecht Meramon. He destroyed the profane who were in the land of Egypt. He purified the great throne of Egypt. He restored the ruined temples and images, and established Ramses III. (who in the Papyrus is represented as addressing his people in the form of a Proclamation) on the throne. In the further course of the Papyrus, Ramses tells how he himself engaged in war with neighbouring nations.

PENTATEUCH.

The Pharaoh (the Egyyptian Peraa, the great house), in whose reign Joseph came into Egypt, was indeed king of Mizraim (Gen. xli. 46), that is, of Middle and Upper Egypt, § 247, *Obs.*, but had not then the absolute power which (Gen. xlvii. 20) he afterwards obtained. Then he secured all Egypt, the whole country, by purchase.

Comp. *e.g.* the rebellion of the chief baker and the chief butler, Gen. xl. 1. Seven years of famine, Gen. xli. 54.

Before the famine broke out, Joseph was made chief administrator, Gen. xli. 41-45.

Comp. Gen. xli. 46 and 55.

Gen. xlvii. 1-6. The children of Israel dwelt together in Goshen.

Gen. xlvii. 14-20. Joseph compelled the Egyptians to sell their cattle, fields, and freedom.

The Israelites on their part did not worship the Egyptian gods. Joseph did not overthrow the Egyptian worship (Gen. xlvii. 22, 26). It is possible, however, that at a later period the Israelites in Goshen threw down images of the gods, if an endeavour was made forcibly to introduce their worship among them. Comp. what is said farther on.

When the passages are set aside, it sufficiently appears how absurd it is for Eisenlohr to identify the Syrian of the Papyrus Harris with Moses, while evidently the reference is to Joseph. That theory can be sustained only by the use of the most reckless conjectures. The only question remaining is as to whether the Pharaoh of the Pentateuch be Ra Setinecht. For four hundred years, according to the Pentateuch, the children of Israel were in Egypt, but a not inconsiderable portion of this time belonged to the period of oppression and persecution. It may undoubtedly be deduced from Ex. i. 9, 11, 16, 22, ii. 2, 11, 21, 23, that this season of trouble lasted throughout several generations. The royal sepulchres at Biban el Moluk (see Eisenlohr, p. 15) indicate before Ramses III. the following series of kings: Menephtah I., Amenmeses, Siphthah, Menephtah-Seti II., Setinecht, Ramses III. The name of Amenmeses, however, is half erased. I venture the conjecture that Menephtah I. was that other Pharaoh, Ex. ii. 8, who rose up and knew not Joseph, an Upper Egyptian prince, who overthrew the dynasty favourable to the Israelites; that Amenmeses was the king at whose court Moses was brought up, and the scratching out of his name would be explained by the hatred against Moses and against his deceased patron; that Siphthah was the king whose death is related in Ex. ii. 23; and finally, that Menephtah-Seti II. was, as also Eisenlohr admits, that Amenoph of Manetho who was drowned in the Red Sea, but whose body, according to Ex. iv. 30, was cast up by the water, and so might have been buried in Biban el Moluk. His successors, Ra Setinecht and Ramses III., reorganized the country that had been convulsed in all its borders.

We now return to the question of the Hyksos. The name Hyksos does not appear upon the Egyptian monuments, but there is mentioned there (Ebers, p. 202 f.) the names of some of the princes, whom Manetho and his transcribers, Josephus, Julius Africanus, Eusebius, describe as Hyksos princes. The royal papyrus at Turin contains in Fragn. 114 the name Salatis, and after him a Beben-an. The inscription on a statue found at Tanis in 1861 runs thus: "The good God (Egyptian predicate of kings and princes), the star of both worlds, Sat Salati, of Sutech, dear to the lord of Hanar (Abaris)." The royal papyrus, Fragn. 112, mentions the names of Annas, Apachnas, Apepi. This is in agreement with the Hyksos names of Manetho: Salatis, Beon, Apachnas, Apophis, Annas. Three names—שליט, prince; בן-עין, son of the Eye, and Annas—are Semitic. Apepi is decidedly Egyptian. Compare the serpent Apep, § 238, and the colossus of Ramses II., discovered in 1860, where he is said to be "beloved of Set Apepi." The

Papyrus Sallier, deciphered by Rougé and Brugsch, gives the following: "It happened that the land of Egypt fell into the hands of the plague-bearers, the destroyers, and no one was king in Upper Egypt when this happened. While King Raskeuen was lord of the South country, the rebels were in possession of the fortress of Amu. Apepi was in Hanar, the whole land appeared before him to pay tribute, and King Apepi chose the god Set (according to another reading, Sutech) for his lord, and served no other god that was in Egypt: to Set he built a temple." In the more extensive fragments there is mention of a summons to serve Amun Ra, then of a message of Apepi to the king of Upper Egypt which made him angry. So far the documents. From what has been said, the conclusion has been drawn that the Hyksos had worshipped a god Set, and it has even been supposed that this god might be identified with the Baal of the heathen Semites. But why then would the Hyksos have resisted so determinedly the worship of the Egyptian Ra? He might easily have been transformed into the Semitic Baal, just as in Phœnicia the Egyptian Melkart was transformed into Baal (§ 250). The documents only prove that three princes of Semitic name, Shalit, Benon, and Annas, ruled in succession over Egypt, and that they were followed by two other princes of the same dynasty, Apachnas and Apepi, and that the latter chose Set as his god. If we turn even to so late and recent a report as that of Manetho, it seems to us quite conceivable that Manetho may have erroneously combined and misunderstood various documentary accounts which he met with. That he makes Jerusalem to have been built before the time of his Osarsiph-Moses, is indeed utterly false. But even this identification of Osarsiph and Moses is itself altogether wrong. In Osarsiph, priest of Heliopolis, we have nothing else but a contorted reminiscence of Potiphera, the priest of Heliopolis, the father-in-law of Joseph. From Gen. xli. 45 it appears that Potiphera or Pe-te-phra was not a proper name, but his title, consecrated to Ra (Ebers, p. 296), so that his own name might quite possibly be Osarsiph. Supposing, then, that Manetho found in one Egyptian document the story, that Osarsiph, representing his son-in-law, called the Israelites down into Egypt, and in another document found the statement, that the Egyptians had been obliged to allow a free departure to the Shepherd kings and their people, and that these went to Palestine, where they (at a later time) built Jerusalem,—might it not then very naturally and easily happen, that he could combine the two in a cross and perverted fashion? Of the circumstances under which Osarsiph, representing Joseph, called the Israelites to Egypt, he knew nothing,

because his documentary sources said nothing about that. He would think, therefore, that they had been called out as a warlike confederacy against the Egyptians, that, consequently, they must have already been a nation, and must already have built Jerusalem; and so he would preface the narrative of the one document by what he found in the other, whereas both documents spoke of one and the same incident. No one can deny that this hypothesis is possessed in the highest degree of internal probability. If this be so, then those Hyksos princes, who were mentioned by name in the latter of Manetho's documents, and are now again found in the royal papyrus of Turin, are none other than the series of those Zaphnath-Paneahs (Gen. xli. 45), or chief administrators, by whom the kings favourable to the Israelites ruled the country. This lasted, according to Manetho, for 250 years, which may be correct, since the 140 years of persecution were under the reigns of Menephtah, Amenmeses, Siphthah, and Menephtah-Seti. The first three Zaphnaths were certainly Israelites. Salatis must be Joseph himself, whom his brethren must have addressed and designated שָׂרִיט. In Beben-an or Beon one would almost at once recognise Benjamin. At a later period this rank was conferred upon native Egyptians, Apachnas and Apepi. A religious influence was undoubtedly exerted by the Israelite on the kings of that age (Gen. xli. 16). And so the story of the Papyrus Harris, of an overthrow of the Egyptian worship, is perhaps not altogether groundless, if we take along with it the statement of the Papyrus Sallier, that Apepi chose Set for his god, and would worship him only. The god Set was the old war-god of the Egyptians, but under his name Apepi might worship the God of Israel, with a similarly sounding name, אֱלֹהֵי-יִשְׂרָאֵל, Gen. xlix. 52, whose name, "the mighty God," would seem to harmonize with the nature of the god of war. It is, indeed, quite possible that this ruler with a good intention sought to win favour and general acceptance among his Egyptian subjects for the worship of the Israelitish God El-Shaddai by introducing him under the title of the Egyptian war-god Set, that in doing so he seriously injured the Egyptian worship, and thereby occasioned the rebellion and civil war, unquestionably excited by the priests, in which Menephtah I., as prince of Upper Egypt, who made common cause with the rebels in Middle and Lower Egypt, overthrew him. The fanatical hatred of this new dynasty against the Israelites, driven to the utmost extreme by the incidents related in Ex. vii.-xi., led them to describe the God whom the hated enemies worshipped, and who had destroyed the Egyptians by such fearful plagues, as the evil god, identical with the

serpent Apep. Very possibly, too, that Chief Administrator had originally another, perhaps a Semitic name, and may have been an Israelite, and have given to him the serpent name Apepi first as an insulting designation by his enemies. Thus the newly-discovered Papyrus inscriptions throw a surprising light on the interval between the seventh and eighth verses of the first chapter of Exodus. In Tanis was the residence of the dynasty favourable to the Israelites, or at least that of their administrators; for there are found there sculptures with undoubtedly Semitic features (Ebers, p. 208). But where have we to seek for Abaris? In both of the documents used by Manetho, Abaris is the entrenchment out of which the unclean or despised people were driven when they were expelled the country. We meet with the name only in Manetho, and it is certainly derived from עברִי. It was the city of the Hebrews, the name which they gave themselves as descendants of Eber, the father of their migrations, and as being themselves still wanderers. The Egyptians again gave it a name which according to Egyptian etymology may be rendered Hanar, the city of the curse. According to Manetho, Abaris lay to the east of the Bubastic or easternmost branch of the Nile. Eusebius and Julius Africanus, after Manetho, call it the Sethroitic province; and Josephus, also after Manetho, the Saitic province. Neither of these is correct. The land of Goshen cannot have lain either in the west at Sais, or in the extreme north at Sethroe. By Abaris no other place is meant than the city of the Israelites סכּוֹת, Ex. xii. 37, xiii. 20: in a London papyrus given as Suko.

The so-called ninth and tenth dynasties in Egypt consisted of (Ebers, i. 184 ff.) Semitic or more particularly Idumean-Arabian intruders, who had overrun Lower Egypt, and held it in subjection for a long time. These, however, were not identical with the Castorim inhabiting the delta of the Nile, a Hamitic-Egyptian tribe, as we shall see § 246, for these Castorim, as Ebers himself proves, p. 125 ff., had colonized the Nile delta from Sardinia and Sicily long before the time of Ramses II. The eleventh dynasty, a genuinely Egyptian one, attacked and overthrew those intruders, and made some of them serve as *ramu*, shepherds, which is an appellative (Ebers, p. 196). The twelfth dynasty fortified their eastern borders for protection against new casualties (Ebers, p. 192). Under the thirteenth dynasty came the Hyksos; that is, according to our interpretation: Joseph came, was made administrator, and brought down his family. There then followed as the fifteenth dynasty the series of kings friendly to the Israelites, and alongside of and under it, as the sixteenth dynasty, the series of administrators

(Gen. xli. 43). Meanwhile Upper Egypt (Ebers, p. 194) formed for itself a separate and independent kingdom, under a so-called fourteenth dynasty. The seventeenth dynasty was that beginning with Menephtah I., hostile to the Israelites. The anxiety which Menephtah I. expresses, Ex. i. 10, is easily explained from the previous subjugation of Lower Egypt during the ninth and tenth dynasties by Arabian-Semitic intruders. But at the same time it shows that between the thirteenth and seventeenth dynasties there is no room for any further events than those related in the Pentateuch, beginning with Joseph's elevation, and ending with the departure of Israel under Moses.

Obs. 2.—When the Egyptians name the founder and first king of their empire Menes, and tell of him that he had dug his bed in the Nile (Herodotus ii. 4. 99), it would seem that there was lurking here a vestige of a reminiscence of Manu and his flood.

§ 242. *The Ethics of the Egyptians.*

It is noteworthy that the moral consciousness, the conscience, had died out among them even less than among the Persians and Greeks. A grim earnestness was the characteristic of the Egyptian religion. Down to the time of the conquest of Cambyses the people observed a strict rule of monogamy.¹ Their civil life was orderly. A judgment of the dead was acknowledged. At the going down of the sun the soul of the dead went down into Amentes, the lower world. In its outer room, the hall of the two judgments, rewards and punishments, Hesiri held his court upon the soul, sitting on a throne, a sceptre and rod in his hand, girded with mummy-bands, surrounded by the water of life, from which sprang up the Lotus flowers. Beside him sit forty-two spirits of the lower world as judges of the dead, adorned with ostrich feathers, the emblems of truth and righteousness. The dead protests that he has committed

¹ Ebers, p. 240, thinks that he finds in Herodotus, ii. 60, the statement that Pacht was worshipped in Bubastis with song, dance, drunkenness, and debauchery. There is, however, no word of this there, but only that at that festival 700,000 men and women, not counting children, were gathered together, and that there more wine was consumed than otherwise throughout the whole year.

none of the forty-two sins forbidden in the Egyptian moral law. These were: malice, theft, premeditated murder, prayers made for show, hypocrisy, seizing the property of the gods, appropriating meat offerings, calumniating, drunkenness, adultery, impurity, shaking the head at the hearing of the truth, unnecessary talk, reviling the king, abusing parents, inveighing against the gods, despising the gods, dishonouring the dead, committing regrettable deeds, deceit, falsehood in a court of justice, sloth, cowardice, oppression of inferiors, pitilessness, false weights and measures, falsifying of signature seals, usury, destroying wild animals in their lairs, doing injury to sacred animals, drawing away of water from the irrigation canals, etc. The heart of the dead was then laid in one balance, while an ostrich feather lay in the other. On the one side stands the accuser Anubis, with a jackal's head; on the other Her (Horus), with the head of a sparrow-hawk. Toth sits with writing material and makes the record. If the heart be found too light, the soul is sent to hell, which has seventy-five departments, over which seventy-five demons armed with swords preside, each department for a particular sin. The souls are black, are bound to a post and are lacerated by the demons in various ways, a picture similar to that of Dante's *Inferno*. The souls that are found righteous receive an ostrich feather, are sprinkled by Hathor and Nut with the water of life, and pass on through dreadful monsters, hippopotami, crocodiles, to the lower world, until in the far east they come to the regions of Ra. Here they occupy themselves in cutting corn and plucking flowers and fruits. If what Herodotus, ii. 123, relates be correct, that the Egyptians believed in a transmigration of souls into animals, this can only have been the fate of those souls which were found to be neither quite righteous nor quite godless. A picture upon a burying vault represents a soul which, having been changed into a sow, is lashed by Anubis out of the court. But it is probable that the godless souls assumed only the animal form after death, and that

Herodotus only misunderstood this, and erroneously conceived of a passing into actual living animals. The Egyptians even in the best case certainly did not succeed very well in overcoming the fear of judgment after death. Of redemption he knew nothing. It will now be seen that the case became worse and worse.

§ 243. *The Dark Side of the Egyptian Religion.*

The dark spot in the Egyptian religion that is most striking, the reverse side of its ethics which at the first glance appears decidedly corrupt, was the animal worship into which, as into a horrible tail, their polytheism ran out. All gods, with the exception of Amun and Hesiri, have frequently in their images the heads of animals sacred to them. The Egyptians must therefore have recognised in these animal species the nature of their gods. Indeed, the gods concerned had been so overgrown by these animals in the people's minds, that the animal form seemed to them better than the human for giving expression to the essence of the divine being. But not merely was a particular animal species consecrated to some particular deity, and therefore inviolable; a particular specimen of that species, which the priests chose and were understood to recognise by a particular token, was kept in the chief temple of the god, and came to be generally regarded as an incarnation of that deity. A bright yellow ox, Mne, kept in Heliopolis, was sacred to Ra; a black ox, with a white spot on the forehead, kept in Memphis, was sacred to Apis, or, according to Plutarch, to Osiris. The cow was sacred to Neith and Hathor; a species of beetle, scarabæus, to Ptah; the ibis and a kind of dog to Toth; the jackal to Anubis; a species of serpent to Amun; the sparrow-hawk to Ra; the falcon to Neith; the cat to Ra and to Pacht. The ichneumon, the he-goat, the wolf, too, were dedicated in particular districts to local deities; at the Moeris lake, according to Herodotus and Strabo, the crocodile was

sacred to Set. These animals were carefully kept, fed, bathed, adorned; offerings were made to them of food and drink; after death they were embalmed, and laid out in state. At the present day several Ibis skeletons have been found at Särgeu;¹ and at Memphis there have been found in sarcophagi sixty-four Apis-mummies. Clement of Alexandria, after describing the beauty of the Egyptian temples, goes on to say: "The innermost sanctuary is concealed by a curtain wrought in gold; the priest draws it aside, and there is seen a cat, or a crocodile, or a serpent, which wriggles upon a purple cover." The constant and invariable instinctive life of the animal, ordained by law, according to a type, together with freedom of movement, seemed to the Egyptians to be representative of the nature of the gods. The worship, however, was by no means confined to the temple specimen, but was extended to the whole species. That any one who intentionally slew a sacred animal should die was indeed what might be expected, for such an act would necessarily presuppose a feeling of wilful contempt for religion; but even one who unintentionally slew an animal of a sacred species must bear a severe punishment, and the natural death of such an animal must be the subject of lamentation. If a cat died in a house, the inhabitants cut the eyelashes; if a dog died, they shaved the hair off their head and bellies (Herod. ii. 66). Rich people spent often as much as a hundred talents on the burial of dead temple animals. On a column at Heliopolis, belonging to the fourth century before Christ, the following prayer to a temple-cat is found:—

"O thou white cat! Thy head is the head of the sun-god. Thy nose is the nose of Toth, of the exceeding great lord of Hermopolis. Thine ears are the ears of Osiris, who hears the cries of all who call upon him. Thy mouth is the mouth of

¹ Comp. Max Eyth, *Wanderbuch eines Ingenieurs*, Heidelb. 1871, vol. i. pp. 287, 288.

Atmu, the lord of life; he has protected thee from all injury. Thy heart is the heart of Ptah; he has cleansed thee from every evil blemish in thy members. Thy teeth are the teeth of Chunsu (the moon-goddess)," etc.

Thus the religion of the Egyptians was a strange mixture of profoundly earnest and perversely degraded elements. Its characteristic feature is rigid legalism. The rigid adherence to law in nature, as this is made very specially prominent in the circle of the Egyptian seasons of the year, was transferred to the gods, whose life was nothing else than a constant reproduction of itself according to a rigid law of nature. Conscience, the consciousness of the difference between good and evil, and the ethical nature of God and things divine, a heritage from earlier and better times, for it cannot be explained from that religion of natural necessity, was not wholly extinguished, was not thrown quite away, but among the Egyptians it was shrivelled up, like their mummies, into a sort of iron and rigid rule of law, in which it yielded only fear and anxiety, and afforded no reconciliation. Such terrorizing legalism, however, cannot permanently hold its ground; where it gives no true peace of conscience, frivolity will seek out a false peace. Had the Egyptians accepted strictly and earnestly its moral precepts, which on the whole are deserving of the highest praise, who then could have looked forward to death without the most agonizing terror? But with that superficiality, which is always a characteristic of the legal standpoint, they conceived the commands in the light of Pharisaic externalism. We have evidence of this in the prayers which are found in the sepulchres and in the books of the dead, as appeals of the dead to their judge, in which a sadly prevalent self-righteousness appears. For example, on the tomb of Ramses VI. at Biban el Moluk (Bunsen, *Aegypten*, v. 2. 551): "Truth bring I before thee: I have not committed murder, I have not practised deceit, I

have not been indolent, I have not flagged, I have done nothing hateful to the gods, I have not needed to consume my heart in repentance," etc. Often, no doubt, it may have been survivors who put these words in the mouth of the dead and not the individual himself; but whoever put such justification in the mouth of another, did this evidently in the expectation and hope that another would some time put such words into his mouth. This tone prevails in all the prayers on the tablets that have been discovered. It testifies to the universal consciousness of the Egyptians about the manner in which one should appear before the tribunal, and indeed only the most notorious sinners are regarded as falling into hell. According to theory, *the heart* should be weighed; in practice every one weighed only his outward deeds, and these only against the least possible weight. Thus, then, we see even in the Egyptian religion a regular deterioration. That religion went through several successively descending stages.

1. We have the prehistoric stage, whose god (neter) was worshipped as the holy, conscious, free creator of the world, and at first only faint traces of emanationistic polytheism appear (comp. what Manetho tells of Ptah, § 238, 1).
2. Then follows the Hesiri religion, where the heavenly gods are still distinguished from their visible manifestations, are still conceived of as an ethical being, although nature is already considered an emanationistic unfree manifestation of the deity, § 241.
3. The purely polytheistic nature-worship of Upper and Lower Egypt (§ 238, 239), in which the legalistic ethics give place to the trivialities of Pharisaic externalism and self-righteousness.

CHAPTER V.—THE RELIGION OF THE CANAANITES AND HEATHEN SEMITES.

(a) A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION ABOUT THEIR ORIGIN.

§ 244. *A Problem.*

The early tradition of the Israelites contained in the Pentateuch regards the Canaanites and Phœnicians as descended from Canaan, a son of Ham (Gen. x. 6, 15–18), and assigns to the same stock the Cushites or Ethiopians (Gen. x. 7). On the other hand, the descent of the Israelites, Midianites, and Ishmaelite Arabs is traced back through Abraham to Shem, while to the same stock is assigned the descent of the Moabites and Ammonites through Lot, that of the Babylonian Chaldees or Elamites, of the Assyrians, the Aramæans, the Lydians, and the Joktan or Kachtan Arabs (Gen. x. 21 ff., xix. 36, xxv. 1 ff., and xxv. 12). In fact, those peoples, who are in the Pentateuch traced back to Shem, spoke languages which belong to one and the same family of languages, which are consequently called Semitic. So far, everything is correct and clear. But now the phenomenon meets us, that the Canaanites and Phœnicians too, assigned by the Pentateuch to the Hamites, along with the numerous colonies of the latter in Crete, Malta, Eubœa, Sardinia, and Carthage, spoke a Semitic language, and one, indeed, most closely related to that of the Israelites, scarcely even dialectically different from it, as may be seen from the Canaanite proper names in the Old Testament, and from the various Phœnician and Punic inscriptions found around the Mediterranean, as well as from the Punic passages in the Pœnulus of Plautus. To this has to be added the second phenomenon, that the Phœnicians and Punic races are in their religion almost thoroughly at one with a portion of the heathen Semites, especially the Babylonians, Assyrians, Moabites, Ammonites, and Lydians. Modern critical science has therefore found no difficulty in pronouncing the Israelitish tradition

about the Hamitic origin of the Phœnicians and Canaanites with the Philistines erroneous, and declaring these nations to be really Semitic. By this almost universally adopted hypothesis the knot of the problem is rather cut than loosed. For the more decidedly and evidently the Phœnician-Canaanites are at one with the Israelites in their language, and with the Moabites, Ammonites, and Semites of the Euphrates in their religion, the more inconceivable does it become how the Israelites could think of assigning to them a Hamitic extraction. An attempt has, indeed, been made to explain this. The Israelites from the time of Moses and Joshua were carried away by national hatred into repudiating any race relationship with the Canaanites, and by imputing to them a Hamitic descent they created a further plausible ground for waging against the Canaanites a war of extermination. But even this convenient hypothesis is found to be in irreconcilable antagonism to a whole series of facts. 1. If the Canaanites were thus in race related to the Israelites, as the Ammonites and Moabites, why then is such a difference made in the overrunning of their land, so that the Israelites behaved in a peaceable way toward the Moabites (Num. xxv.), and left to the Ammonites at least half of their territories (Josh. xiii. 25), while they utterly outrooted the Canaanites (Deut. ii. 18 f.). 2. When in the following age (Judg. iii. 13, x. 7 f.; 1 Sam. xi. 1; 2 Kings i. 1) the Ammonites and Moabites were hereditary enemies of Israel, why does not national hate assign to them a Hamitic descent? It is answered that this national hatred showed itself in tracing back their origin to an incestuous union (Gen. xix. 36 ff.). Well, but their Semitic origin is not denied; and so now the question occurs, why was not this expedient thought of in regard to the Canaanites, and their origin traced back to some odious incestuous connection, that would still have allowed their Semitic extraction to remain intact? When the similarity of language lay so patent before them, and when no very definite points in recollection and tradition were previously

existing which testified to a Hamitic descent of the Canaanites, the first man who, in Joshua's time, attempted to impute such an origin to them would have found it difficult to gain credence, and would certainly have been wise in assigning rather to them, as well as to the Ammonites and Moabites, an illegitimate Semitic extraction. Would any Austrian of 1866 have thought of describing the Prussians as a people of partly Wendish origin, unless there had been previously existing some knowledge of the fact that Slavic tribes had in earlier times actually resided in Lusatia, Neumark, and Mecklenburg?

3. In addition to all this, there is still the phenomenon that that affirmed national hate has not in any case resulted in transforming the old patriarchal tradition so as to corrupt it. The relationship of Abraham to the Canaanite princes is represented throughout the Pentateuch as a peaceful one, even decidedly friendly. When Abraham wars against the Semites of Euphrates, Chedorlaomer, etc. (Gen. xiv. 1), he does not do this so much in the interests of the Canaanites of the valley of Siddim, whom they had conquered, as in the interest of his nephew Lot, who had been carried away with them; but the notice (Gen. xiv. 13) that Abraham was confederate with the Amorites Mamre, Eshcol, and Aner, as well as the statement that (ver. 18) the Canaanite king blessed Abraham, and received from him a tributary tithe (ver. 20), would certainly have been first of all expunged or altered, if that national hate, which is supposed to have determined the construction of the old tradition, had existed in this form. Why was not the confederacy of Abraham with the Amorites, so hated in the time of Joshua, kept secret? Why was there not a turn given to the story of the meeting with Melchizedec so as to make him rather subject to the victorious deliverer Abraham? In Gen. xx., xxi., xxii., the Canaanite prince Abimelech of Gerar, now Um el Jerrâr, in the Wady Sunijeh, five hours south of Gaza, is represented as friendly toward Abraham, and conducting himself like a just man; and in Gen. xxiii. we find Abraham holding friendly intercourse with the chiefs and

people of Heth. A nation that allowed these features of the patriarchal tradition to remain intact cannot possibly have imputed from national enmity a Hamitic descent to the Canaanites. Such hate would first of all have seen to it that the story of Abraham's friendship with these Canaanites had been utterly erased. The problem therefore still stands before us unsolved.

In order to render a scientifically exact solution of the problem possible, we must undertake a thoroughgoing examination of the table of nations given in the tenth chapter of Genesis. This, again, can be done only by a thorough critical determination of the laws which hold good in regard to the development of language. In this latter connection much has been done of extreme importance since the time of Bopp in the department of comparative philology and linguistics generally. So soon, however, as it is a question of the application of this acquisition to the primitive history of mankind, of drawing conclusions from established facts, they become unexamined postulates, which scarcely deserve the name of hypotheses, axioms in need of no proof, dogmas spun out into argumentations, to the utmost prejudice of science. We must now, just as most recently Fr. Pfaff, in his *Geologie als exakten Wissenschaft*, has done, seek to divide with a critically searching knife between that which is fact and that which is only hypothesis, or scarcely even deserving of that name.

§ 245. *The Laws of the Transmutation of Languages and the Province of Language.*

We must proceed, not from *à priori* assertions, but from a careful investigation of established historical facts, if we are to come to an understanding about the periods at which changes in languages take place, and about the rapidity with which these are effected, how these changes are determined by local and ethnographical circumstances, and whether and in how far a language of one division may be found to make its

way among a people belonging, in respect of race, to another division. If, now, we inquire of the confirmable and confirmed history of language, we obtain the four following propositions:—

1. Changes in one and the same language among one and the same people do not take place at equal or regular intervals of time, but as a rule by fits and starts.

That mixed languages on the rebounding one upon another of various peoples should be constructed suddenly in a relatively short time, and thus become comparatively stable, is only what might be expected. Thus in the time of the dissolution of the empire the so-called Provençal language, or *langue d'oc*, was formed in the region of Aquitania out of the Latin, Celto-Iberian, and Visigoth languages, and already about A.D. 980 or A.D. 1000 it had received a fixed and complete construction,¹ and assumed so stable a form that the songs of the troubadours and the writings of the age of the wars of the Albigenses differ very little from the common dialect of Languedoc in the present day. So also between A.D. 1066 and A.D. 1200, the English language has been built up out of fragments of Celtic, Anglo-Saxon, Norse, and Latin. Through a more protracted course of development the French language was formed; as also the Italian dialects, of which the Florentine was made the language of literature by Dante. But a far more important point is, that even within the bounds of one and the same people, the one language common to the whole sometimes suddenly undergoes an inner change. An example of this is afforded by the alterations in construction and particles which passed over the Latin language between the Punic wars and the civil wars of Sulla. Still more thoroughgoing was the change of the German languages. What period was occupied in the first process of the interchange of sounds, the change from the old Indo-Germanic to the Gothic, cannot be definitely determined. The second process, the change from the Gothic stage to that of the Old High German, strictly so called, occupied a period of from four to five centuries.

¹ Vic et Vaissette, *Histoire du Languedoc*, vol. xiv. p. 246 ff.

Since that time the High German language, as Middle High German and New High German, has continued to occupy the same stage of linguistic development. Still more sudden and rapid was the transition from Old High German to Middle High German, by the abandonment of inflectional endings, between Williram, who died in A.D. 1085, and the priest Kemrat, who lived from A.D. 1150 to 1200. In the domain of the Celtic languages we meet with this phenomenon: the remnants of the Irish language surviving from the eighth century belong still to the Old Irish language; the language of the ninth and tenth centuries wants its inflectional endings; and in the eleventh century we have the Middle Irish and Middle Gaelic fully formed. We have already (§ 191) called attention to the sudden transition made from the Indian Vedic dialect to Sanscrit during the second and third periods of the development of the Indian religion. Among the Semitic languages also we may find similar examples. Our contemporary Palgrave found in Central Arabia the most correct Arabic of the Koran of the seventh century preserved in the language of the common people, so stable has the Arabic been there for twelve centuries. Elsewhere, too, it is observable that for a period of a thousand years only unimportant alterations have been made. If we were to reckon backwards according to this standard to a time when Arabic, Assyrian, Hebrew, and Babylonian were one language, we should only reach it in a million years. But since the processes of transmutation and separation of the Indo-Germanic languages have admittedly been much more rapid, and likewise since, as is now more and more readily acknowledged, the two main groups were derived from one and the same mother stem, what we learn of the Indo-Germanic languages prevents us from dating a million years back the existence of the primitive Semitic tongues as distinct and separate from the primitive Aryan tongues. In that case, the primitive Aryan language must have been for at least nine hundred thousand years in that development motionless and unchanged, enjoying a sort of winter sleep. There must therefore neces-

sarily have been also at some time or other within the domain of the Semitic languages a period of more rapid movement, when the Arabic-Ethiopic branch severed itself from the North-Semitic, and when in both again important subdivisions took place. That these divisions and subdivisions were essentially contemporary with one another is proved from the various crossings in which the several Semitic languages have partly retained, partly abandoned, what was originally common (see *Obs.* 1).

2. In different districts and among different races the transmutation of one and the same language does not take place in a uniform manner or with a like rapidity.

That different families of languages possess the capacity of change, and the power of rapidly effecting a change in very various proportions, has been shown by a comparison of Semitic languages that have become stable with the Indo-Germanic languages that are still in a continuously proceeding course of development. But even within the limits of one particular family of languages different national races have proceeded in very different ways. When the Old High German had accomplished its transition to the third stage of the interchange of sounds, the Old Low German (Platt-Deutsch, Dutch, and Flemish), along with the daughters of the old Norse language (Icelandic, Swedish, Danish), and the Teutonic elements of the English language, continued to occupy the second stage, and all these do so down to the present day. When, among the Scandinavian languages, the Swedish and Danish had undergone a process of transmutation, like that of the Old High German passing into Middle and New High German, the Icelandic continued to maintain most of its old inflectional forms. When the High German language in North Germany modified the strong guttural *g* into a palatal sibilant, and partly changed this again into *j*, the Swabian and Allemannian tribes retained the genuine *g*, like a weak *k*; but the Westphalians retained the genuine *sch*, which outside of Westphalia has become a dental sibilant like the French *ch*. The

Swiss have still the mediæval *ch*, the diphthongs *uo* and *ie* (*ië*), and also remnants of the old *z*, *e.g.* "das war ein gueter Shuzz" for Schuss. Of the two principal Celtic groups the Welsh has carried out a displacement or interchange of sounds from one class to another, *e.g.* of labials and gutturals, *p* instead of *k*, from which the Irish Gaelic has altogether refrained. Dozens of examples might be adduced, but these are abundantly sufficient.

3. The change of a people's language does not stand in connection with the geographical course of its wanderings.

This, indeed, one might scarcely be required explicitly to state, and this would not have been done had not most recently Eb. Schrader, in an essay¹ containing much else of extreme importance, made the attempt from the degree and manner of relationship between the various Semitic languages to draw conclusions as to the geographical direction in which the various Semitic races must have proceeded in their wanderings. Because, as he quite convincingly proves, the North Semitic languages were a shrivelled up form of the richer Arabic, he thinks (p. 417) that there follows nothing less than that Northern Arabia must have been the original home of all the Semites. Were this conclusion correct, we should require to conclude that in Iceland, where the old Norse language has been most perfectly maintained, we should look for the original home of the Scandinavian race, that from it the inhabitants of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark had proceeded. We should also be obliged to conclude from the fact that the Northern and Baltic dialects have remained at the second stage of the linguistic movement, that the German races must have entered the continent of Europe not on the south-east from Asia, but on the north-west, perhaps from Britain. And when Schrader writes (p. 420): "If any one should suppose that the Hebrews and Canaanites, who for the most part pressed westward, had been the first to sever themselves from the Arabs, then let him explain how they have still

¹ "Die Abstammung der Chaldäer und die Ursitze der Semiten," in the *Zeitschr. v. d. Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, Bd. 35, H. 3, A. 397 ff.

retained the article, while the Babylonians and Aramæans, who had migrated at a time when the use of the article among the Arabs had taken yet firmer root, had again dispensed with it,"—with equal right the conclusion might be drawn, that the Allemannian race must have been driven southward toward the Alps later than the Suevian, because the former retain far more of the peculiarities of the ancient tongue. It is impossible too earnestly to protest against all such mere mechanical theories. Language is formed and developed not by shoe soles, but by mind and spirit. The Romans had laid aside the article, not because they proceeded earlier or later from Asia into Europe than the Pelasgians or Celts, but because they did not need the article for the expression of their thought.

4. The province of language often transcends the boundaries of races, and the boundaries of race again overlap those of language.

There are in history many cases illustrative of this proposition. And indeed, as a rule, it is not the language of the conquering race which is imposed upon the subject people, but oftener that of the more highly cultured people which is adopted by the less cultured, even if the latter happens to be victorious. The Mandshurians, those conquerors of China, have appropriated the language of their more cultured subjects; the Gauls in *Gallia togata* and in the *provincia* appropriated the language of their more cultured subduers. The Ostrogoths and Visigoths, the Longobards and Gallic Franks have in Upper Italy, Spain, and France, although they were the political conquerors, nevertheless abandoned so much of their own language in favour of the Roman-Salic mixed language of the conquered, because it was more pliable and more cultivated, so that the mixed language which they formed had Latin for its principal element. Again, in other cases, of two equally cultivated languages, one, and that not always the more solid or more capable of development, makes its way over the limits of race division, sometimes with and sometimes without the use of political influences. The

Flemish of West Belgium was more and more driven out by the Walloon of the eastern division. In free Switzerland, French early won ground among the Burgundian population around Lake Geneva, and for centuries has been pushing its way by regular advances northwards, even down to the Allemannian population of Bern. The names of the old German towns of Waadtland, Milden, Wiflisburg, Peterlingen, sound almost like a legend. In like manner the Italian language has made its way up the valley of the Adige from the Italian frontier, so that the boundary of the language which, for somewhat less than a century, was Roveredo, lies now between Trent and Botzen.

This brings us back to the problem of the last section. The possibility of nations of Hamitic descent adopting the language of neighbouring Semitic peoples cannot be denied *in abstracto*, provided that the language and the general culture of those Semites were the higher of the two. If, in addition, we can point to a temporary political dependence of the Hamitic races upon the Semitic in the remote past, this would make the matter all the more easily conceivable. How the case stood in both these respects, an investigation of the Table of Nations will enable us to determine.

Obs. — Eb. Schrader quite correctly concludes that grammatical peculiarities which are common to various languages of Semitic peoples locally separated from one another must be originally Semitic, *e.g.* the vowel endings in Assyrian and Arabic, the existence of cases in Assyrian, Arabic, Ethiopic, the *k* sound in the first personal pronoun (*anoki, anaku*) in Hebrew and Assyrian, the formation of the passive in Arabic and Hebrew by vocalization.

§ 246. *The Table of Nations.* (a) *What it intends.*

Searching as the criticism has been which, since the time of the famous Sam. Bochart, has been applied to the Table of Nations in Gen. x., an error or want of clearness, for which Bochart is not altogether without blame, in regard to one fundamental point persistently cleaves to all these investiga-

tions. "It is in part indeterminable," says Fr. Delitzsch (*Die Genesis*, Leipzig 1852, p. 212), "whether the names in the Table of Nations are at once names of persons and races, or whether they are only names of races." I have never found the question before us, and the way in which the Table of Nations is usually approached, more concisely expressed than in these words. That its author intends to communicate a genealogy of nations, a derivation of one race from another race, may be admitted without dispute. But the proper exegetical procedure would rather be this, that we should examine the author's own words in order to learn what he had intended to give. When, therefore, he begins in ver. 1: "Now these are the generations of the sons of Noah, Shem, Ham, and Japheth; and unto them were sons born after the flood: the sons of Japheth, Gomar and Magog," etc.,—this does not sound as if his intention had been to say that Gomar was a nation descended from Japheth, and Ashkenaz again a second people derived from the nation of Gomar; but it rather appears as if the author meant to give a genealogy of persons. And when, after enumerating the sons and grandsons descending from Japheth, therefore persons, he proceeds in ver. 5: "From these have they scattered themselves (בן, ἀπό or παρά with genitive, not ἐντό with genitive, so the LXX. correctly: ἐκ τούτων) over the isles of the Gentiles in their lands,¹ every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations;" and when again, in ver. 25, he says expressly that this division first occurred in the fifth generation from Noah, this all serves to confirm the view that we have taken. In like manner our interpretation receives confirmation from a second important circumstance, that when the author wishes to say that a whole nation sprang from one individual, he does this not indirectly, but in as many words. Thus he says, in ver. 13, of the individual Mizraim, mentioned in ver. 6,—

¹ That אֵי can only be acc. loc., and not nominative of the subject to נפְרְדוּ, is clear without any discussion. It is not אֵי-נִיִּים but אֵי-נִיִּים, and the islands could not have divided and scattered themselves.

the dual form of whose name has its parallels in those of Ephraim and Appaim (1 Chron. ii. 30), and analogies in the plural forms Meraioth, Jerimoth, Anathoth (1 Chron. vi. 6, 52, vii. 7 f., 12, 15),—that this man whose name was Mizraim begat Ludim, and Anamim, and Lehabim, and Naphtuhim, and Pathrusim, and Casluhim (out of whom came the Philistines), and Caphtorim. And again, in ver. 16, he enumerates alongside of the individual Sidon, whom he expressly designates as the first-born of Canaan, nine other sons of Canaan whose names he is not able to give, but only as Jebusites, Amorites, Girgasites, etc., with the article and the genitive ending ' , that is, evidently, the ancestor of the Jebusites, the ancestor of the Amorites, etc. Before one rushes into ethnographical investigations, then, he ought clearly to examine this question exegetically: What has the author intended to give and to communicate? And after what has just been said, there can be no other answer than this: he has intended to give a genealogical register or list of individuals which carries us up to the point at which either he has reached the progenitors of the nations, or finds his genealogical information defective. This acknowledgment is of great importance, as well for the critical question about the antiquity of the Table of Nations as for the method of its historico-ethnographical interpretation.

A. In regard to the age of this document, the whole set of modern exegetes have, without any further question, proceeded on the hypothesis—what we may call the blind hypothesis—that the author of the Table of Nations has classified those nations which were known to him by name in his own time, and by means of his geographical knowledge, perhaps through intercourse with the Phœnicians and the Egyptians, according to a theory, either upon an ethnographical principle (Knobel) or upon a geographical principle (Ebers), and then concocted for them a family relationship. On this hypothesis it only remains to ask: In what age is it supposable that the people named in Gen. x. could have been known to an Israelite

by name? And by answering this question it has been thought that this problem of the date of composition of the Table of Nations would be solved. Some would place it as late as the time of the exile. Ebers¹ has shown that this is impossible, and is himself disposed to assign its composition to the age of the first kings. But from that hypothesis we would be obliged to fix the date at a time much later than that of the exile. Indeed, we should be obliged to bring it down to the scattering of the nations. Whether by Ashkenaz we understand, with Ebers, the Ascanians, or suppose the term to indicate the Basques, in neither case is it conceivable that an Israelite in Solomon's time, or in Nebuchadnezzar's time, should have had any knowledge of these nations.

The question assumes quite another aspect when we have made out exegetically that the author does not intend to give a genealogy of nations, but of individuals. It is a fragment of primitive tradition that he communicates. For this view, besides our exegetical argument, we have also most convincing proofs of another kind.

1. In § 210 and § 224 reference has already been made to the fact that the patriarch who survived the flood has, both in the Iranian and in the German legends, three sons, who people the world. From this it follows that this was a characteristic feature of the primitive tradition. (See § 224.)

2. The Table of Nations, as already Delitzsch has remarked, speaks in ver. 19 of Sodom and Gomorrah as cities then standing. This does not prove that the Table of Nations was written out in pre-Abrahamic times, but it does prove that it presents a pre-Abrahamic text which in literal form had been orally transmitted, as the Vedas were among the Indians (§ 191).

3. As one of the nations descended from Mizraim, that of the Pathrusim or Upper Egyptians is mentioned in Gen. x. 14. Now Ebers has himself observed (p. 115) that the city Pather, that is, Pa Hathor, house of Hathor, had, in the age before the Hyksos, and so (according to § 241, *Obs.*) in the pre-Mosaic

¹ *Ägypten und die Bücher Moses*, i. p. 36 ff.

age, the magnificence and importance of a capital, and gave its name to the whole province; that in the post-Mosaic age, on the other hand, Pather is indeed mentioned as still existing, but its importance has been transferred to Thebes; and that the province was no longer designated after it. Consequently the notice of ver. 14, enumerating the several nations descending from the individual Mizraim, comes to us at the latest from the time of Moses (see *Obs.* 1).

This now leads us to a more exact determination of the time when the Table of Nations was committed to writing. In order to determine this, it is of decided importance to observe, that we find in it alongside of the old text transmitted by oral tradition a parenthesis, or rather additions of more recent origin. The passage contained in vv. 8-12 is perhaps the addition that most readily attracts attention. After ver. 7 had already enumerated five sons of Cush and two grandsons, ver. 8 adds yet another son, not named before, in the words: and Cush begat Nimrod. Then in a sort of an episode it is told how this man founded an empire. This addition, though indeed evidently resting on ancient oral tradition (see *Obs.* 2), has yet quite the appearance of not having originally belonged to the genealogy communicated in the section made up of vv. 1-7 and vv. 13-32, but of having been combined with it after it had been committed to writing. In this addition the name יהוה occurs twice over in ver. 9, first from the pen of the writer, and then in a proverb quoted by him, which at the time of his writing had already gained currency in this form. Without entering now upon the endless chaos of the Elohist-Jehovistic combination and other hypotheses, we keep simply to the question as to the time at which the God of Israel may have been designated by the name יהוה. The proper names beginning with יי or יה, or ending with יה, will afford us the best key to the solution of this problem. Before the time of Moses we do not meet, in the whole range of ancient tradition, with a single proper name having the letters יהוה; for the name of

the land, Hamoriah (Moriah) in Gen. xxii., which that land bore before the incident there recorded, has nothing to do with the words of Abraham in ver. 14, ¹יהוה יראה, but is rather to be derived from the root ²המר, Arab. hamara, to flow with water (whence מהמורה, a flood of rain), and indicates a country rich in streams. The first names formed of יהוה were the names of Joshua (who was previously called Hosea, and afterwards had his name changed to Joshua, Num. xiii. 17) and Jochebed (Ex. xi. 20), who certainly must have received this name in exchange for her own earlier name. From Moses' time onward these names became frequent (1 Chron. ii. 8, 32, 47, iv. 14, 22, v. 35 ff., etc.; Judg. xviii. 30; 1 Sam. viii. 2). Thus do these proper names confirm what is said in Ex. vi. 1 and in iii. 13 f., that before Moses' time יהוה as a name of God was unknown. Hence in passages like Gen. iv. 1 it can have been put in the mouths of persons of the pre-Mosaic age only by the author of Genesis. When, now, in the passage under discussion, Gen. x. 8-11, this name is mentioned as one already current in the people's speech, although it still remains possible that the people said אלהים, and that the compiler of the Table of Nations first put יהוה in their mouths, that written document, the Table of Nations, cannot have been compiled previous to that revelation of the name Jehovah (Ex. iii.), and thus not before the time of Moses. But, in the next place, the mention of nations descended from the individual Mizraim (see *Obs.* 1) was also in all probability first made at the time when the document was written out, since the mentioning of this is not a continuation of the genealogy of individuals, but a simple note; it cannot be derived from the early tradition about the sons and grandsons of Ham, but from a tradition

¹ There is no ground at all for saying that this word of Abraham contained a play upon words or a play upon the word Hamoriah. Were this the intention of the author, he would have made ver. 14 run: ³אשר יהוה יראה, which is called Moriah at this day. He would explain the name Moriah from that saying of Abraham. This, however, he does not do, but writes: which to that day is called בְּהַר יְהוה יראה.

which spoke about a relationship between the individual Mizraim and some nations that sprang more recently into existence. This note, too, points us to the time of Moses; firstly, because, as observed above, Upper Egypt was in the post-Mosaic age no longer known as the province of Pathros; secondly, because only one habitually living in Egypt and one minutely acquainted with the country could have entertained the idea that the people called Mizraim by the Israelites, and that indeed in the early tradition, Gen. xii. 10, could have sprung from the individual Mizraim, or would be able to describe this people according to its several divisions under their Egyptian names, Lutu, Lubu, Pathros, Ghas-lokh, etc. (comp. Ebers, p. 91 ff.).

On the other hand, the note occupying vv. 16–18, that the individual Canaan begat the Jebusite, the Amorite, the Girgashite, etc., that is, the progenitors of these nationalities, seems to have been added to the genealogy in the pre-Mosaic patriarchal age; because (1) Sodom and Gomorrah are spoken of in ver. 19 as then existing (in regard to their overthrow, see § 308), and because (2) those separate Canaanite tribes were clearly known to the patriarchs, in this completeness indeed only to them, for already in Moses' and Joshua's time the Arkites, Sinites, and Zemorites had utterly passed away (Ex. xiii. 5, etc.), while at this time at least the Arvadites and the Hamathites (Ezek. xxvii. 8 ff.; Num. xiii. 21; Amos vi. 2) are not brought into any connection with Israel. The genealogy, then, of vv. 1–7, vv. 15–22, as a genealogy of individuals, rests upon early tradition transmitted orally by memory; the contents of vv. 8–12 also rest on early tradition; the contents of vv. 13, 14 are derived from personal acquaintance with Egypt in the Mosaic age; the written account to which the genealogy in vv. 8–12 and vv. 13, 14 was added, must have been drawn up previous to the time of the departure from Egypt.

B. From this story of the fortunes of our Table of Nations the canon for the correct method of its historico-ethnographical

interpretation and estimation immediately results. Where proper names stand in the singular without the article, individuals are intended, not nations. This is perfectly illustrated in the 25th verse: "Unto Eber were born two sons . . . and his brother's name was Joktan." If this be so, then it is not the task of the historical interpreter to seek in each of those proper names a nation corresponding to it. The name of the progenitor may possibly have been retained in the name of the people, but there is no reason why it must necessarily be retained in it. Among the Greeks, for example, the name of their common progenitor Javan was manifestly retained in the name of a single branch, the *Ἰάωες*, *Iāwes*, while the names of the four sons of Javan were not retained as the names of the four Greek tribes. The name of the ancestor of a race may possibly have been retained in the name of a locality called in honour of him, as the name Dodanim in *Δωδώνη*, Arphachsad in Arrapachitis, Sheba in Seba. But nothing can be more perverse than for one to proceed on the assumption that if father, son, and grandson follow one another in succession in the genealogy, the father must mean a nation, the son a second nation descending or branching off from the first, and the grandson yet another nation. But just as little has any one a right to conclude from the discovery of a father's name in the name of a place and that of the son or grandson in the name of a nation, that this particular place must be regarded as an original home from which this people had gone forth. In the names Gothland, Götha-Elf, Gothenburg, we have most certainly a reminiscence of the Goths; but who would on that account seek the original home of the Goths in the South of Sweden? In like manner it would be altogether wrong in any one to manufacture out of the circumstance that one of the forefathers of Abraham was called Arphachsad (Gen. x. 24), the tradition that the Hebrews had originally proceeded from the country of Arrapachitis.¹ A proper com-

¹ Schrader in the *Zeitschrift v. d. Morgenl. Gesellschaft*, Bd. 35, H. 3, p. 403.

parison of the genealogical primitive tradition of the Table of Nations with our ethnographical knowledge of antiquity will be possible only if one constantly remembers that the former, in its original portions, vv. 1-7 and vv. 15-32, has to do not with peoples, but with the progenitors of peoples, with individuals.

Obs. 1.—We are obliged to regard Mizraim as the name of an individual. In this way we at once escape the difficulty of explaining the origin of this designation of the Egyptian people, which was current among the Israelites, but was not to be found either among the Egyptians or anywhere else outside of those nations which had come to learn the name from the Israelites. The Israelites of the patriarchal age, Gen. xii., had the primitive tradition that the people of Egypt were descended from Mizraim, and so they named the people after their progenitor. Ebers, who conceives of the Table of Nations in the usual way, as if the names of the progenitors of the nations had been constructed out of the names of the nations, has not been able to solve that problem in anything like a satisfactory manner. That the Israelites chose for the designation of Egypt a dual form, he at first explains by saying (p. 73) that the inhabitants of the Nile valley were themselves wont to separate their native country into two parts—Lower and Upper Egypt. Knobel (*Völkertafel*, p. 273) has correctly shown in regard to this that Isa. xl. 11 and Jer. xlv. 15 mention Pathros alongside of Mizraim, so that it is evident that the Hebrew מצרים designated merely the strip between Tanis and the sea, and cannot have had the meaning of Upper and Lower Egypt. If Ebers answers that it might yet be said: "In the Prussian Chamber representatives spoke from East and West Prussia and Pomerania,"—this case affords no real parallel. We have here the name Prussia in a wider and a narrower sense, but we have nothing corresponding to a dual form. An actual parallel is afforded only in such a case as that of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, adduced by Knobel. By this phrase we mean Sicily and Naples. But we could not rationally place alongside of one another Naples and the kingdom of the Two Sicilies. So also, if by Mizraim, Upper and Lower Egypt had been meant, for the same reason no one could have mentioned Mizraim and Upper Egypt alongside of one another. Ebers has indeed felt this himself, and so, at p. 87, he attempts another explanation of the dual form. He derives Mizraim from the root מצר, which lies at the foundation of the word מצור, meaning circumvallation. But מצור comes

from the root צור, צר, to bind, confine, besiege, and means siege, and had circumvallation only as a secondary and derivative meaning. From צור or צר, however, the form מצרים cannot possibly be derived. The proper etymology of the apparently dual form of the personal name Mizraim should rather be sought in מִן (from מִצֵּן, מִן) and רים for רום, just as the dual-like form of אפרים is got from אף and רים, רום. The name "circumvallation" ought, according to Ebers, to be confined to the territorial limits of the twelfth dynasty in the north-east of Egypt. But even should all this be admitted, it would still afford no explanation of the dual. The probability that is spoken of at p. 83, that two lines of fortification had been found on the Isthmus of Suez, and that we may fairly suppose that the dual in question may be explained by this double wall as twofold circumvallation, this probability is so utterly without any vestige of historical evidence, that Ebers himself immediately sets aside this second conjecture, in order on p. 88 to return to the first, which, however, has meanwhile been shown by us to be no better.

Obs. 2.—In the Egyptian tradition (*Papyrus Anastasi*, i. 23. 6) Nimrod bears the name of Katarti, Lord of the Assyrians. That the Israelites had obtained the Nimrod tradition, not from the Egyptians, but from their own forefathers, and had brought it with them to Egypt, is proved by the independent and Semitic name נמרד. Gesenius and Hitzig think that the Nimrod tradition had an astronomical origin, because the Chron. pasch. and Cedrenus relate, that the Persians represented Nimrod, the builder of Babel, as a constellation in the heavens. But if a person be placed in the heavens, he must have previously existed in tradition or myth. The constellation Orion was designated among the Babylonians by the name of Nimrod. The tradition of Nimrod is met with among various peoples. Among the Arabians that constellation is called Dshebâr, that is, נבור, Gen. x. 10; the Greek Ὠρίων becomes in the Greek legend (*Il.* 22. 29; 18. 486; *Odyss.* 11. 572) an armed hero, and is represented as a hunter accompanied by a dog (Sirius). The Egyptians, as we have said, knew him as Katarti, king of the Assyrians.

§ 247. *The Table of Nations.* (b) *What it says.*

Bearing in mind the results thus secured, we may obtain from the contents of the Table of Nations these statements following:—

A. It says nothing about the existence of these separate

and distinct races. It speaks of three individuals, sons of Noah; but since it does not by any means assume that they had married their sisters (comp. Gen. vii. 13, viii. 18), and since among the children of these three sons just as little indication of sister marriages is given, we are led to infer that the sons of Shem married daughters of Japheth and Ham, and *vice versa*. Also, seeing that in ver. 25 it is expressly said that a local separation of families first occurred in the fifth generation after Noah, we are obliged to assume that during three generations such intermarriages continued to take place, so that it would be utterly impossible to draw any clear line of demarcation between the three races. A son of Mizraim, for example, who had taken to wife one of the daughters of Japheth, say a daughter of Magog, will have begotten a posterity more like to the race of Japheth than another race of Mizraim who had taken to wife a Hamite woman, say a daughter of Cush or of Phut. The Table of Nations, therefore, so far as it is concerned, allows us to look for intercommunication of forms between the Hamites, Shemites, and Japhethites. If now, in fact, such interchanges are found (comp. § 307), then it cannot be said that such a fact is in contradiction to the Tables of Nations.

B. Of the names of the seven sons of Japheth, that of Madai has been retained as the name of an Iranian nation, the Medes; among the Israelites the name of Javan has been taken as a collective name of the Græco-Macedonian races, while among the Greeks themselves it was used as a special name of the tribe of Ionians, *Ἰάκωνες*. Thus the descent of the Iranians, together with the Aryan Indian races branching off from them, in short, that of the Eastern Aryans, is to be traced back to the individual Madai, that of the Macedonian-Pelasgian group of nations to the individual Javan.¹ Two

¹ The name Japheth has also been retained in the remembrance of the Greeks in the form of *Ἰάπετος*. Japetos is named as father of Prometheus, and progenitor of the human race. But when he is at the same time represented as one of the Titans fighting against the gods, we have here

sons of Javan are named in ver. 4, and along with them two tribes (unless we should here also understand the plural forms of כְּתִים and דּוּדָנִים as plural names of individuals, according to the analogy of examples adduced in § 246), which within the bounds of Javan's posterity had already at the time of the separation of the nations, since they are known to an early tradition, existed as distinct nations. Their progenitors were undoubtedly called Keth or Dodan, and may have been brothers or nephews of Elishah and Tarshish. Since the tribe name Dodan is met with in many places (Thessaly, *Il.* 16. 233, and Epirus) in the Dodna of the Pelasgian national sanctuary, Dodan is recognised by us, with Knobel, Delitzsch, etc., as the ancestor of the Pelasgians, that is, of the Greeks; but Keth is undoubtedly the progenitor of the Makettians, subsequently called Macedonians (see *Obs.* 1). Tarshish recurs as the name of the Etruscan colony Tarseion (Polyb. iii. 24), or Tartessus (Strab. iii. 396), in Spain (Ps. lxxii.; Isa. xxiii. and lxvi.; Jer. x.; Ezek. xxvii.; Jonah i.). The names Tyrrhenians (old form *Τυρσηνοί*) and Etruscans both contain the same radicals as Tarshish. Also the form of the name Rasena, which the Etrurians applied to themselves, is most likely derived from Trasena, since in all other forms of the name the T is found. The individual Tarshish will thus be the progenitor of the Etruscans, who moved northward round about the Adriatic and settled in Italy. It has been proved by Corssen that the Etruscan language is Indo-Germanic, closely related to the Old Latin. Elishah has nothing to do, either with the *Αἰολαῖς* (Josephus, Knobel) or with Elis (Tuch, Knobel, etc.), for in both of these cases the s is only an ending. Ezekiel mentions, in chap. xxvii. 7, the isles of Elishah as places from which Tyrian purple was obtained. Since, according to Pausanias, iii. 21, purple was

undoubtedly a reminiscence of a hostile opposition, in which the progenitors of the human race after the flood, and before the separation of the nations, took part against God. Comp. Gen. xi. 3 ff. The Titans tried to storm heaven; with this compare Gen. xi. 4.

produced to the later centuries in Lacedæmon, we might think of a Greek tribe inhabiting the Peloponnesus. There might perhaps have been early inhabitants of Southern Italy and Sicily, who were descended from Elishah. By the interchange of *l* and *r*, a trace of the word Elishah might be discovered in Eryx. The proper name Gomer is retained, with the change of the first letter, in the Cimri or Cimmerians; and so the Celtic nations, but not these only, are descended from Gomer. They seem to be descendants of one son of Gomer, Riphath, whose name points us to the ῥρη *Ῥιπαῖα*, the Carpathians, as the oldest known residence of the Celts. In the legend of the Argonauts we meet with a people called Riphæans on the Caspian Sea in the Caucasus. The name was transferred probably with the people themselves, who, driven out from the Caucasus by the Scythians, and subsequently by Alyattes, Herod. iv. 12, moved on to the Carpathians, and then, driven thence by the Germans, still farther west. But before the Celts, the tribe of the Basques had already, during the Stone Age, § 257, moved westward. They have left their name in the Basque or Vosges Mountains (Vosagus, Vosegus), and they were driven by the Celts into and over the Pyrenees. In the name Basque we find that of their progenitor Ashkenaz (comp. 256 ff.). The name of the third son of Gomer, Togarmah, if the *n* is regarded as a prefixed letter, or even if the pronounced dental be resolved into a hissing aspiration of the guttural, corresponds to the name Salm, Sairimians of the Iranian tradition (§ 210 and § 224), and therefore to the Sarmatians and Sauromatian tribes, which in primitive times must have been neighbours of the Iranians on the north-west in Armenia, and have then moved over the Caucasus northward, where in A.D. 200 (Ptolem.) they had their residence between the Volga and the Vistula,—the forefathers of the Slavic races (see *Obs.* 2). By Tubal and Meshech, since Bochart, the small Caucasian tribes of the Tibareni and Moschi have been understood (Herod. iii. 94, vii. 78), which are mentioned in the inscriptions of Salmanassar

II. and Assarhadon as Tabali and Muski, occupying the east of Asia Minor. But why should the descendants of two of the sons of Japheth have remained so disproportionately small? Tubal is described in Isa. lxvi. 19 as a far-off land; Meshech, as a northern barbarous race, Ps. lxx. 5; and both are spoken of in Ezek. xxxii. 26 as the terror of the world. In Ezek. xxxviii. and xxxix. there is a prophecy of an eschatological period, when a prince Gog from the land Magog will unite the nations of Tubal, Meshech, Gomer, Togarmah, Persia, Phut, and Lud, in short, the most of the Japhetic and Semitic nations, in a last universal war against the kingdom of God.¹ All this is quite unsuitable to two relatively insignificant national stems among the many crowded together in the Caucasus. Among the Iranians, who had no letter *l*, the word Tubal must have been modified into Tubar or Tuwar. Hence the Tur of the Iranian tradition, the progenitor of the Turanians, the Ugro-Tartar-Finnic group of nations, will correspond to Tubal.² The name Meshech, too, has been preserved in the name of the Saki, Scythians, as well as in that of the Massagetæ, who had their residence north of the Jaxartes and Aral Lake, east of the Sarmatians, and were undoubtedly the progenitors of the German tribes so called, with a Celtic designation (see *Obs.* 3). Magog has been regarded, since Josephus and Jerome, as the ancestor of the nomadic tribes of Northern Asia, which as a whole were designated Scythians by the ancients.³ The Scythians among the ancients embraced (1) the true Scythians or Saki, that is, the Germanic tribes; and (2) the Ugro-Tartar-Finnic tribes, or Turanians of

¹ So far as Ezekiel is concerned, the incident already lies in the past. In Herod. i. 103 ff., where a Scythian horde in the time of Joshua overran and plundered Further Asia and Egypt, we can find only a spiritual and intellectual affinity with the prophecy of Ezekiel, not a similarity of contents. Compare also the Revelation of St. John, xx. 8, where this prophecy is considered as still unfulfilled.

² It may be here mentioned that the supreme god of those peoples bears the names Turi, Tiermes, Tara, Torom. Comp. on this matter, § 262.

³ Σκύθης is not derived from ἀποσκυθίζειν, but this is derived from the former. Σκύθης is a modification of Σάκης.

Northern Asia. But there is not the least ground for finding in the name Magog either the one or the other. As descendants of Magog we are led to think rather of people of the Mongolian group, sharply distinguished from the fair, blue-eyed Ugro Tartars by their dark hair and their dark oblique eyes, particularly the Tungus, Japanese, Chinese, and Indo-Chinese, or nations of Further India. The Malays, too, belong to this group (comp. § 270). Since Josephus, almost all, including among moderns Knobel and Delitzsch, find the name Tiras in the name *Θράκες*. How the sound *s* should change to *k* is not immediately clear. It is perhaps more feasible to think of the Agathursi in Eastern Hungary, which seem, indeed, to have been a Thracian tribe, for, according to Herod. iv. 104, they had Thracian customs. A reminiscence of Tiras is found in the old name of the Dniester: Tyras (Strabo, vii. 303).

C. The genealogy of Shem presents no difficulty, if only we maintain that the names with which we have to do are those of individuals, not of nations. The names of the ancestors of nations, Elam, Asshur, Lud, and Aram, are preserved in the names of nations, the Elamites, who in Abraham's time (Gen. xiv. 1) are represented as confederate with Shinar, therefore with the Babylonians, and are at a later period (Isa. xxi. f.; Jer. xxv.) named along with the Medes and Persians, and thus certainly had their residence in the Euphrates regions, probably in the province of Elymais, between the Tigris and the Euläus,—the Assyrians, north of Elymais, to the east of the Tigris; the Lydians in Asia Minor, and the Aramæans in Mesopotamia and Syria, therefore east and west of the Euphrates. Of the names of the four sons of Aram the name of Uz is repeated in those of various individuals of different generations (Gen. xxii. 21, xxxvi. 28); to which of them the name of the land of Uz is referable (Job i. 1) is an open question. No reminiscence of Hul and Gether has been discovered; a reminiscence of Mash may perhaps be found in the tribe of the *Μάσιοι* (Strabo, xi. 541) occupying Mount Masios on the Armenian frontier. — Arphachsad is not a

nation, but an individual. A reminiscence of him seems to be preserved in the name of the country Arrapachitis (Ptolem. vi. 1), to the north-east of the Tigris. It is conceivable that among the Hebrews as his descendants a more detailed acquaintance with his generation should be preserved. Of his two great-grandsons (according to the LXX., his great-great-grandsons), Peleg and Joktan, the latter is the progenitor of the Joktanide Arabians. The sons of Joktan are evidently individuals, not tribes. The names of some of them are preserved in names of certain tribes,—Sheleph is the Σαλαπηνοί of Ptolem., Hadoram perhaps in the Ἀδραμίται of Ptolem.; or in names of places—Hazarmaveth in Hadramaut Usal, an old name of Sana in Yemen, Sheba in Saba, Ophir as the name of a coast town mentioned in 1 Kings ix., etc., the position of which has not been determined, and Havilah in two places in Arabia bearing the same name. Peleg, ver. 25 received his name, because בִּימֵי the earth was divided, which can only mean during his lifetime (Gen. xiv. 1, xxvi. 1; 2 Sam. xxi. 1; 1 Chron. v. 10, xxix. 15, etc.), and not in the days preceding his birth. It therefore follows that the name Peleg had not been given him at the time of his birth, but was a *cognomentum*, by which he was known among his descendants. Possibly Eber, too, is a cognomen of this description, given because Eber crossed the Tigris or the Euphrates in his wanderings. On the other hand, Salah, שָׁלַח, can have no other meaning than that which it seems to have in Methuselah, shot or spear, the compound name meaning the man of the spear. According to the Masoretic text of Gen. xi. 10 ff., Peleg was born $2 + 35 + 30 + 34$, that is, 101 years after the flood; but not according to the LXX., which inserts a Canaan between Arphachsad and Salah, and gives between the flood and Peleg's birth a period of $2 + 135 + 130 + 130 + 134$, that is, 531 years. This latter seems to follow an older and better recension (see § 248, *Obs.*).

D. The Hamites, vv. 6–7 and vv. 13–20. Knobel, Ebers, and indeed all moderns, are agreed that the descendants of

Cush consist of the dark-skinned peoples of India, South Arabia, and Ethiopia, including Abyssinia and Nubia. The ancients speak of Asiatic and African Ethiopians. The Ethiopians called themselves *Χουσαῖοι* (Josephus). According to Jones and Prichard, the dark castes of Behar and Bengal are even yet like the Abyssinians, and already Megasthenes says that the Indians are like the Egyptians. The name Cush, too, has been preserved in the Indian tongue in the names of places, Cutch, Cytcha, Catsha, Gujerat, and in Beloochistan in the names of places, Kuj, Kij, Kej. An inscription of Darius at Persepolis tells of a people Kusiya, living to the east of Susiana. Since the five sons and two grandsons of Cush are individuals, not nations, it is not to be wondered at that, as Ebers complains, they cannot be identified with nations. That a כנע appears among them in ver. 7, and also, as among the sons of Joktan in ver. 28, a שבע, and similarly a Havilah, is just as little surprising as that we should find a Lud as progenitor of the Lydians in ver. 22 among the sons of Shem, and in ver. 13 a Ludim as an Egyptian tribe, the Lutu. It is proved by the Assyrian inscriptions¹ that the Hamitic tribes Sheba and Dedan are to be looked for in Northern Arabia. Moreover, a reminiscence of כנע has been preserved in Seba, the old name of Meroe (Joseph. *Antiq.* ii. 10. 2; comp. Ps. lxxii. 10; Isa. xliii.—xliv.); a reminiscence of רעמא is found in the city *Ῥέγμα* on the Persian Gulf (Ptolem. vi. 7, and Steph. v. Byz.), and of Dedan in the name of the island Dadian in the Persian Gulf (Assemani).—Proceeding upon the supposition contended against in § 246, that an Israelite living in Egypt about B.C. 900 constructed the Table of Nations from Egyptian notes, Ebers takes Phut for Arabia, because among the Egyptians Arabia was called Punt, and the Egyptian language before a *d* (but not before a *t*) is accustomed to strike out an *n*, so that Punt would be reduced to Put. Seeing, however,

¹ Schrader, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, 2 vols. London 1885 f., vol. i. 131.

that Arabia was peopled by descendants of Cush, Joktan, and Ishmael (Gen. xxv.), there is no more room there for the descendants of Phut. Phut is an individual; of his descendants the Table of Nations knows and says nothing. In Jer. xlvi. 9 (and Nahum iii. 9) Phut is named between Cush and the Ludim, a proof that Jeremiah considered the tribes of Central Africa or the Soudan as neighbours of Phut, in which no doubt he was right. Perhaps the name of the Phāzanii dwelling to the south of the Syrbis contains a reminiscence of Phut. From Lake Fittri, east of Lake Tchad down to Sierra Leone, we find a whole series of names, Fittri, Badi-Negro, west of Lake Tchad, Bussa and Funda on the Sirba, Whydah on the Dahomey coast, Buntaco and Banda in Ashantee, Batili on the Upper Sirba, Bassa in Liberia, Benda in Sierra Leone, Bondu on the Senegal, all of which have a labial as the opening consonant, and a dental as the closing consonant.

The descendants of Mizraim are (§ 246, *Obs.* 1) the Egyptians. Since their culture and history began, not in Upper Egypt, but in Memphis,¹ they must have come, not from the south, but from the north or north-east, across Pelusium.² Because they were not wild hordes, but individualized tribes, Ebers thinks that they must be regarded as Caucasians;³ as if there had been given two original families of the human race, civilised Caucasians and wild barbarians. We shall see in the Second Division, from W. von Humboldt's showing, that the wild races have become wild.⁴ And if the languages of that group, to which those of the Egyptians and North Africans belong, have many roots in common with the Semitic and Aryan groups (see *Obs.* 4), it does not follow from this, as Benfey and Ebers suppose, that

¹ Lepsius, *Briefe und aus Ägypten, Äthiopien und der Sinaihalbinsel*, 1842 f. Ebers, *Ägypten*, p. 41.

² Ebers, *Ägypten*, p. 181.

³ And it is to be hoped also the Chinese!

⁴ Ebers himself maintains, p. 52, a demonstrable degradation of race from the old Egyptians down to those of the present day, the Fellahs. In the oldest skulls there is no trace of prognathium; after the time of Ptolemy the facial angle always becomes more and more imperfect.

the Egyptians were related in race to the Semites, but only that the leading languages of mankind have sprung from a common stock. That the old Egyptians do not show a negro type of skull cannot, after what has been remarked under *A*, be used as evidence against their Hamitic descent. If Phut has had for a wife one of his nieces, *e.g.* a daughter of Cush, but Mizraim a daughter of Shem, everything would be cleared up. A certain relationship in physical type, however, does appear between the negroes and the Egyptians. The heads of mummies are indeed orthognathous, but not less so are many of the Central African tribes, the Bishareen, the Kabyls, the Kaffirs. The mummies, however, have in common with the negroes the tendency to curling of the hair (Prichard), powerful development of the muscles of the neck (Retzius, Waitz), weak legs, flat noses, prominent cheek-bones (Czermak, Ebers), and frequently flat faces. The author who, about the time of the departure from Egypt, § 246, committed to writing the genealogy, which had hitherto been orally transmitted, enumerates at ver. 13 f. the different tribes of the Egyptians as they were named in Egypt in his time. The Ludim are, according to Ebers, the *lutu*, which properly means citizens; and means the inhabitants of the kingdom proper, that is, of Lower and Middle Egypt. The Pathrusim are the inhabitants of the province of Pathros or Pather, the people of Upper Egypt. The Naphtuhim, from Ptah and the article *na*, are the inhabitants of Memphis, where Ptah was worshipped. The Lehabim are the Libyans, subject partly to the Egyptian empire; the Egyptian *lub* means, like the Hebrew לֹב, לָבָא, to burn, to thirst. Ebers will have it that the Libyans had migrated from Crete. This supposition is unnecessary. They were a tribe of the stock of Mizraim, speaking a language closely related to that of the Egyptians. On ancient monuments they appear tattooed, which certainly does not suggest an Aryan or a Semitic descent. The Casluhim lived between Pelusium and Palestine on the Mediterranean at *mons Casius* (*ghas*, mountain, and *lokh*, to

dry up), that plateau into which the Idumean mountains run out in their northern extreme. The Anamim, because the word *amu* is an appellative for a herd or keeper of cattle, should be, according to Ebers, a Semitic tribe that had come into the north of Egypt before the time of the Hyksos. A city Anamaima is referred to in the hieroglyphs as destroyed by Ramses II. in a war against the Hittites. On the tomb of Sethos an *amu* is depicted with features decidedly un-Egyptian, and on a sepulchral monument of Benihasan is a series of pictures of cattle herds with a Semitic cast of countenance. It seems quite possible that this latter picture may represent the coming down of the family of Jacob. The conquest of the city Anamaima by Ramses II. is of greater importance; but it may have been a reconquering of an Egyptian city that had been taken away by the Hittites, the city conquered by the Hittites may have been inhabited by Egyptians, and in this way there may have been a province of Anamaima. That an author so well versed in Egyptian affairs, as the writer of the Table of Nations was, should have attributed to a Canaanite or purely Semitic tribe an Egyptian descent, is in the highest degree improbable. By his Anamim he must mean an actually Egyptian tribe, which inhabited Anamaima.

About the Casluhim this author makes the remark that "from thence (כַּשְׁלִימִי) came the Philistines and the Caphtorim." Knobel¹ has pointed out the connection of the Colchians and the Casluhim which had been affirmed by Herodotus. In Colchis there was an Egyptian colony. According to Deut. ii. 23, Amos ix. 7, the Philistines came from Caphtor into Palestine. Ebers has now satisfactorily proved that Kaft in the Egyptian language means the Phœnicians, that the Phœnician writing was derived from the hieratic writing of the Egyptians, that the old Phœnician colonies in Sardinia were already liable to service to the Egyptians under Ramses II., and that the Phœnicians had a very great deal that was Egyptian in their customs and religion (see *Obs.* 5).

¹ Knobel, *Völkertafel*, p. 291.

But, because he adheres firmly to the notion that the Phœnicians must have been Semites,¹ he cannot find any explanation, except by the conjecture, that at a very remote period the Phœnicians had come into possession of the Delta, and that from thence, long before the time of Ramses II., they had colonized Sardinia. But surely it is utterly inconceivable that the twelfth dynasty, just shortly before the time of the Hyksos, could fortify the eastern frontier of Lower Egypt against the Semites, if the Semites had already for centuries occupied the very heart of Lower Egypt. The truth rather is this, that the Caphtorim were a tribe of Egyptian descent, namely, certain of the Casluhim, who on account of over-population issued forth in early times from the barren mountainous region of Mount Casius, undertook voyages as sea robbers, and made colonizing attempts. First of all they settled at Crete (comp. Jer. xlvii. 4 with the invincible combination כרתי ופלתי, 2 Sam. viii. 18, etc.), then from Crete they went to Philistia, and also, still in the early times, to Colchis, and especially to Phœnicia, where, in connection with the descendants of Sidon (Gen. x. 15), a son of Canaan, they constituted a mixed people under the name of Phœnicians, and from this sent out their oldest colonies to Sardinia. We have considered in detail the more characteristically Egyptian elements in the Phœnician religion in § 250, *C*. That the Caphtorim migrating to Phœnicia should adopt the language of the descendants of the Canaanite Sidon, who were there before them, is not more singular than that the Casluhim in Colchis and the Caphtorim in Philistia should have abandoned and unlearned their Egyptian mother tongue.

There remains then only the question (§ 244) as to how the descendants of Canaan, vv. 15–20, in regard to whom individually there is no need of special inquiry, had come to adopt a Semitic language.

¹ In saying this he quite forgets that he has also described the Egyptians as a Semitic race. Here the Egyptians, as not being a Semitic people, are set over against the Phœnicians as Semitic.

E. On this point we are afforded light by the section, vv. 8–12, added by the transcriber of the Table of Nations, but containing an old oral tradition. “And Cush begat Nimrod.” When among the actual sons of Cush, as their names were preserved in the earliest tradition, no Nimrod appears, it must be assumed, either that Nimrod was a son of a concubine, who therefore had no place in the genealogy of legitimate sons as heirs, or, which is better, that he was not immediately but only mediately begotten of Cush, that he was Cush’s grandson or great-grandson. His name therefore was kept in memory in the tradition on account of his personal deeds and achievements. He was a mighty hunter. By this we do not need to understand, with Delitzsch, the hunting of a sportsman, the shooting of hares and partridges, but a brave and successful clearing of the jungles of the Euphrates valley of the beasts of prey that haunted that region.¹ It was, then, because, far from taking in sport the life of other creatures, he was a benefactor, protector, and saviour of the human race, that he attained to something like royal rank (ממלכת, ver. 10), partly in places that were already the residence of man (ver. 10), which submitted to his commands and counsels, partly in new realms founded by himself (ver. 11). The name which was given him is in agreement with this. The root מרר has usually in Arabic the meaning *audacem esse in insolentia et rebellione*, but may be also simply *assiduum esse in re peragenda* (Ch. W. Freytag). Its primary meaning seems therefore to have been that of foolhardiness, rashness. The name Nimrod, נמרד, therefore, corresponds exactly in meaning to the cognomen of

¹ The Egyptian legend in Papyrus Amaratís I. boasts of Katarti, that he had fought with hyenas. But the Assyrian inscriptions afford the most decided confirmation, especially those which tell of Izdubar, that is, Nimrod, § 255, that his life had been a struggle against lions, tigers, and leopards. A pictorial representation (in Smith, *Chaldean Account of Genesis*, p. 174) shows Izdubar engaged in battle with a lion, and his countenance is certainly not of an Assyrio-Babylonian, but of an unmistakeably Ethiopian type. The cylinder inscription of Khorsabad also calls him a Cushite.

William Tell; for Tell or Toll signifies ungovernable, rash. In the name, too, there may have lain, perhaps, the additional meaning, that the son, incapable of being heir, had excelled the legitimate sons who were the heirs. But that he had secured this position by a deed of violence, war, and murder, is not hinted at by a single syllable. On the contrary, it is only his might as a hunter that is mentioned as the ground on which his reputation rests, so that subjection under him seems to have been a thoroughly hearty and voluntary submission. Nor is he at all represented as one who defied God. It is rather hinted—and that, indeed, not first by the transcriber of the Table of Nations, but already in a proverb which he found current—that Nimrod *לפני-יהוה גבור ציד*, in the original form of the proverb it had probably been written *לפני-אלהים*. The words, before God, intimate either (Gen. xvii. 1; Ps. lvi. 13, etc.) that an action of the man, according to its subjective quality, is one done in the consciousness of the omnipresent nearness of God, therefore a God-fearing action, or (Gen. vi. 11, xix. 13; Hos. vii. 2; comp. Jer. xvi. 17) that a human action, according to its objective quality, is such that God cannot remain indifferent to it, but must judge and punish. Had the words *לפני-יהוה* stood in the 11th verse, they would have been at once understood in the latter sense. The rule of a Hamite over Semitic tribes in holding Shinar and Asshur would certainly seem an impious frustration of the blessing of Noah (ix. 25 f.). But the words occur not in ver. 11 but in ver. 9, alongside of *גבור ציד*. Since, then, the boldness and successfulness with which he destroyed beasts of prey could not possibly have been displeasing to God (Gen. i. 28, ix. 2), since, further, there is not a syllable uttered about any penal infliction by God, no other conclusion can be reached than this, that the words in question must be understood as intimating the fact that Nimrod was a devout man who feared God. (Comp. § 274, *Obs.*) It is worthy of remark that even in the Old Babylonian tradition, dating about B.C. 2000, Izdubar, in

whom not only George Smith, but also Herm. and Friedr. Delitzsch recognise Nimrod, is represented as fighting with lions, tigers, and serpents, as born in a district Amardu, the name of which reminds us of Nimrod, as governing Babel, Erech, Accad, and Nippur (which last answers to Caluch), as overthrowing a tyrant Humbaba, as rejecting the love proposals of the moon goddess Istar from abhorrence of her impurity, and so calling down her wrath, as akin to their own ancestor, the Assyrian Noah, Sisit or Hasisadra, and depicted in foreign attire like that of an Ethiopian. (Comp. Sillem, *das a. Testament im Licht der assyr. Forschungen*, i. p. 22 ff.)

It only remains now, in conclusion, to consider what date must be assigned to Nimrod's life and reign. In ver. 11 it is said, he went out of that land to Asshur,¹ and built there four cities. Of the four cities in Shinar, on the other hand, which are called in ver. 10 the beginning of his kingdom, it is not said that he built them. The words rather imply that he had found those settlements there before him. Since, then, Babel was begun to be built immediately before the scattering of the nations, and by the still united race of mankind (xi. 4), and since Nimrod found Babel already built, along with three other cities, and since the Assyrians also (x. 11) had separated from the inhabitants of Shinar, and had taken possession of their own land, Nimrod's career must be assigned to a period subsequent to the scattering of the nations.² Now it was just after the separated tribes began to disperse that such a hero was

¹ Tuch, Baumgarten, Knobel, Delitzsch, and Schrader rightly regard אַשּׁוּר as *acc. localis*; for this country, whither at a later period he went, and not the departure of another man or tribe from Shinar, forms the proper antithesis to the "beginning of his kingdom" of ver. 10.

² The fancy, then, that Nimrod was mainly guilty of the building of the Tower of Babel is doubly contradictory of the text of Genesis. The Masoretic chronology (according to which Peleg was born 101 years after the flood) is quite consistent with the idea that Nimrod was an immediate son of Cush, inasmuch as Cush's eldest son (Gen. xi. 10) was born 37 years after the flood, whereas Nimrod was born much later, and at Peleg's birth may still have been a young man. If, however, the LXX. be right

needed. His doings were praiseworthy, and so he, as a mighty hunter, securing safety to others, was willingly acknowledged by the Semitic races, Elamites, Assyrians, Aramæans, over whom he exercised his authority. Thus we have here in the age immediately following the scattering of the nations a peaceful union of Hamitic and Semitic peoples in the Euphrates region under the rule of a Cushite. In this way it may without hazard be assumed, that the descendants of Canaan, in fulfilment of the testamentary utterance of Noah (Gen. ix. 25 ff.), as a servile class subject to the Semites,¹ had their place then in that combination, until at a later period they freed themselves from the yoke and moved westwards. That a union of two races effected in such a way might, nay must, have had an influence upon the language, is at once evident. If, during that first period, when Mizraim and Phut, unaffected by Semitic influences, had already gone to the west, the family of Canaan still remained in the Euphrates district, it is quite conceivable that this family would speak the language of its immediate rulers, the Semites, and adopt it as their own language. But that the Canaanites actually first withdrew to the west after the tribes of Phut and Mizraim, is proved from the settlements of those peoples. In this we have a thoroughly satisfactory solution of the problem of § 244.

Obs. 1. — Kittim has been identified with Cyprus. But Isaiah evidently does not intend in chap. xxiii. 1 to indicate a country near, but one extremely distant, to which the fall of

in putting Peleg's birth 531 years after the flood, Nimrod could not be a son, but only a descendant of Cush. And, indeed, where had he in the third generation after Noah the number of men needed for peopling eight cities? The first generation after Noah consisted of three, the second of twenty-two families (Gen. x. 7, 13-18); the third, even if, taking Gen. x. 7 as our rule, we reckon six to each, would have 132 families; this would only give sixteen households to each city. Nimrod, therefore, must have been separated from Cush by a series of generations.

¹ That Gen. ix. 20-29 cannot be a new poetical production expressing the national hate of a later period has been proved in § 244. It is therefore an old historical tradition.

Tyrus would become known. Wood for shipbuilding (Ezek. xxvii. 6) grew also in Macedonia, and in 1 Macc. i. 1 and viii. 5 the Macedonian king Alexander the Great is represented as king of Kittim.

Obs. 2.—That the Armenians of to-day (Ritter, *Erdkunde*, x. 358) call themselves “the house of Togarmah,” only proves that they subscribe to the ethnological opinion that they are descended from Togarmah, not that actually the descendants of Togarmah are to be sought in Armenia. The fact that in the languages of both groups of nations the first stage of modification has only been half completed, speaks in favour of the close race connection of the Slavs and the Celts. The initial *mutæ* and *mediæ* have remained *mutæ* and *mediæ*, only the *aspiratæ* are modified in *medias*.

Obs. 3.—According to Greek accounts, there was a Scythian tribe, called by the Persians Σάκαι, living east of Sogdiana and Bactria. This is confirmed by the Persian inscription of Behistun, where, i. 16, 17, among the tribes subject to Darius Hystaspis the Sakai appear. The Assyrian transcript of the inscription (see Schrader, *die assyr. babyl. Keilinschriften*, Leipz. 1872, p. 341) calls them Chimiri. The inscription of Naksch-i-Rustam (*ibid.* p. 360) designates the Scythians by the term Nam-mir-ri. According to Herod. iv. 6, the Scythians called themselves Σκολότους, where λότος can scarcely be anything else than the Teutonic word lot, leod, liut; Sakai people therefore was the name the Scythians gave themselves. It is indisputable that the Μασσαγέται (Herod. i. 204) inhabiting the region extending round the whole northern border of the Sea of Aral, as well as the Θυσσαγέται (Herod. iv. 123) living farther north, belongs to that great family of the Sakai or Scythians. There are two tribes of the Getæ; and if, as is quite possible, the original of the Græcized form of the name Μασσαγέται be Massak-Getæ or Massag-Getæ, this would be quite analogous to the case of the Ἰάονες, as an assumption of the name of the common ancestor of the race as the name of a particular tribe. J. Grimm has assumed on substantial grounds that the Getæ are identical with the Goths who appeared at a later period on the Black Sea; and W. Krafft (*Kirchengeschichte der germ. Völker*, Berl. 1854, i. pp. 77-128) has anew and in a more thorough manner proved it. Ammianus (xxiii. 5) had already recognised the Massagetæ in the Alani. The Scythian tribe of the Νεῦροι (Nervi) so early as the time of Herodotus (iv. 105) had the legend of the Werewolf in its specifically German form. The Scythian names Ἀριπείδης (Ariovistus), Ὀύκος (translation of Ulf, wolf), Herod. iv, 76, 78, are German, and in the name Ἰδανθύρσος (*ibid.*) we only need

to drop the Greek ending and we have it modified according to analogy into the name Agathyrses, which, according to Herodotus, is not a Scythian name. The name Germani is admitted to be no German or Teutonic word, but one given to the Teutons by the Celts: Gairman, the crier or shouter, from *gairm*, to scream, because the Germans were wont to rush into battle with a loud war-cry, while the Celts went with the songs of their bards.

Obs. 4.—Of the examples adduced by Ebers in support of the relationship of the Egyptian and Semitic languages, markabuta (מרנבת) was just as certainly a foreign word imported into the Egyptian language as the horse was a foreign animal. Asi, sister, has hardly any connection with אשה, from the root אנש. The following, however, are really to the point: bitu, בית; bennu, בן; ima, juma, ים; af, אפעה (a serpent); somewhat more doubtful is atef, אט. In regard to the other examples, the Indo-Germanic languages are brought into relation to the Semitic: as in patah, פתח, περάννυμι, patere; in שר, chief, Sausar, Sâra, strength; Celtic, sar, chief, hero; in kelhet, קלחת, κέλυτος, Goth. katils, Old High Germ. chezil, Germ. Kessel, kettle (probably from the root קלה, to be warm). Ebers is confident of possessing three hundred examples.

Obs. 5.—On the tablet of Canopus, Phœnicia is designated in Egyptian by Kaft. The conjecture that Phœnician colonists of the Delta of the Nile, which curves outward toward the sea, had called themselves Kaft, from כפת, to be round, is untenable, because כפת means to bind. The Caphtorim would thus rather have designated themselves the great confederacy (*kaft-ur*).

On Eubœa there were Phœnician settlers with purple dye stuffs and works in metal; whether, on this account, the Eubœan mountain range Caphareus is derived from Kaft, or whether Φαλασσία and Νιλεύς should suggest Pelusium and the Nile (which by the Egyptians is still called not the Nile, but Yaro), is very doubtful. A direct derivation of the Eubœan colonists from the Delta of the Nile has not been by any means decidedly proved.

The admission of Ebers (p. 146) is of greater importance, that the derivation of the Caphtorim in the Table of Nations from Mizraim is to be explained, not from national hate, but from a perception of the early connection between the Phœnicians and the Egyptians. This early connection is clearly proved by Ebers. On the derivation of the Phœnician writing from the hieratic, which from at least B.C. 2000 was in use alongside of the hieroglyphs, see Ebers, p. 147 f. An inscription of the age of Ramses II. mentions a Sardinian (Sardana)

bodyguard; a monument of the time of Ramses III. (thirteenth century) depicts a Sairtana, who wears on his helmet a crescent, and over that a sun-disc; a double emblem which is found also on a gem of B.C. 1000 with the Phœnician superscription **לאביבעל** (Abibal, father of the Hiram of David's time), and on a Phœnician gem at Berlin with the superscription **בנאן**. The shield of that warrior is ornamented round about with a series of points, an ornamentation which is peculiar to the Bronze Age. That double emblem belongs to the worship of Osiris. In Malta and Gozzo, Phœnician coins were found with the legend **אבראסר**, Abd Osir, servant of Osiris. The Phœnicians had thus borrowed from the Egyptians, not only their alphabet, but also the worship of Osiris; and though it does not follow from the Sardinian Phœnicians forming the bodyguard of the Egyptian kings that they were directly sprung from Egypt, yet it is evident that they were aware of their connection with Egypt in early times, and so willing entered into the Egyptian military service. The Nurhags of Sardinia are miniature pyramids with passages and burying-places. In the army of Psammetichus there was a Phœnician soldier named Abd Ptah (Ebers, p. 163 f.). Although the coffin of Eschmunazar is similar in form to the Egyptian coffins of the twenty-sixth dynasty, this does not prove that there was an early connection between the two peoples. Also the curse of Eschmunazar against him who should open the coffin, did not require for its explanation the accumulation of similar expressions from the coffins of Egyptian mummies, for indeed among all ancient civilised peoples the tomb was held sacred, and its violation was regarded as a heinous crime. More important is the demonstration that the Phœnicians also embalmed their dead and wrapt them round with bands, that on Phœnician monuments in Phœnicia Sphinxes and Scarabæi are found, also the inscription **לעת עמי**, to Hathor the mighty, also in On in Egypt it has the predicate "jusas." Whether the block of Syrian limestone in Gebal, where a Pharaoh is represented embracing the cow-shaped Hathor, has come down from early times or is not rather a relic of the wars of Necho, is uncertain. On the religious relationship of the Phœnicians and Egyptians, see § 250.

Obs. 6.—The Turanian (Akkadian) elements that have been proved by Isaac Taylor (*Report of the Second Congress of Orientalists*, 1873, p. 10 f.) to exist in the Etruscan language, indicate either a residence of those peoples alongside of one another in Asia, or an affinity (a relationship by marriage) between their progenitors.

§ 248. *The War of Amraphel.*

If an answer has been given in the previous section to the problem stated in § 244, the matter is made thoroughly clear when we take in connection therewith the old story of Gen. xiv. The supreme importance of this narrative is admitted by Eb. Schrader. In Abraham's time four kings reigned over the countries in the Euphrates region. Of these, three bear Semitic names: 1. אמרפל (from *amir*, lord, and *pil*, or *habal*, son)¹ of Shinar, that is, Babylon; 2. אריך (comp. Dan. ii. 14, perhaps from *aria*, lion, lion-god, and some yet undiscovered verbal stem) of Ellasar (from אל-אשר, God is good, since the modes of writing אשר and אֱלֹהִים interchange, as is seen by a comparison of פלאשר and פול מלך אשר, 2 Kings xv. 19 and 29); 3. כדרלעמר (Kudur Lagamar; see *Obs.*) of Elam; 4. חרעל, king of the גוים, that is, of the non-Semitic races, which were confederates with Babylon, Elam, and Assyria. We see that there has set in a reaction against and opposition to the Hamitic empire founded by Nimrod. The Semites asserted their rights, Gen. ix. 26, and shook off the yoke of Hamitic supremacy or hegemony hateful to their proud spirit.² The old Hamite empire is shattered in Abraham's time, five generations after the birth of Peleg, and somewhere about two centuries after its founding (see *Obs.*), and certain Semitic empires, confederated with one another, rise in its place. The Inscriptions here again afford

¹ Schrader, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, vol. i. 120.

² The Izdubar legend also contains a hint of this. Istar, whose offer of marriage to Izdubar was rejected because of his abhorrence of her impurity, hates him. When he conquers the bull which she sends against him, she goes in despair into the lower world, the abyss. This means that her worship in the upper world, like that of the bull-shaped Moloch, has an end. But since, after her descent into the lower world, female slaves would no longer yield to the importunities of their masters, the God Hea^u caused Istar to return again from the lower world. This means that the Semitic fleshly lust, and with it the shameful worship of Istar, again obtained the victory over the worship of the God Sarturda (שֵׁר, king, and some unknown root) that had been introduced by Izdubar-Nimrod.

admirable confirmatory evidence. These contain, besides the Assyro-Babylonian texts, other texts in a non-Semitic language, the so-called Sumerian or Akkadian, pointing to a non-Semitic race, which bore rule in Shinar before that of the Semitic Babylonians.¹ Now the Inscriptions relate (see Smith, *Chaldean Account of Genesis*, 1880, p. 226 ff.) that Izdubar-Nimrod (see § 247, E, note) was king of Erech and Babylon, that he opposed the worship of Istar (Smith, p. 228 ff., Table 6 of the Flood), that in the Semitic kingdom of Elam the worship of Istar prevailed (Tomkins, *Times of Abraham*, 1879, p. 12), and that in B.C. 2280 the king of Elam, Kudur Nanhundi, overthrew the city of Erech (account of King Assurbanipal in Smith, *Assyrian Discoveries*, 1875, p. 206), and so destroyed the Sumerian empire. This happened shortly before Abraham's time. That in the interval after Nimrod's death the worship of Istar had spread from Elam through the Sumerian empire, is proved by the form of the flood legend (§ 255), as well as by the image of Istar which Kudur Nanhundi found in Erech (Smith, *Assyrian Discoveries*, p. 206). We have proof of the bitter national hate that sprang up by reason of this opposition of the Semites to the Hamitic supremacy, in the fact that the heathen Semites of the Euphrates district and of Western Syria gave to the constellation, in which the Arabs as well as the Indo-Germanic Greeks (§ 246, *Obs.* 2) commemorated Nimrod, the name נִסְרִי, the fool, the profligate. This name of the constellation could not have been originated by the Israelites, for the Israelitish tradition (Gen. x. 8 ff.) knows nothing but what is good about Nimrod (§ 247, E.). It must therefore have been the Semites of the Euphrates regions who had devised this name, which at a later period came into use among the Israelites (Job ix. 9, xxxviii. 31; Amos v. 8) as the name of the constellation, but only as such.

But now we find this national hate extending farther.

¹ Just the primitive legend of the flood (§ 255) is contained in the Sumerian text alongside of the Babylonian.

Not contented with having freed themselves from the Hamitic supremacy in the Euphrates regions, and with having subjected the Cushites of that district, they extended their sway over the Canaanites, who, undoubtedly in the storms and battles during the overturning and destroying of the empire of Nimrod, had made themselves free from the yoke of the Semites, and had migrated to Palestine. Their conflicts were first of all with the Canaanites of the Araba, the valley extending north and south of the Dead Sea, undertaken evidently in order to prevent these Hamitic tribes from being able to afford any help to their brethren the Cushites of the Euphrates. Thus their general relationship as laid down in Gen. ix. 25 f. continued in force. This incident, then, is also quite conceivable if the Table of Nations is right about the Hamitic derivation of the Canaanites. They were actually able for twelve years (Gen. xiv. 4) to hold the Canaanite kings of the vale of Siddim in subjection. Then these revolted and secured their freedom, probably with the help of non-Canaanite, Cushite tribes (the Susim, Emim, Horites), for these tribes were the first to experience the vengeance of the Semites of the Euphrates (Gen. xiv. 5, 6). The Canaanites of the vale of Siddim were also overcome in a battle (ver. 8); but as, among others, Lot was taken away captive, Abraham, with a force of 318 servants, rushed down under cover of night upon the camp of the Euphrates Semites (ver. 15), drove them in their confusion to flight, and took from them their spoil. The continued existence of the Canaanites is thereby made certain.

Thus from the outlines of the early Israelite tradition that have been preserved, the historical and ethnographical relationship is represented in a thoroughly clear and lucid manner, and there is no reason for doubting the Hamitic origin of the Canaanites and Phœnicians. But also the facts obtained form a foundation for the understanding of the religious history of the heathen Semites, the Canaanites, and the Phœnicians.

Obs.—We turn our attention now to the chronology of the Old Testament.

A. Abram goes out with his father from Ur of the Chaldees. This place, as Schrader and Smith suppose, is not to be sought in Mesopotamia, but in Babylon, on the site of the present village of Mugheir, which has been identified as the city Uru by means of inscriptions on bricks found there. Then, after his father's death (Gen. xi. 32, xii. 4), he went on out from Haran, as also Stephen (Acts vii. 4) represents the matter. At this time Abram was seventy-five years old (Gen. xii. 4), so that he was born in his father's one hundred and thirtieth year, and was therefore not his eldest son, who was born, according to Gen. xi. 26, in Terah's seventieth year, and thus he seems to have been a contemporary of his nephew Lot.

B. From the birth of Abraham down to that of Isaac are a hundred years (Gen. xxi. 5); from the birth of Isaac to that of Jacob there are sixty years (Gen. xxv. 26); from that to the going down of Jacob into Egypt there were a hundred and thirty years (Gen. xlvii. 9); from that to the deliverance from Egypt there were four hundred and thirty years (Ex. xii. 40, with which the ten generations reckoned between Ephraim and Joshua, in 1 Chron. vii. 23–27, agree). The going forth from Egypt is thus placed seven hundred and twenty years after the birth of Abraham.

C. From the going out of Egypt to the fourth year of Solomon's reign there are four hundred and eighty years (1 Kings vi. 1). Köhler (*Lehrb. der bibl. Gesch. a. Test.* ii. § 35–50) says that the chronology of the Book of Joshua and of the Book of Judges agrees with this. So soon as it is admitted, in accordance with Judg. x. 6, 7, that the Ammonite oppression runs parallel with that of the Philistines, that therefore the times of Jephthah are parallel to those of Samuel and Samson, and, further, that Saul reigned not forty years, according to the later Jewish idea given in Josephus and others, which, according to the correct reading, Acts xiii. 21 does not adopt, but only somewhere about nine years—we get these results: 1. That from the departure out of Egypt till the complete conquest of Canaan there were forty-five years (Josh. xiv. 10); and 2. That, according to the Jewish tradition given in Josephus, Joshua survived the conquest of Canaan for twenty-five years. Whether this latter statement is correct, and whether he was still in life at the time of the ultimate conquest of Kirjath Sepher by Othniel (Josh. xv. 17), is of no importance in a chronological investigation. The statement is of much more consequence, that it was a generation that had grown up in peace (Judg. iii. 1, 2) that Chushan overcame. If we assume

between the completed conquest (Josh. xiv. 10) and the subjection under Chushan (Judg. iii. 3) a period of twenty years, we shall not be far wrong. Thus from the departure out of Egypt to the end of that forty years' peace we have $45 + 20 + 8 + 40$, giving a total of 113 years. From that time till Gideon's death there are $18 + 80 + 20 + 40 + 7 + 40$ years, giving a total of 205 years (Judg. iii. 14, 30, iv. 3, v. 31, vi. 1, viii. 28). Abimelech succeeded for three years, Tola for twenty-three years, Jair for twenty-two years (Judg. x. 2 f.). Thus $113 + 205 + 48$ will give us 366 years after the departure from Egypt as the time at which the Ammonite and Philistine supremacy begins. The supremacy of the Philistines lasted for forty years, down to the time of Samuel's battle of Ebenezer. To the beginning of this forty years' period belong the deeds of Samson, and running parallel to them, the age of Jephthah, Ibzan, Elon, and Abdon. The victory of Ebenezer, therefore, takes place 406 years after the departure out of Egypt. After this Samuel judged Israel a long time (ver. 15), down to his old age (viii. 1). So, then, from the victory of Ebenezer till the choice of Saul it may be confidently assumed that a period of sixteen years should be allowed; but not much more, for Samuel's life extended through a great part of the reign of Saul. In our opinion, he must have been twenty years old at the time of the battle of Ebenezer (iv. 1), and about fifty-six years old at the beginning of Saul's reign. We have therefore 422 years between the departure from Egypt and the time when Saul was made king. To this add nine years of Saul's reign, forty years of David's reign, and the four years of Solomon's reign, and we have 475 years (1 Kings vi. 1, 480 years) from the exodus to the dedication of the temple. There follow then thirty-six years more of Solomon's reign, and 362 years of the reigns of the kings of Judah, which must be increased some years, say to 370 years, because there were residues of months (comp. 2 Chron. xii. 13 with xiii. 1), which were in no way compensated by some similiar deficiencies, as in chap. xvi. 13. The exodus from Egypt therefore fell, according to this chronology, 480 years + 36 + 370 before the destruction of Jerusalem, or 886 + 586, that is, 1472 years before the beginning of the Dionysian era.

D. We have now only to examine the first of all the periods, that from the flood to the birth of Abraham, and here we encounter serious difficulties. The Masoretic text, with which the Peshito agrees, reckons, according to Gen. xi., from the flood down to the departure of Sarah and Abraham from Haran 427 years, but the Septuagint assigns a period of 1207 years. Tuch and Delitzsch held that the LXX. had made the change

consciously with an object in view. This object, however, could only have been the support of a notion that there had been no begetting of children before the age of seventy. It is, however, objectively highly improbable that the age of begetting, to put it shortly, which in the case of Shem amounted to a hundred years, should have suddenly fallen in the course of ten generations to thirty and thirty-five years (in the case of Arphachsad thirty-five, in the case of Salah thirty, in the case of Eber thirty-four, in the case of Peleg thirty, in the case of Reu thirty-two, in the case of Serug thirty, in the case of Nahor twenty-nine), while it afterward rose in the case of Abraham to eighty-six years (Gen. xvi. 16), in the case of Isaac to sixty years. It is further suspicious that, according to the Masoretic text, the time between the flood and the going of Abraham into Canaan is precisely equal to the period between the exodus from Egypt and the beginning of the reign of Saul, namely, 427 years. Finally, the space of time allowed, according to the Masoretic text, 290 years, between the scattering of the peoples in Peleg's time down to Abraham, is, as Köhler has rightly insisted, much too short, in order that in it such kingdoms could be constructed as those of Elam, Babel, Assyria, and Egypt, which existed in Abraham's time, or that in this space of time there could have been the rooting out of whole peoples, like those of Anakims, who had been destroyed by the Canaanites. There is no indication that the LXX. had wilfully changed the chronology; everything rather points to their having had before them different numbers in the text which they used. That even at the time of Christ those readings of numbers used by the LXX. had unquestionable currency in Israel is proved by the synagogal use of the LXX., as well as by the practice of the New Testament, which in regard to Gen. xi. follows the LXX. Luke iii. 36 inserts Canaan, though left out by the Masoretic text. We shall therefore be justified in following the readings of the LXX. According to these, from the flood to the birth of Arphachsad were two years, from the birth of Arphachsad to that of Cainan 135 years, from the birth of Cainan to that of Salah 130 years, from birth of Salah to that of Eber 130 years, from birth of Eber to that of Peleg 134 years, from birth of Peleg to that of Reu 130 years, from birth of Reu to that of Serug 132 years, from birth of Serug to that of Nahor 130 years, from birth of Nahor to that of Terah 79 years, from birth of Terah down to the departure from Haran 205 years, giving a total of 1207 years. Seeing that Abraham was 75 years old when he left Haran (Gen. xii. 4), this puts the date of the birth of Abraham 1132 years after the flood. The scattering of the peoples in the days of Peleg, that is,

when Peleg was not a boy but a man, may be set down at about 660 years after the flood. This would leave about 470 years between the scattering of the peoples and Abraham's birth, and between the scattering of the peoples and the entrance into Canaan about 546 years. The exodus from Egypt, then, may be put at 1852 years after the flood; the beginning of Saul's reign at 2297; the destruction of Jerusalem at 2738; the beginning of the Dionysian era at 3324. The flood occurred, according to the Masoretic chronology, 1656, according to that of the LXX., 2262 years after the creation of Adam. From Adam to Christ, then, if we follow the reading of the LXX., there are 5586 years; if we follow the Masoretic reading of Gen. v., 4980 years. Should we follow the Masoretic chronology of Gen. xi., the flood would be placed, not 3324, but 2544 years before Christ. This would agree remarkably with the tradition of the Chinese, whose historical documents place the flood in a year which corresponds to B.C. 2597. But not only the Egyptian historical documents, vacillating as their chronology may seem, and admitting that the later Egyptian priesthood has regarded synchronous dynasties as consecutive, imperiously demand a far longer period; but above all, as we have said, holy Scripture itself obliges us, from what it says of the existence of great kingdoms in Abraham's time, to assume a longer period than 290 years between the time of Peleg and that of Abraham.

For the rest, it is a singular procedure on the part of modern critical science to assume as unquestionable truth every date which is found in Egyptian documents, even if these be late, secondary, and tertiary, but to bring against the dates of the early Israelitish tradition the axiomatic conviction, which one might rather call the blind prejudice, that here we have before us only overgrown myths. Hitzig (whom Redslob reproaches with throwing off hypotheses, as an old skin does maggots) even goes so far as to explain the war of Amraphel by representing it as a legendary account of the expedition of Sennacherib against Hezekiah. A brick inscription (Schrader, *The Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, vol. i. 73) of Kudur Mabuk, a king of Elam, is extant, in which he is described as Lord of Aharri, that is, Canaan, which is there represented ideographically as Martu, from a root similar to that of Nimrod. From this Schrader rightly concludes that there had been an old Elamite royal family whose name began with Kudur, כּדּר, one of which, perhaps an immediate predecessor of Kudurlagamar, had pushed his victories as far as Canaan (Gen. xiv. 4). Another such inscription also exists, according to which 1635 years

before the overthrow of the Elamite city Susa by Assurbanipal in B.C. 645, that is to say, in B.C. 2280, King Kudur-Nanhundi plundered Erech, and carried an image of Istar from it to Susa.

If, now, we turn back again to Egypt, the Egyptian documents afford the most complete and exact confirmation of the statements of the Pentateuch down to the time of Joseph (§ 241, *Obs.*). Without being uncritical, one may venture to guess that this primitive Israelitish tradition may also in other particulars also be faithful and correct.

Finally, it should be remembered, that among the cities of Assyria the city Assur, now Kilsh Shergat, to which, according to Gen. x. 11, Nimrod proceeded, which he therefore already found built, is in fact, according to Assyrian tradition, the oldest of all. The second is Nineveh, in Assyrian Ninua, from נִוָּה, to dwell. The passage, Gen. x. 12, is so to be understood that העיר הגדולה are put in apposition to the four preceding names: Nineveh, the city Rehoboth, Calah, and Rasen, that is, these four sections of the city are one city. When Shalmanazar I., about B.C. 1300, founded Calah, in Assyrian Chalah, as the royal residence (*Transactions of the Soc. Lit.* vii. 184), it is not to be concluded therefrom that previous to this Nimrod had established there a first colony. In Sennacherib's time Calah was completely embraced in Nineveh. Of the four cities in Shinar, Gen. x. 10, three are mentioned in the Inscriptions, Babel as Babilu, Erech as Uruk, and Accad as אַכַּד, and these still exist in ruins.

(b) THE RELIGIONS OF THE HEATHEN SEMITES, AND OF THE
CANAANITES AND PHœNICIANS.

§ 249. *Religion of the Assyrians and Babylonians.*

The Assyrian and Babylonian inscriptions¹ discovered by Rawlinson, and deciphered by him, Botta, de Saulcy, Oppert, Schrader, and others, give us an accurate, if sometimes rather spare, information about the religions of these two peoples. These inscriptions were produced for the most part by

¹ Compare with this Eb. Schrader, *Die assyrisch-babylonischen Keilschriften*, Leipzig 1872, and *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, 2 vols. London 1885 ff. In addition to these, works and treatises by Smith, Tomkins, etc., which have appeared since the publication of the first edition of this work, are also referred to in these sections.

Assyrians, and are taken from the library of Assurbanipal, B.C. 660 ; but that monarch himself relates that he had found those literary productions in Sipara, or Sepharvaim, and Erech, now Warka, amongst old Babylonian productions, and had them transcribed on clay tablets. This old Babylonian literature had, according to Smith, Lenormant, etc., its golden age between B.C. 2000 and B.C. 1500. The art of writing is spoken of in these early texts as already existing, *e.g.* in an account of the creation which Assurbanipal found in Cutha ; the origin of the legend is therefore evidently still older than the date of its first writing down. It is mostly from proper names of men compounded with names of the gods that the existence of the corresponding deities can be discovered ; *e.g.* Bil-sar-usur, "Bel guards the king ;" Sin-ahi-irib, "Sin gave many brothers." Rarely are the gods themselves named, and represented with predicates, from which we may conclude as to their nature.

A. What, in this way, we are able to gather respecting the old Babylonian religion is as follows. The *nom. appellativum* for the idea of God was *ilu*, corresponding to 𒀭, from which we have the plural *ili u istarât*, gods and goddesses (*Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, vol. i. 169). A fragment of a clay tablet belonging to the primitive account of the creation (see § 255) is a memorial of a primitive worship of *Ilu* as the one God.¹ The contents of this tablet are rightly admitted by Assyriologists to be "a fragment of the earliest tradition," for it is free from mythological elements in the account of creation, indeed it quite excludes these. It runs thus : "The whole day thy god thou shalt approach, | sacrifice, the prayer of the mouth, the image . . . | to thy god a heart engraved . . . thou hast | How long to the image of the divinity, | supplication, humility, bowing of the face | fire (?) dost thou give to him, and bringest tribute, | and in reverence also with me thou goest straight. | In thy knowledge also behold ; in the tablets | wor-

¹ Smith's *Chaldean Account of Genesis*, p. 73.

ship and blessing thou exaltest. | Sacrifice and the preservation . . . | and prayer for sin . . . | The fear of the gods deserts thee not . . . | the fear of the Anunnaci thou completest . . . | With friend and comrade speech thou makest."

Duncker (*Gesch. des Alterthums*, 4th ed. i. 201) rightly concludes from this that the Babylonians in the earliest times worshipped one God, El, Ilu. Lenormant holds the same opinion. But at a very early period they fell into polytheistic heathenism. Indeed, in an account of the creation just a little later than the one referred to, the great gods make their appearance as the creators of the gods Lahmu and Lahamu, and also of Sar and Kisar. The "great Gods," however, was then, like אֱלֹהִים, a term construed as a singular. "He determined the position of the stars; the position of the gods Bel and Hea he established." "He caused to come forth the god Uru (later Agu, Sin, the moon-god), and Samas (the sun-god)." In the legend of the flood of Sisit (see § 255) there appears a god of heaven, Anu, alongside of Hea. In the following age the sun-god Samas came to be regarded as son of the moon-god Sin, and Istar, the planet Venus and goddess of sexual love and debauchery, as the sister of Samas.

At the time when polytheism arose, the primitive appellation of God, Ilu, in Akkadian, Dingira, became a proper name for an individual deity who is identified with B'lu, בֵּל, Bel. An inscription of King Hammurabi reads thus: "Ilu and Bilu put the inhabitants of Sumir and Akkad under my authority" (*Cuneiform Inscript. and Old Test.* i. 105; *a. b. K.* 95). In the same inscription Bil-Dagani is mentioned (*a. b. K.* 85), that is, Bil with the cognomen Dagani, which, since in Assyrio-Babylonian fish is not דג, but nun, is not to be derived from dag, but from dagan, corn. Bil is thus described as the god of vegetable fruitfulness. Also in another old Babylonian inscription (Rawlinson, ii. 5; *a. b. K.* 135) he is mentioned in the phrase, ismi Dakan, Dakan hears, and also in an Assyrian inscription of the ninth century (*Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 170) as Dakan, so that from being a predicate

this word, it would seem, came to designate an independent deity. Bil or Bel, however, is the supreme and chief God. He comes first in the name Bel-sar-usur, Belshazzar, son of Nabunit (*a. b. K.* 128), on the obelisk of Shalmanazar, and frequently since (*Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 163); as an appellative his name has the meaning of Lord. From the attributes assigned to him, it is evident that in the time of the Assyrian empire Bel had advanced to the rank of chief deity. He is called Father of God the Creator, Father of the Gods, Prince of the Universe. His wife is called Istar (Astarte), and is expressly designated wife of Bel on the obelisk of Shalmanazar, and in subsequent inscriptions (*Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 166). She has the title Bilit, lady, mistress (*Herod.* i. 131, transliterates it by *Μύλιττα*), and the predicates Zir-bânitî, sender of children, of which, according to Rawlinson's conjecture, סְכוּת־בְּנוֹת of 2 Kings xvii. 30 is a free rendering; also lady of the spring; and, on the other hand, mistress of the battle, inflaming to war; and finally, mother of the gods, queen of all gods, the first of heaven and of earth (*Cuneiform Inscript. and Old Test.* i. 163–165). We have seen then that Istar-Bilit was the chief goddess, as her husband Bilu was the highest god. But her nature seems to have consisted of two sides; she is the life-dispensing deity presiding over animal reproduction and fruitfulness, and at the same time goddess of life-destroying war. She is designated in an inscription (*Rawlinson*, ii. 61. 1) as first-born of the god Anu. This god Anu appears at a later period as an idol of the inhabitants of Sipara or Sepharvaim, 2 Kings xvii. 31. Anu is the personal pronoun he (*Schrader, a. b. K.* 257). As a proper name it indicates an old Babylonian deity, identical with the Oannes of Berosus; and in the inscriptions he has the epithets, good lord, founder of cities, fish god, lord of light, appears as a man clothed in a fish skin; and it is told by Berosus that he taught men wisdom and the arts, and every night cast himself again into the depths of the sea. There is here some trace of the serpent of Paradise as deified

by the Ophites. The late Babylonian mythology gave him a wife, Anatuv, who was identified with Astarte. Nisroch, נִסְרוֹךְ, 2 Kings xix. 37, from סִרְךָ, to dispense, Anu, and Bilu appear often as a divine triad under Ilu as the supreme god. Istar bears the title âsirat, the beneficent (*a. b. K.* 138), which is to be distinguished from the title asurit, the Assyrian, p. 137, and is joined in two inscriptions of Assurbanipal (p. 169) with Asur, "in reliance upon Asur and Istar, the mistress of the battle," as elsewhere with Bilu. Asur, too, is frequently met with as the name of a god, from B.C. 1300, that is, from the time when the Assyrians obtained dominion over Babylon. Thus we have Asur-nîsir-habal, Asur guards the son; Asur-ach-iddina, Asur sent a son, etc., see *a. b. K.* 118 ff. The word אִשֻּׁר corresponds to the Hebrew יִשְׂרָאֵל. Besides the form Asur, we meet in Assyrian with Asar (*a. b. K.* 149 ff.); with Asar again the name Adar seems to be identical (*a. b. K.* 148 ff.; comp. Adrammelech, meaning Adar is king, 2 Kings xvii. 31, and Rawlinson, ii. 68, 1. 5. 2, and *a. b. K.* 140). Thus Asar, Asur, Adar indicated originally only another aspect of the nature of Bilu. Asur and Asirat are to some extent identical with Bilu and Bilit. Adar (Rawlinson, ii. 57, 52) has the title Ka-ai-va-nu, the established, the Chiun of Amos v. 26, and Sandan, the helper. He was represented as a winged bull with a man's head; hence Amos describes the golden calf of Aaron as a Chiun image. Adar was god of fire and heat. In later times he was identified with the planet Saturn.

We have in all seven planet gods, who also correspond to the seven days of the week. 1. Samas, Shamas (שָׁמַשׁ), the sun-god, also called Kusu, the deified ancestor Cush, evidently of early origin, as the god of the life-giving and life-destroying sun who appears at a later period in Baal-moloch, intimately connected with the worship of Istar. He appears in the names Samas-nasir-habal, Samas guards the son, Samas-abuna, Samas-bil-usur. The name Hammurabi, from Hammu, חָמֻם, and rab, the shining one is great, shows that Samas had the

title "the shining one." 2. Sin (*a. b. K.* 121 ff.), the god of the moon, in early times also the moon-goddess Astarte, also called Sin-il-irah, Sin of the moon, and also, in Hesychius, σὺν τὴν σέμνην (read σελήνην) ββων, that is, Βαβυλωνίων. 3. Nergal (*Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 275 ; *a. b. K.* 128), god of the planet Mars, explained by Arya, lion, and represented by a lion, worshipped principally in Kutī, which confirms the statement of 2 Kings xvii. 30. He appears in various inscriptions in the name Nergal-sar-ussar, Nergal protects the king. In the legend of the flood he has the title of the destroyer. 4. Nabu, Nebo, god of the planet Mercury, appears in many proper names (*a. b. K.* 124 ff. ; *Isa.* xlvi. 1), *e.g.* Nabuchadrazara, Nabunahid, etc. In the legend of the flood he appears as the thunderer. 5. Marduk, Merodach, god of the planet Jupiter ; in the names Marduk-habal-iddina, Marduk sent the son (*a. b. K.* 129 f.), Merodach-baladan (*Isa.* xxxix. 1 ; *Jer.* i. 2). In old Babylonian texts he is met with as "the righteous prince of the gods," and is styled conqueror of the dragon-like Tiamat, the princess of evil spirits, a reminiscence perhaps of the serpent-slaying, is called Bel, Lord, and identified gradually with Bilu. 6. Istar, goddess of the planet Venus, and originally, indeed, only a star goddess. 7. Adar, who has been already named, god of the planet Saturn.

Besides these are mentioned also the following :—1. An old Elamite god Lagamar, whose image Assurbanipal carried away from Susa (*Assurban.* vi. 77, in *Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 122), whose name, however, was already present in the name of כרלעמר (*Gen.* xiv. 4 f. ; § 248, *Obs.*). Lagamar may perhaps be explained from אל and נמר, Babyl. gimir, as god of the universe. 2. Samul, סמל, *Deut.* iv. 16 ; *Ezek.* viii. 3–5 ; 2 *Chron.* xxxiii. 7, 15, is met with in the time of Assurbanipal in the proper name Samul-sum-ukim, Samul confers the name (*a. b. K.* 127, 166 ; *Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 146). 3. Salmanu in the name Salmanu-asir, Salmanu is favourable. The word has the appellative signification of "bringer of health and safety," and was undoubtedly

the predicate of a god. 4. Hea, god of fortune. 5-7. Pul, Saru, Ninit; see under the legend of the flood, § 255.

B. The present condition of Assyriological researches does not yet permit us to examine in detail the course of this mythological development and the part played therein by the Sumerians after the time of Nimrod. Amid the prevailing darkness this only is made clear, that the essential feature of this mythology consisted in the worship of the heavenly bodies. Such worship we meet with again among the Arabs, another leading people of the Semitic group. The heavenly bodies appointed to rule the seasons and the days (Gen. i. 16, comp. the Assyrian account of the creation, § 255) were personified, and regarded as personal influences or servants of God; and it is possible that it was the sun-god, Samas, who as Bilu, Lord, entered into the place of the ancient Ilu. One thing, however, is certain, and may be clearly deduced from the account in the inscriptions, that outside of the Sumerian empire, in the purely Semitic Elam, and indeed in conscious and furious opposition to the Ethiopic-Sumerian dominion, a new and entirely different form of religion sprang up: the worship of Istar, with its licentious rites, which afterwards developed into the worship of Bilu and Istar, and then into the service of Baal-Moloch and Istar-Bilit. Even had we known nothing else about this worship, the proportionally slight allusions which are found in the cuneiform inscriptions would be sufficient to assure of this one thing, that in this religious system the thought of reproduction and animal fruitfulness had accorded it a peculiarly prominent position. Among the Indians, even in the second period of their religious development, the supreme God is conceived of as the God of heaven; among the Iranians he is the holy creator of the world purely invisible, and a subordinate Yazata appears as the deity of procreation; even among the Egyptians there are stars which rule the course of nature, pre-eminently the sun, and the universal spirit Hesiri ruling over them, to whom worship is rendered, and the human animal act of procreation never

comes to the front; for although there the sun or the year is said to reproduce itself, the new birth is only a figurative expression for the renewing of the day and of the year. On the other hand, among the Semites of the Euphrates the act of procreation as an animal function has a directly substantial, religious significance, and the highest goddess is the goddess of reproduction. This intentional inclination of view to the actions of begetting and the propagation of the species is in itself something unhealthy. It sounds, indeed, quite pious and chaste when Sennacherib in his Bull-inscription (*Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 164) says: "The mistress of the gods, the lady of the spring, fashioned me in the pure womb of the mother who bore me;" but when we read in the old Babylonian legend of Izdubar of Istar's horrible impurities, how she cast off her husband Dumuzi, the Thammuz of the Phœnicians, and had connection with an eagle, then with a lion, then with a servant of her father, etc., and when, along with the inscriptions, we take into account the stories of the Greek writers, we have rolled out before us an exceedingly gruesome picture. Herodotus quite correctly names Βῆλος (i. 118 f.) as the chief god of the Babylonians, Μύλitta (Bilit) as the chief goddess, whom he characterizes as the goddess of procreation and sensual love, describing her as a sort of Ἀφροδίτη (i. 199). He then tells that even in his own time every married woman was bound by religion once in her life to leave husband and children, to betake herself to the temple of Bel in Babylon, and yield herself there as a prostitute, for she must not quit the temple until some one of the male frequenters of the place had misused her. She must not refuse the hire of prostitution; but as something holy it must be given to the goddess. The women must therefore, by prostituting themselves, earn such gifts as will be acceptable to the goddess in offerings. Hence the command in Deut. xxiii. 18. Here we are suddenly brought into a region of pagan error altogether different from the religions of the Indians and Iranians, of the Pelasgians and even of the

Hamitic Egyptians. In these cases, however far they may have gone in the direction of nature-worship, there was always present at least a remnant of a consciousness that the gods punished evil, and kept sacred home, the purity of home and the bond of marriage; purity was regarded as worthy of praise. Here, on the other hand, the sexual act, apart from all moral conditions, as a physical act of fructification is regarded as the doing of an immanent deity, and out of the figure mirrored in this view a deity is constructed, who is thought to be honoured by it, and who demands this as her tribute, that in her honour the act of procreation be completely sundered from all moral conditions. The lustful satisfaction of fleshly desire is a divine service! This is an uprooting destruction of conscience, a demoniacal Satanic abomination, in contradiction to the innate ethical law, and so an utter perversion of the knowledge of God. Even to the Greek Herodotus this worship seemed utterly shameful (*αἰσχιστος*). Whereas among the Indians, Iranians, Greeks, and Egyptians the deities were always viewed as subjects, though also confessedly faulty, under the requirements of the moral law, here among the Semites of the Euphrates a Satanic lust prevailed, the morally detestable being represented as corresponding to the nature and suitable in the worship of the deity.

But now the question arises, When did the Semitic heathenism descend to this depth of depravity? May it have been only shortly before Herodotus' time? We shall get an answer to those questions after we have come to know the religions of the other peoples, who were worshippers of Baal.

§ 250. *The Religion of the Phœnicians.*

We begin with the Phœnician religion, because it is of it that we possess the most complete accounts, partly in Phœnician and Punic inscriptions, partly in the statements of ancient historians.¹

¹ The documentary proof of the following statements will be found for the most part in Duncker.

A. The Phœnicians worshipped a divine pair called Baal and Baaltis. Baal was the sun-god, not, however, as a supernatural creative power superior to the sun, but only as the sun itself in its warming and consequently fructifying power. Hence he bore the cognomen *בַּעַל-הַפָּזוֹן*, the beaming lord, and is depicted with a circle of rays surrounding his face, which is represented as round, like the sun's disc. At his side stands Baaltis or Aschera, described by the Greeks as *θεὰ Ἀσκαλωνίτις*, and is thus identified with the Philistine-Phœnician deity, see § 251, as also the Babylonian Istar is identified with Aphrodite.¹ Baal corresponds to the Babylonian Bilu, Baaltis to Bilit, the designation Aschera to the Babylonian appellative *āsirat* (from *אִשָּׁר=אִשָּׁר*). This Baaltis was the goddess of the firmament of night, but she was, at the same time, the goddess of vegetable and animal productiveness. Among the stars Venus was the planet sacred to her, undoubtedly for this reason, that, though a star generally belonging to the night, it yet occupies a relation to the sun-god as the morning and the evening star, and appears always in his neighbourhood. Among animals, the he-goat on account of its lasciviousness, and the fish on account of the abundance of its spawn, were sacred to Aschera. But men also, by impure and lustful practices, were required to consecrate themselves to this goddess. Marriageable maidens were obliged to appear in the temple of the goddess, and there to surrender their maidenhood and honour to the male frequenters of the temple. For this every one received as reward of prostitution a he-goat; which, however, she must not retain for herself, but must give to the goddess. This first violation, however, did not satisfy the claims of this deity. Women who wished to show themselves zealous in her service, from time to time after marriage left their

¹ We call attention to the fact that Aphrodite (§ 232) is not a genuinely Greek goddess, but one borrowed from the Phœnicians; only idealized and ennobled by the Greeks. It was only in the period of the decay of the Greek religion that the impure rites after the manner of the Phœnician mysteries obtained an entrance into Greece.

husbands, in order to yield themselves to further dishonour as devotees in the temple. This prostitution of married women was a legalized custom in the Phœnician colonies at Cyprus, as well as in Babylon (Herod. i. 199). Now, where marriage has been profaned and in principle destroyed, because associated with shameful orgies and broken up by the prostitution on the part of the wife, there we must inevitably have, on the part of the husband, a life of impurity as a daily occurrence. Where chastity is set aside, and sexual lust, emancipated from the moral conditions of love, is regarded as a divine service, unnatural lusts will also make their appearance. The symbol of these is found in the Phallic worship. That this flourished among the Phœnicians is, among other proofs, made certain by the Horus adorned with a phallus found in the Phœnician colony of Coptos in Egypt, who was not, however, worshipped there alone, but is characterized in an inscription as guardian deity of all Phœnician colonies, whose worship extends to Sicily, and his name is spread through all lands.¹ Thus the Phœnicians brought the moral plague into all countries into which they sent out colonies.

B. Partly contrasted, partly identified with this first divine pair, we also meet, among the Phœnicians, with a second divine pair, Moloch and Astarte. Moloch again is nothing else than the sun, viewed, however, not as giving growth, but as the broiling heat of summer, glowing and burning up vegetation, and destroying life. We have already met with these two aspects in the Babylonian Istar-Bilit,—the production and the destruction of life. Possibly, too, Samas and Hammu (§ 249, A, 3) were only two attributes of one and the same Bilu. Then among the Phœnicians these two pairs of names came to be applied to two pairs of partially separated and distinct deities. Moloch is derived from the name *malik*, king, used as a predicate, which in the Assyrio-Babylonian religion was reserved for Bilu. The Phœnician Moloch was

¹ Ebers, *Ägypten und die Bücher Moses*, i. p. 143.

represented as a man with the head of an ox; the ox and pig were the animals sacred to him. As the god of death and destruction, he is at the same time the god of war. In order to turn aside his wrath, human sacrifices must be offered him, and indeed, so that with existing life there may be also the destruction of every germ of a future life, the sacrifice must be of virgin boys and girls. The offering was made by the victims being cast alive into the hollow of the colossal statue of the god when heated to the intensest degree. The nobler the rank and the dearer to their parents, the more acceptable to the deity would the victims prove. Hanbaal, who is known to us from Roman history under the Latinized name of Hannibal, offered to Moloch at one time three thousand prisoners of the Hymerians. When Agathocles had defeated the Carthaginians, they thought that the anger of Moloch had overtaken them, because during the immediately previous period they had substituted for the sons and daughters of the nobler families purchased children of poor people as sacrifices to Moloch. The families which were liable to this charge directly of their own free will gave three hundred of their sons as victims, after the Suffetim (שופטים) other two hundred of the noblest children had already been sacrificed.¹ In 2 Kings iii. 27, comp. § 252, it is shown that a similar worship of Moloch prevailed among the Moabites. Thus diabolical cruelty commonly goes side by side with diabolical lust.

Astarte occupies precisely the same relation to Moloch that Baaltis or Aschera does to Baal. Astarte was the goddess of the moon, the waning moon, for she was represented as a maiden with the horns of an ox, which was the symbol of the crescent-shaped moon, or as riding upon an ox. She was goddess of war, and as such was armed with a spear. She is designated goddess of heaven or virgin of heaven, but, as an adjunct to Moloch, she was pre-eminently the goddess of waning light, generally by decreasing power and barrenness. Complete abstinence from sexual intercourse was

¹ Diod. Sic. 13. 86.

enjoined upon her priestesses. No married women could enter a temple of Astarte. Pure virgins, who had not yielded any service to Aschera, were burnt in sacrifice to Astarte; and men showed her worship and honour by self-mutilation. Such men and youths rushed in frenzied excitement into the temple of the goddess, seized upon a knife consecrated to this purpose, performed the act of mutilation upon themselves, and then served in these temples as eunuchs. There were thousands of such castrated persons in Phœnicia. They went in crowds about the country in women's clothing, lashing themselves amid wild contortions of their limbs to the sound of kettledrums and fifes, cutting themselves with swords, biting their arms with their teeth till blood flowed, and uttering prophetic sayings. We find this frantic dancing, with laceration of the flesh, in the Baal-worship introduced into the kingdom of the ten tribes by the Phœnician Jezebel, 1 Kings xviii. 28. Then, alongside of the horrible impurity of the worship of Baaltis, and of the horrible and murderous cruelty of the worship of Moloch, we meet with a diabolical raving asceticism contrary to nature and a demoniacal sooth-saying. This is no gradual sinking from a pure knowledge of God to one more obscure, as in the case of the Iranians, Indians, Greeks, and Egyptians. The origin of this religion presupposes a second intentional and deliberate fall, a fall from a state of simple sinfulness into diabolical-demoniacal obduracy, a high-handed rebellion against God and against conscience. The only question remaining that need be answered is, did the Semites of the Euphrates borrow this Baal-Moloch religion from the Phœnicians, or did the Phœnicians borrow it from the Euphrates Semites? For the latter alternative may be adduced the fact that the Phœnician religion has all the appearance of a further development of the Babylonian-Assyrian religion. We shall also find other evidence to support the same conclusion.

C. Alongside of these two Satanic impure pairs of deities among the Phœnicians, which have been developed out of the Babylonian impure divine pair Bilu and Istar-Bilit, there is

also a guiltless sort of divine being of an old Hamite origin, which reminds us throughout of the religion of the Egyptians. In Tyre the worship of Baal fell into the background, and alongside of Baaltis - Aschera appeared a god who was worshipped under the name of Melkart, who is in every respect similar to the Egyptian Ra. He appears specially to be a god, who in the region of nature overcomes the destructive and injurious influences, and out of destruction awakens new life; but let it be carefully observed, all this refers, in a characteristically Egyptian way, only to the realm of nature, and not to the realm of morals and conduct. He is the sun-god, just as Ra.¹ Precisely like Ra, too (§ 238), he conquers the hostile signs of the zodiac, since by his advance he causes one after the other to disappear. The broiling sun of the dog days was represented as a lion, which was slain by Melkart, or else he was represented as Melkart burning in his own glowing heat, and going forth from the burning rejuvenated, just as the Egyptian Bemu (§ 241). Both of them constitute emblems of nature constantly rejuvenated in its regular successive changes. In the winter Melkart sleeps in the far west on the island of Crete, to return again in spring. This again is only a variation of the Egyptian myth of Hesiri (§ 240), to suit the geographical situation of Phœnicia. When subsequently, by means of their extended sea voyages, the Phœnicians gained more accurate geographical knowledge in regard to western lands, they fabricated this myth to the effect that Melkart had erected for himself the two pillars called Calpe and Abyla on the Straits of Gibraltar, and they named them the gates of the sun-god.² Melkart also in

¹ Might not his name, Melkart, be possibly derived from Melak Ra?

² Since the Phœnicians had already at a very early period (§ 247, *Obs.* 5) colonized Sardinia, that form of the legend, in which Crete is still represented as the extreme west, must be very early, from the time immediately after their entrance into Phœnicia and before the discovery of Sardinia. The Melkart form of the myth must therefore be genuinely Phœnician or Hamitic, and have been brought from Egypt, and not at all borrowed from the Semites of the Euphrates.

course of time grew into Adon (אֲדֹן, Lord), as Hesiri was elaborated out of Ra (§ 241). Under this designation Melkart was worshipped in Gebal or Byblos, and in Berytus, also in Malta, where a Phœnician inscription has been found which proves this identity : *לאֲדֹנִינוּ לְמִלְכָּרְת בַּעַל צַר*. Adon, from which the Greek *Ἄδωνις* was derived, while certain characteristics of the Melkart myth have been transferred to Hercules (§ 231), is a youth, who is cut off in his prime and is mourned by Baaltis, just like Hesiri. The wild boar of the war-god tore him. He is called by the Semitic name Thammuz (Ezek. viii. 14), because the old Babylonia Dumuzi (§ 249) was identified with him. Melkart, however, had originally no further resemblance to Dumuzi beyond this, that the latter was conceived of as the lawful husband of Istar, put away by her in a shameful manner, and perhaps also as the god of summer. He is the summer sun, which is slain by the winter; and thus again the Hesiri legend was adapted to the conditions of nature in Phœnicia,¹ in which only at a later period Baaltis was substituted for Isis. If the river of Phœnicia, south of Byblos, named after Adon, rolled along in harvest a swollen stream, red with clay, the blood of the slain Adon, lamentations for Adon's death were continued for seven days; his image was laid in a coffin; women beat their breasts and cried *ailānu*, woe to us. In spring the resurrection of Adon was celebrated with unbridled lust. In the religion of the Semites of the Euphrates no kind of deity is found like Melkart. In later ages, indeed, the inhabitants of the city of Damascus which borders upon the land of the Phœnicians borrowed certain characteristics of Melkart and attributed them to the Syrian-Aramæan god Hadad (2 Sam. viii. 3, x. 16; 1 Kings xi. 23; 1 Chron. xix. 3). This, however, is no proof of the original identity of Melkart and Hadad. The Phœnicians themselves have rather transferred to the Semitic Baaltis one of the incidents of the Isis legend,

¹ Even Macrobius and Lucian admitted the identity of Adonis and Osiris.

the mourning for Hesiri. We have here then again a confirmation of conclusion reached in § 247, that the Phœnicians were really of Hamite origin. The Caphtorim, whose oldest colony was founded at Byblos, where their religion had its first seat (Ebers, p. 239), originally brought with them to Phœnicia, from their forefathers the Casluhim of Mons Casius (§ 247), the worship and traditions of Ra and of Hesiri. And this connection in history and religion was known and understood also in Egypt. The Egyptian myth¹ represents the body of Osiris as floating to Byblos. There Isis arrives, becomes nurse of the child of the reigning king, whose mother is called Nemanous, or Saosis, or Astarte. Nemanous is met with in the hieroglyphs in the form *nehemau*, and Saosis in the form *jusas*, as designations of Hathor.² When Astarte appears in the Egyptian tradition, according to Plutarch, as synonymous with both, we see in this an expression of the knowledge and conviction that the Phœnicians, when in their own country they amalgamated the Semitic religion of Baal with their own Hamitic Hesiri-Melkart religion, identified the Semitic Astarte with their old Hamitic Hathor, and substituted her for that other. To that Egyptian legend again corresponds the Phœnician legend,³ that every year a head comes swimming over the sea from Egypt to Byblos. The Maneros song also, common to the Phœnicians and the Egyptians,⁴ witnesses to the Egyptian origin of the primitive religion of the Phœnicians. This primitive religion of theirs was Hamitic, closely related to the Egyptian, and indeed identical with it. The Semitic Baal religion was introduced among them only afterward as a secondary element, when they began to substitute for their old Hathor, Istar or Astarte, and for the old Egyptian war-god Set,⁵ Baal, and to describe Hesiri or Adon as בעל צר, Lord of Tyre, and perhaps

¹ Plutarch, *De Iside et Osiride*, 15.

² Ebers, *Ägypten und die Bücher Mosis*, p. 173.

³ Lucianus, *De dea Syra*, 7.

⁴ Herod. ii. 79. Plutarch, *De Iside*, etc., 17.

⁵ This was still in the age of Ramses II. See Ebers, *l.c.* p. 245.

also Ra, as Melek Ra, King Ra. One other question only we need ask: From whom have these Phœnicians of Egyptian descent, these Caphtorim, obtained that Semitic Baal-worship? was it from the Canaanitish tribe of Sidon (Gen. x. 15), whom they may have met with upon their arrival in Phœnicia, or who may have been mixed up with them even in the earliest ages? This question can be decided (§ 253) only when we have made ourselves acquainted with the history of the religion of the Canaanites.

Obs. 1.—We must now give our attention for a little to the later development of the Phœnician religion. As Baal had originally been identical with Moloch, and Aschera with Astarte, about B.C. 1000, the two latter, who were respectively goddess of the starry heavens and the moon-goddess, came to be again identified with one another, as goddess of night, in the Astarte of Tyre. This deity was at once goddess of fruitfulness and unfruitfulness, of the begetting and of the destroying of life, just like Bilit in Babylon, and came to demand as worship at once the ravishing by men of maidens and married women, and also the self-mutilation of other men and the burning of virgins. In Carthage we find the two goddesses distinguished from the very first. There is Dido-Astarte, corresponding to the older Sidonian Astarte, whose worship consisted in human sacrifices and self-mutilation; and there is Anna-Astarte, corresponding to Aschera, who was worshipped by prostitution. But even in Carthage at a later date Anna, the graceful, and Dido were confounded with one another. The temple devotees of the Phœnician colonies in Cyprus and elsewhere worshipped the goddess with war-dances among the ceremonies, which gave rise to the legend of the Amazons. Thus the Melkart myth got mixed up with the Astarte ritual. Melkart seeks the wandering, roving moon-goddess Astarte, finds her, unites himself with her, and thereby transforms her from the maidenly Dido into the lustful Anna.¹ At the basis of this lay the astronomical fact that the sun always draws near to the waning moon, and reaches her as the new moon; the subsequent growth of moon was represented as the consequence of impregnation; for these Moloch-worshippers had a curious readiness in describing all manner of things under the figure of sexual relations. But as now, even from the time of the founding of Tyre, about B.C. 1000, Aschera was identified with Astarte, the male gods also in course of time, because loose reins were given to a

¹ Philo, *Fragm.* p. 32.

voluptuous and wanton fancy, were identified with the female deities, and were represented as hermaphrodite. Figures of Dido-Astarte have been found in which she wears a beard like Melkart. In this way legends arose about Hercules, who wore women's clothing in the service of Omphale, about Sardanapalus and Semiramis, who had changed their sex. The Phœnicians, too, in worshipping these hermaphrodite deities, made a mutual exchange of garments, which serves to illustrate the prohibition of Deut. xxii. 5. Even so early as B.C. 1000, the various deities and classes of gods were grouped under the common designation of *בְּיָרִים*, mighty ones. In the later centuries the priests constructed a quasi-philosophical and theological system of the Cabbirim, which in comparison with the earlier lustful character of the Moloch-religion looks remarkably tame. This took place at the time when Phœnicia, conquered by the Persians, came under the influence of the Iranian religion, which, if not highly ennobling, at least encouraged modesty; when the savage horrors of the Moloch-worship either would not be any longer tolerated by the victors, to whom any contact of a dead body with fire was an abomination, or appeared to the conquered no longer called for or possible. The priests then placed at the head of their system of divinity a god of the arts, Chusor, whom they represented as carrying smiths' tools in his hands, and a goddess *תְּוִרָה*, or Thuro, rendered by the Greeks *Ἀρμονία* (comp. the Hebrew *תּוֹר*, series, order, from *תָּר*, to embrace, surround). These were followed by Astarte, Melkart, etc., and an end was made with Eschmun as a sort of summing up of all the rest. He was represented with a serpent in his hand, and was reproduced and depicted by the Greeks as *Ἀσκληπίους*, and was described as the sum-total of all forms of wisdom and all sorts of art. The coffin and inscription of one named after him, Eschmunazar, Eschmun helps, was found at Sidon in 1885. According to Schlottmann's careful observation, it belongs to the time of Artaxerxes Memnon. This, too, is Ebers' opinion (p. 167), who places this sarcophagus between B.C. 664 and B.C. 335.

Obs. 2.—The cosmogonic legends of the Phœnicians are, as a whole, artistic productions of the Cabbirim period, in which single shreds and fragments of older legends are wrought up. Thus, for example, in the first *θηητοῖς ἀνθρώποις: Αἰὼν καὶ Πρωτόγονος*, of whom the former *τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν δένδρων προφῆν εὔρεν* (Sanchun. cap. 3), we have a first reminiscence of the fall. Then again, in the brothers Memrum, Usoos, and Hypsuranios, of whom the two latter were at enmity with each other (*σπασιάσαι*), we have a reminiscence of Cain and Abel. Also, Memrum, after a conflagration of the woods, began to worship

fire, and to bring to it animal sacrifices, and then, also, he discovered the art of seamanship (Sanchun.). On the other hand, the old Baal-worship gave occasion to, and material for, various myths current among the Greeks. Reminiscences of the Phœnician colonies and their modes of worship lie at the basis of the legend of Minos. Minos or the Minotaur is nothing else than the ox-headed Baal-Moloch. Europa, that is, the dark, made pregnant by Zeus, and also the wife of Minos, Pasiphæ, that is, the all-appearing, are both nothing else than Astarte in her twofold aspect.

Obs. 3.—No one has more thoroughly and strikingly proved the identity of the one half of the Phœnician deities with the Egyptian than Ebers (*Æg. und Bücher Mosis*, p. 237 ff.). This indeed is not the place for considering how the Egyptian priests in the later age of the Ptolemies introduced into the hieroglyphic inscriptions foreign names of gods, such as the Greek Musé and the Phœnician Astarte (Ebers, p. 240 f.), still less for calling attention to the designation of Pacht as *ta anch*, the world of life (in the seventh century), as indicating Phœnician influences, because the foreign quarter of Memphis was named *anch ta*, the life of the world. But, on the other hand, this is the place for calling attention to the fact that the Casluhim at *mons Casius*, who kept up their connection with their brethren who had migrated to Philistia and Phœnicia, adopted Dagon from the Philistines (Ebers, 247; comp. § 251) and Baal from the Phœnicians, and combined the latter with their old Egyptian war-god Set. At a later period, when Set was in Egypt identified with Typhon, the Baal of the Casluhim was identified also with Typhon, and subsequently with Horus (Ebers, 248 f.). We may therefore conclude that the Phœnicians had already in their own land, in Byblos and Old Tyre, made a similar identification. Greek accounts support the statement that the Casluhim in Pamprenis, on the north-east corner of the delta of the Nile, and at *mons Casius*, did in fact confound the Semitic Baal-Moloch with the Egyptian Set, that foreigners who landed on those coasts were in danger of being offered up in sacrifice to a god Busiris, whom Herod. 2. 64 rightly designates "Αρης. This also is confirmed by the hieroglyphics on a sacrificial seal dedicated to Set, on which a man is pictured with a knife at his throat (Ebers, 246). In the time of Ramses II., before the Hyksos period, the hippopotamus was sacred to Set, and consequently, during the Hyksos period, to Typhon (§ 241). It is quite natural that the Casluhim and the Phœnicians should conceive of their war-god as at once god of robber expeditions by sea and protector of their coasts. The Phœnician Adon, also, whom the boar of Ares

slew in harvest, as we have seen above, is evidently identical with Hesiri, who was slain in harvest by Set. Ebers thinks that in all these facts he finds support for his hypothesis that the Phœnicians were Semites, and had in early times brought Semitic modes of worship into Lower Egypt. But this hypothesis obliges him immediately to assume (p. 251) that Set, and indeed also the god of Lower Egypt, Ptah, were not genuinely Egyptian, but Semitic deities, imported by the Phœnicians. He must consequently, on precisely similar grounds, assert this of Hesiri, who is identical with Melkart, and the supreme god of the whole of Egypt. In this the hypothesis is self-contradictory; according to it, there ultimately remains no vestige of the genuine Egyptian religion. The characteristic features of the old Phœnician religion were originally identical with those of the Egyptian, and it was only after the arrival of the Caphtorim in Phœnicia that the Semitic religion was amalgamated with that original element. The condition of the Phœnician religion affords the strongest proof of the correctness of the early Israelitish tradition about the Hamitic descent of the Caphtorim or Phœnicians.

Obs. 4.—On the ruins of Palmyra (comp. Mordtmann in the *Augsb. Allg. Zeitung*, 1874, Beil. Nr. 53) the following Assyrio-Phœnician deities are named: Baal-Schemin, god of heaven and thunder; Schemscha (Bel, Malak-bel), the sun-god; Aglibol (Yarchibol), hermaphrodite moon-god; Gad, god of fortune; Thaimi, goddess of fortune; Alath, the Nabatean national goddess; Atharata, the Phœnician Atergatis; also a Nebo, a Rachm (a love-goddess), and an Athi.

§ 251. *The Religion of the Philistines.*

We possess, upon the whole, but scanty records of the religion of the Philistines. That the worship of Baal and Astarte, the religious rites of Semitic paganism, had been introduced among them before B.C. 1000, is shown by 1 Sam. xxx. 10; 2 Kings i. 2 ff. Baal, indeed, was worshipped at Ekron as Baal-zebub, protector from flies. The worship of the god Dagon, however, and that of the goddess Derceto, rendered in Greek *Ἀτέργατις*, plays a far more important part among them, and that indeed in the very earliest times (Judg. xvi.). Dagon (Judg. xvi. 23 ff.; 1 Sam. v. 1 ff.; 1 Macc. x. 83), from *ἰχθῆρ*, fish, was represented

as having in the upper part of his body the figure of a man (1 Sam. v. 4), but ending below in a fish, and was evidently the god of the sea, whose worship specially commended itself to the Philistines dwelling on the coast, and engaged in sea-faring pursuits, who had come across, according to § 247, from Crete. Alongside of him there is the female fish-goddess Derceto (1 Macc. v. 43 ; 2 Macc. xii. 26 ; Diod. Sic. 7. 4 ; Strabo, 16. 785 ; Plin. maj. 5. 19 ; Herod. 1. 105 ; Lucian, *de dea Syra*, 14), either from דרר, to go along, or more probably after the Syrian reading דרעכא, opening, χάσμα, gulf of the sea, as Lucian also explains the name by χάσμα μέγα. She was represented as a woman ending in the tail of a fish. The question now arises as to whether these were Semitic or Hamitic deities. The Semitic names of the two deities will not prove their Semitic origin ; for after the Philistines had, like the Phœnicians, adopted the language of the country into which they went as colonists, the language of the Canaanites (comp. § 247 f.), it was natural that they should devise Semitic names for their gods, even for those which they had brought with them from Lower Egypt or from Crete, and that these should become the principal names for their deities, just exactly as the Phœnicians in common use employed the Semitic name Adon for their god Hesiri, and the Semitic name Melkart for their god Ra. In order to prove the Semitic, and indeed Babylonian, origin of Dagon, reference may be made to the Ὀδάκων of the Babylonian tradition in Berosus, a benefactor of mankind, who also was half man, half fish ; unless Berosus has merely so represented him in consequence of some confusion or erroneous identification of it with the Philistine god. This Odakon, however, was a man, not a god, and was never worshipped as a god in Babylon. The name Dagon, too, cannot be derived from Odakon, since it certainly comes from the appellative דג. On the other hand, reference has been made to the Bilu Dagani of the Babylonians (§ 249). But he is never designated as a sea-god or a fish-god, and indeed cannot have been the fish-god, since in the Babylonian

language fish is not *dag*, but *nun*.¹ Schrader (*Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, i. 171) reminds us that on Assyrio-Babylonian monuments once and again persons are found represented as clothed in the skin of a fish, and he thinks that these may have been priests of Dagon. But since (§ 250) the fish was sacred to Baaltis, they might, if priests at all, just as well be priests of Bilit, and the name Bilu Dagani will be most simply explained from דג, grain, as that of the god of fruitfulness. Seeing that among the Phœnicians, Canaanites, Moabites, Ammonites, dwelling between Babylonia and Philistia, we find no trace of a worship of Dagon, it is not in the least probable that Bilu Dagani leapt with a bound from the Euphrates to Palestine over the peoples occupying the intermediate regions. Then, again, it has been proved by Starck and Ebers,² that the worship of Dagon prevailed among the Casluhim about *mons Casius*. It was natural that those whose chief employment had always been the salting of fish with the bay salt of the Sirbo lake should have a special predilection for the worship of the god of the sea, to whom they owed their support, and that they should represent him in the form of a fish.³ We shall thus have to distinguish between the Philistine Dagon as god of the sea and fish-god, and the Babylonian god bearing the name of "grain-Bilu." We must regard the former, along with Derceto, as genuinely Hamitic, and indeed as specially originating with the Casluhim.

§ 252. *The Religion of the Ammonites and Moabites.*

The Ammonites and Moabites, descendants of Lot, who grew up into nationalities contemporaneously with the

¹ Since also *dadshun*, for fish, and *dadshâ*, for increasing, are foreign terms introduced into the Arabic, דג and דגה seem not to be at all original Semitic words, but to be Hamitic words which the Israelites and Canaanites first adopted in Palestine from the Philistines who were in possession of the sea fisheries.

² Ebers, *Ägypten und Bücher Moses*, p. 247.

³ *Ibid.* p. 123.

Israelites, even in the time of Moses were worshippers of Baal (Num. xxiii. 1, xxv. 3), and celebrated his worship with licentious rites (Num. xxv. 8). This is, first of all, told about the Moabites; but that the same is true about the Ammonites follows from 1 Kings xi. 7 and 33, where Milcom stands for Moloch. The fact, however, that the Moabite king Balak had to send to Mesopotamia for a soothsayer (Num. xxii. 5) clearly shows that in respect of religion those peoples were dependent upon a Mesopotamian-Semitic people. In the inscription of the Moabite king Mesha,¹ a contemporary of Omri and Ahab, discovered at Dibon in 1869 by Clermont-Ganneau, the French Consul at Jerusalem, a city, Baal-Meon or Beth-Baal-Meon, is mentioned in lines 9 and 30 as built by Mesha (comp. Num. xxxii. 38; Isa. xiii. 7; Ezek. xxv. 9; 1 Chron. v. 8; Jer. xlviii. 23); and in lines 3, 9, 12-14, 17-19, a war-god Chamos,² and at line 17, Astar-Chemos. It is impossible, with Schlottmann (p. 29), to identify Chemos with Baal, who as such was not the war-god, or with Moloch, since in 1 Kings xi. 7, 33 (comp. 2 Kings xxiii. 13), they are named together. He seems rather to have been originally a special national god of the Moabites, who are designated in Jer. xlviii. 7, 13, 46, the people of Chemosh, and also of the Ammonites, Judg. xi. 24. He seems thus to have been represented, after the analogy of Moloch, as a companion figure to him, probably in such a way as to make Moloch the sun-god, but Chemosh specially the national god and god of war, who was worshipped, as Moloch was, with human sacrifices (2 Kings iii. 27). In Astar-Chemos, evidently Astar is identical with the name of the Babylonian goddess Istar. It should be translated Istar of Chemosh, that is, Istar the wife of Chemosh. To her Mesha devoted what he had taken, either spoil or men (the text is imperfect here), as a

¹ *La stèle de Mesa, roi de Moab . . .* par Ch. Clermont-Ganneau, Paris 1870. Nöldeke, *die Inschrift des Königs Mesa von Moab*, Kiel 1870. Schlottmann, *die Siegestäule Mesa's*, 1870.

² At the basis of the name כְּמוֹשׁ there lies undoubtedly the root retained in the Arabic *kamascha*, to arm, put on armour.

חרם. In the days of Tiglath-Pileser a Moabitish king appears in an Assyrian inscription called Kammusu-nadbi, that is, Chemosh-Nadab; in the time of Assurbanipal a Moabitish king is mentioned named Salamanu, Shalman (Hos. x. 14).¹

Obs.—It may also be concluded from the name of the Edomite king Malikraimmu, of the time of Sennacherib (Schrader, *Cuneiform Inscriptions and the Old Testament*, i. 136), that the Edomites practised the worship of Moloch. According to Josephus (*Antiq.* xv. 7. 9), they also worshipped a god Κoζέ, and, in fact, on an inscription of Tiglath-Pileser there occurs Kausmalaka, Kaus is king, as the name of an Edomite king. This Kaus, too, like the Chemosh of the Moabites, may have been an old national deity of the Edomites.

§ 253. *Origin of the Worship of Baal in Palestine.—Sodom.*

We turn back now to the question that was proposed at the close of § 250, as to whether the Semitic constituents of the Phœnician religion were derived from the descendants of Sidon, the son of Canaan (Gen. x. 15), as the Hamitic-Egyptian constituents of it were derived from the Caphtorim, the Casluhim colonists who had come from Egypt by way of Crete. It would be conceivable, indeed, that these Caphtorim had already met with those Sidonians or Canaanites and become familiarized with their worship of Baal in Phœnicia. Sidon is well known to have been more ancient (Josh. xi. 8, xix. 28) than the city of Tyre, which is first mentioned in the time of David; but the Caphtor city Byblos (גבל), with its worship of Melkart-Adonis, may possibly have been still older (Josh. xiii. 5). As to the question now, whether the Caphtorim came upon the Sidonians, or the Sidonians came upon the Caphtorim in Phœnicia, it might at first sight be regarded as more probable that the Baal-Moloch worship was a dowry brought with them by the Sidonians; and this might seem all the more likely, since the rest of the Canaanite nations had practised this religion. When the Israelites

¹ Schrader, *Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 126.

under Joshua invaded Palestine, they found there the cities Baalah (Josh. xv. 9-11), Baalath-Beer (Josh. xix. 8, 44), Baalah-Gad (Josh. xii. 7), the names of which indicate the prevalence of Baal-worship; and to these we may add from the time of the judges, Baal-Hermon (Judg. iii. 3) and Baal-Tamar (Judg. xx. 33). It is also expressly stated in Judg. ii. 11, iii. 3, viii. 33, x. 10, that the Canaanite nations worshipped Baal, and Judg. ii. 13, x. 6 add also Ashtaroth (comp. 1 Sam. xii. 10, etc.); also Judg. viii., ix. tells of a Baal-Berith worshipped at Shechem, evidently the guardian deity of a political confederacy. That the worship of Moloch was immediately associated with the worship of Baal follows from Lev. xviii. 21, xx. 2; 2 Kings xxiii. 20; Jer. xxxii. 36. About the time of Moses, therefore, the Canaanite races had undoubtedly the Semitic religion of Baal. But had they always had it? Or was it only at a later period introduced among them?

4. During the days of Abraham there is no word of any worship of Baal among the Canaanites. Yet had there been even the slightest foundation known to the Israelites for supposing that this religion of Baal had always been prevalent among the Canaanites, we may be sure that, owing to the hostile attitude which Israel from the time of Moses assumed toward the Canaanites, the traditional reminiscence in reference to it would not have been lost. The Israelitish tradition, however, tells us just the very opposite. As it has given us an account of a friendly relationship between Abraham and the Canaanite chiefs (§ 244), it also retained the reminiscence of quite special incidents, from which it follows, that the Canaanites of Abraham's times still knew nothing of the religion of Baal and Moloch. Melchizedec, king of Salem (Gen. xiv. 18 f.), is also priest of אֱלֹהֵי עֵלִין, and blesses Abraham in the name of אֱלֹהֵי עֵלִין קוֹנֵה שָׁמַיִם וָאָרֶץ, the most high God, possessor of heaven and earth. In the word אֱל, as in the primitive Babylonian *Ilu* (אֱלִי), which became subsequently degenerate, and was dislodged by Bilu, the name and the

appellative designation of God coincide. This name, as also the description of this God as possessor of heaven and earth, shows us that the primitive monotheism, as we find it in the earliest Vedic period among the Indians, and as we must suppose it to have existed (§ 217) among the most ancient Iranians, likewise then prevailed among the Canaanites. Consequently the מלך in the name Melchizedec can be understood only as an appellative, signifying either "my king is righteousness," in which case God is described by the appellative as the king of Salem, or king of righteousness, as an epithet of the prince of Salem himself; but in no case is it a proper name of Moloch. Seeing that Moloch was the sun-god, the apposition, "possessor of heaven and earth," would be as little suitable as the attributing to the blind forces of nature in this fiery god the quality of righteousness, and to the wild character of his worship the gentle rites of that prince of Salem. A second example is Abimelech of Gerar, who (Gen. xx. f.), although involved in the coarse practices of his age in making provision for his harem (xx. 2), appears as a man who genuinely fears the אלהים (vv. 3, 4), addressing God as his Lord (אדוני, ver. 4), and entertaining a noble abhorrence of sins (vv. 4, 6, 9, 11). On a subsequent occasion he challenges Abraham to swear to a covenant which he wishes to conclude with him in the name of אלהים (Gen. xxi. 23). In the Hittite prince Ephron, too (Gen. xxiii. 3 ff.), we find no trace of religious antagonism or religious hate.

B. The first trace of that demoniacal and bestial corruption, which makes its appearance as a necessary consequence of the Baal-Astarte worship, is met with among the inhabitants of the valley of Siddim (Gen. xix. 4 ff.). These cities, however, had already been for twelve years under subjection to the Semites of the Euphrates (Gen. xiv. 2-4), and it is thus not difficult to see whence they received the poison of the Baal religion. The religion of Baal was not the original religion of the Canaanites, but had been imported among them in

consequence of the wars of Chederlaomer and Amraphel from the Semitic country of Elam. Throughout the four centuries during which Israel was in Egypt, this corruption, notwithstanding the judgment that overtook Sodom,¹ spread through Palestine like a moral and religious plague, pandering to the desires of sinful flesh. It made way also among the descendants of Lot, the Moabites and Ammonites, and also among the Edomites, who previously served only Chemosh and Kaus; amid this corrupt surrounding they grew up into nations. Their surroundings were similar to those in which the descendants were placed by the divine decree of the history of Joseph, amid which they kept themselves pure. Thus Moses and Joshua found the condition of the Canaanite nations to be one of utter pollution.

C. The problem is now easily solved in regard to the Phœnicians. This plague may have spread among them gradually, between the time of Jacob and that of Moses, as it did among the Canaanites, or it may have been that military expeditions of the Semites of the Euphrates had already, in or before Abraham's time, reached Phœnicia, which lay along the track from Babylon to Palestine. The latter supposition might be supported from brick inscriptions of Kudur-Mabug, § 248, *Obs.*; but this again may be far more simply explained from the advance of the Lydians, who, according to § 247, were a decidedly Semitic tribe, from the Euphrates region to the Orontes, and thence to Cilicia and Lydia (see *Obs.*). In any case, even in the Sidonian branch of the Canaanites, the religion of Baal had not its original seat. This religion must have come from the Euphrates Semites, and that not earlier than B.C. 1900, and consequently long after the settlement of the Caphtorim in Phœnicia. The worship of Baal, therefore, did not belong to the Caphtor Phœnicians originally, but was first introduced among them through contact with the Euphrates Semites and the Lydians, and perhaps partly in consequence of subjection to them. It was then amalgamated

¹ On the overthrow of Sodom, see § 308.

with the Egyptian Melkart-worship of the Caphtorim, as the latter had previously been amalgamated with the old Canaanite-Sidonian primitive monotheistic worship of אֵל, and this again, in consequence of the identification of Adon and Hesiri, had resolved itself into pure paganism.

Obs.—On Cilician monuments and coins Baal is represented with a sceptre, ears of corn, a bow in his hand, and his name inscribed; Aschera, likewise, appears in form similar to that of the Ephesian Artemis; and, finally, there is a sun-god, with the name San, who is represented as binding a lion. This San reminds us of the Sin of the Babylonians. Among the people of Cilicia, Phœnicians may have been mixed up with Semitic Lydians. Not much credit can be given to the tradition in Herod. vii. 91, that the Cilicians had derived their name from a Phœnician Cilix, son of Agenor. It gives strong support, however, to the prevalence of a tradition that Phœnician colonists had found their way after the Lydians into Cilicia. That in Lydia itself the Semitic Lydian tribe was at an early period put in subjection by the Carian Greeks, and that there first of all the conception of the Greek Hercules was confounded with that of the Phœnician Melkart, and that of the Greek Artemis with that of the Semitic Aschera, is generally admitted.

§ 254. *Origin of the Worship of Baal among the Euphrates Semites.*

The Baal religion was introduced among the Canaanites and Phœnicians, Hamitic races, from the Semites of the Euphrates; but now we ask, How did it first arise among these? We have already seen that this religion was not original to the Semites as such, from the notorious and acknowledged fact that the whole of the Arabic tribes continued unaffected by the religion of Baal (see *Obs.*). The religion of Baal, therefore, must have made way among the Euphrates Semites first after the Arabic Semites had separated from them. Before this there had already appeared there the beginnings of heathenism, the personifying and reverencing of particular creative powers of God manifesting themselves in nature; but these were pre-eminently the heavenly bodies, as also among the Japhetic peoples, the Indians, Iranians, and

Pelasgians, and among the Hamitic Egyptians, and especially the sun, the blue firmament of day and the starry firmament of night, formed the object of their worship. (Compare in § 249 the oldest monotheistic fragment, and then the old account of the creation, in which the star deities make their appearance.) It thus follows, from the fact that (§ 249) the Babylonians and Assyrians in the earliest times worshipped a god *Ilu*, whose proper name was identical with ʾĪl, Arab. *allah*, the designation of the idea of God common to all the Semitic peoples, that at the beginning the primitive monotheistic consciousness of the one invisible God, who moves in all this substance of nature and in all the powers of nature, was still retained by those Euphrates Semites. We also see here clearly how alongside of *ilu* simply, alongside of God, gradually other gods appeared and assumed forms like to His, and how *Ilu* has come now to be regarded as one god alongside of others, until at last he passed entirely out of view and was quite forgotten.

Keeping in view the conclusions reached in § 247 E, we get the following positive history of the origin of heathenism generally, and of the later origin of the Baal religion in particular.

A. The flood is a historical fact witnessed to by the harmonious tradition of the most diverse races (with § 224 comp. § 255, and Second Div. from § 256, and § 303). In the generations that immediately followed the flood, there was developed anew, from the root of inherent depravity (see § 114–124), the tendency to forget God, to put Him at a distance, to worship Him not as a personal, holy being, that might be dealt with in Himself, but rather as one who is manifested in His works (comp. § 118). He would not, therefore, be altogether forgotten. The consciousness still continued, that as the one God He stood over His works. It was, however, regarded as quite sufficient, if one accorded worship to His manifestations.

If, then, the Israelitish tradition, which we find in Genesis,

appears to us in all other points thoroughly credible, we may quite trust that which is told us in Gen. xi. 1 ff. The sons and grandsons of Noah went down from Armenia through the valley of the Tigris, rather than of the Euphrates, southwards across the plain lying between the two rivers until they reached Shinar. Here they began to build a city and a tower, a common settlement which they might protect with walls against wild beasts; but at the same time they said, Let us make us a **שם**, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. That this name does not mean, as in the phrases **שם שם**, 2 Sam. vii. 23, and **עשה שם**, Jer. xxxii. 20, fame, a renowned name, is distinctly evident from this, that besides them there was no one else on the earth who could have heard the report of their fame. Besides, a far-renowned name would not have protected them from scattering, but rather would have exposed them to this danger. The means for securing consolidation can only have been the erection of a common sanctuary and the adoption of a common ritual of worship, and for this purpose they wished to make themselves a **שם**. This word, although in the Hebrew it has come to have the meaning of name, was undoubtedly at the time of the building of the tower of Babel used in its old fundamental meaning, which must necessarily have been presupposed in the words **שם**, Arab. *asmun*, Ethiop. *sam*, Syr. *schem*, Grk. *σῆμα*, *σημεῖον*, as well as in the closely related roots, Saner. *sama*, Grk. *ὁμοῖος*, Lat. *similis*, Old High Germ. *simel*, Celt. *samal*, the meaning, that is to say, sign, token, image.¹ They wish to erect a visible symbol or idol representing God. This plan was frustrated by means of a catastrophe, and indeed, according

¹ Schrader, *Cuneiform Inscript. and the Old Test.* i. 109 f., quoting the inscription of Nebuchadnezzar, where he says, "the temple of the seven lights of the earth" (the sun, moon, and five planets), "the tower of Borsippa, which a former king had erected and had completed to the height of 42 yards, whose pinnacle, however, he had not set up, since remote days had fallen to ruin"—he, Nebuchadnezzar, restored it. Schrader makes this refer to the tower of Babel of Gen. xi. If it were justifiable so to understand it (Borsippa lies some miles west of Babel, yet

to the primitive Israelitish tradition, by the descent of God Himself (ver. 7), that is, either an actual appearing, or a mere manifestation of God, which struck terror into men, and was as such the cause of a confusion of languages. The tendency to the construction of separated languages made sudden and energetic progress (§ 305), which, according to § 245, is no unreasonable assumption, and resulted in the local separation of the tribes. In reference to this manifestation of God the various families assumed divine attitudes. The Japhetidæ—the Indians, Iranians, Pelasgians, etc.—continued to worship God as immanent in His works, the consciousness being retained for centuries among the Indians (§ 193–196) of His unity and invisibility, also to some extent that of His holiness, this latter element being set forth far more energetically by the Iranians (§ 218–220). The Basques have refrained completely (§ 258)—the Iranians, Indians, Germans, Turanians, and Mongols, for centuries, and even for a period of a thousand years—from making for themselves any image of God. The Hamitic Egyptians, too, at the first acknowledged a god who ruled over nature (§ 241), but soon sank down to the standpoint of mere nature-worship, just like the Arab tribes with their worship of the stars. In the Euphrates plain the greater part of the Semites remained, and these united with the Hamitic Canaanites (§ 248), and it was there that a Hamite, Nimrod (§ 247), by means of his bravery and activity in exterminating wild animals, raised himself to an acknowledged chieftainship, and, because he was personally a God-fearing man, upon whom those divine manifestations had made a deep impression (§ 247, *E.*), reared a bulwark against advancing heathenism.

the most ancient Babel might have had a different position from the one now generally accepted), then we have here surviving among the Babylonians a reminiscence that this building had been a temple, and indeed, what is of importance, a temple dedicated to the old star-worship which preceded that of Baal, as indicated by the phrase “all the lights of the earth.” That Borsippa is called by its present Mohammedan inhabitants Birs Nimrod is of no consequence.

B. The Semites willingly submitted themselves to the rule of Nimrod, but only so long as it could not dispense with his strong arm for protection against the lions and tigers of the jungles of the Euphrates. About the time of Nimrod's death, when the territory had in some measure been cleared of wild beasts, and its population had been consolidated by the founding of cities, the pride of the Semites rebelled. Along with the national enmity of the Euphrates Semites against the Hamite dynasty (§ 248), there appeared now, hand in hand therewith, a savage and violent opposition to the religion and the god of those Hamites, the אֱלֹהִים (§ 253). On the overthrow of the Nimrod empire, the Canaanites, rightly fearing that they might be reduced to slavery, migrated to Palestine (§ 248), where in the days of Abraham they had to defend themselves against the attacks of Chederlaomer and Amraphel (comp. § 248, *Obs.*). On the Euphrates, in Shinar and Elam, that process of Semitic wickedness and hardening was carried on, which, in § 250, *B.*, we have already characterized. That must have been a sudden and headlong rush by which the Euphrates Semites were brought to represent as specially fit for the worship of the gods everything which conscience forbade and condemned as disgraceful and horrible, and to form conceptions of the deity in correspondence therewith. A conscious determination no longer to listen to the voice of conscience, to trample shame and conscience under foot, and to drive aside the אֱלֹהִים, must have here found place, just as now in our own times, in certain quarters, such a conscious hatred against the God worshipped by Christians is manifested. The flesh would have itself no longer punished by the Spirit of God speaking in conscience. Among the Iranians, Indians, Pelasgians, Egyptians, Arabians, conscience went to sleep slowly and by degrees; among the Euphrates Semites there arose a violent revolt against God and God's voice, a second fall from natural sinfulness into utter obduracy (Rom. ii. 8).

C. When this corruption had wrought its way from Elam to Shinar (to Babel, Uru), Terah moved with Abraham and Lot (Gen. xi. 31), at the divine command, from Ur of the Chaldees in Babylonia, to go to the still God-fearing Canaanites, to Canaan, but in the first instance went only to Haran; thence after Terah's death, Abraham (in B.C. 2317) journeyed on till he reached Canaan. The generation of Arphachsad still knew and worshipped the one God (Gen. xxii. 31, 50, where יְהוָה has been substituted for אֱלֹהִים or אֱלֹהֵי by the transcriber of Genesis), although it was not by any means free from those beginnings of heathenism, the worship of the works of God, the stars, as is seen from Josh. xxiv. 2 (comp. Gen. xxxi. 30 ff.). It had the primitive tradition in a pure and unadulterated form.

Obs.—On the ideas of God among the Arabs, see Krehl, *über die Religion der vorislamischen Araber*, Leipz. 1863.

(a) All Arab authors say that the Arabians originally professed the religion of Ibrahim (Abraham), that is, the simple faith in Allah, God, and Krehl (p. 5) admits in this an historical reminiscence. The Bedouins of the Hauran profess (Krehl, p. 4) to this day, according to their own statement, the religion of Ibrahim, not of Islam. When Allah had withdrawn himself to a distance, and as it were had removed himself from the world (as it is strikingly put by Krehl, p. 5), compensation for his presence was sought in his works.

(b) Further, all Arab accounts agree that the old religion of the Arabians was star-worship. The name Atstar, found in Himyarite inscriptions in the extreme south of Arabia, etymologically reminding us of the Babylonian designation of deity, which lies at the basis of the name Istar, represented perhaps the moon-goddess. In regard to this, however, it must be emphatically observed, that there is not the slightest trace of a worship of this or any other sort of deity on the part of the Arabians by means of prostitution, or with human sacrifices. In itself, *atstar* is nothing else than the primitive appellative term for the stars common to the Semitic and Aryan languages: Sanscr. *stara*, *tara*; Iran., in reduplicated form, *tistrya*; Grk. *ἀστὴρ*; Lat. *stella*, *astrum*; Goth. *stairō*; Old High Germ. *sterro*; Babyl. *istar*; Pers. *شهر*, Esth. i. 14 (comp. Finn. *syty*; and Mongol. *sita*, to burn; Mongol. *sara*, morn). At the basis of it lies a primitive root, *שחר*, *str*, which probably means to spread a gleam, to beam, and with it probably the root *שטר*, to point

the way, is connected. More certain are the reports, that the Himyarite tribe Tsasm, belonging to the oldest Arabian population, had worshipped the Debâran, the Hyades; that the tribes Lahm and Gudsâm, also in the south, worshipped Muschtari, the planet Jupiter, which as a luck-bringing star had the title *sad* or *said*, luck; that the tribe Tsajji worshipped Suhail, the constellation Canopus, as bringing misfortune; that the tribes Asad and Tamim worshipped Utsârid, the planet Mercury; that the tribes Khais and Huzâa worshipped Sira al abûr, Sirius; that the tribes Madhidsh, Khurâis, Ijâd, worshipped Tsurajji, the Pleiades, and that other tribes worshipped Zachâl, the planet Saturn. Traces of a worship of the sun are found (Krehl, p. 50, in opposition to Levy and Blau) among the Arab Nabatheans of Petra, whose god $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma \ \acute{\alpha}\rho\eta\varsigma$ (Suid.) or $\Delta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\alpha\rho\acute{\eta}$ (Hesych. and Steph. of Byz.), that is, Dû'l-sharâ of Arabian authors, probably identical with Dû'l-kaffain, and the דל־שרא of the Semitic inscriptions, is to be interpreted as the "Lord of gleaming light," and thus appears to have been the sun-god. That the sun-worship was practised in Arabia is proved by the proper names Sampsigeranos, Amrisaimnos, Baisampta, from *samas* שמש , even as they occur in their Grecianized forms. The Arabian god Sabis, spoken of by Pliny (*Hist. Nat.* xii. 14. 32), seems to be Samas. Philostorgius says of the Himyarites, even in A.D. 330, $\theta\acute{\upsilon}\beta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu \ \eta\lambda\acute{\iota}\omega \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \sigma\epsilon\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu\eta \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \delta\alpha\acute{\iota}\mu\omicron\sigma\iota\nu \ \epsilon\pi\iota\chi\omega\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$. That each tribe should have chosen its own particular star as the special guardian deity of the tribe, is already a significant proof of superstitious deterioration.

(c) Centuries before Mohammed, the further superstition of the worship of stones and trees had made way. A tree planted under a particular star, or a stone dedicated to a particular star, was considered (as Maimonides has properly explained it, for the Arabic worship of stones has hardly any connection with the old Semitic memorial stars, Gen. xxi. 23, xxviii. 18, xxxi. 44; 1 Sam. vii. 12) as having absorbed into it the power of that star. Thus did the Kaaba, a black mass of rock at Mecca, become an object of worship, which all the more certainly is a representation of the planet Saturn, since the followers of Mohammed strongly contend against this notion, and since, according to Al Dimiski, the black colour was sacred to Saturn. So among the tribes Lahm and Gudsâm there was a sacred stone idol al Ukhaischir, probably representing the planet Jupiter; so also the red rocky peak al Fuls, carved like three swords; an idol Katsra, in the tribe Tsasm; an idol al Lât, a square white stone, in the tribe Tsakhif; a black stone, Manât, among the Hudhailites, and similar idols. Sad and Dsimâr, in the tribe Sulaim; a sacred Sumara tree al Uzzâ, grouped by Abulmundir

with Manat and al Lat as the three eminent youths, according to Krehl's interpretation, sacred to the moon-goddess; finally, the tree Anvât at Mecca. Animal sacrifices were offered to these trees, about which fortune-tellers are employed, and arms are hung upon them. The stone idols are covered and adorned with garments, the hair is shorn before it and baked with vermin into cakes, which then are eaten. The disciples of Mohammed affirmed that Amr bin Lubhaj, reigning in Mecca in B.C. 300, introduced idol-worship, and also the worship of the stars. The former is very old, the latter is primeval.

(d) Of the Arabians who had laid hold as conquerors of the coasts of the Mediterranean Sea at Gaza, in the time of Nehemiah (Krehl, pp. 30-34), we are told in Herod. i. 131, iii. 8, that under the name of Orotal they worshipped Dionysos, and under the name of Alilal they worship Mylitta. According to Arrian (*Exped. Alex.* vii. 20), they worshipped Οὐρανός and Διονύσος, conceiving of the former as embracing all the stars; according to Strabo, 741, they worshipped Zeus and Dionysos. In Herodotus we are to read, according to Krehl's ingenious conjecture, p. 40, Διονύσον Νουράλλα, that is, *nûr allâhi*, light of God, that is, the sun. Herodotus identified the Arabian sun-god with Dionysos, because Dionysos was worshipped in Asia as the sun-god (Creuzer, *Symbolik*, i. 466, iv. 131), and because, according to the Arabian accounts of Imrulkain, the Arabic worship of the sun-god had an orchestral character. The Alilat of Herodotus is the name of the moon-goddess at Ilâhat, met with on Himyarite inscriptions, which in that strip of land along the Philistine coast known to Herodotus may have assumed, under Phœnician influences, a shape in regard to outward form and inward character like that of Μύλιττα, that is, Bilit or Aschera (Krehl, p. 47 f.).

(e) Alongside of the Kaaba lay two stone idols, Isâh and Nailâ, of which the disciples of Mohammed tell, that they are an adulterous pair turned into stone. But Isâh is described as son of Canopus, and Nailâ, as an appellative meaning kiss, as the daughter of a constellation. There is no possibility of supposing here a parallel with Adonis and Aphrodite (Krehl), since the pairing of Adonis with Aschera (§ 250) is only explicable on the assumption of a local Phœnician mixing of Egyptian and Euphrates Semitic religious elements, while the substitution of Aphrodite for Aschera was quite a tertiary occurrence. Two other idols, Vadd and Suvâ, in Ruhât, near to the Egyptian frontier, an armed man and woman, may perhaps point to Osiris and Isis (Krehl), and represent an

imported Egyptian religious idea,—probably a chaste idea, for, according to Ibn Habib, Vadd has forbidden lustful jests with women.

(f) The Himyarites had (Krehl, p. 38), besides the appellation *allah*, another name of God, אל, corresponding to the Hebrew אלה and the Babylonian *ilu*. This name seems to have been with them a proper name of a particular deity. This then confirms what we have said in the above section of the process of transmutation, according to which the one god came to be regarded as one among many. When the Arabs, the Cushite Arabs (Gen. x. 7) and the Joktanite-Semite Arabs (ver. 26 f.) separated from the Euphrates Semites, that process of primary polytheism, the worship of the works of God, had already set in. What Mohammedan writers tell about the idols Vadd, Suvâ, etc., as being images of antediluvian patriarchs, which had been then worshipped, is nothing else than a refining explanation of the origin of Arabian idolatry, and is of no historical value.

§ 255. *The Assyrio-Babylonian Traditions.*

Notwithstanding the Baal-worship, and alongside of it, there have been retained in Babylon and Assyria reminiscences of the primeval history in the form of legends. These legends are related, partly by Berosus and other ancient writers, partly in the Assyrio-Babylonian inscriptions recently discovered by George Smith, which have been wrought up with sober and sound criticism in the work: George Smith's *Chaldean Genesis*, of which an authorized German translation by Hermann Delitzsch has appeared, with explanations and excursuses by Friedrich Delitzsch.

A. In the Cuneiform Inscriptions we meet with the ancient account of the creation in a twofold form, though indeed only fragments of it remain. The more complete one runs thus:¹—

“At that time above, the heaven was unnamed: | below the earth by name was unrecorded; | the boundless deep also was

¹ Smith's *Chald. Account of Genesis*, ed. by Sayce, London 1880, pp. 57, 58.

their generation. | The chaos of the sea [Mummu-Tiamat] was she who bore the whole of them. | Their waters were collected together in one place, and | the flowering seed was not gathered, the marsh plant was not grown. | At that time the gods had not been produced, any one of them; | by name they had not been called, destiny was not fixed. | Were made also the great gods, | the gods Lakhmu and Lakhamu were produced the first and | to growth they . . . | the gods Sar and Kisar were next made. | The days were long; a long time passed and | the gods Anu (Bel and Hea were born of) | the gods Sar and Kisar.”

At the crown of creation there is here put a mythological theogony, and by means of it the reminiscence of an old One invisible Ilu, to whom the fragment quoted in § 249 refers, is completely blotted out. The following passage corresponds to the fourth day of Holy Scripture:—

“Anu [or Ilu] made suitable the mansions of the seven great gods. | The stars he placed in them, the *lumasi* he fixed. | He arranged the year according to the bounds [or sign of the zodiac: Heb. Mazzaroth] that he defined. | For each of the twelve months three stars he fixed. From the day when the year issues forth unto the close, | he established the mansion of the god Nibiru, that they might know their land or bounds. | That they might not err or deflect at all, | the mansion of Bel and Hea he established along with himself. | He opened also the great gates in the sides of the world; | the bolts he strengthened on the left hand and on the right. | In its centre also he made a staircase. | The moon-god he caused to beautify the thick night. | He appointed him also to hinder or balance the night, that the day may be known, | saying: Every month without break observe thy circle: | at the beginning of the month also when the night is at its height, | with the hours thou announcest that the heavens may be known. | On the seventh day thy circle begins to fill, | but open in darkness will remain the half on the right (?). | At that time the sun will be on the horizon of heaven at thy rising. | Thy form determine and make a circle. | From hence return and approach the path of the sun. | Then will the darkness return: the sun will change” (Tablet v.).¹

On Tablet vii. we have the following fragment:—

“All that time the gods in their assembly created. . . . | They made suitable the strong monsters. . . . | They caused to

¹ Smith's *Chald. Genesis*, pp. 64, 65.

come living creatures . . . | cattle of the fold, beasts of the field, and creeping things of the field. . . . | They fixed for the living creatures . . . | . . . cattle and creeping things of the city they fixed . . . | . . . the assembly of the creeping things, the whole which were created . . . | . . . which in the assembly of my family . . . | . . . and the god Nin-si-ku (the lord of the noble face) joined the two together . . . | . . . to the assembly of the creeping things I gave life | . . . the seed of Lakhamu I destroyed."¹

We find here, then, that primitive tradition of the six days' work of creation, which Abraham had brought in unaltered, original purity and genuine simplicity from Shinar to Canaan, probably in a written document, for already in B.C. 2000 Shinar possessed a finished and rich literature, and literary culture; but when we find that tradition again, it is already adulterated with mythological additions. Finally, there is mentioned also a creation's-day of rest, *sabbatuv*.

B. The first legend in Berosus is a wildly fantastic and completely disfigured rendering of the history of the fall. A sea monster called Oan, with the body of a fish and two human heads, the voice of a man and two human feet (Gen. iii. 14), taught man language and all the arts. The serpent of Paradise is thus here, in trustful surrender to its sophism in Gen. iii. 5, considered as the benefactor, and sin as the blessing and salvation of man, quite in correspondence with the conscious falling away from God characterized in § 254. Two hundred thousand years later—for in regard to vast numbers of years this Babylonian legend emulates our Darwinians—another such being, Idotion (might this be Jubal, son of Adah? Gen. iv. 20 f.), makes his appearance, and continued the instruction. Then, somewhere about a hundred thousand years afterwards, four such beings come forward together; and again, last of all, one Odakon. An Assyrian inscription on clay, found by George Smith, although its interpretation in details is still shrouded in considerable

¹ Smith's *Chald. Genesis*, p. 71.

obscurity, speaks evidently of a serpent-shaped demon, Kikar-Tiamat, and places him in original connection with a destruction that had overtaken the human race.

C. The tradition of the fall has not as yet been found in the inscriptions, which is quite as might be expected, since the serpent has been raised into the god Anu, and a benefactor of man. A very old Babylonian seal, however, in the British Museum, represents the occurrence of this unhappy incident: a man and a woman, their hands stretching toward the fruit of a tree, and behind the woman a serpent (Smith, *Chaldean Account of Genesis*, p. 88). While this tree of knowledge is only once met with, the tree of life is met with more frequently, and that as the symbol of life, *e.g.* on clay coffins at Erech, in archaic form, growing between cypresses and pines, now and again surrounded by winged men or angels. An inscription fragment tells that the tree of life is guarded at all the four quarters of heaven by a threatening sword (comp. Gen. iii. 24). Finally, in a fragment relating the revolt of the spirits against the gods, the god Marduk guards the grove of his father Anu with a drawn sword (Smith, *Chaldean Account of Genesis*, p. 86; Layard, *Introd. à l'état du culte et des mystères de Mithra*, Paris 1847, Tabl. 17, 31, 57, 61). In other inscriptions there is mention of a province Gandanu, which was watered by four rivers, the Euphrates, Tigris, Surrapi, and Ukni, in which Rawlinson and Delitzsch rightly recognise the garden of Eden with its rivers, the Euphrates, Tigris, Gihon, and Pishon.

D. About the flood (which, according to Berosus, occurred 432,000 years after Oan) there is a much older account than that of Berosus, on a clay tablet in the library of the Assyrian king Assurbanipal, about B.C. 660, which was found, deciphered, and published by George Smith.¹ This account, again, is only a copy of a much older one, which belonged to the ancient city of Erech, now called Warka. The copyist has marked

¹ Smith, *Chaldean Account of Genesis*, 27 ff. Delitzsch, *Chald. Gen.* 223 ff.

the division lines of his original, and noted variations. The account is as follows: A king (ideographically Iz du bar, the phonetic reading is unknown), corresponding to Nimrod (see § 247, *E.*), refuses an offer of marriage by the goddess Istar, overcomes, along with his friend Heabani, the princes of Elam and Belesu and the winged bull, wishes, when an illness overtakes him, to visit Sisit, the son of Ubaratutu, the Assyrian Noah, who has attained unto immortality without seeing death. Sisit¹ dwells at the mouth of the Euphrates. Izdubar comes to the water which divides the mortals from the immortals, and sees Sisit with his wife upon the other side. Izdubar asks [the question is wanting]: Sisit answers, The goddess Manitu, who determines our fortunes, appoints to us all death and life, but the day of death is unknown. The king now asks how Sisit himself had become immortal, and Sisit then tells the king the story of the flood:²—

“Man of Suripak,³ son of Ubara-tutu, build a house, make a ship to preserve the sleep of plants and living beings; store the seed and vivify life, cause also the seed of life of every kind to go up into the midst of the ship. The ship which thou shalt make, 600 cubits shall be its measure in length, 60 cubits the amount of its breadth and height . . . and on the deep cover it, even it, with a roof. I understood, and say to Hea my lord: The building of the ship which thou commandest thus . . . I shall have made . . . the sons of the host and the old men. (Hea opened his mouth and) speaks and says to me his servant . . . thou shalt say unto them . . . he has rejected me and . . . it is upon me . . . like caves . . . may I judge above and below . . . close the ship . . . at the season which I will make known to you, into it enter and the door of the ship turn. Into the midst of it thy grain, thy furniture, thy goods, thy wealth, thy women slaves, thy hand-

¹ Formed probably from the Babylonian-Assyrian root סתת, to remain over, he who remained over from the flood, therefore Noah, with whom in other particulars the personality of Enoch seems to have been combined (Gen. v. 24). Elsewhere also Hasisadra is mentioned, which name lies at the basis of the Xisuthros of Berosus.

² Smith's *Chald. Genesis*, ed. Sayce, pp. 280–289.

³ The city of Suripak is also elsewhere described as the city of the ship, that is, of the ark (Smith, *Assyrian Discoveries*, p. 212. Delitzsch, *Chald. Gen.* p. 145).

maids, and the sons of the host, the beasts of the field, the wild animals of the field as many as I would protect, I will send to thee, and thy door shall guard (them). . . . On the fifth day . . . it rose. In its circuit fourteen in all were its girders. Fourteen in all it contained . . . above it I placed its roof, it . . . I enclosed it. I rode in it the sixth time; I divided its passages the seventh time; its interior I divided the eighth time. Leaks for the waters within it I cut off. I saw the rents and the wanting parts I added. Three *sari* of bitumen I poured over the outside. Three *sari* of bitumen I poured over the inside. Three *sari* of men carrying baskets, who carried on their heads food. I added a *saros* of food which the people should eat; two *sari* of food the boatmen shared. To . . . I sacrificed oxen. I established . . . each day . . . beer, food, and wine; (I collected them) like the waters of a river and like the dust of the earth, and (in the ship) the food with my hand I placed. Through the help of Samas the seaworthiness of the ship was accomplished . . . they were strong, and the tackling of the ship I caused to bring above and below . . . they went in two-thirds of it. All I possessed I collected it, all I possessed I collected it in silver, all I possessed I collected it in gold, all I possessed I collected it in the seed of life of all kinds. I caused everything to go up into the ship, my slaves and my handmaids, the beast of the field, the wild animal of the field, the sons of the people, all of them I caused to go up. The season Samas fixed, and he spake, saying: In the night I will cause it to rain from heaven heavily, enter into the midst of the ship and shut thy door. That season came round of which he spake, saying: In the night I will cause it to rain from heaven heavily. Of the day I reached its evening, the day of watching fear I had. I entered into the midst of the ship and shut my door. On closing the ship to Buzur-sadi-rabi the boatman the habitation I gave with its goods. Mu-seri-ina-namari arose, from the horizon of heaven a black cloud. Rimmon in the midst of it thundered, and Nebo and the Wind-God went in front, the throne-bearers went over the mountain and plain, Nergal the mighty removes the wicked, Ninip¹ goes in front, he casts down, the spirits of earth carried destruction, in their terror they shake the earth; of Rimmon the flood reached to heaven. The darkened (earth to a waste) was turned. The surface of the earth like . . . they covered, it destroyed all living beings from the face of the earth; the raging deluge over the people reached to heaven. Brother saw

¹ Not perhaps to be identified with the name of Nineveh, which in Babylonian is נִנְוָה. Ninip is also mentioned above as a god alongside of Anu and Bilu.

not his brother, men did not know one another. In heaven the gods feared the whirlwind, and sought a refuge; they ascended to the heaven of Anu. The gods like dogs were fixed, in a heap did they lie down. Spake Istar like a child,¹ the great goddess uttered her speech: All to clay are turned, and that which I in the presence of the gods prophesied (even evil has happened). As I prophesied in the presence of the gods evil, to evil (were devoted) all my people, the trouble I prophesied thus: I the mother have begotten my people, and like the young of the fishes they fill the sea. And the gods because of the spirits of the earth are weeping with me. The gods on seats are seated in lamentation, covered were their lips for the coming evil. Six days and nights passed, the wind, the whirlwind, and the storm overwhelmed. On the seventh day at its approach the rain was stayed, the raging whirlwind which had smitten like an earthquake was quieted. The sea began to dry, and the wind and deluge ended. I watched the sea making a noise, and the whole of mankind was turned to clay, like reeds the corpses floated. I opened the window, and the light smote upon the fortress of my nostrils. I was grieved, and sat down; I weep, over the fortress of my nostrils went my tears. I watched the regions at the boundary of the sea, towards all the twelve points of the compass there was no land. In the country of Nizir rested the ship; the mountain of Nizir stopped the ship, and to pass over it it was not able. The first day, the second day, the mountain of Nizir stopped the ship. The third day, the fourth day, the mountain of Nizir stopped the ship. The fifth day, the sixth day, the mountain of Nizir stopped the ship. On the seventh day at its approach I sent forth a dove, and it left. The dove went, it returned, and a resting-place it did not find, and it came back. I sent forth a swallow, and it left. The swallow went, it returned, and a resting-place it did not find, and it came back. I sent forth a raven, and it left. The raven went, and the carrion on the water it saw, and it did eat; it swam and turned away, it did not come back. I sent the animals forth to the four winds, I sacrificed a sacrifice, I built an altar on the peak of the mountain, by sevens vessels I placed, at the bottom of them I spread reeds, pines, and juniper. The gods smelt the savour, the gods smelt the good savour; the gods like flies over the

¹ The passage that follows represents a configuration which was given to the legend after the origin of the Baal-worship. Istar, who has brought men into being, as the goddess of procreation and of physical life, makes her appearance as the advocate and saviour of mankind over against the god Ilu. To her man owes his salvation; to Ilu the destructive flood is ascribed.

sacrificer gathered. From afar also the great goddess at her approach lifted up the mighty arches (*i.e.* the rainbow), which Anu had created as his glory. The crystal of those gods before me (*i.e.* the rainbow) never may I forget. Those days I devised with longing that I might never forget. 'May the gods come to my altar, may Ilu (or Bel) never come to my altar,¹ for he did not consider, and had made a whirlwind, and my people he consigned to the abyss.' From afar also Bel at his approach saw, the ship he stopped; Bel was filled with anger against the gods and the spirits of heaven: 'Let no one come out alive, never may a man live in the abyss.' Ninip his mouth opened and spake; he says to the warrior Bel: 'Who is it except Hea that forms a resolution?'² And Hea knows, and all things he . . . ' Hea his mouth opened and spake, he says to the warrior Bel: 'Thou messenger of the gods, warrior, as thou didst not consider a deluge thou madest. The doer of sin bore his sin, the blasphemer bore his blasphemy. Never may the just prince be cut off, never may the faithful (be destroyed).³ Instead of thy making a deluge, may lions come and men be diminished; instead of thy making a deluge, may hyænas come and men be diminished; instead of thy making a deluge, may a famine happen and the country be (destroyed); instead of thy making a deluge, may pestilence come and men be destroyed. I did not reveal the judgment of the gods to Sisit (Xisuthrus), a dream I sent and the judgment of the gods he heard.' Again also Bel considers; he approaches the midst of the ship. He took my hand and caused me to ascend up, he caused me to ascend; he united my wife to my side; he turned unto us and fixes himself in covenant with us; he approaches us: 'Formerly Sisit was mortal, but again also Sisit and his wife to live as gods are taken away, and Sisit also dwells in a remote place at the mouth of the rivers.'⁴ They took me, and in a remote place at the mouth of the rivers they caused me to dwell."

Such is the account which Sisit gives of the flood.⁵ That the inhabitants of Erech did not receive that tradition from

¹ Sisit also reviles Ilu, the primitive invisible God (comp. § 249), because he sent this flood. It is not Ilu, but Hea, the god of fate, who saves Sisit, when he commanded him to build the ship.

² It is Hea that saved Sisit.

³ The wicked may be punished, but a righteous man, like Sisit, must not die.

⁴ A caricature of the promise, Gen. ix. 9-11.

⁵ Representations of Sisit are found, which show him as going into his ark.

the Israelites is *à priori* evident and universally admitted. All the more important, notwithstanding the accommodation and reconstruction in terms of the Baal-worship, is the reminiscence of so many particulars regarding the incident which the Israelitish tradition has preserved in its sober truth.

E. How the history of Nimrod is contained in the Izdubar legend, has been told already in § 247, *E.* But there is also found in it a reminiscence of the expulsion from Paradise. After the performance of his deeds he comes to the grove of the gods, which produces emeralds for fruits and ukni stones for buds; but Sidari and Sabitu, guardians of the grove, shut the gate against him, and with shame upon his face and the brand of the gods he goes forth. He goes to Sisit, and learns of him how he escaped death in the flood, and how man may attain unto immortality. There is also a sculpture, now in the British Museum, which reminds us of the fall: a tree toward which two men stretch out their hands, behind one of them a serpent.

F. Alexander Polyhistor and Abydenus quote a Babylonian tradition about the building of the tower of Babel. All men had spoken the same language, and had been very strong. They had begun to build a great tower to reach up to heaven, and they were now quite near heaven, when the gods sent a great storm, which overturned the tower, scattered men, and confused their language. No great importance, however, can be attached to a tradition of so recent an origin as this, which must have received its present shape at the time of the exile, and so probably under Israelitish influences, until it has been corroborated by something discovered in the old Babylonian-Assyrian clay inscriptions. George Smith thought that he had found such a report; but its meaning just in regard to the most decisive words is doubtful. On the other hand, the biblical derivation of the name Babel, בָּבֶל, Babyl. Assy. *Babîlu*, also *Babîlu*, from the root בָּלַל, to mix, jumble, confuse, must be admitted to be correct. The reduplicated form is analogous to that of Sisit from *satat*. Schrader's derivation

from *bābu*, gate, and *Ilu*, Gate of Ilu, which he then interprets as meaning the Sanctuary of Ilu, should be overthrown once and for all by the fact that it is never found written as Bâbilu.

We have now gained those two conclusions—1. There has been a universal degeneration of all the cultured races of antiquity from a primitive monotheism into various forms of heathenism. 2. Their legends and mythologies concur in possessing reminiscences of the same primitive tradition, which in its simple sober form we meet with in the Book of Genesis. The Assyrian-Babylonian legends, written down upon tablets about B.C. 1700, but long before current in oral forms, while in respect of contents most intimately connected with the primitive tradition of the Israelites, but at the same time evidently representing a form of this primitive tradition disfigured by mythological and polytheistic modifications, are yet of themselves sufficient to contradict the negative criticism of Zunz, Kayser, Graf, Wellhausen, which assigns the origin of Genesis to the post-Davidic age. Before presenting for comparison with the wickedness of Semitic heathenism the constitution and history of the religion of Israel, we must direct our inquiries to the half-civilised and savage races, and ask whether among them any sort of upward development can be found, and what legendary remnants are still discoverable among them.

SECOND DIVISION.

THE HALF-CIVILISED AND THE SAVAGE RACES.



CHAPTER I.—THE RACES OF THE NORTH AND WEST OF EUROPE.

§ 256. *The Basques, an Indo-Germanic People.*

FROM Greek and Roman writers we learn about three different races, which one after another, from the north of the Caucasus, rushed over the Alps and spread throughout Europe, all of them undoubtedly in respect of language and race belonging to the Indo-Germanic stem. The first of these were the Celts, who, even four centuries before Christ, about B.C. 389, threatened with overthrow the Roman empire in the beginning of its recorded history, and took possession of the west of Europe, Gaul, Northern Italy, Great Britain, and the west of the present Germany. The second was the race of the Sarmatians or Slavonians in the east. And finally, the third group of nations, designated among the Romans by the Gallic word Germani, were at first wedged in in Northern Germany between the Slavs and Celts, and peopled Scandinavia; then at the time of the rush of new hordes and tribes from Asia, they broke through into the south and middle of Europe, subjugated the Celts in the west, and almost exterminated them.

Before the arrival of these three groups of peoples, another

race, the earliest of all the colonists, had migrated to the north and west of Europe, and among other places established themselves in Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica, so that they formed in primitive times the chief population of Gaul and Spain. They were afterwards driven before the advancing Celts into the Pyrenees, and at last confined to Spain, where, in the Pyrenees, and especially at their southern base, they continue unmixed to the present day, and in possession of their ancient speech. In other parts of Spain, however, they had even in very early times got mixed up with the Celtic invaders so as to form the mixed race of the Celt-Iberians. This people received from the Romans the name of Iberians, either because they had given themselves this designation as being wanderers (from Basque *ibilli*, to wander),¹ or as dwellers in valleys (from *ibarra*, a valley), or, as is more probable, because the Romans first came to know this people as one dwelling on the banks of the Ebro (Iberno). They call themselves at the present day Euscaldunac, from *Eusc* and *alda*, "line, portion," and the plural affix *c*. Their language is called Euscara, and it has also been designated by Ptolemy and the ancients generally by the corresponding names Uasc, Vasc.² Mela (iii. 2. 4) names one of their principal tribes the Auscii. There is no appellative etymology for this name of the Basques, for the derivation from *basca*, forest, is merely suggested by accidental similarity in sound, and that for *eusi*, to bask, is utterly untenable. The name must therefore be regarded as a patronymic (comp. § 247). We must therefore inquire, first of all, whether the Basques are an Indo-Germanic race? Since their language is agglutinate (see *Obs.* 1), some have regarded them as the primeval inhabitants, others have attributed to them a relationship with the American tribes,³ denying to them at

¹ This is the conjecture of W. von Humboldt, *Prüfung der Untersuchungen über die Urbewohner Hispaniens* (Gesam. Werke, ii. 1 ff.), p. 68.

² The name Biscaya (in Plin. i. 142. 5, Biscargis) has no connection with the name Vascones, but is derived from *bizcarra*, a hill. W. von Humboldt, *l.c.* § 66.

³ Denied by W. von Humboldt, *Prüfung der Untersuch.* p. 189 ff.

least an Indo-Germanic descent. This, however, is an error. If, according to § 246, it would be a perversion of the biblical standpoint to regard it as indicating the derivation of these clearly distinguished chief races, it would be no less perverse, from the scientific point of view, to build upon the grammatical partition of the various languages into monosyllabic, agglutinate, and inflectional, the hypothesis of a corresponding threefold division of races. "The grammatical peculiarities of the structure of a language," as W. von Humboldt¹ rightly remarks, "are signs rather of the stages of its formation than of its relation to others." Even the Celtic languages, whose Indo-Germanic character no one can question, have not altogether surmounted the agglutinative standpoint (see *Obs.* 1). Humboldt says:² "The Iberians may very possibly have belonged to the Celts, and have broken off from them as a separate tribe at an early date." This is just what we have assumed in § 247. For the Indo-Germanic extraction of the Basques we find a thoroughly valid proof in the fact that an immense number of Basque words, especially such words as express universally human conceptions regarding the commonest things and relations, are demonstrably identical with the corresponding Indo-Germanic roots (see *Obs.* 2).

Obs. 1.—To the intellectual instinct that constructs language is assigned a twofold task: in the first place, objectively to describe the objective notions by articulate sounds, that is, words; and secondly, to indicate also by words the subjective categories under which the speaker thinks his different ideas, and causes them to be thought of by the one addressed, that is, the relation of these ideas to one another. Two paths lead to this end. Either, first of all, the whole subjective conception in its entirety is put into a vocable, that is, the whole proposition is rolled up together into a unity, when, as *e.g.* in the Aztec, the verb, the subject, and the predicate are combined in one, *e.g.* *ni-naca-qua*, I flesh eat; or a pronominal suffix is incorporated with the verb, for the explanation of which uninflected nouns follow, which, like rays from a central verbal proposition, indicate the direction in which the several uninflected nouns should be regarded as connected with the verb,

¹ Humboldt, *Prüfung*, etc. p. 192.

² *Ibid.* p. 195.

e.g. ni-c-tschui-hui-lia in nopiltzin ce calli, I-it-make-for the my-son a-house, that is, I make a house for my son, where *c* means "it," and *lia* means "for a," in connection with the following nouns. Or, secondly, the idea conveyed by the proposition is broken up into its several constituents as so many distinct complete words, and to each word is given its own vocal sign, which expresses the relation in which it stands to the other words, *e.g. exstruo, filio, meo, domum, splendidam*. It is obvious that this latter form of linguistic construction, the inflectional, which makes vocal modifications or endings represent the relations, presupposes a greater power of abstraction and reflection, and that the former, the agglutinate, either corresponds to the immediateness of a first attempt at speech, where the speaker gives utterance to the whole thought in undivided unity, without distinguishing in the form of his expression the objective substance of the idea from the subjective connections and combinations which he gives to the ideas. A third class, that of the monosyllabic languages, which, as in the case of the Chinese, express the subjective connection by no positive sound, but only by the position of the word, is perhaps less primitive than that of the agglutinate languages (see § 264, *Obs.* 1). There is, however, no language which has taken exclusively the agglutinate or inflectional method. Apart from the fact that many inflectional endings, indeed perhaps all, have arisen out of agglutinate suffixes, the inflectional languages have retained many agglutinative elements, *e.g. the Semitic status constructus*, and the suffix of the object, as in יְקַבְּלֶהָ, the Sanscrit Bahuprihi compounds, in which are often put a whole relative clause, such Greek compounds as *σαρκοφαγῆν, οἰκοδομεῖν, οἰκοδοσπέτης, μεγαλόθυμος*, etc. On the other side nearly all agglutinate languages have modifications, especially in the verb, which border upon inflection. Even the Gā language of the Akra negroes has a formally constructed conjugation with five tenses, Aorist, Imperfect, Present, Perfect, and Future; and in addition to these it has a negative Aorist, *e.g. mikēe*, I said not, as well as *miké*, I said; also an Optative of the Aorist and of the Future; also besides the three persons in the singular and plural (*miké, oké, eké, woké, nyeké, ameké*), it has an impersonal form *aké*, one says. Compare J. Zimmermann, *Gramm. of the Akra or Gā Language*, Stuttg. 1856. The Ketchua language of the Peruvians, too, has brought the forms of declension and conjugation to such perfection, that its latest and most skilful grammarian, J. J. von Tschudi, has been misled into treating it throughout as an inflectional language. But we need only to give attention to the form of the declension,—

<i>Sing. nom.</i> uma (the head)	<i>Plur. nom.</i> uma-cuna
<i>acc.</i> uma-cta	<i>acc.</i> uma-cuna-cta
<i>gen.</i> uma-p etc.	<i>gen.</i> uma-cuna-p
uma-y (my head)	
uma-y-ta	
uma-y-pa,	

or to the pronouns of the object sometimes incorporated in, sometimes affixed to the verb,—

- | | |
|---------------------------|---|
| (1) apa-nki, thou bearest | apa- <i>hua</i> -nki, thou bearest me |
| apa-n, he bears | apa- <i>hua</i> -n, he bears me |
| | apa- <i>hua</i> -n- <i>chik</i> , he bears us |
| (2) apa-ni, I bear | apa-y- <i>ki</i> , I bear thee |
| | apa-y- <i>kichik</i> , I bear you |
| (3) apa-n, he bears | apasun- <i>ki</i> , he bears thee |
| | apasun- <i>kichik</i> , he bears you. |

(according to which, before the suffix of the second person *apani* is shortened into *apay*, *apan* is elongated into *apasun*), in order to see that here the agglutinative stage has not been completely surmounted in favour of the inflectional.

The Basque language has not only a special construction of verbal stems from noun roots which it conjugates, by means of attaching the auxiliary verb *-tu*, Sanscr. *dhā*, to do, but has also the declension of nouns, and though it no longer distinguishes in pronunciation the nominative from the accusative, it is in this respect not much inferior to the Old Irish or Celtic language, which does so only rarely, only in the plural of vowel declensions, in the singular of feminines ending in *e*, and in the singular and plural of consonantal declensions. In general, the Celtic languages, like the Peruvian, have only half transcended the principle of agglutination. The almost regular attachment of the relative clause without a relative pronoun is essentially explained upon this principle: *e.g. indii gnite*, those do, instead of those who do; *is-hé intecttaire maith condaig indocbail diathigerni*, it is he the worker good seeks the honour of his lord, that is, he is a good worker who seeks the honour of his lord—a construction which has become common in English, *e.g.* You will see with your own eyes the countries I speak of. The tendency becomes yet more evident in the incorporating of the governed particles into the verb as the central part of the sentence; and the formation of the preterite by means of a syllable *ro* prefixed to the whole clause is precisely similar to the like prefixing of *o* in the Aztec language. The Mexican says, *o-ni-c-te-maca-c*, then I it to some one give it, that is, I

gave it to some one; and the old Irish wrote, *ro m-rela*, then me covers, that is, he covered me; *ro-m-soir-sa*, then me saves this, that is, he saved me; *ni m-charat-sa*, not me they love this, that is, they love me not; *for-du-b-cechna*, at some time you he exhorts, that is, thus he exhorted you. Just so the Celtic language deals with the possessive pronouns according to the agglutinative method: *e.g. fri-bar-nicc*, against your well-being; *as-sa-anmin*, from his soul, where *bar* and *sa* are not properly adjectival possessive pronouns, which would have been *farn* and *a*, but simply added particles. The personal pronouns, too, in the form of possessive suffixes are attached agglutinatively to the prepositions, *e.g. indium*, in me; *uaim*, from me; *lem*, to me; *uain*, from us; *indit*, in thee. The endeavour to incorporate all subordinate parts of the sentence into the principal part is still evidently prevalent. And so powerfully has this tendency continued to operate, that in the course of centuries the Irish language has allowed inflections to drop away, while it has tenaciously held by the agglutinate affixes. If, then, the structure of the Celtic language is so closely related to that of the Basque, no conclusion can be drawn from the structure of the Basque against the possibility of its belonging to the group of the Indo-Germanic languages.

Obs. 2.—W. von Humboldt has proved that the following Basque words are Indo-Germanic: *osoa*, safe, *σῶς*, *σῶς*; *alboa*, hillside, Old High Germ. *halp*, Irish *alb*, hill; *ala-lecua*, pasture, Lat. *alere*, similarly *athor*, field; *capia*, *habia*, *abia*, nest, *κάπρω*, Lat. *capio*; *cur*, *gur*, crooked, Lat. *curvus*, Old Irish *crund*, *cruinn*, round; *cará*, *gara*, *gora*, *goia*, high, Sanscr. *giri*, mountain, Old Irish *carn*, to heap up; *biruncatu* (root *bir*), to turn, Lat. *vertere* and *veru*; *gar*, hollow, Lat. *cavus*. To these eight examples we now add one hundred and one more. In order to understand this investigation, it is necessary to preface our list by these remarks: (1) The Basque language wants the letter *f*. (2) As three of the above examples show, it has a tendency to soften the initial consonant until it wholly disappears, *e.g.* in the forms *gili*, *ili*, *iri*, *uri*, city; *gunea*, *unia*, *une*, district; *quea*, *kea*, *gea*, smoke; *zaina*, *zana*, *savia*, vein, etc. (3) An original guttural *ch* passes over into *tz* and ultimately into *st*, as in the case of *achia*, which becomes *aitza*, and then *asta*, rock. Comp. Humboldt, p. 27. (4) Before an initial *r* an *e* is inserted, as in the Romance languages before *st*. If we remember these points, it will help to render the following derivations intelligible. *Ar*, and, with the article, *aarra*, man, Old Irish *fir*, Old High Germ. *wër*, Lat. *vir*.—*Emea*, wife, Old Irish *mna*, Sanscr. *mana*, fem. of *manu*; comp. generally the root *ma* in Sanscr. *mātr*, *μήτηρ*, Lat. *mater*, Esthon. *ema*, etc.

—*A*, the definite article, Old Irish *a*, *an*.—*Acha*, *aitza*, *asta*, rock, Old High Germ. *akes*, Lat. *acus*.—*Arcu*, bow, Lat. *arcus* (perhaps a foreign word).—*Asi-tu*, to make a beginning, to begin, Old Irish *as*, out of, and *i*, to go.—*Ar*, extended; comp. Old High Germ. *fēr*, *far*.—*Ara-tu*, to plough, Lat. *arare*, hence *artoa*, bread; comp. *ἄρτος*, see § 258.—*Astuna*, great, Lat. *vastus*, Old High Germ. *wasta*.—*Aria*, *ara*, plain, Lat. *area*.—*Andia*, great, related to Lat. *pandere*.—*Arria*, stone, Sanscr. *sr*, to be hard, *κίρρη*, Pers. *châra*, Armen. *char*, Irish *carragh*.—*Aria*, wether, Lat. *aries*.—*Artea*, *artia*, holm-oak, Old High Germ. *hart*, forest, and *harti*, hard (comp. the two meanings of Lat. *robur*), Old Irish *att*, cork tree.—*Atea*, door, gate, Lat. *patere*.—*Arua*, loose, *ἀραιός*.—*Al*, *ahal*, *ahala*, power, to be able, *ζῆλος*, Old High Germ. *elljan*.—*Atz*, *ost*, behind (not from Lat. *post*, but presupposes a primitive form, *ach*), Old High Germ. *ahter*.—(From *atz* comes *atzean*, backward, behind, and *atzea*, foreigner, a foreign people. As the Basques who had all gone forth regarded all other peoples as left behind, Humboldt, p. 140.)—*Basoa*, forest (scarcely connected with the Old High Germ. *busc*, bush, which comes from *bûwis*, *pûwan*, to build), Gael. *bad*, related to Sanscr. *vana*.—*Belaua*, valley, Lat. *vallis*.—*Berri*, new, from Sanscr. *para*, the other, later, or from Basque, *ber*, the second.—*Bi*, two, Lat. *bini* (*Bitan*, as much again; *biderbia*, doubled; *biderta-tu*, to repeat).—*Biz*, hill (from *bich*), Old High Germ. *puhil*, hillock.—*Belz*, black, Old Irish *ball*, a streak, *βάσις*, *μέλας*.—*Bidea*, way, Old High Germ. *pat*, *phat*, path, *πάτος*.—*Bildu*, to gather, collect, heap up; similar forms; *balsatu*, to unite; *balsa*, collected water; *pilla*, *pulua*, heaps; Old High Germ. *vili*, many; *fulli*, fulness; *fulljan*, to fill; *fulls*, full, *πλῆρες*, Lat. *plures*.—*Bola*, ball, Old High Germ. *pallo*, *ballo*, Scand. *ball*.—*Bara-tu*, to remain, continue, end; comp. Cymric *bar*, Gael. *barr*, end, Old High Germ. *para*, Middle High Germ. *bar*, boundary, limits. (From the signification of remaining, dwelling, is derived: *barna*, within the range; *barruan*, within; as antithesis to *campuan*, in the field, without.)—*Barrutia*, surroundings, Sanscr. *pari*, *περί*.—*Caltea*, hurt, *galdu*, to destroy, Old Irish *coll*, to destroy, Sanscr. *kala*, to break down, *kri*, to destroy.—*Ce*, *cia*, thin, fine, point, Old Irish *séim*.—*Co*, *go*, high, Old High Germ. *hō*, *hoho*.—*Calamua*, hemp, rush, Lat. *calamus*.—*Cortea*, *borda*, court, Old Irish *cor*, place, situation, Mongol. *kora*, *clora*, court, places.—*Edea*, sweet, *ἡδύς*.—*Erregue*, king, Celti *rig*, Lat. *rex*.—*Erria*, earth, Old High Germ. *ëro*, *ëru*, Sanscr. *irâ*, *ἔρα*, *arvum*, *arena*, hence also *erda*, earth.—*Esi*, wall, *esia*, circumvallation, *esi-tu*, to enclose, Old High Germ. *faz*, vessel, box, band, fetter, wrapper.—*Escu*, hand, *σχῆν*, *ἔχειν*.—*Egui*, *heguia*, belting of wood, rim, Old

High Germ. ekka, corner, angle, edge.—*Echea*, *echa*, house, from Lat. tectum, Old Irish tech, teg, house, with the initial letter dropt (not from *οἶκος*, Lat. vicus, Goth. veihs).—*Egon*, to stand, Old High Germ. hagan, to be, exist, Old Irish ic, as root of taigu, tuccu, deg.—*Eroa*, *errua*, clever, related to Lat. ruere, rumpere.—*Erbesta-tu*, to migrate, that is, *erria-besta-tu*, to exchange the country; *besta* from *becha*, which is related to Lat. vices, Old High Germ. wëh-sal.—*Gili*, *ili*, *iri*, *uri*, city, Sanscr. çala, dwelling, Old High Germ. saljan, to dwell; comp. Aztec and Sonor. calli and cari, house.—*Guei*, twenty, Lat. viginti, *εἴκοσι*.—*Gunea*, *unia*, *une*, district, Old High Germ. kawi, gawi, province.—*Habea*, *abia*, *abe*, thicket, Lat. vepres.—*Hildoa*, furrow, field, Old High Germ. fêlth, field.—*Hitza* (from *hicha*), word, Lat. voc, vox, Irish focal.—*Im*, high, Old Irish imide, to increase, much, rich.—*Iturria*, source, Old High Germ. turi, door, opening, mouth. *Istilia*, swamp, Old Irish stan, Lat. stagnum.—*Ibilli*, to wander, Old High Germ. wallôn, to move.—*Ibeni*, to place, add, Old Irish ben, to take in hand.—*Ilarra*, vetch, *λάθυρος*.—*Ibarra*, bed of a stream, valley, Gael. burn, flowing water, Old High Germ. prunno, boundary.—*Ibaya*, river, Irish abh, abhainn, Old High Germ. awa, brook, Sanscr. avani.—*Indarra*, strong, Gael. trian, strong, Old High Germ. traihan, to strain, Sanscr. tr.—*Istoa*, arrow, comp. Gael. iuthad, arrow, from ite, *πίεσμαι*.—*Lecua*, situation, Lat. locus, Old Irish luc.—*Labea*, oven, *κλίβανος*.—*Lambroa*, rain, connected with Lat. imber.—*Larri-tu*, to grow, *larrea*, meadow, *lurra*, earth, *larazquena*, later growth, that is, harvest; comp. Irish lar, larach, field.—*Lauba*, flat, Gael. lom, bare, Lat. lævus, *λαῖνω*, *λάω*.—*Lorra*, dry; comp. Gael. lurach, shining, Old High Germ. lërjan, to make clear, Lat. lumen, lux.—*Leuna*, smooth, is related like *lauba* to lævus, lom, etc.—*Liz-arra*, ashes, Old Irish luat, ashes.—*Lobioa*, cattle-shed; comp. the Romance word, lioba, cow, which seems again to be connected with the Old High Germ. liup, esteemed.—*Lucea*, long, Lat. longus.—*Langotua*, swamp, Irish loch, Lat. lacus.—*Mal*, hill (*malda*, hillock; *malla*, step, stage; *malcorra*, hilly, steep), Irish maol, precipice, meall, hill, Lat. moles.—*Mea*, *mehea*, narrow, loose, hollow, fine, Old Irish mintach, Gael. mion, *μῖνς*, Lat. minus, Fr. mince.—*Minha*, *mihia*, tongue, and *mintza*, word, Goth. munths, mouth.—*Morutu*, to heap up (*murua*, heap, hill; *mortua*, mountain); Old Irish mor, great, nio, greater, related to Sanscr. mahat, *μέγας*, magnus.—*Montoa*, *mendia*, *monhoa*, *munoa*, mountain, Lat. mons.—*Mana-tu*, to command, from root man, Old High Germ. manôn, to exhort.—*Mandoa*, mule, from *maldoa*, Lat. mulus.—*Na*, low (*nava*, flat, level), Old High Germ. nida, underneath (comp. nigan, hneivan, to neigh, *νεύω*, Lat. nuere, nictare).—*Ona*, good, Lat. bonus.

—*Ostoa*, leaf, branch, Old High Germ. ast, twig.—*Otsa*, noise, ἦχος.—*Pinua*, pine, Lat. pinus (a foreign word).—*Quena*, *guenna*, *gun*, the last, Old Irish cenn, beginning, head, point, end (gu' chenn at the end), from Irish cinn-im, to begin, καίνος.—*Quea*, *hea*, *gea*, smoke, and *quedarra*, soot, Sanscr. kapi, κάπνος, καπύω, Lat. vapor.—*Saldu*, to sell, hence *saldoa*, herd; comp. Engl. sell.—*Sar*, to assume possession, to enter upon; comp. Irish, sar, hero, lord, Sanscr. sâra, strength.—*Saroya*, wood, Lat. silva.—*Soloa*, meadow, Old High Germ. sol, moist place.—*Troquia*, name of a Basque dance, Old High Germ. drahjan, to turn, drâti, quick.—*Ule*, wool, Old High Germ. fullo and wolla, Old Fris. ulle, Scand. ull, uld, wool, Old Irish folt, hair.—*Ura*, *ulla*, water, Sanscr. vari (W. von Humboldt, compare Irish dur, ὕδωρ).—*Ubera*, ford, Old High Germ. upur, upar, over.—*Un*, a hundred, in *bere-un*, two hundred, Old High Germ. hunta, ἑκατον, centum.—*Urdea*, pig; comp. Old High Germ. hurten, to rush upon, Fr. heurter, and hure, boar's head.—*Zaldia*, horse, Old High Germ. zêltari, a horse going at speed, Middle High Germ. zelten, to go at speed.—*Zamara*, horse; comp. Old High Germ. zoum, bridle, Middle High Germ. zoumen, to bridle, δαμάζειν, to command. *Zaina*, *zana*, *zan*, *savia*, vein, nerve, Old High Germ. senawa, sinew, tendon.—*Zubia*, bridge, ΓΕΦΩ, γαμφή, γεφυρά.

Of the 136 Basque words which I have had the opportunity hitherto of learning, 109 may with confidence be reduced to Indo-Germanic roots. The remaining twenty-seven are these: *Az*, imprint, *azpi*, low, which may perhaps be compared with ὕψος, ἦνεγκα.—*Atarbea*, roof (compos.).—*Besoa*, arm; comp. Old Irish ben, to take in hand.—*Beruna*, lead (foreign word from Caucasian - Iberian, and also Georgian ebro, lead).—*Burdina*, iron (seems a foreign word, ברזל; then the Basques had since the beginning of the iron age come to know about iron through the Phœnician traders).—*Urrea*, gold, *estanua*, tin, and *coprea*, copper, are evidently of Latin origin.—*Alamerea*, copper, reminds us of the Lithuanian alwas, lead.—*Bitsa*, scum.—*Biri*, round (according to Humboldt, from *bir*, see above).—*Borda*, farm, dairy.—*Cerra*, ridge, ridge of back (perhaps connected with Germ. grat, ridge, which comes from Middle High German).—*Caraza*, occasion.—*Caya*, thing; comp. Sanscr. kaja, body.—*Celaya*, *selaya*, valley, and *ciloa*, grove, related perhaps to κοῖλος.—*Egurra*, cut wood.—*Erurra*, *elurra*, *eurra*, snow; comp. δρίσος, ros.—*Eman*, to give, is perhaps identical with Lat. emere, to offer to price, to obtain something.—*Eusi*, to bark (onomatop.).—*Gubia*, bow; comp. κάμπω.—*Iduna*, neck. *Illunua*, dark, black, luridus.—*Lasta*, gravelly sand, ΛΑΩ, λάσκω.—*Last*, straw.—*Lubeta*, dam, mole.—*Otza*, cold.—*Tinca*, firm, tenere.—*Ulia*, fly, autumn flies, related to pulex.

§ 257. *Relation of the Basques to the Stone Age.*

The discovery of stake buildings has brought to us knowledge of a period when Europe was inhabited by races which were still ignorant of the use of the metals and without skill in working in them, but employed tools and weapons of stone, wood, and bone. The question, therefore, is at once suggested: Was this race of the Stone Age a people that preceded the Basques,¹ or was it one and the same?

A. In the caves at Liege, Dr. Schmerling found in 1833 under the hard stalagmite floor some human bones, and many tools of flint and bone, some of them beautifully polished, along with the bones of rhinoceroses, cave-bears, and cave-lions. At Abbeville, Baucher de Perthes found in 1841, and at Amiens shortly thereafter Rigollet found, twenty feet under the earth's surface, in deep rolled strata, remains of the mammoth (*elephas primigenius*), together with tools of flint. Finally, in 1852 at Aurignac, on the northern spur of the Pyrenees, a cave was discovered and examined by Lartet, which was filled by the uninjured bones of seventeen human skeletons, while upon its floor were found about a hundred knives, spears, sling-stones, polished bodkins of flint, reindeer and deer horn. In front of the cave, in the same strata, were found bones of the mammoth, cave-bears, cave-lions, cave-hyænas, the Siberian rhinoceros (*rh. tichorhinus*), horses, asses, swine, giant-stags, reindeers, buffaloes (*bison europ.*). Under this stratum a layer of coal and ashes was found, along with similar tools and the remains of an altar, which was built of a sandstone, not native to that district, which must have been imported. The bones of the animals

¹ Virchow (*Urbevölk. Europa's*, pp. 40, 48) considers it possible that during the quaternary period, which he reckons at 10,000 years, the population of Europe had frequent changes. But what is there that is not possible when one abandons the region of facts and enters that of fancy! Even the Trojans had stone weapons (Keller in the *Allg. Augsb. Ztg.* 1874, No. 245, Beil).

in front of the cave were gnawed and broken up, just as if hyænas had gnawed and crushed the bones as their prey. The cave had evidently been a burying place; their weapons were placed beside the dead; in front of the cave sacrifices had been offered, and also sacrificial feasts had been celebrated. Hyænas had fallen upon the remaining fragments of the animals sacrificed, and then seem themselves to have engaged in mortal combat with lions and bears. From these discoveries, to which may be added also the more recently discovered cave at Thäyngen in the Canton of Schaffhausen, see *Ausland*, 1874, Nr. 4, it is established as an undoubted fact, that in Europe men were existing at a time when mammoths, lions, cave-bears, and hyænas also were in existence there.

B. Proceeding on the assumption that, after the flood and the Ice Age, the above-named animal species were still found living in Europe, from those discoveries palæontological proof has been drawn to the effect that the human race had existed before the deluge,¹ that therefore, what in itself is quite correct, the biblical flood is identical with the deluge of the geologists. From that presupposition it is also further concluded that already before the flood men must have spread over the breadth of the earth, although indeed only in several small groups. And finally, it also follows that these antediluvian workers in stone had nothing to do with our postdiluvian Basques, but had belonged to the race that perished in the flood. This hypothesis, again, would thoroughly harmonize with Holy Scripture. The primitive tradition (Gen. v.) enumerates nine generations from Adam to the flood,² and Gen. iv. 22 says, that in the sixth generation after Adam the art of working in metals was discovered. A tribe which before the flood had reached as far as the North Sea and the

¹ So Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, Germ. transl., Gütersloh 1869, p. 4.

² If we assign on an average to each pair a family of eight children, four sons and four daughters, we should have in the nine generations after Adam a population of more than three millions, namely 3,062,500.

Pyrenees, must have clearly, for at least three generations, and thus before they possessed the art of working in metals, been separated from the main stem and removed from the cradle of the human race. Hence it could only have tools of such materials as would immediately suggest themselves to the thinking and contriving human mind.¹

C. From the side of natural history, however, the assumption that after the flood no living mammoths, rhinoceroses, etc., were any longer to be found in Europe, has been opposed and shaken by arguments that are not easily set aside.² Those animals seem still to have existed in Europe in post-diluvian times, and to have been gradually exterminated by hunting. If this latter hypothesis should be further confirmed, then the above-mentioned discoveries would not be assigned to a company of antediluvian men. Nothing would

¹ It is foolish to conclude from the material of those tools that the condition of the people must have been an animal one. The more primitive the material was, the greater were the difficulties to be overcome in working them, and the greater the ingenuity in the production of them. In the present day, with tools and machinery for everything, the stupidest man as a workman may contribute to the production of an artistic fabric; he needs only mechanically to repeat from morning to night the grasping of the handle assigned to him. Each new discovery makes the mass of men more stupid. To bore through a hard flint by means of a bone and water and sand, to make tools without a tool, this required mind, ingenuity, and personal expertness. The earliest of all discoveries were the most difficult. The individuals from whom the first generations of mankind sprang, are not to be compared to our artisans, but to our inventors and discoverers. That that horde which migrated to the west of Europe had also some kind of religion is proved by the altar and ashes before the cave at Aurignac. Even the impulse to represent objects by pictorial art was clearly developed. In the cave of La Madeleine in the south of France, belonging to the pre-reindeer period, containing the oldest discovery of human bones, a piece of ivory was found with a very prettily scratched representation of a mammoth; in the cave at Thäyngen a bone was found with a finely figured representation of a reindeer.

² Comp. Fr. Pfaff, *Die Neuesten Forschungen und Theorien auf dem Gebiete der Schöpfungsgeschichte*, Frankfurt 1868, p. 55 ff. Also Virchow, "Urbevölk. der Erde," in Virchow and Holtzendorff's *Samml. von Vorträgen*, Serie ix. H. 193, speaks with great decision as to the fact that a tertiary or prediluvian antiquity of man in Europe has not down to the present time been proved palæontologically.

stand in the way of regarding them as memorials of the Basque immigration.

D. In regard to the great majority of the remains of the Stone Age, especially all the stake buildings, it is indisputable that they belong to the post-diluvian or quaternary age; for there is represented by them a regularly consecutive chain of settlements, the history of which comes down into the historic period. In connection with the stake buildings those furnaces were discovered in which, after bronze and the art of working in it had been introduced among the dwellers in the stake buildings by Phœnician traders, bronze was wrought with nine parts of copper to one part of tin. From the various places where such things were found may be traced the great highways of commerce along which the Phœnicio - Carthaginian and Iberian - Celtic - Germanic trade was conducted in tin and amber. This is confirmed by the account of the Greek and Roman writers, who also afford a further explanation of it.¹ Thus before its close this period of stake dwellings is brought down into the region of history. From this point the chain proceeds unbroken. The same colonies which from B.C. 1500 received through Phœnician traders the bronze as an imported article, carried on the native manufacture of stone instruments, and as stone weapons were gradually displaced by bronze weapons, which were first of all imported, and afterwards manufactured in their own country, bronze articles in every land and in every race were constructed according to the pattern of the most approved specimens of stone weapons then lying before them.² A careful examination of these stone weapons, however, has shown that the so-called "zelta,"³ that is, polished stone balls and stone knives with perforations for wooden handles, belong to a period when the fauna was distinguished

¹ Comp. Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, pp. 122, 144 ff.

² *Ibid.* pp. 9, 10.

³ From an assumed Latin word *celtis*, which appears in the Vulgate as a hapax legomenon; where, however, probably *celte* is only a copyist's error for *certe*.

from our own only by the presence of the bison and elk, both of which were found in Germany in the times of Cæsar, *Bell. Gall.* vi. 26 ff. On the other hand, it is quite evident that rude, unpolished forms of stone weapons were found along with reindeer bones, belonging therefore to a period which followed that Ice Age, in which, in consequence of a sudden evaporation of the masses of the waters of the flood, a cold climate prevailed in the temperate zones, that the glaciers of the Swiss Alps (according to Arn. Escher's and Osw. Heer's researches) extended down into the province of Hohentwiel, and that even after this glacier had gradually melted away, the reindeer still remained in Germany and France for some centuries. Danish antiquarians, from the number of the annual rings of trees, and the tools which they have found in the turf-pits along with these, fixed the beginning of the age of the zelta at about B.C. 2000. The flood falls in the year B.C. 3324, according to our calculation. These thirteen centuries, more particularly the period between B.C. 2800 and B.C. 2000, belong to the period of the post-diluvian rude stone implements (see *Obs.*). The first migration of Asiatic tribes into Europe must have taken place during those centuries, and to this period must be assigned the migration of the Basques. This hypothesis, that the inhabitants of the older stake dwellings were Basques,—those of the more recent were Celts,—is confirmed by the lately established fact,¹ that in the skulls and bones of those caves and buildings we have a dolichocephalous race of small stature represented, corresponding to the Basques of the present day, and that, on the other hand, in France and Spain, where Iberians and Celts found a minor race of Celt-Iberians, and also blended with the Basques, we have a brachycephalous race of large stature, which corresponds in physical constitution to the Celtic races of the present day.²

¹ Pfaff, *Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 2nd ed. pp. 719, 720.

² From implements which correspond to those of the present Eskimos some would conclude that there was a pre-Bascan, palæolithic migration related to that of the Eskimos. With equal right might we conclude from the leather boats of the Basques and the leather canoes of the Eskimo,

Obs.—The rivulet Tinière forms a delta at its mouth in the Geneva lake. In a cutting through it for a railway, Morlot found at a depth of 4 feet, a Roman seal; at a depth of 10 feet, bronze wares; at a depth of 19 feet, rude earthenware vessels, bones, and a human skeleton. On the assumption that this delta had grown as slowly in early times as it has done since the Roman period, the lowest layer, from 19 to 10 feet below the surface, would have needed for its formation from 3600 to 4050 years, the middle layer from 2400 to 2700 years, and the uppermost from 1600 to 1800 years. According to the proportion of 4 : 6 : 9, we have 1600 : 2400 : 3600, or 1800 : 2700 : 4050. The beginning of the Stone Age was at least 7600 years before the construction of that railway, and so must be placed at B.C. 5750. In the first place, however, one does not know whether Roman bricks were not at a much later period rolled down by the river to its mouth. Had there been anywhere in its neighbourhood the remains of masonry belonging to the Roman period, a high tide, even about A.D. 1000, might have carried off its stones, in which case the beginning of the Stone Age would be brought down to B.C. 2900. But besides this, the hypothesis that the river had never a more abundant supply of water than at present, is probably false. But if the river was fuller of water before the clearing of the woods of the wilderness, it must have more rapidly deposited slime and debris. The following facts should be pondered. At Tuttlingen lie numerous fragments of Roman vessels, with Roman potters' stamps, on the original floor, but covered with a layer of gravel of the Danube 7 feet thick. In the latter, from two to two and a half feet deep, are Alemannian graves embedded from the sixth to the eighth century (*Bericht in der Südd. Reichspost*, 1874, Nr. 173). Between the time of the Roman dominion and that of the Alemanni, at the most seven hundred years, the Danube has formed a bed of gravel, not 4, but 7 feet high.

§ 258. *Course of the Basques' Wanderings. Their Culture and their Religion.*

That the starting-point of that primitive migration is to be sought in Asia, is proved by the frequent use in the that the Eskimo themselves were a Basque tribe. But this would be a wrong conclusion, both in respect of the physical structure and the language of these two people. The name Eskimo means in the Algonkin language "raw eater," from *eski*, to eat, and *mowew*, raw, and has no connection with *Eusc*, Basque. Comp. Bessels, *Amerik. Nordpolexpedition*, p. 350.

stone implements of the Stone Age of Nephrite, a mineral which is found only in Eastern and Middle Asia. But in what direction did the Basques move? The Iberians of the Caucasus, who call themselves Kartli, that is, the Grusinians and the Mingrelians, have no connection with the Basques in language or customs. Before we discover anything positive about the way taken by the Basques, we must provide against the danger of error. From the fact that in the whole of Great Britain, in the whole of France, in the South and West of Spain, along the sea-coast, and in the whole of North Africa, indeed, according to Palgrave, even at Casim in Central Arabia, Megaliths, Cromlechs, Dolmens, etc., are to be found (see *Obs.* 1), Defor and others have drawn the conclusion that there was a primitive tribe, which proceeded from Asia through Arabia, to North Africa, then across the Straits of Gibraltar into Spain, France, and Britain.¹ This conclusion, however, as a general statement is false. For those Megaliths are found in all the five divisions of the world, and the same shapes occur in them among the most diverse and furthest separated races. The Megaliths are signs, not of tribal relationship, but of a certain stage of culture (see *Obs.* 1). If, then, any one should take up the idea that the Basques were a primitive race, and that the Arabic and North African Megaliths afforded indication of the way they had pursued, this would be *à priori* preposterous.² To this we must also add a second fact, that just where the Basques have held their place unmixed down to the present day, no Megaliths are found,³ but only along the coasts of the Atlantic and in the south, where the Celts were mixed with the Basques, and foreign colonists possessed holdings alongside of these two peoples. Rougemont has accurately

¹ So, too, B. Hehn, *Kulturpflanzen und Haustihere*, 2nd ed., Berlin 1874, p. 121.

² That the Arabian Megaliths are genuine products of the old Arabian religion, see § 254, *Obs.*

³ Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, p. 295. Aristotle (*Polit.* vii. 2) expressly declares: ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἰβηρσί, ἔθνεϊ πολεμικῷ, τισούτους τὸν ἀριθμὸν

remarked, that generally where cyclopean building is found no Megaliths are met with. Now cyclopean walls of rude work, constructed of unhewn stone, are found in the Basque mountains (*mons Vosagus*). The Heidenmauer or wall of the heathens on the Odilian mountains may have been made use of by the Romans, but was certainly not originally built by them. It was not the custom of the Romans to build castles. To surround a vast territory of more than a million square metres with a rude stone wall, was far more likely to be done for the protection of the lands from wild animals, than for defence against hostile armies. The same is true of the wall of the heathens (Heidenmauer) at Dürkheim, of the circular wall of Altkönig (Taunus), of the Hohbirg at Hersbruck, etc.

All these enclosing walls, however, have walls in the neighbourhood just outside of the circumvallation, — an arrangement quite suitable for the protection of women, children, and herds from beasts of prey, but not suitable for defence against a besieging army. They can scarcely have originated with the Huns. With their rapid advances the Huns had not time to rear such walls, still less had they any occasion for so doing. Their horsemen rushed down with destructive force against a city, and did not then retire to the most barren peak. The Celts built their forts on the plains (*dun*), not on the peaks of the wildest mountains. Thus there only remains for those stone walls a Basque, or, more exactly, a Ligurian origin. The Basques were divided into Iberians, valley people, from the Basque word *ibarra*, valley, and Iligurians, from *ili-gura*, mountain fortress. The name of the Basque mountain ranges reminds us distinctly of that

ὀβελίσκους καταπηγνύουσι περὶ τὸν τάφον, ὅσους ἂν διαφθείρῃ τῶν πολεμίων. Rougemont (p. 292) has translated ὀβελίσκους by pillars, but it is generally admitted to mean small spears. And so in this statement, that the Basques covered over the grave of a hero with as many spears as the enemies he had slain, we have indirectly a proof that it was not a grave, like that of the Celts, covered with a Megalith. The astonishment at not finding any of these pillars might thus have been spared to Rougemont.

of the Basque people. The name Luxovium—regarded in A.D. 594 by Columbanus as a ruin of a *castrum*—is not a Celtic but a Basque name, similar in meaning to the name of the Basque city Luxia.¹ Even the name of the Ill may be derived from the Basque *ulla*, water. In the Cevennes, too, the Basques perhaps have retained a reminiscence of their name. North of Alais is a valley Valgasques, with two villages, St. Julien de Valgasques and St. Martin de Valgasques. Ruessium, as it was called down to A.D. 880, though now called St. Paulhan, in the Cevennes, reminds us of the Basque tribe Orissi (Diod. Sic. xxv. 2; Mannert, i. 419), of the Aruci (Ptolem. ii. 4, p. 40), of Arriaca and Aritium (*Itiner. Anton.* pp. 436 and 418).² The Basques were driven over the Rhine, a portion perhaps down the Rhine toward Liege; they took possession of the Basque mountains (Vosges) and the Cevennes, and by means of the more recently driven out Celts, they were pressed southwards into and over the Pyrenees.

A preliminary glance at their culture will afford us a further insight into the course of their wandering. In Asturia an ancient copper mine has been found, in which not a single iron or bronze tool was discovered, but only stone hammers, chisels of deer's horn, and fragments of coal and ashes.³ It is quite evident that this mountain work was not built by the Phœnicians. It seems to have been the Basques,

¹ W. von Humboldt, p. 29.

² There is also a place called Le Gasquet in the Cevennes. My own family is of Visigoth extraction, and originally lived in the Cevennes from A.D. 928 as vassals in the county of Gevaudan. My great-great-grandfather lived in Ardalliers, and fled about 1699 into Germany. This line, attached to the Reformed Church, took the name Ebrard du Gasquet, after a country seat, Le Gasquet, at Ardalliers, which till recently was in possession of the branch of my family which remained in France, but still adhered to the Reformed faith. Other traces of the Basque migration are found in the names of a family De Gasquet, living since A.D. 1262 in Marseilles, of a family De Gasquet living in Nismes, and of a Gascon family Gasc. In all these names, just as in the well-known Provençal word *gardar*, an original *gua* seems to have been hardened into *ga*.

³ Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, p. 292.

who already introduced into Spain the antediluvian metallurgy, an art practised before the separating of the nations. If they wrought only in soft metals, like copper and lead, and as yet possessed no tin in order to harden the copper by alloying, it is conceivable that they would prefer stone to copper for making weapons and implements. Now it is worthy of notice that they have only words for copper and lead (*alamerea*, *beruna*), which were etymologically identical with the names of these metals among far-off Caucasian peoples (*alwas* of the Lithuanians, *ebro* of the Georgian Iberians, to whom indeed the Basques were not tribally or linguistically related), and were thus word-stems which they had brought with them from their Armenian-Caucasian original home. Now Pliny designates as workers in lead a tribe of the Medubricii occupying Mount Herminius (Sierra d'Estrella). This, as we may conclude from the Celtic ending of the name, was a Celt-Iberian, and not a purely Iberian tribe. That their metallurgy was derived from the Basque element in their composition is evident from the fact that the Celts on their arrival in Spain were a rude people,¹ that the Basques among whom they came were the cultured race, and that from them the Celts received their civilisation. Now, however, we meet in Rhætia with a people, the *Berunenses*,² whose name was derived from the Basque word *beruna* for lead, meaning workers in lead. Little as this by itself might prove, it is noteworthy when we meet with a city Astura, on the frontier between Noricum and Pannonia, the name of which is distinctly Basque, and a tribe, the Carpi, whose name reminds us of the name of the Iberian city Carabis,³ from the root *gora*. Seebruck, in Upper Bavaria, between Rosenheim and Traunstein, is still known by the name Bidaium,⁴ and was a station on the military road from Augsburg to Salzburg; but the name is pure Basque, from *bidea*, a way.⁵ In like manner

¹ Strabo, iii. 1, p. 129. Polyb. iii. 2, p. 151.

² Humboldt, p. 118.

³ Appian. vi. 42.

⁴ Bavaria, i. p. 598.

⁵ The discovery there of a stone with a Latin inscription which is

the Urusa of the Romans (now Raisting, near Pähl, on the Ammer See), where, according to popular tradition, there was in ancient times a large city, seems to have had its name from the Basque word *ura*, water. Perhaps, also, the river Iller, as well as the Ill, may be derived from *ulla*, water; this at least is better than the derivation from the Old High German *ilan*, to hasten, to speed. In these coincidences it appears to us that traces of the course of the wanderings of the Basques are found about as distinct and clear as we can fairly expect to obtain regarding a race of such extreme antiquity, considering the enormous revolutions that have in the meanwhile taken place.

In Italy, too, names of places are found which may possibly at least be derived from Basque roots: Urcinium in Corsica, Ursentini in Liguria, Astura in Antium, Uria in Apulia, Asta in Liguria, Basta in Calabria, Arsia in Istria, Biturgia in Etruria, Suessa in Latium, and Murgantia, a city of the Siculi. It may therefore be assumed, with W. von Humboldt, that a portion of the Basques had moved southward across the Danube to the south of the Alps. But much more positively we may assume that the Ligurians, those ancient pre-Celtic inhabitants of the regions round the Gulf of Lyons and the Gulf of Genoa, were themselves of Basque origin. Their name means "fortified city," from *ili-gura*. It is generally admitted in regard to the Celts that they were driven southwards into Italy, where they appeared in Sicily under the name of Sicani, in which name the two characteristic letters of the root of Basque, *eusc*, recur. This affords an explanation of the Basque names of places in Etruria, Latium, Southern Italy, and Sicily. At this time, too, the Iberian colonies in Etruria, Corsica, and Sardinia might originate; for it could scarcely be expected

addressed to a local god Bidaius, does not tell against our view (*Bavaria*, i. 253). A Roman god of this name has never been met with, and the Romans must have adopted a god whose name they had come upon belonging to pre-Roman times. And why should not the Basques have had a "god of travellers," the recollection of which should have been retained by their successors, the Celts? See under *Obs.* 2.

of the Basques that on their migration from Asia they should have had such skill in seamanship that at once they would have been able to people Sardinia, as Pausanias, by an evident mistake, says that they did.¹ The Ligurians, however, when pressed by the Celts, may have done so, and likewise, in this later age, the Iberians from Spain founded market towns in Sardinia, Etruria, and Southern Italy; for it is abundantly proved that, in course of time, they developed into a seafaring race. Avienus, in A.D. 300,² tells that "the clever Iberian, in his light bark made of skins," went by ship from Spain round the point of Armorica (Normandy, etc.) down to the Cassiterides (Scilly Isles, and south of Cornwall), and thence fetched tin. According to Dionysius Perieg., those islands were themselves inhabited by Iberians, that is, they had colonies and emporia there. The account of Pytheas in Strabo agrees therewith, according to which the inhabitants of those islands wore dark-coloured garments; now black cloaks were in ancient times, and are at the present day, the clothing of the Basques.³ Now this trade in tin would lead them to Sardinia, Corsica, Italy, and would lead to their founding market-places there. Their original migration, on the contrary, led them through Thrace, where, according to Humboldt, the names of the cities Iliga and Oescus, and the name of the river Arsia, are memorials of their presence along the Danube into France and Spain. When pressed by the Celts, before they were driven wholly into and over the Pyrenees, they at last held their ground only among the Vosges and Cevennes mountains. Hence the former chain has got the name of the Basque mountains, and in the other mountain range there is a valley which retains the name of the Basque valley.

We now turn our attention expressly to the question of the culture of the Basques. It can be proved that during the Roman period, besides their skill in seamanship and their knowledge of trade, they were also acquainted with the art of

¹ *Avien. ora marit.* 94-115.

² Humboldt, p. 173.

³ Strabo, iii. 1, p. 139.

writing. Strabo¹ says: καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἰβηρες (he means by this the Spaniards as a whole, both Celt-Iberians and Basques, comp. Humboldt, p. 144) χρῶνται γραμματικῇ (writing, the art of writing) οὐ μὴ ἰδέα, οὐ δὲ γὰρ γλώττη μὴ. He also says at iv. 1, p. 176, and at 2, p. 189, that the language of the Celt-Iberians was different from that of the pure Iberians. The Turduli or Turdetani² possessed, according to Justin, their own traditions in the form of ancient native poetry, and had a native literature. The Basque alphabet, however, so far as one can learn from old coins, has been supposed to have a great similarity to the Tyrrhenian alphabet;³ and then, indeed, if this were so, which we still doubt, the supposition would have strong support, that they had received the art of writing from the Tyrrhenian colonists. That they had a higher civilisation than the Celts is proved generally by Strabo and Polybius, and in particular from scattered allusions to their manners and customs. The Basques were distinguished for their purity, and surrendered their life rather than their chastity, while among the Gauls the basest forms of impurity and unnatural vice were current.⁴ The Celt-Iberians followed the good example of the Basques. These latter were temperate, and contented with little; the Celts were sensual and self-indulgent. The former never sold their lives for gold or wine, as the latter did; nor washed, as these did, their skin and teeth with urine; nor ate upon the ground, but sitting round tables of wicker-work. Their clothing was black,⁵ as it still is; and at the present day, as

¹ Rougemont also allows himself too readily to be carried away by wild hypotheses, e.g. by Hitzig's notion of the identity of the Philistines and Pelasgians, and by his own freak to prove the Semites generally to have been the bearers of civilisation, regards these Turduli to have been identical with the inhabitants of the colony of Tartessus, and to have been Ionians. But Tartessus was a Tyrrhenian colony (§ 247), and the Turduli were a purely Basque tribe on the banks of the Bætis (Humboldt, p. 139).

² Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, p. 291.

³ Strabo, iii. 4, p. 164.

⁴ Diod. Sic. v. 32. Athenæus, xiii. 79.

⁵ When the Spanish troops at Cannæ (Liv. xxii. 46; Polyb. iii. 114) wore white clothing, this only proves that the majority of them were

in the times of Diodorus Siculus, they bound up the legs with long strips of cloth woven from goat's hair or wool with the *chapinua*, and wore under their foot a sole of cowhide (*abarca*). Household duties were left to the women, who in the present day, in contrast to the Spanish women, are distinguished by hardiness, strength, and handiness. It has only further to be asked, how much of this civilisation they may have borne with them from Asia. They certainly did not bring with them the art of writing or the art of seamanship; but undoubtedly they did carry with them the elements of metallurgy, and probably of agriculture. The Basque language has for bread the word *artoa*, from the root *ar* (*arare*), like *ἄρτος*, not from *artea*, an oak. In North Spain, indeed, a holm-oak grows, with an edible fruit, which in some poor mountain glens is gnawed, and even used for baking into a sort of bread; but this could never have given origin to the common Iberian word *artoa*. The fact of the Basques possessing the word for, and the idea of, bread before their arrival in Spain makes it certain, that as concerned agriculture they had also brought with them the custom, quite peculiar to themselves, of a yearly partition of the land and a corresponding distribution of the reaped fruits,¹ as also that they brewed beer from barley,² and had for this³ the primitive Basque word *celia*, from the primitive root קלה, *calere*, common to the Semitic and Aryan languages (see *Obs.* 3). Among the Celts, about A.D. 500, we meet with the Celtic name *curu* for beer. That the art of brewing, however, did not pass from the Celts to the Basques, but from the Basques to the Celts, is shown by the fact that the Celt-Iberians, in contrast to the beer-drinking Iberians, drank mead.⁴ The Basques must therefore have known from the first the art of Celt-Iberians. Or may the Carthaginians have given them uniforms for the war?

¹ Diod. Sic. v. 34.

² Oros. v. 7. Polyb. in Athenæus, i. 16.

³ Florus, ii. 18. 12; Plin. xxii. 164. The latter gives, besides *celia*, the Celtic form *cerea*.

⁴ Humboldt, p. 170.

rearing grain, and must have brought it with them from Asia. This also is true of their cattle-rearing and dairy management. As distinguished from the Celts, as well as from all the Italian and Greek races, they made butter;¹ and as this associates them with the Germans, so far removed from them in time and space, its origin must be sought in the common Asiatic home of the two peoples. The Basques, as they passed through the region of the Danube to the Rhine and the Vosges, are not nomadic hunters, but a pastoral and agricultural race. It is possible that the so-called "Romerfelder" in Upper Bavaria, heathland and forests, the soil of which shows long stretches of regular and deep furrows,² may be memorials of the Basque residence.

All these facts are now confirmed by means of the stake dwellings of the Bavarian and Swiss lakes. In Spain down to the present day only a single bronze hatchet has been found. On the other hand, Diodorus (v. 33) and others tell that the Iberians commonly used iron weapons, and that they were well skilled in tempering iron. Thus in an independent development of culture in respect of weapons and tools, the Basques passed over immediately from the use of stone to that of iron.³ Stake buildings with bronze work could not therefore have belonged to them. All the more certainly, however, the stake villages, in so far as they only show stone implements, and these of rude forms, are regarded as memorials of the Basques on their entrance into Europe.⁴ The name Turicum (Zurich) is probably a Basque word (as Turiga in Humboldt, p. 152), and therefore a confirmation of the statement, that the Basques had found their way to the Swiss lakes. Now these stake buildings of the Stone Age, as well as comparative philology, testify that these first immigrants had

¹ Humboldt, p. 170.

² *Bavaria*, i. 150. Sendt, *Die Vegetation Südbaierns*, 453 ff.

³ Unless, indeed, they had also brought the art of working in iron with them into Europe! In the stake buildings of La Tène, Defer found iron swords and other iron implements.

⁴ Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, p. 298.

already domestic animals, such as the horse and the dog, cattle, cows, and sheep, practised agriculture and made bread, manufactured woven fabrics, and pottery, on which they often wrought beautiful designs. Thus we see here also again a confirmation of the fact that the history of the human race did not begin with a state of animal rudeness, but with an originally vigorous exercise of intellectual and spiritual powers, which show themselves just in the first buddings of the development of civilisation in the most conspicuous and remarkable way; and that, as W. von Humboldt writes,¹ "the state of savageness is that of a community beaten up, shaken apart, and convulsed by great revolutions and misfortunes, not that of one coming into existence." We turn now, finally, to ask about the religion of the Basques. The ancients troubled themselves so little about barbarians, that they have told us scarcely anything at all. There is, however, some light shed upon this point by Strabo's report,² that the Iberian people, the Cellaici, believed in no gods, and that the Celt-Iberians celebrated a festival in honour of a nameless god on a night of full moon. W. von Humboldt³ rightly concludes, from this statement, that the Basques either had no plurality of gods, or no remarkable multiplicity of gods. That they had a religion and sacrifices is proved by the caves of Aurignac. Certainly they had no images of the gods, and in the stake buildings belonging to them no idols of any kind are found;⁴ also no remains of temples and Megaliths have been found in districts inhabited by them alone.⁵ It may accordingly be assumed that they, like the Indians of the Veda period, brought with them into Europe the worship of the one invisible God, and that down to the time of Strabo, that is, down to the Augustan age, there were among them

¹ Humboldt, p. 171.

² Strabo, iii. 4. 164.

³ Humboldt, p. 174.

⁴ Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, p. 298.

⁵ The groups of three or four stones mentioned by Strabo (iii. 1. 138), which were found in Spain, might and did belong to the Celt-Iberians, for among the Celts (§ 259) the Megaliths play a most important part in the worship.

some tribes at least which kept themselves free from the polytheistic worship of images. Hence, along with W. von Humboldt, we assume that, with the morally purifying influence which the Basques exercised upon the invading Celts, in so far as these, avoiding the unnatural lusts of the Gallican Celts, copied the chaste customs and sobriety of the Basques, a religious influence was also exerted by the Basques, inasmuch as even among the Celt-Iberians only faint traces of polytheism and worship of stones have been discovered. A degeneration showed itself here, indeed, in course of centuries. In consequence of the incessant wars with the Carthaginians and the Romans, a certain gradual development in the direction of barbarousness set in among the Celt-Iberians and among the Iberians themselves,¹ especially in the last century before Christ, and then elements of a foreign, heathen sort of worship may most likely have found an entrance. Indeed, when on old Spanish coins the figure of the half moon, sometimes alone, sometimes with a star beside it, or that of an ox with a half moon, is found, these coins and emblems are evidently to be ascribed to the Carthaginians. If, however, according to Strabo, the Celt-Iberians celebrated that feast referred to above on the night of full moon, this shows that a worship of the moon had also made its way among them. This, however, since it was celebrated, not at the new moon, but in connection with the full moon, seems to have been of Celtic rather than Punic-Libyan or Carthaginian origin. Pliny tells of the Celt-Iberians, that they offered he-goats to their war-god, whom he calls Mars, that they offered also horses and prisoners of war, and that they read auspices from the entrails of these, and from the fall and death struggle of the prisoners of war. Accordingly the Celtic polytheism seems at least in part to have made its way among the mixed people, the Celt-Iberians. This same Pliny, however, also says expressly that the Celt-Iberians were distinguished in their religion from the Iberians. But yet no author attributes to the Celt-Iberians the Gallic custom² of

¹ Humboldt, p. 164. ² Strabo, iv. 1. 13, p. 137. Diod. Sic. v. 27.

laying down gold as a gift in the temples of the gods, and of dipping in sacred ponds. On the other hand, Justin relates¹ that, while Spain is rich in gold, so that daily the plough brings up lumps of gold, a sacred mountain existed there, which it would be a crime to touch with iron; should, however, lightning strike the mountain and lay bare the gold, it must then be appropriated as a gift to the gods. This indicates the worship of a thunder-god, whose property that mountain with its gold was considered to be; but even this thunder-god must have been Celt-Iberian, the Celtic Taranis, § 259. There is no evidence requiring us to ascribe to the un-mixed Iberians, to the Basques, a polytheistic worship of idols, but there is rather reason for concluding that they brought with them from Asia the worship of the one invisible God.

Obs. 1.—Rising polytheism, so soon as it experienced the impulse to set up visible signs and incarnations of deity and deities as objects of worship, has generally seized upon vast blocks of stone, which it set up as pillars. Thus we have the stone pillars of the Pelasgians, modified at a later period into the Hermæ pillars; also the pillars of the sun (*chammanim*) and obelisks of polished stone of the Egyptians and Phœnicians; the stone pillars of the Libyans; those of the Arabs; the menhirs of the Celts; the stone pillars in Old Peru and on the Titicaca lake; those in Central America, in Finland, in Ceylon, on the Marianne Islands, in Central Asia on the Balkash lake, and in Korathal (Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, p. 46 ff.). In Arabia and America also, as well as in the Greek Hermæ, an attempt was made to represent and chisel out a human head. In America, Ceylon, the Marianne Islands, etc., as well as among the Celts, many of them are found in groups together, sometimes smaller ones forming a circle round about a taller one, sometimes in all sorts of arrangement. In order to represent the sublimity of God and the divine image, an immense block of stone is set upon the top of a thin stone pillar. To these belong the Biliths, also the rocking-stones (*loghau*), where the block is made to revolve upon the pillar, here and there by means of a ball lying between the block and the supporting pillar, inserted into concave receptacles in the two stones. Or the block rests on two pillars (the Celtic Cromlechs, the Arabic and North African Triliths), or upon a larger number. Simple stone pillars

¹ Justin, xliv. 3.

also serve as memorial stones of important events, covenants, battles, victories (so Gen. xxviii. 18, xxxv. 14; Ex. xxiv. 4; Josh. iv. 24 ff., viii. 32; 1 Sam. vii. 12). Similarly single Menhirs of the Celts (Rougemont, p. 49). Even at the beginning of our own century the Berbers erected such a memorial stone to the memory and honour of a new legislative code (Rougemont, p. 48). Such stone pillars were also raised to distinguished dead, to heroes fallen in battle, and placed over their graves. Thus we have the Scandinavian bautas, the matsebôth of the Phœnicians, the low sepulchral blocks of the Celts, and the majaki in Siberia. The worship of heroes and the worship of the gods on all hands pass over the one into the other. Further, among the most diverse peoples, another form of tomb is found: the Dolmen, that is, a burial chamber, formed of four panels of hewn stone laid closely side by side, and one laid over them, forming a somewhat projecting stone plate. These are found among the Celts, but also in Peru, and in Malabar, and in the Neilgherry mountains. The flat stone seems at the same time to have served as an altar for offerings to the dead. While the Dolmen was sometimes covered by a pyramid of earth, as in Sardinia, among the Gallic Celts, and also in Malaga, there was the Nurhag, which bore a resemblance to the pyramids of Egypt.

Obs. 2.—That the Basques had brought with them from Asia the worship of one invisible God seems to me to be supported by the deus Bidaius of the Romans at Seeon. If there was a Basque colony there, it is quite conceivable that when the people as a whole moved farther along, a smaller detachment remained behind, and lived in friendly intercourse and relations with the conquering Celts, as the Celts did in Spain with the Iberians or Celt-Iberians. In fact, quite near Bidaium, at Juvavia, there was Artobriga (*Bavaria*, i. 599), which, to judge from the termination of the name, must have been a Celtic colony. Also Isinisca, near the present Helfendorf, seems a Celtic name, reminding us of the Isu-brigantes in Britain and Ireland. Now while the Basques viewed their one God as the God of their journeys, of their way (*bidea*), protecting and leading them, the Celts in a purely polytheistic manner viewed this Basque god of travellers as one special god among many. It was, however, also possible that these isolated Basques should sink down into the polytheism of the Celts, and conceive of and worship their travellers' god as one among several deities. Thus it might happen that the Romans should meet there with a local god Bidaius, and that they, or even before them, the Celts, should have named the place after him. It is a less probable conjecture that the place had given his name to the

god. It might rather be assumed that, just as in Spain there was an Iberian city Ilurbida (Ptolem. ii. 6, p. 46), city on the water-way, so the Basques had called the settlement Ilbidea, city on the way; that this was afterwards contracted into the simple Bidea, and that the Celts then designated the god worshipped by the inhabitants of the city as the god of Bidea, then Bidaiu, and so the Romans assumed that this god was a local deity. It is absolutely certain that no Celtic or Latin etymology has ever been found for Bidaium, Bidaius.

Obs. 3.—It might, perhaps, be supposed that the art of brewing beer may have come to the Basques from the Egyptians through the Phœnicians; for, according to Herod. ii. 77, and Diod. Sic. i. 20. 34, iv. 2, the Egyptians prepared an *oīnos* from barley. This seems to me extremely improbable, for the following reasons:—(1) It is first of all questionable whether the Phœnicians, in their barren original home on *mons Casius*, ever brewed that ζύθος. If this was not their practice, then they did not bring it with them into Phœnicia, and in fact I never find that drink made from barley is mentioned by the Phœnicians. Even the שֶׁבֶר of the Israelites was certainly not barley beer, but, according to Isa. v. 22, a drink made by a certain mixing, probably of grape and date wine with spices (Plin. xiv. 19. 3, etc.). When the Gemara (Schabbath, fol. 156. 1) explains שֶׁבֶר by “Egyptian ζύθος” (זיתום המצרי), this is a subjective opinion of later Rabbis, and not a historical tradition. (2) Had the Phœnicians actually brewed in Phœnicia a sort of drink from barley, it would still be extremely improbable that in their colonies, which they founded purely in the interests of their commerce, and always in a country where they had in abundance the richest wines, they should have occupied themselves with cultivating barley and brewing beer, still less that they would have such beer imported from Phœnicia. (3) The third and most important argument is that the Egyptian ζύθος was in no case a drink that would keep for a longer period than a few months, and in a hot climate without hops could not be kept at all. The Egyptian ζύθος, prepared from barley, crocus, and salt (see Winer, *Realwörterb.*, art. “Wein”),—according to *Colum.* 10. 114, from carrots (*siser*) and lupins,—was certainly made only for immediate consumption. So then the drink was of an entirely different kind from this, which the Celts learned from the Basques to brew. The beer of the Celts was kept in cellars (Jonas von Bobio, *vit. Columb.* § 26), and was like the beer of the Germans (Tac. *Germ.* 23; Jon. Bob. *vit. Columb.* § 53), which we have in use at the present time. Pliny, too, says of the Iberians expressly (xiv. 149), that they *vetustatem ferre docuerunt* their beer. (4) Had the Basques learnt brewing

from the Phœnicians, they would have adopted in some form or other the Semitic word *shekar*, but instead of that they use only their own word *celia*, just as the Germans have their own word in the Old High German, *pior*, *bior*, from *pari*, *bari*, barley, and that again from *përan*, *bëran*, to produce. Hehn, in *Kulturpflanzen*, etc., p. 132, regards the word beer as a foreign term borrowed from the Latin *bibere*! (5) If the Basques, about B.C. 2400, and, quite independently of them, the Germans, migrating at a much later date, brought the art of brewing beer with them into Europe, while again the Finns, and also the Hamitic Egyptians, as also, according to Baker, the Gallo-Negroes on Lake Nyanza, and also again the Carduchians on the Tigris in Armenia (Xenophon, *Arab.* iv. 5), all had the custom of preparing a drink from barley, it is evident that the custom or art is older than the separation of the peoples. The natives of hot climates, however, prepared a different kind from that of those in temperate climates, and then many races, such as the Slavs, and also the Celts of the earlier period, abandoned the practice, and found it more agreeable to make honey into mead than barley into beer. Hence in the regions round the Nile we meet with the Abyssinian mead, *tüdsch*, alongside of the Egyptian beer (Maltzan, *Reise n. Südarabien*, 1873, p. 126). We shall come upon many more or less feeble attempts at beer-making among the savage tribes of Asia and America. The objection that, if beer-brewing had been already discovered before the separation of the peoples, all languages must have had one and the same word for designating this sort of drink, is of no force. (a) There is not the least doubt that already, before the separation of the peoples, men had hands, and yet this member of the body is designated by the Latin, Aztec, and Sonora races, as also by the Peruvians, by a word formed from the root *ma*, by the Greeks by one from the root *hr*, by the Celts by one from the root $\lambda\alpha\beta$, by the Basques by one from the root $\sigma\chi\epsilon\tilde{n}$, $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota\nu$, by the Germans by one from a root $\kappa\epsilon\nu\tau$, by the Malays by one from a root *tang* (comp. § 305). (3) Old High German *briuwan*, *brauen*, to brew, and Thracian $\beta\rho\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu$, are in fact etymologically identical; and, again, the Finnic *kalja* is the same as the Basque *celia*.

§ 259. *The Celtic Nations and their Religion.*

The scattered and fragmentary notices which we possess regarding the religion of the Celtic nations¹ put the matter

¹ I assume that the condition of those peoples in respect of culture is well known.

beyond doubt, that among them a complete system of polytheism had been developed at the time when they, in succession to the Basques, although at a long interval behind them, migrated into the west of Europe. Julius Cæsar¹ tells of the Gauls that they worshipped as the supreme deity, as the inventor of the arts, and the guardian of travellers, as well as the protector and patron of commerce, a god for whose Celtic name he substitutes that of Mercurius, and that of him they had many images. They had also a physician-god, Apollo, a goddess of the arts, Minerva, a possessor of heaven, Jupiter, and a war-god, Mars, to whom before a war they promised the spoil, and after gaining a victory they slaughtered the animals taken as well as the prisoners of war, and laid the rest of the spoil in heaps. From a comparison with other notices, especially with the Cambrian or Welsh legends which have been greatly wrought up in later poetic treatment, we find that the name of that Mercury in Cambrian was Gwydion, a name which corresponds to the German name Wuotan; the name of the physician-god, probably also the sun-god, was Beal, corresponding to the Pwyll of the Welsh legends, to the German Phol, to the Greek Ἀπόλλων, to the Scandinavian Bjel-bog, to the Etruscan Apul, and perhaps to the Semitic Bi'lu (see § 229); and the name of the lord of heaven and of the thunder-god, Jupiter, is Taranis, corresponding to the German Donar, to the Scandinavian Thorr, and the Finnic Tara. The name of Minerva, Belesamis, is found on Gallican inscriptions;² in the Cambrian legends instead of her there appears a Kerydwen, as goddess of the arts. But on the Gallican inscriptions there are also found several other names of gods and goddesses, such as Magalus, Alisanus, Anvallonacus, Ucuete Virodedi. One found in Bitburg in Rhenish Prussia runs thus: N. D. H. Deo Mercu.

¹ Cæsar, *Bello Gallico*, vi. 17.

² *E.g.* the marble slab found by Vaison in 1840, now in the Musée Calvet in Avignon with the Gallic inscription: *σερομαρος ουιλλωνεος τουτοιους ναμαν-
σατις ειωρου βηλησαμις οσιν νεμητον.*

Vasso Caleti Mandaliniu Gratus D. The name Vasso Caleti, which occurs in it, was one known to Gregory of Tours and understood as meaning Mercurius Avernus.¹ Vassus would thus be the Gallic form of the Welsh Gwydion. On altars at Todi in Tuscany and in Este, the names Ateknati trutikni and Tarkno Vosseno repeatedly occur. Of four altars found under the choir of Notre Dame in Paris on the 16th March 1711, one has on its four sides the inscriptions: Jovis—Volcanus—Esus (beside it a man hewing with an axe boughs from a tree)—Tarvos Trigaranus (beside it an ox with three wings): another has the inscriptions: Castor—Cernunvos (beside it a bearded old man, with long ears and the horns of a stag, on which hang rings)—Sevi ri cs (beside it a youthful figure killing a serpent with a club). Esus, Hesus, was, according to Lucan (i. 445), the god of war of the Gauls. In Latin inscriptions which were found in the Upper and Middle Rhine, a forest-goddess is found, Abnoba, corresponding to Diana, a physician-goddess, Sirona, answering to Apollo, and undoubtedly identical with Belisamis, who is designed by the latter name perhaps simply as the wife of Beal, a local mountain-god Vosegus, Vesoncus, Visucius, who takes his name from the Vosges or Basque mountains, a Jautissa, and a mountain or sea god Tettus,² which we meet with again in the Titi Lake of the Upper Black Forest in the neighbourhood of Kirchzarten (Tarodunum, that is, Fort of Taro, Tarani), as also in the name of the river Tisana of that same district. May not Tet be identical with Taro, Tarani; Tet being the proper name, and Tarani, thunderer, only an appellative designation of the god. Tet would correspond in sound with the Gothic god of heaven Tius, Old High Germ. Ziu, Aeol. Δεῦς, Lat. Jus in Ju-piter, Jovis. Finally, the Celts must

¹ The Caleti were a tribe of the Gauls on the right bank of the Seine.

² A stone altar in the Antiquarium at Speier has the inscription: Silvano Tetto Serus f(i)lius Taciti e voto r(estituit). This inscription has been repeated on various counterfeit Rhenish charms of potters' work, which, however, does not bring into question the genuineness of that stone altar.

also have had a god of the lower world or of the earth ; for Cæsar says,¹ Galli se omnes ab Dite patre prognatos prædicant. This earth-god, whose name we do not know, unless perhaps it was Tarkno, that is, Tar-gniu, begetter of Taro, corresponds exactly to the Tivisco of the Germans, whom they regard as their progenitor and as the son of their heavenly God Tius born upon the earth. The Cambrians had a goddess Gwen, whose name (in Gothic *gino*, Lat. Venus) and nature seem to have corresponded to those of Venus, or the old Norse Frigg. To the gods and especially to Vasso or Gwydion, stone pillars, menhirs, were dedicated as images or symbols of the god. These are found in many parts of France,² sometimes singly, where they have at the same time served as sacred boundary stones, sometimes in series which, as *e.g.* Perigues in Dordogne, are grouped round a larger menhir. Instead of simple pillars, rocking stones and cromlechs are also met with in France and England (see § 258, *Obs.* 1). Instead of temples the Celts had nemets, that is, open spaces, which were surrounded with stones, also with groves,³ or, as in the case of the famous Stonehenge, with trilithic cromlechs, sometimes circular, sometimes rectangular, and in their midst stood generally several, even as many as nineteen, images of the gods or stone pillars. At Furness in Lancashire there is an elliptical nemet, the axes of which are 350 and 315 feet, formed by a wall of cyclopean blocks. The priests of the Celts were called Druids (*druoid*) ; but alongside of them there existed an order of poets and singers, Bards (*bard*, plur. *baird*), which had so developed itself with the inner life of the nation, that it was transferred to Christianity, and continued to flourish in Wales down to the 14th century. Although the bards of Christian times had perhaps not only to produce cheerfulness by secular songs, but to open every solemn festival with a

¹ Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, vi. 18.

² Rougemont, *Die Bronzezeit*, p. 53 f.

³ Thus also the nemets at Lèves in Chartres, at Alluyes in Chateaudun (Eure et Loire), at Pieux near Cherbourg.

hymn of prayer, to sing over each of the dead his grave song, in every case to accompany the army to the field of battle and celebrate its victories, and in this capacity to take a definite and indeed high place in the organism of the State, it is evident that this rank and calling cannot be put down to the account of Christianity, which has certainly called forth nothing like it in other groups of nations, but only to the account of the nationality, which must have already, in their pre-Christian age, had this order with similar functions. It was therefore in accordance with the spirit of heathenism that the order of sacred minstrels (*baird*) were ranked by the Celts alongside of the order of sacrificing priests (*druid*). This distinction is analogous to that between the *purohitas* (*hotris* and *udgâtris*) and the *avajas* in the Vedic religion (§ 194 and § 197), and leads us back to a time when among the Celts also the prayer formed the chief element in divine service. At the period when they enter into the history of Western Europe, they are already found to be deeply degraded and sunken. Their god of travel and their god of commerce have gained a pre-eminence above the ancient god of heaven, and the old god of heaven has resumed the character of the dreaded thunderer. When next the thunder-god is distinguished from him, a full-blown polytheism has then set in. Engaged in incessant fierce and horribly bloody clan feuds, which were favoured by the clan constitution, the Celtic nations, which had once made Rome tremble, wrought utter destruction upon themselves. Their religion had sunk into a senseless superstition, and on account of their superstitious fear human sacrifices were offered, not in time of war only, but also in times of peace.¹ On the moral deterioration of the Gauls we have already spoken in § 258; on the faithlessness and savageness of the pagan Celts of Britain, the writings of Patrick contain important evidence.² In regard to the fate of the soul after death,

¹ Cæsar, *De Bello Gallico*, vi. 16.

² *Patricii Confessio*, and his *Epistola ad christianos Corotico subditos*,

the notions of the Celts were various. The Cambrians believed in an island of the blessed, Enwli, lying far out upon the sea, where the souls went after death. The Irish and Scotch believed that the souls after death haunted the hollows and dens in the neighbourhood of their former habitations, and as ghostly spectres (*taibhse*, *aibhse*) could make themselves visible,—a belief in ghosts, which has been retained among the people of Ireland down to the present day. The Bretons of Brittany are in the habit still on Christmas night of spreading a feast for their dead; they then quit the room, and are next morning convinced that the spirits of the dead had been there and had partaken of the food.

§ 260. *The Religion of the Germans and that of the Slavs.*

In the religion of the German nations¹ we meet with an advancing polytheism which points to these two phenomena: (1) the same God who, according to the etymology of His name, must have been originally the one God, and among the Greeks and Romans at least continued to be the highest of the gods, in Gothic *Tius*, Old High Germ. *Zio*, Norse *Tyr* (*dêva*, *Δεὺς*, *Zeûs*, *deus*, *Dius*, *Ju-*), is reduced to a mere war-god and not even the highest god of war; and (2) instead of the old appellative of God, *tius*, *ziu*,² another is introduced of very obscure etymology,³ namely, the Gothic *guth*, the Old High

quoted in my work, *Die iroschottische Missionskirche des 6, 7, und 8 Jahrhunderts*. Gütersloh 1873, pp. 482–511.

¹ As concerns the facts, I refer once and for all to Jacob Grimm's *Deutsche Mythologie*, Gottingen 1854. In opinions and interpretations I differ, as will be seen, in some few points from Grimm.

² A trace of the appellative use of *Ziu* (Norse *Tyr*) is found when *Odhinn* is designated *Sigtȳr*, god of victory, *Thôrr*, *Reidartyr*, god of travels.

³ The appellative *gutt*, Old High Germ. *cot*, Old Norse *godh*, can have no connection with *Gutrus*, Old High Germ. *Kuzun*, Old Norse *Gotar*, the Goths; but just as little with the Huzareseh Persian *khoda* (§ 208), which seems to have been derived first in the Sassanian age (A.D. 226–651) from the Zend *qvadâta*, Sanscr. *svadâta*, that is, a *se datus*, self-created. The Assam language gives one the true origin of the word. This, a daughter or modification of the Sanscrit, has, besides *Deo*, a second appellation of god,

Germ. *cot*, and in the Old Norse the almost equally enigmatical *ás*, plur. *æsir*.¹

A. Highest among the gods of the Germans stands the Gothic *Vodans*, in Old High Germ. *Wuotan*, Old Frisian *Wōdan*, West-Frisian *Guodan*, Norse *Odhinn*, *Othinn*, corresponding to the Cambrian *Gwydion* (§ 259). His name is usually derived from *watan*, Lat. *radere*, to go, to penetrate or permeate, and is then again brought into connection with *wuot*, rage, fury (Grimm). But *wud* does not come from *watan*, but from the Gothic *rods*, raging, possessed, and that again from the Gothic *visan*, to be possessed.² It is not then conceivable that a people should have thought of their highest god in the participial meaning of this term as one possessed by another god as by a spirit, for then this latter being must have been the highest of all. Not one instance is found in which it can mean "furious" in an adjectival sense. Only under the influence of Christianity is *Wuotan* of the heathens

khôda. It cannot conceivably be related to the Zend *gadâtha*, for to it in Sanscr. *svadâta* corresponds, but *khôda* has as opening sound not *sv* but *kh*. At the basis of this Assam *khôda* rather lies the Sanscr. root *khut*, which only occurs in a few places in the Rigveda (10, 101, 12), and there only in the meaning of to fructify, impregnate; its original meaning will then have been that of begetting, bearing. The fundamental sense of *khôda*, then, is that of originating or creating. According to the laws of interchange of letters, the Sanscrit root *khut* corresponds to the Gothic *ghut* most exactly. Less satisfactory is the derivation from the Sanscrit *ghut*, which occurs twice in Dhatup., once meaning to protect, then in the sense of contradicting oneself.

¹ *As* corresponds to the Old High Germ. *ans*, which occurs in the name *Ansbach*. This name also appears in the form of *Onolzbach*, which from the absence of the H cannot be derived from *Hunoltsbach* but from *Unholdsbach*, i.e. Idols' Brook. This divine appellative cannot be derived from the Gothic *ans*, beam. It has rather, as Grimm supposes, a connection with the Tyrrhenian *æsi*, gods (Hesychius, s.v. αἰσοί; Suet. Octav. 97), and the Akkadian *ausar*, god; and both from the root *as*, to sit, to be enthroned. To explain the Ochsenkopf of the Fichtelgebirge as *Asen Kopf* is erroneous, since the Old High Germ. form of the word is not *as*, still less *ass* or *oss*, but *ans*.

² Still appearing in the South German provincialism "das *wesen*" for epilepsy, which word is distinguished from the word *wesen*, *essentia*, coming from the root *bhû*.

represented as the leader of the furious host, and this was evidently suggested by the sound of his name. In his original genuine form he appeared to the Romans as a Mercurius, that is, as a god of wisdom and patron of the arts. Thus also the Germans worshipped him as the dispenser of wisdom, wit, and beauty, as the director of armies and battles,¹ who as *sigföðhr* confers victory (superior to and ranking above the god of the tumult of battle, Ziu), who receives the souls of those who fall in battle into his Hall of Delights, Valhöll, and from his throne Hlidskialf looks out upon the whole world, and beholds all that is done in it, from whom also all good comes to men, who, therefore, bears the title Wunsch (desire) as having realized the ideal. He sends and he removes pestilences; he invented the minstrel's art; the Saga is his daughter. As fru Gude, that is, frô Gwodan, holy Wuotan, he still, according to the superstitious belief of the people, confers fruitfulness upon the fields.² The attributes which originally belonged to Tius-Zeus, to God as such, have evidently been transferred to and appropriated by him. Since, then, he is conceived of neither as the god of travellers nor as the raging and possessed one, the etymological derivation of his name is to be sought neither in *watan* nor in *visan* and *vods*. The genealogical traditions of the Germans will lead us to the correct etymology of the name.

B. Donar, Old Saxon Thunar, Norse Thôrr, the thunder-god, corresponds as such to the Celtic Taranis, apparently also to the Roman *Jupiter tonans*, with whom the Romans identified him, but in truth is simply a name for a Gothic deity Fair-guns, who appears again in the Edda as Fiörggyn, father of Frigg. His name is retained in that of the Virgunnia forest near Ansbach,³ and he is identical with the Slavic thunder-

¹ Grimm, *Die deutsche Mythologie*, p. 121 ff.

² *Ibid.* p. 231. Of the regard previously shown him traces are found in the names of places, Godesberg near Bonn, Wunsidel and Wonsgehaig in the Fichtelgebirg, Wonseess near Hassfurt, etc. In the legends of the Bohemian forest he is called Wond.

³ Zeuss, *Die deutschen Stämme*, p. 10. The Ans worshipped in Ansbach,

god Perun, in Lithuanian Perkunas, in Wendic Porguini, and evidently with the Italian Volcanus (*l* and *r* being interchanged, as so frequently happens), but at the same time to be distinguished from Jupiter, and rather, in point of character, though not in name, to be associated with Hephaistos. The Donar of the Germans wears a long red beard, the shaking of which causes the lightning, and carries in his hand the *hamar*, that is, stone, or stone hammer, which with the lightning he hurls upon the earth, represented by the belemnites and flints, and to some extent by the arrow-heads (Donnerkeile). The thunder is the roll of his chariot. In the Norse Sagas he does battle with the reptile Midgard (the serpent). The oak, stag-beetle, and mistletoe are sacred to him.

C. Tius, Old High German *Zio*, in the Edda *Tyr*, was the god of battle, of the tumult of the fight. We should not regard this degradation as an immediate conscious reduction of the supreme ruler of the world to the rank of a mere god of slaughter, but rather as showing how, on the rise of polytheism, the word *tius*, *ziu*, which originally designated the one God, so that the proper name and the appellative coincided, was applied as an appellative to the various deities, just as *sigtyr* was applied to Wodan, and *reidatyr* to Thorr. The name was finally attached to one of those gods who was peculiarly helpful to the warlike Germans, so that they called him the god *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. This particular deity must have formerly had a proper name of his own, and this name we know. He was called *Ear*, *Eor*, identical with *Ἀρης*, with the Celtic *Esus*, the Iranian *Airya* (§ 232). His name is still retained in that of the Bavarian *Ertag*, *Dienstag* or Tuesday, Alemann. *Zies-tik*, that is, *Tius-tag*, *Ziu's-tag*, and in the names of localities, *Eresberg* in Westphalia, *Erenbirg* and *Erenbach* near Forchheim in Franconia, and from him the Cherusceans (*Heru-sci*) had their name.

or, according to its Christian designation, *Unhold* (fiend), was thus the thunder-god *Fairguns*. Among the Swedes, too, the thunder-god was regarded as the *As par excellence*; for in Swedish lightning is called *áska*, that is, "the course (*aka*) of the *As*."

In the Edda he is represented as one-handed, because he could give the victory only to one side. One tribe, that of the Suevi, not merely transferred the word *ziu* to the war-god Ear, but also worshipped this Zio as the supreme god; for when a Wessobrunner comment designates the Suevi as Cyuvari (Ziowari, Zio-worshippers), this can scarcely have any other meaning than that they worshipped Ziu instead of Wuotan as the highest of the gods. This also is confirmed by the information that the Tenchtheri designated Mars, that is, their Zio, as their *præcipuus deus*.¹

D. Paltar, called in Old High German in a Merseburg poem Phol, in Norse Baldr, in Anglo-Saxon Baldæg, occurs in the names of places, Pholesauwe near Passau, Pholespiunt near Eichstadt, Baldersbrunn in the Palatinate, Pholing, Polling, in Bavaria, Pfuhl near Ulm, Pfullendorf near Gotha, Pfullingen on the Alb, etc. As the same god, whom, according to the Edda, the blind Hödr slew with his arrow, who in the spring comes to life again, he corresponds in nature and in name to the Celtic Baal, the Slavic Bjel-bog, the Roman and Greek Apollo, the Etruscan Apul, and the Semitic Bi'lu. His name is therefore to be derived neither from the Gothic *balths*, skilful, nor from the Lithuanian *baltas*, white. The northern mythology has represented him under two different forms; for alongside of him as thus described is placed a god of sunshine and fruitfulness, Freyr, whose name, corresponding to the Gothic *fráuja*, lord, got again the appellative signification of the Semitic baal. The Edda makes this Freyr a son of Niördr, who usually lived in Nôatûm, who, as Grimm thinks, should remind us of Noah, and Freya is his wife, whose name corresponds in pronunciation to the Old High German *frôwa*, lady, mistress. He had power over the sea, air, and fire. Since the Edda, however, says expressly of these three deities, Niördr, Freyr, and Freyja, that they are not *æsir*, but *vanir*, and seeing that Vana, Vena, is an old name of a Slavic tribe,² and that a

¹ Tacitus, *Historia*, iv. 64.

² Vinidæ, Wends. In Finnic, Weneläinen means Russians.

Slavic goddess, Prije, is actually met with, which exactly answers to Freyja, it is probable enough that these three deities, at least Freyr and Freyja (for Niördr might be a Nerthus transformed into a male, Tac. *Germ.* 40), might be regarded as having been at an early period borrowed by the Scandinavians from their Slavic neighbours, whose name they had changed so as to secure for it a German etymology.

E. In the Edda we find a more recent form of the German mythology already wrought up into an artificial and complicated system. Even the ancient Sagas are swollen out with manifold additions.¹ Heimdallr, the guardian and first parent of the gods, is a reduplication of Odhinn. A wife Nanna, and son Forseti (President, *Vorsitzer*), are assigned to Baldr. To the sea-god Oegir are given a wife, Ran, and nine daughters, who draw the souls of the drunken into their net. Gefjon appears as the guardian goddess of virgins. The legend is personified as Saga, and viewed as a daughter of Odhinn, and alongside of her stands Braji, the god of the minstrel's art. Forniotr is father of Hler, Logi, and Kari (perhaps water, fire, air). As older deities we can only mention: (*a*) Oegir, the giant and sea-god (from *ægin*, sea, comp. *ωγγύς*, *ωκέανος*, Celt. *cuan*), who appears in the Old High German traditions as Ecke, while in the inland parts of Germany he seems at an early date to have passed out of view; and (*b*) Loki (from *lukan*, to be lame, and to conclude, Lat. *claudico* and *claudio*), an evil god who begat the enormous serpent Jörmungandr, a daughter Hel, and the wolf Fenrir. This wolf by devouring the moon occasions the moon's disappearance and darkness. Loki himself is chained in the lower world.

F. We also meet with a series of female deities, all of whom are of Old German origin: (*a*) The earth-goddess, Nerthus (Goth. *airtha*, Old High German *ërda*, old Norse *iörd*), is mentioned by Tacitus, *Germ.* 40, together with her island worship. Hera, Herche, Helche are identical with her.² (*b*) Hluodana,

¹ See under H.

² Grimm, *Deutsche Mythologie*, p. 231.

probably a guardian goddess of the domestic hearth (from *hlod*, hearth), is mentioned in a stone inscription at Xantes,¹ and is represented in the Edda as the mother of Thor. (c) Tamfana is only known by name.² (d) Holda (Goth. *hulths*, hold, friendly) is represented by Tacitus as Isis, goddess of the air and fountains, giving fruitfulness to the fields and rewarding diligence in household duties (weaving), in popular tradition transformed into Frau Hölle, the mistress of the lower world. Among the South German tribes she appears under the name of Perahta, the shining one, "Frau Berchte," in Franconia and Swabia under the combined names Hilda-berta. As the white lady she is the ancestress of various races. As the snow-goddess during the winter solstice she drives in her chariot in her circuit through the land. She has a plough, from which drop off splinters of gold. Among the Anglo-Saxons she is called Hrêda, from *hruod*, fame; in northern mythology Frigg to some extent corresponds to her, the wife of Odhinn, the Frea of the Longobards (from Goth. *freis*, Old High Germ. *frî*, free, Gothic *frijon*, Old High Germ. *frion*, Sanscr. *prî*, to love), as goddess of marriage, who in other respects has manifold resemblances to the above-mentioned Freyja (from *Prije*, Sanscr. *Prija*, dear, friendly, from *prî*, to love, and thus from the same root). (e) Ostarâ, in sound identical with the Lat. *auster*, is goddess of morning, light, spring. (f) In an extract from an old "gallica historia," a *dea Zisa* or *Cise* (fem. from *Zio*) is mentioned as worshipped at Lech and Werbach, probably a river-goddess. Perhaps her name forms the root of that of the Seissenberg near Hirschbüchel. (g) Hel is, in the northern mythology, the goddess of the lower world, a daughter of Loki by a giantess. In Germany her name has been preserved only in the name of the lower world itself (Goth. *halja*, Old High Germ. *hella*, *hellia*, Middle High Germ. *hell*, Mod. Germ. *Hölle*); but *halja* corresponds in sound to Sanscr. *Kali*, and is related to

¹ "Deæ Hludanæ sacrum C. Tiberius Verus."

² Tacitus, *Annals*, i. 51, and an inscription upon a stone at Naples.

κελαινός, caligo. Hel, the insatiably hungry, retains inexorably in Niflhell the souls of those who neither have fallen in battle nor died drunken. She rides forth on a three-legged horse through the land as the bringer of pestilence and disease.

G. The gods were worshipped in holy places, sanctuaries, Goth. alhs, Old High Germ. alah, which consisted partly of sacred groves, Old High Germ. haruc, wih, paro, partly of buildings, hof, halla, sal, rakkud, chirihha, comp. Tac. *Ann.* i. 51; *Germ.* 40. Sacred trees were regarded as possessed and inhabited by particular deities.¹ There were also images of the gods.² The Germans had priests (*godhi*, *cotinc*), who, partly at special festival seasons, partly as occasion called for it, offered to the gods horses, wild boars, rams, and other animals; but also men, and especially prisoners of war, were sacrificed to Ziu-Ear. For the word "to offer" they had a term *blotan*, which means to burn, identical with *φλοιδῶω*, and wholly different from *pluoten*, to bleed; but from what Tacitus says,³ it follows that in sacrificing they probably did not burn the living, but only those who had previously been slain. Certain animals were sacred to particular gods; but this only implied that they might be offered to them in sacrifice, not that the entire species was withdrawn from being used by and supplying food to men, still less that the animal was regarded as an incarnation of the god. Woods, fountains, streams, trees, mountains, were haunted by elves, dwarfs, and such-like spirits. The house, too, had its guardian *húsinge*,⁴ and its comical hobgoblins (*cobaut*, *kobold*, *κόβαλος*), who were not, however, by any means considered as spirits of departed ancestors, standing thus in marked contrast to the beliefs of the Mongolian and Ugro-Finnic tribes.

H. When we turn now to the German legends, there is special significance in the genealogical traditions, according to

¹ Tacitus, *Germ.* 9 and 39-43; *Annales*, i. 61, ii. 12, iv. 14, 73. Maxim. *Tyrius diss.* 8. Willibald, *vita Bonifac.*, in Pertz II. 343. Compare also the names of localities, Heiligenlohe, Heiligenforst, Dreieich.

² Grimm, *Die deutsche Mythologie*, p. 95.

³ *Germ.* 9 and 39; *Ann.* i. 61, xiii. 57.

⁴ Grimm, 458 ff.

which the most diverse German tribes trace their descent from Wuotan. According to Tacitus,¹ Tuisco or Tivisco was a *deus terra editus*; his son was Mannus, who had three sons, the tribal fathers of the *Ingæwones* (the Ynglingar of the northern sagas), the *Isçæwones* (the Askr of the Eddas, comp. *Asciburgium* in Tacitus, *Germ.* 3; or were they the Basques?), and the *Hermiones* (the Sairim and Cimri?). It may be supposed that these sons of Mannus were called Ingo, Isco, and Hermino. In Mannus we recognise the Manu of the Indian and Iranian legends, the survivor of the flood; and his having three sons is a further point of agreement (comp. § 224). The three races descending from them, however, do not altogether prove to be German in the sense that they may be recognised again in three actual main stems of the Germans, such as Saxons, Franks, Suevi, or Goths, Saxons, Suevi. Evidently three national stems of ancient times are intended by this legend, the form of whose name only was Teutonic. But now the Edda,² instead of Mannus, calls the father of Yngvi or Ingo Odhinn, and also represents Odhinn as having two brothers, Vili and Ve, and names Buri as the progenitor of these three brothers, the quasi-son or descendant of the first man licked by a cow out of the rock.³ Now, if we add to all this the fact⁴ that the most diverse German tribes trace their descent to Wuotan and to no other (the Goths through Gauts, the Saxons through Piawolf, *i.e.* the woodpecker, who reminds us of Saturn's son, the Picus of the Italians, or through Pillunc or Bilvisus, from whom at last Bilwiz has become a spirit of the corn-field), there can be no doubt but that this Vôdâns is a patriarch of the Japhetic family of nations elevated into a god. In the Iranian legends also (§ 224, *E.*) we found Manu, that is, Noah, identified with the promised serpent-slayer; and among the Indians we found this Manu completely raised

¹ *Germ.* 2.

² Grimm, 322 f.

³ The legend of the Saxon name Heremôd and Gaât as ancestors of Wuotan. Gaât may be the same as the Wata of the Edda, an antediluvian hero.

⁴ Grimm, 340 ff.

to divine rank as a second creator of the world. As polytheism advanced, confusion between the second creator of the world and the first became easy. In the Iranian legends Airya is the one of the three sons of Noah-Manu from whom the Iranians are descended, while the other two sons, from their contracted view of the world, were regarded by them as the progenitors of the Turanians and Sairimians. Objectively, therefore, those three brothers of the Iranian legends (if our interpretation of § 247 be right) correspond to Madai, Tubal, and Togarmah of the primitive tradition of the Israelites; subjectively, they correspond to Japhet, Ham, and Shem, in so far as a reminiscence of the three sons of Noah lay at the basis of the legend; and so Airya, the progenitor of the Aryans, is no other than Japhet. Some German tribes, too, had got hold of the name Airya in Asia (see above under *C.*), and made it the name of the ancestral and tribal god Ear, their guardian deity and god of war, and as Tius or Zio κατ' ἐξοχήν, elevated him above all the other gods. In the majority of the German tribes the remembrance of the name Japhet and its root *fatah* has been retained, and since here, as often, the Semitic *ḥ* is changed into *v* (see *Obs.* 1), the name reappears in the form of Vödans, and so their tribal ancestor, Japhet-Vodan, is transformed into the highest of the gods. Consequently they named Ear alongside of him as one of their ancestors.¹ That none of the German tribes take their name from Vodan, but only Gaut, Saxnot, Skiöldr (the Skiöldinger, *i.e.* the Danes), Valis (the Völsinger, *i.e.* the Franks), etc., is quite conceivable, if Vodan was the common ancestor of all, and not merely the progenitor of any particular tribe. All the more significant is it that all of them trace their descent to Vodan and Ear, and never to Donar, Paltar, etc. And the two ravens which Odhinn sends out, that they may

¹ Ear has in Germany been confounded with Irmino (Grimm, 325 ff.). In the Asiatic home Hermino was certainly—corresponding in its letters to the Sairim of the Iranians—a reminiscence of the progenitor of the Sarmatians, Japhet's grandson Togarmah, just as Isco is a reminiscence of Ashkenaz, the progenitor of the Euse races. Then the primitive form of Irmino is Hermino.

bring him news of the world, remind us of the ravens which Noah, Japhet's father, sent out from the ark, in order to learn about the state of the flood. If the German legend has confused the post-diluvian second quasi-creator of the world with the first actual creator, Noah with God, it must consequently mix up the flood with the overthrow of the giants (jöthn, thuro, hiune, ent, risi) before the world's creation, or put the flood before the creation, and this is just what it does. That the giants were an old overthrown race, whom the gods had utterly destroyed, is still clear from the legends.¹ These legends, too, tell of the marriages of the ancestral heroes Niördr, Börr, and even particular gods, such as the wicked Loki, with daughters of the giants.² But the thunder-god Thor has smashed the giants with his hammer, when the giants sought to take wives to themselves of the daughters of the gods (Gen. vi. 2).³ From the blood of the slain giant Ymir arose a flood in which all the giants, with the single exception of Bergelmir, were drowned. Thus far the reminiscence is clear. But in the legends the antediluvian race of men is simply converted into a race of giants; the first of the giants, Ymir (in whose name without difficulty we recognise the Iranian Yima), is simply the first man; to him succeeds Buri, whose son is Börr, the father of Odhinn, Vili, and Ve. Hence Börr or Buri, of whom Börr is only a reduplication, must have survived the flood, and not Bergelmir. And, in fact, the legends of the Edda inconsistently make Börr's sons, Odhinn (Vodan), Vili, and Ve appear alive, instead of this Bergelmir, after the flood in which all the giants, with the exception of Bergelmir, were drowned, and from the corpse of Ymir make earth, heaven, and sea to spring up, and, since these three brothers are made into gods, nothing remains but that a first human pair should now be created—though they are called the first post-diluvian pair—Askr and Embla. Had the peoples continued to regard the three brothers as children of men, the idea of a new creation of a first human pair could never have found expression.

¹ Snorri, 150*b*.² Grimm, 497.³ *Ibid.* 514.

Apart from this one feature, the legend is thoroughly in agreement with the primitive biblical tradition. Ymir or Yima is Adam, Buri-Börr is Noah; Odhinn or Vodan, Vili, and Ve are Noah's sons. But Bergelmir seems to be a younger reduplication of Buri,¹ through whom the belief that even after the flood there were giants (by whom perhaps may be meant the God-defying builders of the Tower of Babel) may have taken its rise. Our view of Vodan has here a further confirmation. The antediluvian trio of brothers, Tubal-Cain, Jabal, Jubal, are again met with in the Edda. The giant Wate, corresponding to the Lamech of the Bible,² had three sons, Völundr (the Wieland of the German mythology), a smith, Egill, an archer, who was so dexterous that he shot an apple from the head of his own son Orentil (the earliest trace of the Toko or Tell legend), and Slagfider, who by his name (*slagen* and *fidl*, from the Old High Germ. *fidulā*, side) is characterized as a fiddler or player on musical instruments.

Obs. 1.—From the researches of R. von Raumer and Friedrich Delitzsch, it appears that the Semitic **א** corresponds as a rule to the Indo-Germanic *p* as an initial letter, but the **א** corresponds to *bh*, *φ*, and Latin *f* or *b*. Every one, however, who has studied the subject, knows that the interchange of sounds between the Semitic and Aryan languages are not so simple and regular as they are among the various divisions of the Aryan branch. In connection with these investigations three points deserve to be made prominent:—(a) Semitic and Aryan are not related, and cannot be related, to one another as mother and daughter, but only as sisters, that is, as two daughters of the most primitive of all languages (comp. Romer, *Vierte Forts*, § 2). (b) The development in the Semitic languages of one-syllabled roots into two-syllabled, and biliteral roots into triliteral, led to essential modifications in sound and sense. (c) In

¹ His grandfather, Ymir, becomes Or-gelmir, his father Thrud-gelmir. His proper name was therefore Ber (and Gelmir was only a predicate); but Ber is clearly identical with Börr and Buri. Similarly the first man, Askr (so, too, thinks Grimm), is only another form of Mannus' son Isco. But Mannus is only another name for Buri; Ingo, Isco, Hermino, only other names for the three sons of Buri-Mannus. In Askr, then, we have one of the three sons of Buri, Odhinn, Vili, and Ve, present a second time.

² لَمَك, from the Arabic *lamaka* (*talmaku juvenis validus*). Wate is from *wat*, armour, *wätan*, to put on armour.

the one family of languages as well as the other, alongside of the relationship in the line of descent, and alongside of the "root-variation" specially affecting the vowels, to which attention has been called by Curtius (*e.g.* TAK, τέκεν, TIK, τίκτω, TYK, τέύχω), we also meet with a side-relationship (not sufficiently considered hitherto) between different roots. It cannot be denied that such side-relationships exist, *e.g.* between the Aryan root *ahva* (whence *aqua*, *Ache*) and the root *ava* (Sanskrit. *avani*, Old High Germ. *awa*, *Auc*, eye, Celt. *abh*),—between the root *lab* (in Lat. *labium*, Irish *labar*) and *loc* (*loqui*),—between Sanskrit. *mrd*, Lat. *mordere*, and Lat. *mandere*,—between *oc* (in *oculus*, in the Malay *wak*, to see) and *op* (in ὄψις),—between *str* (in *strennus*, Old High Germ. *strachjan*, *strangen*), and *sr* (in Finnic, *seria*, *srigi*), and *tr* (Sanskrit. *tr*, Old Irish *tren*, Old High Germ. *thrachan*), etc. In such cases there is an alteration of the root by means of some change in the initial or final letter, producing different forms, in which the same idea recurs under special modifications. We may observe this tendency, which I might designate root-division, in constant operation. There is a trace of this tendency even in the Arabic, which distinguishes *te* and *tse*, *tzad* and *dhad*, *ajin* and *ghajin*, etc. The Semitic languages, from a primitive root פֶּר (which we meet with in the Aryan languages in *frango*, Old High Germ. *prēchan*, *brechen*, to break; Sanskrit. *bhang* seems to me not to be connected with this, but rather to be related to *findere*), have constructed the various stems פָּרַם, פָּרַק, פָּרַם, פָּרַךְ, פָּרַק, *pharatza*, *pharadha*, *pharasa*, *pharaza*, *pharada*, which together and separately express the idea of breaking, separating, partitioning, under various modifications, and are readily mistaken for composite words (*far-am*, *far-az*, *far-as*, etc.), but in fact only the same word variously altered by added particles. Such side-relationship may be illustrated from the root פָּל, partly under its meaning of dividing (פָּלַח, פָּלַל, פָּלֵא, *phalaga*, *phaladsa*, *phaladsha*, *phala'a*, *phalagha*, etc.), partly under its meaning of loosing, making free, and becoming free (פָּלַם, פָּלַט, *phalatza*). In the Indo-Germanic languages we have from a root *PAT*, which means extension and width, on the one hand, the stems *pandere*, πειράννυμι, πειράω; and on the other hand, *patere*, and a hundred similar cases. The formation, too, of the thirteen Arabic conjugations rests partly on the same principle and tendency. The endeavour made to connect immediately triliteral Semitic roots with triliteral Aryan roots, in order to deduce therefrom the laws of the transmutation of sounds, must therefore be characterized as a mistake and failure. As the above examples show, even among the different branches of the Semitic stem, the triliteral development has in those

different languages had quite diverse accomplishment. The case of an agreement between a Semitic stem and a synonymous Aryan stem in all the three radicals must in most cases be regarded as purely accidental. It may even be assumed as a supreme canon of method, that one must, to begin with, separate from the multitude of Semitic stems the Semitic original root, in order to find an Aryan original root related to it, and from both to reach a conclusion as to the form of the primitive root lying at the basis of these two original roots.

With these preliminary remarks, we now turn to the question whether the word *Vôdan* could be constructed in the Gothic language out of a stem present in the Semitic פתה. (1) This was not altogether impossible, even on the assumption that without exception only an Aryan *p* can correspond to the Semitic פ. Even in that case, within the range of the Aryan languages, an initial *p* might have been changed into a *v*, as is proved by the change of the Slav. *Perkuna* and *Fairguns* into the Italian *Volcanus* and *Nirgynnia*. (2) But there is no need of so dubious a hypothesis. In order to secure a comparison of Semitic with Aryan roots, we cannot state the question thus: Into what Indo-Germanic sound has the Semitic פ been changed? (as if the original Aryan language had been a daughter of the Semitic!); but rather: what sound or sounds of the earliest ancestral tongue are represented in the Semitic פ? And then we are obliged to answer: Not merely such as are represented in the Aryan by *p*, but such also as are represented in the Aryan by *bh*, *φ*, *f*, and even such as in Aryan appear in *v*. In the Semitic root referred to above for "to break," פר, which corresponds to the Latin *frangere*, Old High German *prēchan*, Irish *bris*, and its secondary root פל, whence also פלה, and false, we have an example of פ answering to *bh*. The occurrence of פרו alongside of ברזל (*fer-rum*), the transposition of the Assyrian הבל into פל (*filius*), shows that in the Semitic languages the initial labial was weak and variable. One and the same original root PR appears in Gothic as *freis* (which presupposes a Greek πρ), in Semitic languages (with change of *r* into *l*) as פל, so that here a Semitic corresponds to the Aryan *p*. But, on the other hand, one and the same original root VAL, which in the Aryan languages appears in Latin *volvo*, Goth. *valtjan*, Old High Germ. *walagôn* and *walzan*, appeared in the Semitic languages as פל (פלר, and פלש, and *phalaka*), so that here a פ corresponds to the Aryan *v*. Precisely similar is it with the original root VAN (Goth. *vandjan*, Old High Germ. *wentan*, Sem. פנה), and with its collateral root VAR (Lat. *vetere*, פרום, *pharphara*),—with the root VAS, to clothe (Sanscr. *vas*, Lat. *vestis*, Old High Germ. *wat*, *wētan*,

hence also זָאָר, ver, earrach, Sem. פֶּשֶׁט, phasephâ-schun, "*vestimentum densum*"),—with VR, to grow (Sanscr. vrh and vrdh, Sem. פָּרָה and פָּרַח),—with VRG, dimittere (Sanscr. vrdoh, Sem. פָּרַע),—with VAR (Sanscr. var, to choose, פָּאָר, to distinguish, adorn),—VAK (Old High Germ. wankjan, wenkan, Sem. פָּוֶק),—perhaps also with VAN, to traffic (Lat. ven-, Sem. פָּרַח), and VAK (Sanscr. vatsch, Sem. פָּעַח). At the same time, in the Aryan languages roots have split up into two collateral roots. From an onomatopoetic primitive root, which may have been pronounced fâ or wâ, or perhaps even existed in both forms, has become in the Aryan languages, on the one hand, Sanscr. wâ, Old High Germ. wâjan, wehen, to blow; on the other hand, φασάω, flare; but in the Semitic, פִּיחַ and פֶּה, phâha, mouth, and to speak. Similarly PAD, to go, to turn, Sem. פָּשַׁע; Aryan: (1) Sanscr. pad and path, πατάσμαι, πάτος, pes, pessus, Old High Germ. phat, Basque bidea; (2) vadere, Old High Germ. watan. Precisely analogous, too, is the case of a primitive root meaning "to be wide:" FAT, which appears in Sem. as פָּתַח, phaschâ, phasch'a; while in the Aryan languages it breaks up into the two collateral roots: (1) πετάνομι, petere, pendere; (2) a root wed, whence Old Sax. wido, Old High Germ. wito, weit, wide.—We see, then, that just in reference to this primitive root fat, phat, to be wide, which as פָּתַח lies at the foundation of the name of Japhet, an Old High Germ. w, a Goth. v corresponds to the Sem. פ. And as concerns the vowel, Vôdâns, Wuotan is related to veids, wido, just as the Old High Germ. hulfa, Old Fris. hulpa, to the Old High Germ. hilpa, Old Fris. hilpa, hëlpa, or as Old High Germ. guomo to Old High Germ. giumo, Mid. High Germ. gueme, or as fuoz and πούς to Lat. pes, or as Norse freyja to Old High Germ. frôwa, or as Anglo-Sax. vyrt to Goth. vaurts. In the proper name the long and heavy vowel sound has been retained, while in the appellative it has given way to the shorter and lighter form.

Obs. 2.—The religion of the Slavic peoples is closely related to that of the Germans, for as Sarmatians they had lived in Asia, wedged in among the Geto-Scythians. It will therefore be sufficient briefly to indicate the parallel. To Fairgun-Donar corresponds the Perun of the Slavs (Lithuan. Perkunas); to Tius-Êar, Svatovit; to Wuotan, Radegast; to Frigg, Prije; to Nerthus, Zeme (zimia, zembja). To Loki corresponds the Slavic Sitivrat; for in the Harz district Loki appears as Krodo, while Sitivrat among the Slavs bears the similar name of Kirt. The ancestral hero of the Saxons, Pillunc, Bilvisus, seems to be an importation from the Slavic religion. Among the Lithuanians, Pilwite or Pilvitus was the god of riches. The Slavic ety-

mology seems to be *biela*, white, and *wiedziéc*, sage, sorcerer. The Germans have rendered the name in accordance with the German sense of its sound (*bil*, law ; *billigkeit*, reasonableness ; and *wizan*, *wissin*, *weise*, similar in sound to *wiedziéc*). Similarly have they modified *Prije* (fair, lovely) into *Freyja*, lady, and placed her alongside of their *Frigg* (who really, and in accordance with the meaning of her name, corresponds to *Prije*). The Aryan (Iranian) *bâga* seems to lie at the root of the Slavic divine appellative *bog*.

Obs. 3.—The oldest name of the Slavic peoples was *Sarmatians*, *Salm*, *Sairim*, whence by hardening of the final letter came *Serbi*. They were likewise called *Veni*, *Weni*, hence *Vinidæ*, *Wends*. *Slav* is an Old Slavic word for celebrated, distinguished. It was therefore a title of honour which these tribes assumed. *Fr. v. Erdmann* (*Temudschin der Unerschutterliche*, Leipz. 1869, p. 78) himself gives this meaning to the word *Slav*, but this does not prevent him from writing on p. 61, and repeating on p. 65: The Romans had subjugated the *Getæ* and the *Dacians*; the Germans had subdued another portion of them; among the Romans they appeared under the name *Servi*, among the Germans under that of *Sclavs*, and the Roman name *Servi* passed over in time into the milder (!) *Serbi*, the German *Sclav* into the milder *Slav* (!!). It never occurred to him to ask whether the word *Sclav* was previously in existence in the German language. The *Getæ* he takes to be identical with the *Goths*, but nevertheless supposes them to have been subdued by the Germans, and represents on p. 76 the *Sarmatians*, and on p. 108 also the *Finns*, as Gothic tribes, and both as *Turko-Tartar* peoples. At p. 76 he describes the *Sarmatians* as quite different from the *Slavs*; at p. 109 he divides the *Slavs* into *Sarmatians* and *Serbs*. His history of religion is no better than his ethnography. At p. 5 he constructs *à priori* a theory that to men, when their intelligence began to develop, the sun must have appeared as the father who begat, the earth as the mother who brought forth everything that has life. The sun-god is in the earliest stage of all worshipped as—*Buddha* (!! p. 8), the earth as *Ella*, and from *Ella* is derived *ℒ*, *Elohim*, *ἑλῑος*, *Alitta*. The sun-god is now conceived of as an ox, the earth as a cow, and since now there exist for ox the words *taurus* and *bos*, and for cow the words, Sanscr. *gaus*, Lat. *vacca*, etc., it is not difficult for him to find words with all possible initial letters, dental, labial, and guttural, in all possible languages, confirming his theory. *Γ* is *gaus*; the *Turanians* are *taurus*-worshippers, and with them he also joins the *Goths*, whose *Thorr*, and the *Finns*, whose *Taara* can naturally be nothing else than the sun-god *Taurus*!

Even the word Turnier (tournament) he derives from taurus, and maintains that tilters were originally fighters with oxen, who engaged in these performances in honour of the ox sun-god. His materials he throws together pell-mell, all sorts of notices about all sorts of religions being reported without any attempt to distinguish critically between the earlier and later elements in the several religions. At the close of this remarkable treatise, at p. 247, he says: "Certainly no one will venture to deny, that without the Zur, that is, the ox, or will we rather say, the ox-head, we would have wanted the light indispensable for the study either of the earliest European or earliest Asiatic history and mythology." For our part, we prefer to the light that is brought into history by means of an ox-head, that light which is gained by conscientious study of the different national religions and their developments,—not brought into history, but won from history. In this way we shall at least be saved from such blunders as taking Buddha for a primitive god of India, and "Selav" for a primitive Old High German stem.

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
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